Little, it seemed, had been learnt from the ‘Crusader’ battle. Rather than dividing the front into two command areas, north and south, it was again divided into infantry and armour, static and mobile, front and back, with no thought of the confusion such arrangements would inevitably give rise to. Wherever the Axis forces attacked they would be engaging infantry and armour controlled from two separate headquarters.
Even more serious was Cunningham’s continuing failure to concentrate his armour adequately. He saw this as flexibility, it was merely incompetence. Auchinleck specifically enjoined him to ensure that no chance be given the enemy to destroy the British armour piecemeal, but such a chance was to be offered just the same. The British commanders, as Rommel said after the war, could not seem to grasp the peculiar conditions of mobile desert warfare. It was much akin to naval fighting; there was little point in relying on fixed positions, little to be gained from controlling space per se. If the British had been literally at sea they would have had no trouble grasping the point. Unfortunately they were only metaphorically at sea, and grasp it they could not.
The German attack on the frontier positions, when it came, would be concentrated against either the British right flank, centre or left flank. Which would it be? The former was considered unlikely. Along the coastal strip the terrain was difficult, the defences deep, and there was no obvious objective upon which an encirclement could be anchored. It would be like punching air. Auchinleck expected Rommel to try and punch a hole in the centre of the British line. Such an attack, if successful, would effectively cut Eighth Army in two, and give the German commander a good opportunity of encircling and destroying one of the halves. Cunningham thought Rommel would attempt a ‘Crusader- in-reverse’, a long right hook around the trailing British southern flank and a straight drive for the coast between Buq-Buq and Sidi Barrani. If this move proved successful the whole British army might be forfeit.
Both these options were certainly open to Rommel, and the deployment of the British armour had to take both possibilities into account. 1st Armoured Division was placed east and south of Bir el Khireigat, 7th Armoured Division an ominous twenty miles further south. In theory a German attack in the centre could thus be hit in both flanks, while one in the south would give the British armour time to concentrate. It sounded better than it was.
V
At dawn on Monday, 8 May, dense formations of German bombers and dive-bombers swooped down on the Tobruk perimeter defences, and as the clouds of smoke and dust drifted up into the blue sky detachments of infantry from 14th Motorised cut the wire along the south-eastern sector and pushed forward into the front-line defences. Within two hours a wide breach had been made, and the sappers and engineers were called forward to clear channels through the minefields and bridge the anti-tank ditch.
In April 1941 some forty German tanks had broken into these defences before being repulsed by strong counterattacks. Rommel was determined that there would be no recurrence of this setback; he had committed the whole of the recently arrived II Afrika Korps to the attack, while the more experienced I Afrika Korps kept watch on the frontier sixty miles to the east. At around 09.30 the tanks of 7th and 20th Panzer moved forward across the bridged antitank ditch and fought their way north towards the ‘King’s Cross’ road junction. By mid-afternoon they had broken through the inner minefields with only light losses and were engaging the Matildas and Valentines of 32nd Army Tank Brigade around ‘King’s Cross’ and astride the Pilastrino Ridge. In these engagements tank losses were heavier, and one British anti-aircraft crew who had the temerity to use their 3.7" AA gun against Balck’s tanks - the Germans had been using their similar 88mm AA guns in an anti-tank role since Arras in 1940 - claimed several victims before being overrun by German infantry.
By late afternoon the disparity of forces was becoming too much for the defenders. Manteuffel’s leading tanks had broken through to the harbour area and were gaily shooting up British naval vessels; Balck’s division was in undisputed possession of the ridge and the road junction. The Luftwaffe filled the sky.
General Scobie, commanding the garrison, realised that the unequal contest could not be prolonged indefinitely. In fact it was only his desire to inflict enemy losses that prolonged it through the night. By morning there was no choice but to raise the white flag. Tobruk had followed Malta into the Axis bag.
Rommel had no time for celebrations. ‘Fortress Tobruk has capitulated,’ he signalled the Panzer Army. ‘All units will reassemble and prepare for further advance.’ The Italian Brescia and Trento infantry divisions were set in motion for the frontier; II Afrika Korps refuelled, refitted and set out for its pre-arranged assembly area west of Gasr el Abid. The new offensive was set to begin four days hence, on Saturday, 13 May.
