by Lou Ureneck
On September 24, the day following Jennings’s negotiations with the Greek government aboard the Kilkis, the Greek minister of foreign affairs called on Jefferson Caffrey, the American chargé d’affaires in Athens. The Greek minister wanted to confirm Jennings’s promise of protection of Greek ships. The request caught Caffrey by surprise. He was not aware of any promise to protect Greek ships, nor was he aware of any plan to evacuate the refugees with Greek ships. He immediately cabled Bristol. Caffrey’s message was sent at 3 P.M., September 24.
Caffrey did not receive a response from Bristol so he resent the message of query the next day, September 25. It read, “September 25 11 p.m. URGENT My 20 [20 is the cable number—Author] September 24 3 p.m. Minister of Foreign Affairs called today to ask if American warships would protect Greek vessels being sent to Smyrna to rescue refugees. Please inform me of what action has been taken.”
The late hour of telegraph transmission suggests that the Greek government was pressing Caffrey for an answer. Quite reasonably, after the unorthodox negotiations between the Greek prime minister and the Kilkis, the Greek government wanted to know if Greek ships could rely on U.S. protection.
Bristol finally responded to the first message late in the day, at 7 P.M.—a delay that is hard to explain but becomes understandable through subsequent developments; his cable also was sent before he received Caffrey’s second cable, suggesting that he had received the first cable but was withholding a response. (Caffrey apparently didn’t receive Bristol’s response so he had sent his second query.) In any event, Bristol’s answer to the Greek question of American protection of its ships was a firm no: “Action of American Naval Officers Smyrna confined purely to using good offices with Turkish authorities to obtain permission for Greek vessels to enter that port when not flying flag. We have not repeat not promised naval protection of any sort nor have [our] naval authorities given an assurances [sic] of assistance or care of refugees after evacuation.”
Bristol’s message to Caffrey in Athens makes it clear that Bristol was unaware of the full scope and detail of Jennings’s mission as it was unfolding. Bristol’s message to Caffrey makes no mention of the promise of a naval escort or Powell’s attempt to send flour to Mytilene, which surely was an “assurance of assistance or care of refugees after evacuation.” A cable Bristol had sent to Washington earlier on the same day was vague or silent on key points that Washington surely would have wanted to know about and Bristol would have felt compelled to mention had he know about them. His Washington cable makes no mention of escort nor does it explain that the Greek evacuation ships were obtained by a relief worker’s negotiations with a foreign government.
No doubt, Bristol’s response to Caffrey alarmed the Greek government. The Greeks thought they had a promise. Had they been duped by Jennings? The answer clearly was yes. Nonetheless, Athens continued to make Greek merchant ships available for the evacuation. Perhaps the success of the first refugee shuttle to Mytilene had reassured the Greek government that its ships were safe from seizure.
From Bristol’s perspective, a promise by one of his officers to protect Greek ships would have been gross insubordination. He had not been consulted on the matter, and, in addition to his dislike of the Greeks, the promise had the potential of thrusting the United States between the warring Greeks and Turks. So what had happened?
Based on U.S. Navy and State Department records, Bristol’s awareness of Jennings’s mission seems to have unfolded this way:
1.On September 23, after dropping off Jennings at Mytilene, Rhodes arrived back in Constantinople at noon and remained there until 10 P.M. Then, he departed for Smyrna by way of Mytilene to pick up Jennings. In the ten hours Rhodes was in Constantinople, he most likely informed Captain Hepburn or Bristol that he had delivered Jennings to Mytilene. Rhodes may also have told Hepburn or Bristol that Jennings had gotten permission the previous day to bring six small Greek merchant ships to Smyrna to evacuate refugees. In addition, Rhodes may also have shown Hepburn or Bristol the letter he had given to Jennings.
To Bristol, the offer of six Greek ships would have come as unexpected news, but it was not a problem since he had argued from the beginning that the Greeks should take responsibility for the refugees. Bristol also would have inferred from the six-ships development that Powell had managed to get official permission from the Turkish authorities for Greek ships to enter Smyrna harbor. Again, from Bristol’s perspective, there was no problem.
