Association between form and lifestyle. At HA 487a10 A. gives a quite extensive list of ways in which the lifestyles of animals may differ from each other; however, he uses few of them in teleological explanations in PA. Perhaps this is because, as LENNOX (2010) notes, the list of differentiae in lifestyles in HA I, 1 is confounded by a list of activities. See also Pol 1256a18 for use of lifestyle, with an emphasis on diet. A. speaks of the adaptations of the frogfish and the torpedo ray at HA 620b10. Additional cases where A. explains diversity in forms in terms of lifestyle are: fish mouths and diet, PA 662a7, PA 662a31 and PA 696b24; insect wings and mobility and damage, HA 490a13, HA 532a19 and PA 682b12; land v. water animals, PA 668b35.
Conditional necessity. At PA 642a4 A. distinguishes two basic causes: the cause for the sake of which and the cause from necessity. He then goes on to distinguish two forms of necessity. One is ‘conditional necessity’ by which he means the features that a part must have if it is to function properly, the other is ‘material necessity’ by which he means the features of a part (or animal) that arise directly from the properties of the matter of which it is composed; cf. PA 639b24 and PA 645b15. In practice, these kinds of necessity are difficult to disentangle, and A. often doesn’t indicate which he’s talking about; see COOPER (1987) and LEUNISSEN (2010a) ch. 3.
XLVIII
The power of conditional necessity. Emphasizing the importance of genē to the explanations given in PA goes, it will be apparent, against the trend of those who believe that A.’s classification is of no importance, or does not exist; see GOTTHELF (2012) ch. 9 for an argument similar to the one I present here. A. says that the following parts or activities are part of the ‘definition of substantial being’ (GA 778a34) in the following genē: flight in birds, PA 669b10, PA 697b1 and PA 693b10; fishes, swimming, PA 695b17; birds, lungs, PA 669b10; fish, blooded, PA 695b17; birds, blooded, PA 693b2–13; blood or its absence, PA 678a26; animals, sensation, PA 653b19. GOTTHELF (2012) ch. 7 and LEUNISSEN (2010a) ch. 3.2 show the importance of such arguments for A. He just says that birds have beaks because ‘nature has constituted them this way’, PA 659b5, and that it is an ‘odd and distinctive feature’ of birds, PA 692b15. On the consequences of beaks for the alimentary tracts of birds see HA 508b25ff. and PA 674b22. OGLE (1882) p. 241, OWEN (1866) vol. 2, pp. 156–86 and ZISWILER and FARNER (1972) describe the diversity of avian alimentary tracts.
XLIX
Material necessity. BALME (1987d) discusses role of material necessity in A.’s explanatory scheme. A. outlines the uniform parts, their composition and their functions, at HA III, 2–20 and PA II, 1–9; see LONES (1912) pp. 107–17 for a survey of A.’s knowledge of them. A. says that uniform parts are for the sake of non-uniform parts at PA 646b11; cf. PA 653b30 and PA 654b26. For their physiological relationships see Ch. CVII. A. mentions the sea urchin of the deep at HA 530a32 and explains its spines at GA 783a20; see THOMPSON (1947) p. 72 for its identification. He asserts that sea urchins in general are cold at PA 680a25. The Hippocratics and the medical writer Discorides appear to have used sea-urchin spines as a diuretic, PLATT (1910) n. GA 783a20. GUIDETTI and MORI (2005) analyse the functional properties of sea-urchin spines; MOUREAUX and DUBOIS (2012) demonstrate their plasticity. A. refers to the sea urchin of the deep as a distinct kind (genos) which would seem to imply heritable differences with respect to other sea urchins, but his explanation of the features he discusses is given purely in terms of environmentally determined features so cannot be associated with a difference in eidos or inherited form. He uses genos in a similarly casual way elsewhere in his zoology (see Ch. LXXXII on bees).
