Smith was found guilty and sentenced to sixteen years in prison, with a non-parole period of twelve years for his part in the child’s death and interfering with her corpse. He will not be eligible for release until 2023. In a secretly recorded conversation with undercover police, Smith said he’d heard a loud bang come from the child’s bedroom. However, throughout the months that followed he maintained the deception that Kiesha had disappeared without trace from the family unit, and he even said that Kiesha had been like a daughter to him. Eventually, though, Smith folded and admitted his part in the crime, pleading guilty in December 2011. During Smith’s trial, Abrahams’ identity was kept confidential to try and avoid any potential jury trial being affected.
The precise cause and time of Kiesha’s death were unknown. But a number of facts are incontrovertible. First, both Abrahams and Smith were forensically aware and tried to cover up what had happened to Kiesha. What was also clear was that Abrahams’ account of what happened was not supported by the physical forensic evidence. Things simply did not add up. As the cause of death could not be discovered, it was impossible to say if Abrahams intentionally committed an act – or more than one – to cause Kiesha harm, or if she was actually trying to kill her child. Or was the mother simply recklessly indifferent to the life of her child, as Abrahams contended. It was impossible for the court to determine the truth.
And the truth is important. Assessing the degree of intent to kill is an essential aspect of a fair trial, especially when considering sentencing, as the court must determine the gravity of the offence. The gravity is linked to the premeditation or intent.
In May 2013 Kristi had plead guilty to manslaughter as well as guilty to having interfered with the child’s remains. The Crown accepted the second plea, but did not accept the plea of manslaughter; they were determined to try Abrahams for murder. They got their wish. By the time Abrahams’ trial began in Sydney on 17 June 2013 she had changed her plea to guilty of murder, acknowledging that she killed Kiesha. She was charged with two offences: murdering Kiesha Weippeart and interfering with the child’s body. Claiming that the pre-trial publicity would prejudice a jury, Abrahams had made a bid to be tried before the judge alone, in her case Judge Harrison; however, her request was denied.
Murder carries a maximum penalty of life imprisonment, and due to Kiesha’s young age, a standard non-parole period of fifteen years was applied, with the act of improperly interfering with a body carrying a maximum penalty of two years in prison. However, the presiding judge has latitude as the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 19996 requires all of the relevant factors to be considered in sentencing. That includes the history of abuse – for example, when Kiesha was bitten by Abrahams as a fifteen-month-old.
Abrahams maintained that she had not intentionally hurt Kiesha. But the Crown countered, saying that the evidence indicated a number of blows from numerous directions, adding up to intent by Abrahams to inflict serious harm on a defenceless six-year-old. The forensic odontologist, Dr Middleton, found it difficult to determine how many times the child may have been hit. His initial estimate was simply ‘more than one’ but later in oral presentation he said possibly four or five individual blows were necessary to cause the pattern of damage found to the child’s tooth enamel.
Coupled with the other details, the prosecution said that this equalled intention to kill. Dr Orde, the forensic pathologist, could not determine the specific cause of death, as there simply was not enough evidence remaining. However, there was enough evidence to say that Kiesha suffered multiple head and face wounds around the time of her death – inconsistent with Abrahams’ story. The judge said that he was prepared to accept, beyond reasonable doubt, that the child did not simply strike her head on the foot of the bed after being nudged, causing the trauma found to the child’s teeth. He said there was an evidentiary gap between what the offender said happened and what must have actually happened to cause the injuries found. The Crown asserted that Kiesha had been thrown against a wall or the corner of the bed; however, this is speculation and cannot be proven from the evidence.
The number of blows is of real importance when looking at the culpability of the mother. Dr Middleton changed his estimate from ‘more than one’ to possibly four or five. This may have been what the judge called ‘recent invention’ on the part of Dr Middleton, and the judge decided it was safer to stick to the original opinion. As an expert, I would say it may be that Dr Middleton simply re-evaluated his evidence and determined a new number objectively. It may also be that he had been swayed by the wealth of evidence against Abrahams and was being influenced by the proceedings. All this can happen completely subconsciously, and I agree that sticking to the original estimation that was less damaging to Abrahams was the fairest way forward.
There was another essential comment made by the judge in relation to Middleton’s evidence. The odontologist based his assessment of the number of blows Kiesha would have to have received on biomechanics. It is common for odontologists and anthropologists to apply their knowledge of the biomechanics (the study of the mechanics of the human body, including the influence of internal and external forces – in this case, trauma) to determine the number of traumas required to cause damage. The judge noted that Middleton was not an expert in biomechanics, saying that he had stepped outside his area of expertise – a big no-no for an expert. But here I would question the judge’s decision making. Middleton was talking about the biomechanical properties of living tissues, and in this context a forensic odontologist is absolutely an expert, as is a forensic anthropologist – who else understands the responses of tissue better? Justice Harrison summarised with ‘The only evidence Dr Middleton could properly give within his area of expertise was that the positioning of the fractures to the deceased’s teeth established that different directional forces from more than one blow caused them’.7 This evidence, although limited, was supported by a paediatric dentist, Associate Professor Richard Widmer, who agreed that the dental damage was the result of trauma that occurred around the time of death. The judge did also concur that – even ignoring the problem with the number of blows – the injuries show an intention by whoever made them to cause really serious injury.