Undoubtedly, though, Bristol would have seen the loose language in Rhodes’s letter as holding the potential for mischief by opening a path around his orders of strict neutrality. No doubt the artery in the strong-willed admiral’s substantial neck was pounding in anger. Or so it would appear from subsequent events. His message to Powell of the 20th allowed Powell to load refugees on to Greek-chartered vessels but Bristol had not sanctioned escorts or protection of Greek shipping.
2.The next day, September 24, Caffrey in Athens sent his cable to Bristol conveying the Greek’s government’s request for confirmation of American protection. Caffrey received no response—either because it had been somehow delayed in reaching him or because Bristol was himself delaying until he could determine what was going on at Smyrna. No doubt Bristol would have connected the two troublesome dots: Rhodes’s letter written for Jennings suggesting American protection and the Athens request for confirmation of the protection. If a promise had been made, Bristol would have wanted to put matters right before responding to Caffrey. Hence, a possible decision to delay a response. It surely was not Bristol’s style to cable back, “I’m not sure. Let me find out what’s going on.”
3.On September 25, The New York Times carried a Reuters report from Athens that Bristol has offered to protect Greek shipping to evacuate refugees. The news story said the Greek government “has gratefully accepted the offer.” The paper also carried a story reporting Washington’s denial of a deal. Bristol, his cable to Caffrey, also denied protection had been offered. But in Athens, Caffrey apparently did not receive the message, and he repeated his message to Bristol.
4.On September 26, Rhodes arrived back in Smyrna—and he had with him a formal memorandum, over his signature and dated September 26, indicating he had been directed to rescind any promise that may have been made to protect the Greeks’ ships. It seems clear that the memorandum was prepared by Bristol once the artery in his neck had resumed its normal rhythm. Rhodes was not the sort to write memoranda—in fact, he had not been inclined to commit anything to writing since arriving at Smyrna. Nor was he the sort of person to communicate with his commanding officer (Powell) by handing him a memorandum with an official “cc” to the admiral.
The memorandum in full is worth including:
Courtesy of the Mark Bristol Papers at the Library of Congress
It was a heavy-handed rebuke of Powell, and it’s impossible to know, from the official record, the nature of Powell’s reaction to the memorandum. Did he become angry with Rhodes, express consternation with Jennings, or grow frustrated with Bristol? All would have been reasonable responses. For the previous ten days, Powell had been confronted with the near-impossible task of removing hundreds of thousands of starving women and children from a hostile city under an unreasonable deadline, and—having found a way to do so—he had received a memorandum from a subordinate officer (no doubt having been directed his superior officer) ordering him to correct an error that had occurred on his watch.
To his credit, Powell maintained his composure. He seems to have taken the approach of “counting to ten” before responding to Bristol.
5.The next day, September 27, Powell sent a cable to Bristol: “The Greeks got the understanding that the U.S. Navy would protect them from all molestation from their interpretation of the letter written to Mr. Jennings by Commanding Officer of the Litchfield, or from Mr. Jennings’ interpretation of paragraph 2 of that letter.” (Paragraph 2 said the U.S. Navy would provide escort.) In his cable to Bristol, Powell said he had directed Jen
nings to correct the misunderstanding—though he did not say with whom since a revolution was now under way—and he reported to Bristol that he had sent a note to the governor at Mytilene clarifying the U.S. Navy’s role. By then, of course, the governor of Mytilene was a prisoner of the revolution and Greek ships were running regularly, under American escort, to the Smyrna railroad pier.
On the day Powell sent his note to Bristol, he had already evacuated more than one hundred thousand people, and it was clear that his effort was a huge success—at a time when Washington was clamoring for results. Nothing more was said by Bristol about the misunderstanding—at least on the record. It would have been politically difficult for Bristol to bring down the hammer on Powell as he had done with Houston in the Samsun incident. The entire country was watching, and the navy was emerging as the hero at Smyrna.
Later, much later, Bristol would extol Powell’s action and efficiency. In a letter to the secretary of the navy commending Powell on his work at Smyrna, Bristol would excuse his delay in communicating the officer’s exceptional work because he had been occupied with other matters.
