Obviously, many Japanese were quite oblivious of this development. On the evening of the capture of Wundwin, the PAVO officers were dining at a table set up close to the road, when four lorry-loads of neatly aligned, and conspicuously silent figures, drove past from the south. ‘They’re Japs!’ yelled Major Boyd, leaping to his feet. The guard car just had time to get a shot into the last vehicle, wrecking it, before the remainder accelerated away northwards into the darkness.
Nor were the Japanese alone affected by the fluid situation. A despatch rider of PAVO’s A Squadron became one of the luckiest men in the 14th Army when, taking a wrong turning, he rode into Meiktila from the north, after passing through miles of Japanese controlled territory, thus providing the first involuntary contact between 33 and 4 Corps. Needless to say, his B Squadron comrades at Meiktila were more than a little surprised at his sudden appearance.
From Wundwin, Barcol pushed out disruptive patrols before swinging north again. One patrol, pushing south, came across Sherman tracks, obviously made during Ralphcol’s visit earlier in the month.
The road home, however, was not as easy as the road out, for the enemy was thicker on the ground, and was aided by rough country and water obstacles. In one action, 7th’s A Squadron lost three tanks, one being penetrated by 75-mm no less than five times, and one damaged. However, the Japanese were now melting away from the Mandalay front, unwilling to be trapped between Barcol in the south and 20th and 2nd Divisions to the north, and after capturing Kume, Barcol was broken up, having accomplished the purpose for which it had been formed.
Fighting around the 2nd Division’s bridgehead had not been as bitter as it had around those of 19th and 20th Divisions, but the surrounding Japanese seemed even more ready to the than usual, and brought up a great number of anti-tank guns, including the efficient 47-mms. The two Carabinier squadrons in the bridgehead, A and C, were engaged almost every day in support of infantry operations to expand the perimeter, forming a firm base for a breakout eastwards along the river towards Mandalay. Unfortunately, the country was broken and close, and the tanks were forced to work without a close escort during the early stages, although Bombay Grenadiers were attached later. The Japanese took full advantage of the deficiency.
On 2nd March A Squadron had been detailed to clear Zolokma–Lewingon–Myintha area, and met ‘the most fanatical defence against our tanks we ever encountered’. The country was scrub, broken up by small chaungs, and progress was slow, but steady.
At one point, Captain Cornaby, the squadron’s second-in-command, halted his tank to engage a party of Japanese he had discovered in a chaung. His guns were in action, and the attention of the entire crew was focused ahead. Suddenly, a Japanese artillery lieutenant and a private soldier broke out of the scrub and scrambled onto the rear of the vehicle. The private was sent toppling by a burst of Browning from another tank, but not before the officer had run Cornaby through with his sword, kicked his body down into the turret, and followed him, killing the 37-mm gunner similarly. Only the 37-mm gun breach was between him and the leader, Tpr Jenkins, who had just enough time to draw his pistol before the officer was slashing and stabbing him. Jenkins fired all six chambers, the bullets thudding into his opponent’s body, but the man was quite berserk in the literal Norse sense, and would not die. Jenkins closed with him and they struggled for a moment on top of the bodies of Cornaby and the gunner, before Jenkins noticed that the latter had fallen off his stool with his pistol holster uppermost. He managed to free the weapon, and fired three more shots, which finished the officer. Meanwhile, the other members of the crew had no idea what was taking place, and the 75-mm had continued in action. Jenkins was awarded the Military Medal.
Elsewhere other Japanese had launched themselves onto A Squadron’s tanks, but had been shot off before they could cause any damage. However, the day was far from over, for as the tanks approached Myintha, a 47-mm anti-tank gun opened up, knocking out two of the Lees in quick succession. The flash from the gun was observed by the squadron leader and his sergeant-major, who destroyed it with 75-mm fire.
At this stage, A Squadron had lost two tanks outright, one bogged down, a fourth crippled by crew casualties, and wounded crew to evacuate. Further fire was exchanged with small Japanese parties, but little further progress was made, and the tanks retired into leaguer, abandoning the bogged vehicle after rendering it immobile and stripping the breach blocks.
