As Hoche saw it, this was advanced through apodictic and dogmatic assertions, rash assertions and the abdication of generally convincing proofs. Given the sect-character of the movement, these had a suggestive effect on the believers.
Hoche: What occurs to one person today will on the next day already become a proven fact and be used as the basis for further inferences.228
This peculiar social psychology of the movement was augmented by Freud’s studious avoidance of general congresses and the holding of private congresses. Referring to Wilhelm Stekel’s greetings for the Weimar psychoanalytic congress, Hoche noted sarcastically that his characterisation of the movement as a sect three years ago had in a certain sense been accepted by the Freudians themselves.
Stekel, 1911: We all have the need to feel that we do not stand alone, and that we belong to a large school, whose disciples are spread over the whole Earth. Each single one of us stands against a world of opponents, and must assert himself against the scorn and mockery of the opponent . . . We know that the future is ours. One cannot work and create alone without the acknowledging resonance of fellow men. One must build up one’s faith from the faith of others. This is the deep meaning of the psychoanalytic congresses, which have become for us a matter of heart . . . On this day of celebration we feel that we are brothers of an Order which requires a sacrifice from each individual in service of the generality.229
The sect-character of the movement was reflected in the schisms, and Hoche took it as a fortunate sign that the best minds were leaving the movement.
By reproaching psychoanalysis with having returned to a private form of knowledge, Hoche did not know how correct he was. In 1912, Ernest Jones had already proposed the formation of a secret committee to Freud, charged with defending the purity of Freudian doctrine against heretical deviations.
Jones to Freud, 30 July 1912: [A] small group of men could be thoroughly analysed by you, so that they could represent the pure theory unadulterated by personal complexes, and thus build an unofficial inner circle in the Verein and serve as centres where others (beginners) could come and learn the work.230
Freud to Jones, 1 August 1912: What took hold of my imagination almost immediately is your idea of a secret council composed of the best and most trustworthy among our men to take care of the further development of Ψα.231
Jones to Freud, 7 August 1912: The idea of a united small body, designed, like the Paladins of Charlemagne, to guard the kingdom and policy of their master, was a product of my own romanticism.232
Jones, 1955: There would be only one definite obligation undertaken among us: namely, that if anyone wished to depart from any of the fundamental tenets of psychoanalytical theory, e.g., the conception of repression, of the unconscious, of infantile sexuality, etc., he would promise not to do so publicly before first discussing his views with the rest.233
To each of his Paladins, Freud gave a golden ring.
Hoche’s main attention was directed to psychoanalytic therapy. He viewed it as ‘essentially an old suggestive technique in a new pseudoscientific guise’. It was not surprising that hysterics were receptive to it, as this was the case with all new methods which surrounded themselves with mysteries. The believing doctor and patient were both under the suggestive effect of the same circle of ideas. Another category of patients was those in conditions where spontaneous remissions were common, such as neurasthenia and depression. But above all, Hoche contested that psychoanalytic therapy was without dangers. Basing himself on the results of his survey, he presented a series of cases where psychoanalysis has purportedly done more harm than good. He concluded that Freudians trumpeted their successes whilst passing over their failures in silence.
Hoche: In very many cases, psychoanalytic therapy is a direct damage to the patient.234
The only remaining interest of psychoanalysis lay in the cultural and historical field. In the discussion, one after the other, the leading lights of German psychiatry – Kraepelin, Stransky, Weygandt, Liepmann, Forster, Kohnstamm – and of psychology, in the figure of William Stern, got up to condemn Freud and his pretensions to originality.