L
The interaction of conditional and material necessity. A. describes the functional properties of the snake’s vertebral column at PA 692a1, how rays move at PA 655a23, the structure of the oesophagus at PA 664a32 and the penis at PA 689a20. Such examples are very close to the axe metaphor he gives when explaining conditional necessity in PA I, 1; see LENNOX (2001b) ch. 8 for other examples. A. describes the purpose of the epiglottis at PA 664b20; for a modern account see EKBERG and SIGURJONSSON (1982). A. discusses spleen and its purpose at HA 506a13, PA 666a25, PA III, 7; see LENNOX (2001a) p. 270 and OGLE (1882) pp. 207–8; the latter assesses his fairly accurate comparative data. The spleen is an example of ‘indirect’ or ‘secondary’ teleology, LENNOX (2001a) pp. 248–9, LEUNISSEN (2010a) ch. 4.3. MEBIUS and KRAAL (2005) review the modern view of spleen function. A. discusses gall bladders and bile at HA 506a20 and PA IV, 2. LENNOX (2001a) pp. 288–90 insists that the Greek cholē does not differentiate between ‘gall bladder’ and ‘bile’ and so just chooses to translate always as ‘bile’, but A.’s descriptions of the distribution of cholē in different animals seem to make more sense if we allow that sometimes he’s talking about gall bladders and at other times about bile. OGLE (1882) p. 218 reviews the comparative distribution of gall bladders and concludes, again, that A.’s comparative anatomy is mostly sound. A. concludes that bile is useless at PA 677a16.
LI
The teleology of household economics. A. alludes to Aesop’s fable about Momus at PA 663a34; the original can be found in Babrius’ Fables, 59. A. argues the need for auxiliary teleological principles at IA 704b11, cf. IA 708a9, IA 711a18, but he lists only a few of them; FARQUHARSON (1912) n. 704b12 identifies many more. A.’s major statement on household economics is in Pol I, 2–9. He states and applies a series of economic principles in his zoology at the following places: (i) nature is ‘like a good householder’ at GA 744b12; see LEUNISSEN (2010a) ch. 3.2 who speaks of ‘luxury parts’. (ii) ‘Nature does nothing in vain’ as applied to: fish eyelids, PA 658a8; tooth morphology, PA 661b23; mouth function, PA 691b25; fish don’t have legs, PA 695b16; fish don’t have lungs, JSVM 476a13; teeth, GA 745a32; males, GA 741b4; see LENNOX (2001a) pp. 231, 244, LENNOX (2001b) ch. 9. (iii) ‘What nature takes from one place it gives to another’ as applied to: selachian cartilage, PA655a27, cf. PA 696b5; distribution of body hair, PA 658a31; absence of bladder in feathered and scaled animals, PA 671a12; teats in lions, PA 688b1; no tails in humans, PA 689a20; wings v. spurs, PA 694a8; spurs v. claws, PA 694a26; bird tails and legs, PA 694b18; the reason ducks have short legs, IA 714a14; the frogfish’s funny shape, PA 695b12; life history, see ch. LXXXIII; see LENNOX (2001a) pp. 218–19 and LEROI (2010). (iv) ‘Nature is not parsimonious . . .’: Pol 1252b1 and PA 683a22. (v) Multifunctional parts: e.g. PA 655b6, see TIPTON (2002) and KULLMANN (2007) p. 444. A. discusses the function and formation of horns at PA 655b2, PA 661b26, but mostly PA III, 2; see OGLE (1882) pp. 186–91, LENNOX (2001a) pp. 246–50 and KULLMANN (2007) pp. 499–514. A. does mention some aggressive behaviour in animals when mating 571b1, but does not refer to stags using their antlers in male–male combat.
LII
The soul of the cuttlefish. A. describes cuttlefish spawning at HA 550b6, embryology at HA 550a10, and cephalopod copulation at HA 541b1, cont. HA 541b13. THOMPSON (1928) describes ancient and modern ways of catching cuttlefish.