CHAPTER 32
Revolution
On his return to Mytilene on Tuesday, September 26, aboard the Ismini, Jennings found the island overcrowded, on the edge of starvation, and suffering outbreaks of typhus. As if that wasn’t enough, he also learned that elements of the Greek army had launched a revolution against the military command, the government in Athens, and the king.
The revolt had begun on nearby Chios on September 23, during the very hours when Jennings and Captain Theophanides had been negotiating with the Greek cabinet. The leader of the revolt was Colonel Nikolaos Plastiras, commander of an elite Evzone unit, which was among the troops evacuated at Chesme about two weeks earlier. He was one of the few officers who had come out of the war with his honor intact—fighting his way back and more or less holding his unit together. (The Turks called him Black Pepper for his mustache and fighting spirit.) Through threats and appeals to their patriotism, he had rallied the army’s officers and troops at Chios with the intention of overthrowing the government in Athens, deposing the king, and preventing Thrace from falling to the Turks. He and his followers recruited the Greek navy’s junior officers at Chios into the revolt and arrested the navy’s senior officers. The older men had continued to stand with the king and government, including the admiral of the fleet and the captain of the Lemnos, the Kilkis’s sister ship.
Only hours after Jennings and Theophanides had struck their deal with the Greek government for ships, the revolution had leaped from Chios to Mytilene under the direction of Colonel Stylianos Gonatas. The revolutionaries began rounding up Royalist officers including General Frangos and Governor Bakas. Theophanides, a staunch Royalist, put the Kilkis to sea and kept the battleship out of the possession of the revolutionary committee. All this had been happening as Jennings stood on the bridge of the Ismini on the way back to Smyrna with the first group of empty Greek merchant ships.
It was not until he returned to Mytilene late the same day, September 24, with the loaded ships that Jennings learned that his partner Theophanides was gone, and the revolt was under way. This of course presented him with the problem of working with two governments—the revolutionary government at Mytilene and the Royalist government still in place in Athens.
On landing at Mytilene, Jennings went to the revolutionary leaders and asked for their cooperation. It was immediately given, and he maintained command of his Greek merchant fleet. It was no doubt helpful that the Captain Argyropoulos, whom he had designated to handle the merchant ships at Mytilene, was a former Republican naval officer.
As Jennings prepared to return to Smyrna, the revolution rolled forward around him. Three military transports carrying Greek soldiers put to sea and rendezvoused, off the island of Tinos, with the Lemnos, which was carrying the revolutionary officers from Chios. Together, the leaders of the revolt and the troops in the transport ships steamed toward Athens. Before they arrived, two planes from Chios dropped leaflets on Athens demanding the government’s resignation and the king’s abdication.
The troops landed the next day on the Greek mainland at Porto Rafti, Raphina and Laurium—an easy march into the capital. Caffrey cabled Washington: “Troops have been landed this evening at a number of points near Athens. Government has not yet decided whether or not to oppose movement by force.” Theophanides maintained his loyalty to the king and took the Kilkis to Phaleron, close to Piraeus, presumably to defend the government. With a civil war possible, the guns of the Kilkis would be important to the Royalist government.
Late on September 26, King Constantine abdicated, and Theophanides withdrew plans to resist. By then, Asia Minor refugees already were flowing into Athens. The city, packed with homeless people and humiliated by the catastrophe, sank into a sullen and angry mood that wanted retribution from the politicians and officers who had lost the war. It would come soon in front of a firing squad.
Meanwhile, Jennings continued to shuttle his flotilla back and forth between Smyrna and Mytilene. On the island, his right hand remained Captain Argyropoulos, and Jennings worked through his relief committee to care for the refugees. “The island is facing starvation within three days unless flour can be sent,” he radioed to Powell. He reported that the city had put a hospital at his disposal as well as a warehouse for the storage of flour. Since the Turks were making it difficult to ship flour from Smyrna, Powell attempted to have it shipped from the Near East Relief supply in Constantinople.
CHAPTER 33
British Assistance
On Wednesday, September 27, a third group of Greek ships arrived at Smyrna, twelve of them, and the American and British officers and men loaded thirty-one thousand refugees on to the vessels at the railroad pier.