Kraepelin: Munich rejects Freud’s psychoanalysis . . . The good in it is not new, and essentially stems from Janet. Kr. stresses how much harm has already been caused by this method and energetically warns against its use.235
Wilhelm Weygandt: For historical correctness, it should be noted that it is above all Breuer, who, following French authors such as Janet, laid the basis of the most solid elements of psychoanalysis, whilst Freud now reaps the rewards.236
O. Kohnstamm: Honesty requires one to note that this method of psychanalysis had already been practised by P. Janet. Then Breuer–Freud and Oskar Vogt followed around the same time, and last but not least L. Frank.237
William Stern: Psychoanalysts, who regularly reproach their adversaries on their professional ignorance, also work in this domain [the psychology of childhood] as complete dilettantes; scientific research on infants either does not exist for them or is submitted to all sorts of interpretive modifications until it can be connected to their conceptual system.238
Erwin Stransky: The systematic ignorance of the works of other researchers and the systematic refusal of opening themselves to the criticisms is one of the distinctive traits of psychoanalytic obedience . . . The most fatal error [of Freudian theory] resides in the interpretive mania without restraint and in the confusion between interpretation and proof.239
Only Stegmann stood up to defend the Freudian cause. In conclusion, Bleuler indicated that there was much which was correct in what Hoche had said, to which he could subscribe. He maintained that there was much that was good and much that was false in psychoanalysis. The difference between them was that he wanted to maintain and purify what was good in it. None the less Hoche directly held Bleuler, whom he described as the figurehead of the sect, with his scientific reputation, directly responsible for the spread of psychoanalysis. He expressed his sympathy for Bleuler for being excluded from the movement. According to Eitingon, Hoche requested that Bleuler give up his protectorate of the psychoanalytic movement. Breslau was an overwhelming defeat for the movment. Freud’s dream of conquering psychiatry lay in ruins, and psychoanalysis was almost unanimously rejected by the profession.
Freud to Abraham, 23 May 1913: Breslau was bad. According to Eitingon, who was there, Bleuler behaved most unpleasantly . . . Only Stegmann was present from our side . . . Hoche did get the laughter on his side.240
Following the conference, Bleuler’s paper was critiqued by Ferenczi, who attempted to pathologise Bleuler.
Ferenczi: There is nothing left but to assume that the founder of the concept of ambivalence is himself ambivalent with regard to psychoanalysis.241
However, this could not hide the gravity of the situation. The public defeat at Breslau only intensified the conflict with Zurich. The whole psychoanalytic movement was in danger of escaping from Freud’s control, as Jung was the head of the IPA. After having been rejected outside, Freud now risked being rejected inside. The correspondences between Freud, Jones, Abraham and Ferenczi, only published in their entirety over the last few years, show that Freud was fully aware of this danger and sought to take evasive action. Should he dissolve the IPA and form a new organisation? Or should he resign before being ejected by Jung? None of these solutions appeared to be viable. There were not enough numbers to impose the dissolution of the IPA on the Zurich contingent. As for leaving the IPA, one could imagine the pleasure that it would give to Forel, Bleuler, Kraepelin, Hoche, Frank, Bezzola and their colleagues to see Freud leave his own organisation.