Fortunately, enemy resistance elsewhere did not match that encountered by A Squadron on this occasion. Four days later Major Dimsdale’s C Squadron surrounded and captured a village without loss, Lt Shepley stalking two enemy 75-mm guns on foot, and then guiding his tanks into a hull-down position so that they destroyed them with 37-mm gunfire.
By 11th March 2nd Division’s breakout had started. A Squadron advanced with 6 Brigade to cut the Kyauktalon–Myotha road, whilst C Squadron and 5 Brigade advanced east along the river bank to Kyauktalon. An A Squadron attack on a village was notable for the arrival of the divisional commander, Major-General Nicholson, amongst the tanks in his jeep, pennant flying, only 100 yards from the enemy’s position. Having secured their original objectives, A Squadron crossed the Panlaung River, and went on to cut the main road south from Mandalay, at Sizon, whilst C Squadron proceeded to capture Ava fort, at the southern end of the great bridge which had been so effectively destroyed in 1942.*
During the entry to Ava fort, the infantry were suddenly pinned down by machine-gun fire. Sergeant Felthouse moved forward to deal with this, was in turn engaged by anti-tank guns, and opened up with all guns.
‘What are you firing at?’ asked his troop leader.
‘I don’t know, but I can see flashes and keep firing at them.’
‘I should hurry up and hit them if I were you; the first flash is usually enough! Out.’
Felthouse was being engaged by two captured British 2-pounders, fortunately without proper sights, and knocked them both out, winning a MM.
On 20th March both Carabinier squadrons were ferried over the Mytinge River, and the defenders of Mandalay were denied any escape route to the south. Contact was made with 19th Division, and the battle of the Irrawaddy was over.
Kimura’s Burma Area Army, its nervous system paralysed at Meiktila, its limbs mangled and bruised along the Irrawaddy, staggered away as best it could. The only remaining question for Kimura was whether he could organize an effective defensive front somewhere between Meiktila and Rangoon before the monsoon broke? If he could, Slim’s communications would be so badly stretched by bad going and impossible flying weather, that a stalemate would ensue, giving him time to reinforce and re-form his shattered forces.
The same thoughts were going through Slim’s mind. If Kimura could be prevented from forming his defensive front, he might be able to break through to Rangoon on a narrow front before the monsoon. If not?
In war, time is more precious than the finest gold, and at this stage both commanders were desperately short of it. Whoever used his time and resources to best advantage would win the next battle.
* Rees’s eventual chief-of-staff was John Masters, the famous novelist, who had recently commanded a Chindit column, and was therefore better able to administer his general’s division in spite of the latter’s highly individualistic style of command.
* The northern end had been captured by the Intelligence Officer of 268 Brigade, leading a force of Bombay Grenadiers disguised as Burmans and riding in bullock carts. 3rd Carabiniers’ B Squadron was supporting Brigade’s operations on the opposite bank to 2nd Division’s advance.
11
The End in Arakan
Following the appalling collapse of their U-Go offensive on the Central front, the Japanese began to withdraw slowly from the Arakan, not only to avoid being strategically isolated by the Allied drive on Mandalay, but also in attempt to use the garrison as replacements for the catastrophic losses suffered at Kohima and Imphal. Kimura was quite prepared to write off the Northern Arakan for a period, u
sing the troops so released for the major battle he had hoped to fight around Mandalay.
None of this was known to the Allies, who went ahead with plans for a major offensive by 15 Corps, commanded by Lt-General A. F. P. Christison, designed to clear the Arakan mainland and also to capture the islands of Akyab, Ramree and Cheduba, which contained airfields from which vital support could be given to the forces operating on the Central front.
15 Corps contained 25th and 26th Indian and 82nd West African Divisions, two Brigades of 81st West African Division and 3rd Commando Brigade. Armoured support would be supplied by 50th Indian Tank Brigade, commanded by Brigadier G. H. N. Todd.