LIII
Definitions of life. The various definitions can be found in SCHRöDINGER (1944/1967) ch. 6, LOEB (1906) p. 1 and SPENCER (1864) vol. 1, p. 74; LEWES (1864) pp. 228–31 gives earlier definitions and a commentary on A.’s definition. A. gives his own definition at DA 412a14 [trans. modified from HETT (1936)].
LIV
Early conceptions of the soul. Patroclus’ fate is described in Iliad XVI. A. calls the butterfly psychē at HA 551a14; see DAVIES and KATHIRITHAMY (1986) pp. 99–108. Plato’s conception of the soul and argument for its immortality can be found at Phaedo 78B–95D, Phaedrus 245C–257B and Rep 609C–611C; see LORENZ (Summer 2009) for an account of early theories of the soul. A.’s early conception of the soul is given in the fragments of Eudemus FR F37R3–F39R3 and Protrepticus FR F55R3, F59R3, F60R3, F61R3. It is generally thought that A.’s conception of the soul changed radically over the course of his life, e.g. LAWSON-TANCRED (1986) pp. 51–2, but BOS (2003) gives a contrary view, on whom, however, see KING (2007)
. A. says knowledge of the soul is very important in DA 402a1 and considers his predecessor’s views in DA I. He defines the soul as a first actuality of the body at DA 412b4 [trans. HETT (1936)], cf. DA 412a19, DA 412b4, DA 414a15, and speaks of seeds as potentially ensouled bodies at DA 412b27; see KING (2001) pp. 41–8. A.’s doctrine that the soul is an enmattered form is a special case of his theory of ‘hylomorphism’ – the idea that a substance (ousia) can be thought of as a compound of matter and form. He applies this theory to the soul at DA 412b6. This position is sometimes thought to conflict with this general hylomorphic theory which holds that form and matter are contingently related, ACKRILL (1972/1973). A. makes the soul responsible for change at DA I, 3; DA 415b21. Here I translate A.’s kinēsis (pl. kinēseis) as ‘process’ – by which I mean any time-dependent set of states – but it is more commonly translated as ‘movement’. A. makes the soul goal directed at DA II, 4 and speaks of it as an entity at DA 412b10, cf. DA 415b8, PA 640b34 and Meteor 390b31; he states its relationship to his ‘causes’ at DA 415b8. A. describes the eyes of moles at HA 491b28, HA 533a1 and DA 425a10.
LV
Spiritual interpretations of the soul. The ‘ghost in the machine’ is due to RYLE (1949) ch. 1. LAWSON-TANCRED (1986) p. 24 seems to view A.’s theory of soul through the lens of Cartesian mind–body dualism, but FREDE (1992), among others, show that A.’s theory is not Descartes’. A. speaks of the mysterious active intellect at DA 408b19 and DA III, 5. A. argues that souls are not agents at DA 408b11 and DA 408b25; more generally, DA I, 4. See the collections of essays in NUSSBAUM and RORTY (1992) and DURRANT (1993) for A.’s conception of soul, mental states and their relevance to the modern theory of mind. KANT (1793) * 75, Ak. v, p. 400 despairs at explaining teleological processes; see GRENE and DEPEW (2004) ch. 4 on Kant’s biology. As LENOIR (1982) points out, not all teleologists were overt vitalists; some were ‘telomechanists’; however, a fascination with teleology often tips over into vitalism. DRIESCH (1914) gives a self-serving history of vitalism; CONKLIN (1929) p. 30 and SCHRöDINGER (1944/1967) react to Driesch’s vitalism; SANDER (1993a) and SANDER (1993b) give a sympathetic account of it; see also KULLMANN (1998) pp. 308–10. DRIESCH (1914) p. 1 and NEEDHAM (1934) pp. 30 ff. give an explicitly vitalist interpretation of A.’s biology; nowadays few scholars subscribe to this but FREUDENTHAL (1995)’s account of A.’s theory of pneuma often seems vitalist; see KING (2001) n. p. 141. Among the scholars who agree that A. is neither a vitalist nor a Democritean materialist are NUSSBAUM (1978), COOPER (1987), BALME (1987c), GOTTHELF (2012) ch. 1, KING (2001) ch. 3, KULLMANN (1998) ch. IV, QUARANTOTTO (2010). My own label of A. as an ‘informed materialist’ is merely a restatement of his hylomorphism. A. identifies soul with form at DA 412b6 and DA 414b20 and the moving principle of life at DA 415b21.