Jones to Freud, 25 April 1913: I am deeply impressed by the success of Jung’s campaign, for he appeals to formidable prejudices. It is, in my opinion, the most critical period that Ψα will ever have to go through, and we formed the [Secret] committee not at all too early.242
Freud to Ferenczi, 8 May 1913: According to reports from Jones we have bad things to expect from Jung and
should brace ourselves for the collapse of the organization at the Congress. Of course, everything that strives to get away from our truths has public approval in its favor. It is quite possible that they will really bury us this time, after they have so often sung a dirge for us in vain.243
Jones to Freud, 4 November 1913: Vereinigung. I am in favour of dissolving, as you all are, but I do not understand the urgency of acting at once until we can correspond with one another . . . Ferenczi says that a dissolution is better than our being forced to resign.244
Ferenczi to Freud, 8 November 1913: After Jones’ and Abraham’s explanations, I don’t think we can bring about the dissolution of the International Association. Nothing remains but a collective resignation of those members of all groups who are with you. An International Psychoanalytic Association from which you, Abraham, Jones, all Viennese and Budapesters, Brill (perhaps Putnam) have resigned – with Jung at the head – won’t count for much. You must immediately set in motion the founding of the new Association.245
Freud to Jones, 22 November 1913: We know J.’s position is a very strong one, our only hope is still he will ruin it himself.246
In response to this situation, Freud decided to stake his all. Abraham, Jones, Ferenczi and Eitington were directed to publish conjoint attacks against Jung, in a carefully orchestrated campaign. Freud himself turned to writing his ‘bomb’, the ‘History of the psychoanalytic movement’. From the opening lines, it was quite clear that one was no longer dealing with even a pretence of open scientific discussion. As we have seen, Freud peremptorily declared that he alone was authorised to decide what was psychoanalysis, his creation. This argument from authority was clearly a response to the proliferation of Breuerian, Forelian, Adlerian and Jungian deviations. The vehemence with which Freud denounced Breuer, Jung, Adler and official science indicated his failure to resolve the question on the theoretical level, to persuade his colleagues of his definition of psychoanalysis. The extraordinary polemical tone of Freud’s ‘History’ reflects this defeat. Giving up all pretension at objectivity, Freud accused his adversaries of shameful motives, duplicity, incompetence, mental pathology, and in the case of Jung, racism.
Freud to Ferenczi, 24 April 1914: Jung’s surprising resignation has made our task much easier . . . Perhaps he has succumbed to the salvo in the Zeitschrift, and the bomb in the Jahrbuch is coming too late.247
Freud to Abraham, 25 June 1914: So the bombshell has now burst, we shall soon discover with what effect. I think we shall have to allow the victims 2 to 3 weeks’ time to collect themselves and react.248
Confronted by this, the Zurich group decided to leave Freud with his psychoanalysis, and resigned en masse – which is precisely what Freud wanted to achieve. Just as Adler had done before them, they justified their decision through referring to the incompatibility between Freud’s attitude and the freedom of scientific research.
Minutes of the Zurich Psychoanalytic Society, 10 July 1914: Freud’s demonstration published in the Yearbook of Ψa (‘On the history of the Ψα movement’) is in an unequivocal manner bound to the authority of the theory of one individual. The Zurich branch considers this standpoint to be incompatible with the principle of free research.249
In terms of posterity, Freud’s strategy was a masterstroke. In the absence of prominent alternative accounts by Adler and Jung, Freud’s so-called ‘History’ became a founding document of the psychoanalytic movement and the basis of its official history, subsequently elaborated in numerous articles, books and biographies. Freud had managed to snatch victory out of defeat, passing in silence over embarrassing episodes (Forel, the Breslau congress), and transforming disagreements concerning psychoanalysis into irrational resistances. It is no exaggeration to say that without this tendentious rescripting of history, psychoanalysis would not have been able to propagate itself and attain the prominence which it had in the twentieth century.
It is important to note that this victory was the reverse of its failure to attain widespread assent through open discussion and debate, and came at the cost of the complete privatisation of the science of psychoanalysis under the sole possession of Freud, and of its separation from the prevailing norms of the academic world. Between 1905 and 1914, Freud had sought to internationalise the psychoanalytic movement through seeking allies, initially through Bleuler and Jung. Henceforth, psychoanalysis came to be propagated from the interior, through producing more psychoanalysts in the form of patients turned into disciples. In this regard, the success which psychoanalysis came to have was due not to its capacity to convince its opponents (who remained sceptical), but to the unique form of transmission which it inaugurated.
It was not without reason that Hoche compared this mode of transmission to a sectarian proselytising. However, it was combined with a remarkable modernism, perfectly adapted to the market economy in the burgeoning area of private-practice psychotherapy. One had to pay significant amounts to have access to Freud’s secret art (in contrast to the open form of transmission practised by Bernheimian hypnotic and suggestive psychotherapy). But it was also possible in turn to recoup this expenditure, as the practice gave one an independent livelihood. Separated from the university and the school of medicine (Freud formally stopped teaching in 1917), psychoanalysis became a private enterprise, recruiting clients (and hence potential followers) in an unregulated market, independent of all university or governmental authority. Psychoanalysis effectively became Freud’s firm, organised like an international company based on franchises. All sorts of subsidiaries could be formed across the world, on the condition that they faithfully reproduced the proprietary mode for forming analysts.