The loading began at 8:30 A.M. and ended at 7 P.M. Powell was also attempting to reconnoiter the situation up and down the coast near Smyrna based on reports he was receiving from Jennings that refugees needed evacuation from other towns and cities. Even though he did not have Turkish permission to enter other ports, Powell attempted to divert the Litchfield to Aivali on its return to Smyrna after delivering the Kemal-interview transcript to Bristol, but the ship failed to receive his radio message. He then tried to reach the MacLeish, which was on its way to Smyrna, behind the Litchfield. He had no success making contact with it either.
Powell hoped that he would be able to retain all four ships—Lawrence, Litchfield, MacLeish, and Edsall—for the evacuations at Smyrna and elsewhere. He wanted to keep the Edsall and Lawrence at Smyrna and send the MacLeish and Litchfield to Aivali, Vourla, and Chesme. Powell maintained his communication with Jennings at Mytilene via the Edsall’s radiotelegraph. Their plan was for Powell to telegraph Jennings if he was able to release a destroyer from Smyrna as an escort; then Jennings would dispatch the Greek freighter to the outlying coastal towns and cities for an escorted pickup of refugees.
On Wednesday, Powell learned that Kemal was preparing to leave the city with his cabinet for a conference at Ismid to negotiate an armistice and possibly to travel to Vienna to settle other big territorial questions now that the nationalists were in control of what remained of the Ottoman Empire. Final matters were congealing. The French minister, Henry Franklin Bouillon, was expected to arrive in Smyrna for talks with Kemal before his departure.
On Thursday, September 28, the situation on the pier took a belligerent turn. In the morning, the Turks were showing a nasty disposition. They began moving machine guns to the end of the pier. One possible explanation for the sudden Turkish aggression was the discovery of the body of the brutal Turkish guard that had been found floating in the water at the pier. The appearance of the guns alarmed the British, who had left their ships exposed to help load refugees. “Unarmed as we were, and with the ship denuded of men, we were helpless,” wrote a British officer.
Powell responded forcefully to the provocation. He brought the Edsall broadside to the pier, uncovered the ship�
�s deck guns and put his men at their fighting stations. The Turkish guards were staring down the barrels of the Edsall’s four-inch guns, big enough around at the muzzle to take a man’s fist. “To the eternal credit of the captain of the American destroyer,” a British officer said, “he at once abandoned all thoughts of neutrality.” The Edsall’s threat was a clear violation of Bristol’s orders—no demonstrations of naval force—but it worked. The Turkish machine guns were removed, and the evacuation continued with the assistance of the British sailors and officers. (Not surprisingly, mention of the incident does not appear in the Edsall’s ship diary, nor did Powell communicate it to Bristol.)
On the same day, Powell got permission from Noureddin for American and Allied warships to enter Aivali and Vourla, but Noureddin denied permission for Greek merchant ships to enter those ports. Noureddin wanted Smyrna evacuated first and was withholding an answer on the request to extend the evacuation deadline past September 30. Powell sent the MacLeish to Aivali, and the British sent a ship to Chesme with a French escort. The commanding officer of the MacLeish went ashore at Aivali. The town seemed quiet, and the Turkish authorities, with a Greek priest present, assured the American officer that there were no people to evacuate. The authorities said the Greeks at Aivali wanted to stay. The MacLeish carried the news back to Powell, who later learned (through Jennings) that the Greeks had been fearful of requesting evacuation. There were thousands, kept out of sight, who wanted to leave.
By the end of the day, Powell had loaded thirteen ships with thirty-six thousand people. In an attempt to remove all the refugees before the deadline expired, only three days distant, he increased the number of ships being loaded at the same time by embarking refugees from the Quay with small boats from the Cordelio rather than waiting to tie up the ships at the pier. But the success of Powell’s rapid loading of the ships had created a crisis at Mytilene, which was bursting with people. Mytilene was hardly much more than a town, and it now had 175,000 refugees—seven times its usual population. Jennings, in consultation with the new Greek government, was making arrangements for many of the refugees to be taken to other Greek islands and to the Greek mainland at Piraeus and Salonika.