50th Tank Brigade consisted of the Shermans of 19th (King George Vth’s Own) Lancers, commanded by Lt-Colonel G. H. Critchley, the Lees of 146 Regiment RAC under Lt-Colonel R. L. Agnew, and 45th Cavalry’s Stuarts, recently returned from Manipur. In the event, the Japanese withdrawal led to the majority of General Christison’s air support being diverted elsewhere, and the brunt of the fighting fell on two squadrons, to the bitter disappointment of the remainder. There were no longer enough Japanese to go round.
As we have seen, the Arakan is one of the most unpleasant places in the world in which to fight, and the conduct of armoured operations is particularly difficult in view of the close and hilly nature of the terrain, which is further broken by the muddy meanderings of countless coastal chaungs. It is therefore worth pausing here to examine the tactical developments which had taken place since the last Arakan offensive.
19th Lancers have been described elsewhere as ‘a Regiment that could shoot’, and as shoot they certainly could, members of other regiments which also took a pride in their gunnery will not object to my describing the techniques they employed during the last Arakan offensive.
19th Lancers also contained some outstandingly good wireless operators, as one might expect from a regiment which had been equipped with armoured cars before converting to tanks. Their expertise kept Colonel Critchley, up with the forward squadron, in regular contact with his rear headquarters, 200 miles away.
Critchley had spent some time with 25th Dragoons after their battle in the Admin Box, and had brought his regiment to a high standard of co-operation with its Forward Tank Officers. The FTOs were to the tanks what the Forward Observation Officers were to the artillery, and their function was to accompany the infantry and direct the tanks’ fire onto bunkers and strongpoints which were invisible to the crews. A minimum requirement was that the tank gunners should be able to hit a 4-gallon petrol tin every time at 800 yards. This might not sound particularly demanding today, but at the time there were gunners who could not reach this standard, and it must be remembered that although the Sherman possessed comparatively sophisticated gun-control equipment, there has been thirty years development since. This then, was 19th Lancers’ method of tackling a heavily wooded hill feature which was to be attacked by the infantry; it was practised endlessly, and similar methods were used by other regiments.
We tried to get an air strike, with napalm for preference, to knock off the vegetation. As the infantry advance started the tanks came out, attracting most of the hostile fire, and started a concentrated bombardment of the feature with HE. This often revealed emplacements and bunkers, and further targets were indicated by the FTO.
As the infantry advance got closer to the objective, say fifty yards, we switched to AP solid shot, knocking the bunkers about and allowing the infantry with training and practice to within five yards of the objective in perfect safety. The tanks’ fire then lifted and changed to co-ax mg to cover the ridge.
This makes the tanks sound a bit stand-offish, but the vegetation, and much more so, the very loose sandy soil, made it quite impossible to get closer.
For the FTO, the engagement looked something like this, as described by Lt-Colonel E. R. McM. Wright, who obtained a wide experience of the job with 19th Lancers.
The Sherman’s 75-mm gun, in the hands of a good gunner, was extremely accurate. For this reason, the FTO was able in the first instance to have his first round put exactly where he wanted it by giving the tank commander a straight fire order onto a conspicuous target, such as a bit of jungle scrub or shell-shot tree stump, which was easy to identify and acknowledge.
Remember, initially the FTO has no idea where the ultimate target (i.e. the bunker) is, and the tank commander has little idea where the FTO is either. Once the first directed shot is fired (as opposed to the gunfire phase for jungle clearing when the infantry are moving forward) it is possible to indicate to the tank commander from the strike the position of the forward infantry and the FTO.
The fire control and corrections were passed by conventional communications between the FTO and the tank commander, with the tank gunner probably listening in. The FTO at this stage of the attack is on his stomach with the forward infantry and no doubt the company commander is with him as they always seem to command their companies from the front end. The 38 set with a throat mike gave good voice communication, but the 4-ft aerial was sometimes a bit awkward and necessitated the FTO lying on his back while transmitting in order to get it up into the air.