Thomas Szasz: To Freud, psychoanalysis was like an invention, which the inventor could patent, thus restricting the rights of others in its use. Thus, Freud insisted that psychoanalysis was to be dispensed only in accordance with his specifications. But he went even further: he declared that only he, and no one else, could change or modify the original formula . . . Here is his explanation, in his own words, of his objection to Adler: ‘I wish merely to show that these theories controvert the fundamental principles of analysis (and on what points they controvert them) and for that reason they should not be known by the name of analysis.’250 So the issue was not whether Adler was right or wrong, but what should be called psychoanalysis. It was as if Freud had patented Coca Cola. He did not really care whether Pepsi Cola or Royal Cola or Crown Cola were better. He merely wanted to make sure that only his products carried the original label.251
From this perspective, it was no longer the content of a theory which was important, but the fact it was sanctioned by Freud and his official representatives. The unity of the psychoanalytic movement was not really maintained by a joint allegiance to a body of doctrine (we have seen that it never really consistently had one) or to a research methodology, but solely by reference to the Freud label, maintained by a feudal structure of authority. Freud did not hesitate, after the first Freud wars, to appropriate silently many of the theoretical innovations which he had so violently denounced when they were initially proposed. After Adler’s departure, Freud incorporated aspects of his theories under the banner of psychoanalysis, and the same thing happened with others. As Ellenberger notes, Freud took over Adler’s conceptions of an autonomous aggressive drive, of the confluence and displacement of the drives and the internalisation of external demands.
Ellenberger: The shift of psychoanalysis to ego psychology was to a great extent an adaptation of former Adlerian concepts.252
Stekel: Everything I discovered was considered common property or was attributed to Freud. I could give countless examples of that.253
Stekel: Freud later adopted some of my discoveries without mentioning my name. Even the fact that in my first edition I had defined anxiety as the reaction of the life instinct against the upsurge of the death instinct was not mentioned in his later books, and many people believe that the death instinct is Freud’s discovery.254
Jung, 1957:
[Freud] later started to work on concepts that were no longer Freudian in the original sense . . . He found himself constrained to take my line, but this he could not admit to himself.255
Freud to Ferenczi, 8 February 1910: I have a decidedly obliging intellect and am very much inclined toward plagiarism.256
This tacit recuperation of the theories of dissidents or of external critics became one of the most striking traits of the psychoanalytic movement, and it demonstrates that what was at stake in the formidable disputes between Freud and his adversaries was not the intrinsic value of particular ideas, but of who could lay claim to them. A particular conception was not psychoanalysis when it was put forward by Adler, Stekel or Jung, but it could become one when it was advanced by Freud. As Szasz noted, psychoanalysis had become a trademark.
The immaculate conception
The privatisation of analytic theory is particularly marked in the ‘History of the psychoanalytic movement’. Freud justified the subjective character of his narrative through the necessity of reaffirming his monopoly over psychoanalysis – his science – against the claims of his rivals.
Freud: No one need be surprised at the subjective character of the contribution I propose to make here to the history of the psycho-analytic movement, nor need anyone wonder at the part I play in it. For psycho-analysis is my creation . . . I consider myself justified in maintaining that even to-day no one can know better than I do what psycho-analysis is, how it differs from other ways of investigating the life of the mind, and precisely what should be called psycho-analysis and what would better be described by some other name. In thus repudiating what seems to me a cool act of usurpation, I am indirectly informing the readers of this Jahrbuch of the events that have led to the changes in its editorship and format.257
The Freud Files Page 12