The inability of the British commanders to think and act at Rommel’s pace continued to haunt Eighth Army. Cunningham expected that his German counterpart would require at least a fortnight to prepare his next attack, despite plentiful past experience to the contrary. As darkness fell on 13 May he had no idea that the long columns of I Afrika Korps and XX Italian Corps were beginning their long night-march around his southern flank, following their route by compass, the moon, and the dim marker lights in gasoline cans. In the early hours of 14 May Cruewell’s Corps, with Rommel and his armoured command vehicle in close attendance, were refuelling south-east of Fort Maddalena, still unsighted by the British.
Further to the north, around Gasr el Abid, dawn broke with a ferocious artillery barrage and air strike as II Afrika Korps, fresh from its desert battle baptism at Tobruk, attacked the centre of the British line in the sector held by 150th Brigade of the 50th Infantry Division. 1st Army Tank Brigade was ordered south to help the hard-pressed infantry by 13th Corps Commander Godwin-Austen. He also suggested to his fellow corps commander, General Norrie, that 1st Armoured Division might also care to lend a hand.
Cunningham, as fortune would have it, received news of II Afrika Korp’s attack and garbled reports of a German armoured attack in the far south at the same time. Mindful of Auchinleck’s instructions not to send his two armoured divisions off in separate directions he decided to leave them where they were, and await identification of the main enemy effort. This, though understandable, was a mistake. Cunningham should have concentrated his armour at this point by withdrawing 7th Armoured Division northwards; by postponing such concentration until he had more information, the British commander gave Rommel exactly the chance which he wished to deny him.
The Panzer Army commander was, as usual in such situations, in his ‘Boy’s Own’ element. His plan, such as it was, was to strike north with I Afrika Korps across the British rear and see what happened. If II Afrika Korps broke through the British centre there was a good chance that the two corps between them could cut off and destroy the southern half of Eighth Army. Or, more optimistically, if I Afrika Korps reached the coast then the entire British Army would be trapped. The next few days would provide the answers.
For Cunningham too. As the sun rose in the sky that morning more ominous news came in from the south. 151st Brigade, holding the positions around Fort Maddalena, reported itself under strong attack from the Ariete Division. The 3rd Indian Motor Brigade, which had been deployed some ten miles to the east of Fort Maddalena, reported that it had been overrun by ‘an entire bloody German armoured division’. From 7th Motor Brigade there was no news at all. In fact it had been crushed by 21st Panzer, headquarters and all.
The next in line to face this southern onslaught was 4th Armoured Brigade, which should by this time have been falling back to link hands with 1st Armoured Division. But Cunningham had ordered it to stay where it was for the moment, and around 10.45 the Brigade suddenly found itself under attack from the south and south-west as 15th and 21st Panzer closed in for the kill.
Here the Germans received their first, though not too serious, setback. The new Grant tanks, of which German Intelligence knew next to nothing, proved a worthy foe for the panzers
. Though the British brigade lost more than forty tanks, nearly a quarter of its complement, the Germans lost close to that number themselves, and the British managed to withdraw northwards in reasonable order. The German divisions followed, but soon found themselves counter-attacked as 2nd Armoured Brigade appeared out of the north to bolster the shaken but still intact 4th Armoured Brigade. For the rest of the afternoon and early evening the two sides slugged away at each other, the 88s on the one side and the Grants on the other taking an occasional victim. Night fell with 15th and 21st Panzer in leaguer ten miles south of Bir el Khireigat. Further to the east 90th Motorised, which had earlier overrun the small supply depot at Habata, was now threatening the huge one at Misheifa.
During that afternoon a bolder man than Cunningham might have been tempted to bring 22nd Armoured Brigade into the battle against I Afrika Korps, in the hope of gaining a decisive victory. But the British commander was too worried about the situation developing on the frontier, where Schmidt’s Corps was proving too powerful for 150th Infantry Brigade. By nightfall mixed elements of 14th Motorised and 20th Panzer had secured a bridgehead to the west of the minefields, and a full-scale breakthrough was threatening. Cunningham decided that 22nd Armoured Brigade should attack this bridgehead at first light on the following day.