Once the target had been located, and it really was difficult (and regrettably caused casualties to do so), then the fun began. It was a case of laying the gun foot by foot. Up one, down a half, left, right, and so on. If the timber splintered a good tank commander might pick it up through his binoculars, in which case he had a go on his own.
Finally, the general idea was to smash the timber with AP and pop an HE into the hole. A phosphorous smoke round was even better, as it might conceivably indicate where the other holes were, which of course was the next problem. These were the ones which invariably caused the casualties when the final assault was made. This was supported by concentrated fire from the tanks, which switched from HE to AP and elevated without interruption to enable the infantry to rush in and get on top of the bunker.
The advance of 15 Corps began on 14th December 1944, the general plan being for 81st (less one brigade) and 82nd West African Divisions to move respectively down the Kaladan and Kalapanzin valleys, whilst 25th Indian Division pushed on down the Mayu Peninsula to Foul Point. 26th Indian Division would then capture Akyab Island. B Squadron 45th Cavalry assisted the infantry in clearing some bunkers in the Goppe Bazaar area, and B and C Squadrons 19th Lancers put down concentrations in minor operations near Buthidaung and on the Mayu peninsula, but most of the birds had flown by this time.
12 Arakan—final offensive, 1944–45
By 27th December, 25th Indian Division had reached Foul Point, and plans taken from a dead Japanese officer indicated that Akyab Island was only lightly held. Accordingly, the Corps timetable was brought forward, and 74th and 3rd Commando Brigades detailed to capture the island with the support of A Squadron 19th Lancers and two troops from 45th Cavalry.
However, an artillery observation officer, flying over Akyab on 2nd January, saw absolutely no sign of the Japanese, and landing his light aircraft in a paddy field, was told by the excited inhabitants that the enemy had fled.
The assault force, arriving offshore during the morning of the 3rd, were nonplussed by the complete absence of the naval gunfire and RAF activity which was to see them on to the beaches, and even more surprised on landing to be greeted by General Christison himself!
The offensive was going far better than anyone could have imagined at the outset. Harried by 81st Division to the east, the Japanese hastened the pace of their withdrawal. Their line of retreat ran along the coast, through Kangaw, to the An Pass and Taungup, from both of which escape roads led through the Arakan Yomas to the Irrawaddy valley. Christison now planned a series of amphibious landings along this route, designed to trap as many of the enemy as possible. The coast in this part of Burma had not been thoroughly charted, and in spite of detailed reconnaissance, contained many hazards which had not been foreseen.
First to be assaulted was the Myebon Peninsula, which would have to be neutralized
before Kangaw could be attacked. The landing would be made by 3rd Commando Brigade, who would be supported by half of A Squadron 19th Lancers.
Kangaw was known to be very heavily fortified as it covered the main Japanese line of retreat at its narrowest point; however, the defences faced north.
The operation began at 0745 on 12th January. As the Commandos’ landing craft started their run in, covered by the fire of one cruiser, eight smaller warships and a number of armed launches, the RAF mounted a massive raid, mixing napalm with high explosive, and finishing off with smoke to screen the advancing assault craft.
This was just as well, as the Landing Craft Infantry touched bottom 400 yards out, and the Marines were forced to wade through heavy mud to the beach before establishing themselves in the jungle beyond. By now, the enemy was beginning to surface, and was subjecting the beaches to sporadic machine-gun shell fire.
The Landing Craft Tank arrived on a falling title and their commanders refused to ground them. The first to arrive lowered its ramp 300 yards from the shore, with the result that the leading tank, from Lt Billimoria’s troop, went straight out into four feet of water covering deep mud. After moving about five yards, the tank heeled over and bellied hard, the water flooding in through the hull gunner’s hatch.
A more suitable landing site was found by Major Keighley, the regiment’s second-in-command, but even this required considerable improvement by sappers and infantry detachments. At length the leading LCT nosed in and the D8 recovery tractor motored off without trouble, as did Billimoria’s two remaining tanks. As the second LCT approached, the Japanese began to range on the craft obtaining a hit on the ramp just as Major Sample, A Squadron leader, was driving off.
Tank Tracks to Rangoon Page 23