LVI
The capacities of the soul. For the hierarchical capacities of the soul see DA 414a2. For the capacities of the nutritive soul see DA 415a22, DA 416b3 and DA 432b7. Living things defined by possession of a nutritive soul at DA 416b20; it’s said to be found in all living things at DA 414a29 and DA 434a22. The nutritive soul is the first to appear in ontogeny, GA 735a12; see also ch. LXV. The soul holds living things together, DA 411b5 and DA 415a6; see QUARANTOTTO (2010). A. discusses metabolism at DA 416a33 and compares growth to the flow of a river at GC 321b24; cf. GC 322a22. This is similar to modern growth models, e.g. BERTALANFFY (1968) p. 180; A. also distinguishes between nutrition used for somatic maintenance and nutrition used for growth, e.g. GA 744b33, see n. PECK (1943) p. 232. A. speaks of chemical transformation at DA 416a21; see Ch. LVII. His account of digestion and assimilation in blooded animals is given at PA III. For an example of a modern energy budget see WARE (1982).
LVII
The chemistry of uniform parts. The proportions of elements specify, indeed begin to define, the uniform parts, PA 642a18 and Metaph 993a17. For Empedocles on the chemical constituents of bone see DK 31B96 and FURTH (1987) pp. 30–3. SOLMSEN (1960) p. 375 and KING (2001) p. 168, n. 12, are sceptical about expressing A.’s compounds in terms of actual ratios, but in addition to the passages cited above the idea of a numerical ratio is implicit in many others where he discusses the composition of various uniform parts, e.g. PA II, 4 for blood; PA 653a20 for brain; PA 654a29 for insect exoskeletons and GA 743a14 for nails. A. sometimes refers to uniform parts as also being composed of a ‘hot substance’, e.g. GA 743a14; he may mean pneuma – see Chs LIX and LXV. A. berates Empedocles for his theory of mixtures at GC 334a27; for the difference between mixtures and compounds see BOGAARD (1979). A.’s general theory of compounds is given at Meteor IV, 8, GC I, 10 and GC II, 7–8. I speak here of the uniform parts as varying in elemental proportions, but A. often couches his discussion of the composition of uniform parts in terms of contrary elemental powers (hot/cold, dry/wet) present and actually says these powers are more fundamental, e.g. PA 646a12. These powers are not isomorphic with the elements since each element is a combination of them, see Ch. LXXX, but, in fact, he often segues between talking about elements and their powers, e.g. GA 743a14; see WATERLOW (1982) pp. 83–6, SORABJI (1988) p. 70, KING (2001) pp. 74–80 and SCALITAS (2009).
The meaning of ‘hot’ and ‘cold’. A. discusses the various meanings of ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ at PA II, 2. When reading him on heat there are at least three possible sources of confusion. (i) He does not distinguish very clearly between the roles of heat in ‘cooking’ and ‘burning’, i.e. between endothermic and exothermic reactions, but see PA 648b35. (ii) When he says that something is ‘hot’ he does not necessarily mean that it has a high temperature compared to its surroundings, but often means that it is easily altered by the application of heat – in other words, that it burns, melts or cooks easily, cf. PA 648b16, i.e. he is talking about something akin to its relative thermodynamic stability. Fat is ‘hot’ in this sense (though it may also have a high temperature). (iii) Finally, there’s the question of ‘vital heat’. FREUDENTHAL (1995) argues that it is a very exotic kind of ‘informed heat’ rather than regular heat that happens to be in a living thing and he ties this to pneuma, on which see Ch. LIX. Although vital heat is not the same as conventional fire, this is unnecessarily vitalistic and we may doubt that pneuma is really so important for it does not appear in A.’s adult nutritional physiology in JSVM, but only in his embryology and sensory physiology where it seems to be a vehicle of the soul that permits action at a distance; see KING (2001) for a discussion.