At the opposing Command HQ Rommel was worrying about his overextended supply route. The Italian motorised division Trieste had not yet taken Fort Maddalena, and I Afrika Korps’ supplies were still having to be carried right round the southern end of the British line. During the night Rommel considered sending the as-yet-uncommitted 7th Panzer south to help Trieste, but then decided that II Afrika Korps could be relied on to open a fresh route through the centre during the coming day.
Cunningham was not so confident, and the night passed with endless conferences among the British commanders which only served to increase their general confusion. In truth the British position at this juncture was far from untenable. The bulk of the armour was still intact and Rommel’s drive for the coast had been, temporarily at least, halted. 1st Armoured Brigade had been called out of reserve and was being deployed to the west of Misheifa, between 90th Motorised and the coast. There was a distinct possibility that the German attack could be ground down by a resolute defence, if only the British could react swiftly enough to whatever Rommel pulled out of his hat.
By dawn on 15 May they were already one step behind. Rommel, aware of the twenty-mile gap separating the two armoured engagements, had made use of his mobility. Before first light he had pulled 21st Panzer south and then directed it east towards the frontier, leaving 15th Panzer to tie down 4th and 2nd Armoured Brigades. Simultaneously Schmidt was funnelling 7th Panzer into the bridgehead. Cunningham had unwittingly directed 22nd Armoured Brigade into a trap. Around 08.00 it was still assembling to attack the bridgehead when 21st Panzer loomed out of the south to hit the brigade in the flank. A large number of British tanks were driven back on to the waiting 88s of 7th Panzer and 14th Motorised. The division broke up into uncoordinated segments, lost almost half its tanks, and took no further part in the battle for almost thirty-six hours. Yet again the Germans had managed to concentrate against dispersed British armour.
All was not yet lost, however. Units of 2nd Armoured Brigade, pushing south in an attempt to outflank the long-gone 21st Panzer, had inadvertently driven a wedge between the two German corps and struck hard at the unsuspecting Ariete Division. 21st Panzer, by now almost immobilised by lack of fuel, could neither go to the Italians’ aid nor close the gap. 15th Panzer was also low on fuel and ammunition, and fully occupied holding off the British armour to its north. So Rommel’s main priorities for the rest of the day were to reseal the gap, concentrate his two corps on a line facing north, and get supplies through to 15th and 21st Panzer. For the moment there could be no full-scale exploitation of the gap presented by 22nd Armoured Brigade’s temporary demise. Only 7th Panzer could be pushed north towards Bir el Khireigat, and this division was halted by the stern resistance of 1st Army Tank Brigade and the 2nd South African Brigade. On the frontier 20th Panzer and 14th Motorised were struggling to widen the breach through the minefields for the supply columns.
By nightfall on 15 May the ‘front’ ran in an L-shape south from the coast to Gasr el Abid and then east to the area of Habata. British armour losses had been heavier than the German, and the tank ratio now stood at roughly five to six. Cunningham reported to Auchinleck that he doubted whether a German breakthrough to the coast could be held off indefinitely. He wondered whether it would be wise to pull back to the Alamein positions which, Churchill notwithstanding, had been appreciably strengthened in the preceding months. Auchinleck decided to come and assess the situation on the spot the following morning. In the meantime he ‘advised’ Cunningham to move 1st Armoured Brigade, which had been ‘harassing’ 90th Motorised for the previous twenty-four hours, west to the area of Bir el Khireigat. 5th Indian Division could take its place north of Habata.
Through the night of 15/16 May the supply columns drove east across the gravel wastes to replenish the German right wing. Behind them rumbled the tanks of 20th and 21st Panzer. Rommel intended to deliver the decisive stroke that morning - a three-panzer division attack towards the coast at Buq-Buq. Eighth Army, he believed, was as good as dead.