The role of heat in the workings of the nutritive soul. Animals are said to have an internal source of heat at JSVM 469b8; cf. PA 682a24. A. compares fire to a river at JSVM 470a3 [trans. HETT (1936)], but says that vital heat is not conventional fire, GA 736b33, even though he often speaks of an internal ‘fire’. On the sufficiency of heat to effect transformation, see e.g. Meteor 390b2. For concoction and transformation see Meteor IV, 2–3, DA 416b28. When A. explains how heat produces various uniform parts he can be very confusing, e.g. GA 743a5. This is because he says that some uniform parts are formed by heating and others by cooling, and sometimes (e.g. flesh) are formed by both. The solution seems to be that the blood is heated, thereby separating it into hotter and colder components; the colder components then congeal into flesh or bone or other solid uniform parts, cf. Meteor IV, 7–8. Fire is said not to be the main cause of nutrition and growth at DA 416a9. A. emphasizes the necessity of regulating the internal fire at JSVM 469b10 and JSVM 474b10.
LVIII
The seat of the soul. A. speaks of vivisecting tortoises at JSVM 468b9 and JSVM 479a3; chameleons at HA 503b23, cf. PA 692a20; insects and plants at DA 411b19, JSVM 468a23, JSVM 471b20, JSVM 479a3 and PA 682a2; see LLOYD (1991) ch. 10. A. talks of the heart as the seat of the soul at JSVM 1, 3. Concoction and the internal fire in the heart are described at JSVM 469b10, its boiling action at JSVM 479b28. He says the heart is the citadel of the body at PA 670a25 and that it has supreme control at JSVM 469a5. His general account of the heart is given in PA III, 4; see KING (2001) pp. 64–
73 on A.’s cardiocentrism. He asserts that only organs with blood (in blooded animals) are viscera at PA 665a28. His contrast between centralized and distributed souls is developed at JSVM 468b9, cf. PA 682a2, PA 682b30, PA 666a13. COSANS (1998) ‘vivisected’ a terrapin.
LIX
The structure of the sensitive soul. The CIOM model is from GREGORIC and CORCILIUS (2013) who would not, however, call the entire system the sensitive soul. This difference in interpretation arises from the tension, pervasive in A.’s writings, between the cardiocentric and hylomorphic accounts of the soul. Perception as transmission of form: DA 435a4. Empedocles’ and Plato’s theory of vision are given at DA II, 7 and Sens 2; A. has other anatomical arguments against it too, but it’s hard to interpret them since his ocular anatomy is so hazy; see LLOYD (1991) ch. 10. A.’s theory of light and vision are given at DA II, 7 and DA 434b24. The precise nature of the change that occurs in the eyeball is controversial. Some scholars argue that it is a material change, others deny this. I am inclined to believe that it is a material change since it’s hard to see how a non-material change could effect further physical changes; and this model is consistent with the plainly material changes that occur with touch-perception; see JOHANSEN (1997) for a discussion. A. identifies the heart as the sensorium at PA 657a28 and JSVM 467b27 and argues against the brain at JSVM 469a10, JSVM 469a20 and PA 656a15. His account of the communication between the sense organs and heart is given at Sens 2; see LLOYD (1991) ch. 10 and FRAMPTON (1991). GREGORIC and CORCILIUS (2013) p. 63 discuss the homeostatic role of the sensitive soul; see DA 431a8. Desire has to drink at MA 701a32; see NUSSBAUM (1978) Essay 5 and CASTON (2009) on phantasia. A. alludes to the higher cognitive processes involved in the perception of smells at DA 424b16. Pleasant and painful desires are discussed at MA 701b35.
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