Auchinleck, arriving at Cunningham’s HQ around 08.30, and, receiving the first reports of Rommel’s attack, came to a similar conclusion. Eighth Army had to retreat. Fortunately 1st Armoured Brigade had not, for reasons unknown, received the order to move west, and with the newly arrived 5th Indian Division was fighting a resolute delaying action.
Cunningham’s mental condition gave less cause for satisfaction. The strain had been too much, and Auchinleck effectively assumed direct command of Eighth Army that morning, Cunningham being officially relieved some days later.
What could be saved from the wreck? The two infantry divisions, with the exception of 50th Division’s 150th Brigade, had suffered relatively few casualties. The South African Division was ordered out along the coast road, while 50th Division’s other two brigades would retreat across the rear of the German armour. The armoured brigades in the north would fall back slowly to provide cover as the South Africans withdrew through the narrowing gap between the panzers and the sea.
Rommel, naturally enough, was determined to close the gap. In this he was to be disappointed. Despite all the efforts of the panzer crews their progress was slowed by the prodigious efforts of the RAF. On 16 and 17 May, as Auchinleck later categorically stated, ‘Eighth Army was saved by the RAF.’ When Balck’s leading panzers reached the coast two miles east of Buq-Buq at 15.45 on 17 May only a few stragglers remained to the west.
But there was ample compensation for Rommel. The enemy was in full retreat, having suffered severe losses in supplies and equipment. His victorious Panzer Army was now not much more than two hundred miles from Alexandria. Egypt, he believed, was in his grasp.
VI
During the next few days, as 90th Motorised reconnaissance units moved east along the coastal road in the wake of the retreating British, the defenders and population of the Egyptian heartland prepared themselves for the inevitable onslaught. The proud remains of the British Mediterranean Fleet sailed from Alexandria on the night of 19 May; around the harbour the demolition gangs awaited the order to destroy the port installations. The town itself seemed like a ghost town, the effects of a strict curfew compounded by the absence of army units, most of whom had been sent either west to the front or south-east to Cairo for possible evacuation.
In the capital itself streets were jammed with traffic from the front, from the country districts, from Alexandria. It was impossible to find space on the densely-packed trains leaving the main station for Palestine. On the roads leading east and south away from Cairo long convoys carried noncombat personnel towards the Suez Canal, Suez itself and the Upper Nile valley. On an open stretch of ground between the British Embassy and the GHQ buildings a number of b
onfires were consuming maps, codes, reports, documents of every kind. Cairo seemed to be echoing Moscow.
In the Abdin Palace a nervous King Farouk was closeted with ex-Prime Minister Ali Maher. The King had promised the British authorities that he would move to Gaza when the time came, but he had no intention of doing so. The Germans had also offered him sanctuary; the Abwehr had promised to spirit him and Ali Maher away to Crete. The two Egyptians had refused this offer. They would ‘disappear’ in the near future, they told their Axis contact, and resurface only to welcome the ‘liberation of our country’.
In the barracks of the Egyptian Army the plotting was also proceeding, though with little apparent effect. The Free Officers were trying to inveigle the powerful leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, Sheikh Hassan el Banna, to join them in mounting a coup. He advised them to wait for further Axis successes. When Rommel reached Alexandria, he told Anwar as-Sadat, then they would act together to free Egypt of the accursed British. While these two were sitting in Banna’s tree-shaded mansion in an expensive Cairo suburb, the British were busy building defensive positions on the outskirts of the capital, around Mena to the north-west and near the Pyramids to the west. Auchinleck was still in the desert, supervising Eighth Army’s retreat into the El Alamein positions, but messages were flashing back and forth between him and his deputy in Cairo, Lieutenant-General Corbett, concerning the defence of central Egypt. Though Auchinleck did not wish to alarm his already despondent army, he was determined to prepare for the worst. A plan to flood large areas of the Delta was being drawn up, a line of defences under construction between Wadi Natrun and the coast near Alexandria. If the worst came to the worst Auchinleck intended to pull Eighth Army back through Egypt step-by- step, half of it to the line of the Suez Canal, the other half up the valley of the Nile where it could threaten the flank of any German advance into Sinai and Palestine.
The Moscow Option Page 13