The judge determined that Abrahams was aware that Kiesha had sustained life-threatening injuries and that if she didn’t receive emergency medical help she might die. I agree the evidence points that way, as I cannot see how anyone could watch a child fit, remain unconscious for many hours and fail to respond to stimuli without realising that something was very, very wrong.
The court also heard how the child physically resembled her father and therefore reminded Abrahams of Christopher Weippeart. The memories triggered bouts of physical and verbal abuse because Abrahams was said to have hated Chris Weippeart. In another twist worryingly reminiscent of Dean Shillingsworth’s case, a few weeks before Kiesha’s death, Abrahams had wanted her father, Kiesha’s grandfather, to take custody of the child to live with him in Canberra, as Abrahams predicted she would kill the child and she was fed up with her wetting the bed. According to the prosecution, this was indicative of how Abrahams felt towards her daughter and what she would do to her if Kiesha remained in her custody. Abrahams said this to her father in a conversation that took place over a month before the child’s death. Did the father not take his daughter seriously? Maybe he underestimated the gravity of the comment. In his evidence he said he called Abrahams back an hour or two later and by that time she’d ‘calmed down’. He didn’t know his daughter well and may not have realised that Abrahams was having difficulty coping with Kiesha, and that she was ‘bad tempered’ with the child.
People say all sorts of things in anger and desperation, and through fear. But this was more than that. Under the circumstances it was a strange and foreboding request, as Kiesha did not know her grandfather – Abrahams had barely seen or spoken to him in the preceding fifteen years. Worse, Abrahams claimed her father had abused her as a child (the type of alleged abuse is not d
isclosed). Abrahams did not seem to be worried that Kiesha would be abused in the same way she claimed she had been as a child. But it begs the question – if Abrahams was so desperate to be rid of her daughter, why not ask DoCS for help? Perhaps, like Pfitzner, she was worried that if DoCS took Kiesha they would also take her other two children. That at least was the reason she gave for lying to the police and attempting to hide the body – her fear that her other children would be taken.
There was physical evidence of numerous periods of physical abuse, DoCS was aware of the family and the abuse was documented – again I wonder if someone couldn’t have predicted this dreadful outcome and stepped in before it was too late. Certainly the evidence from Abrahams that Kiesha wet the bed further supports the notion that she was suffering psychological trauma, as this is one of the physical symptoms of emotional abuse, together with problems sleeping. Bedwetting can be very frustrating for parents, especially parents who are themselves emotionally and intellectually challenged, and it is worse for children when the parents are predisposed to violent responses. The violence can cause more distress, increasing the occurrence of bedwetting episodes and the cycle continues.
The Crown also said that the fact the Abrahams tried to send her daughter to live with a man Abrahams hardly knew any more and who the child did not know at all, failed to get Kiesha medical help following her seizure, and that the couple had tried to burn her before burial shows how little Abrahams cared for this child. I agree, because the couple acted not through panic – as they took three days to dispose of Kiesha’s remains – they planned their steps to avoid detection and then lied for eight months while Kiesha was considered ‘missing’. Abrahams seemed more intent on protecting herself than worrying about the fact that her child was dead. But that doesn’t explain why.
Justice Harrison said that Kiesha’s death was the result of an ‘impulsive and uncontrolled act of violence’, and that it occurred quickly. The judge also thought that even had medical help been sought, Kiesha would probably have died anyway. To that end, in the judge’s opinion Abrahams did not stand by and watch Kiesha die when her death could have been prevented. From the court documents available, I am not sure how this conclusion was reached in terms of Kiesha’s recovery had she been treated. But one thing is for sure: Abrahams could not have known that her inaction would not in all likelihood have changed the outcome.
The judge presiding over Abrahams’ trial commented that there was no specific element of deterrence in Abrahams’ sentencing, as she is never likely to offend again and is expected to be rehabilitated during her time in prison. He also took into consideration that Abrahams was genuinely remorseful, as this came out when she was being secretly recorded when there was no reason for her to have lied. In fact, during the recorded conversation Abrahams is described as being quite emotional when recounting some of the events leading up to Kiesha’s death. However, when this is balanced against the fact that she conspired to hide Kiesha’s death, knew that the child’s body was being stored in a suitcase in the apartment, and then stood by and watched while an attempt was made to burn the little girl’s remains, in my mind Abrahams’ ‘remorse’ is not a given.
Abrahams was found guilty of both offences and was charged separately. The judge considered the murder in the mid-range of the category, disregarding the evidence indicating that Kiesha had been abused on previous occasions. This is because the injuries she received at those times did not directly contribute to her death. For the initial offence of murder, Abrahams was sentenced to a prison term of twenty-one years and six months, with a non-parole period of fifteen years, commencing on 22 April 2012 and expiring on 21 April 2027, and a balance of six years and six months beginning on 22 April 2027 to expire on 21 October 2033. Abrahams was also found guilty of improperly interfering with Kiesha’s body, which relates to the attempt at burning her remains, for which the mother was sentenced to a fixed term of imprisonment of eighteen months, which commenced on 22 April 2011, expiring on 21 October 2012. Together, this means that Abrahams was sentenced to a maximum term of twenty-two years and six months for murdering the ‘vulnerable and defenceless’ child and for interfering with her body afterwards, with a non-parole period of sixteen years. She will not be eligible for parole until 22 April 2027. Justice Harrison said Abrahams would get psychiatric care and support in prison. Following release, Abrahams will be subject to long-term supervision.
THE MEDIA’S INFLUENCE AND THE PUBLIC’S RESPONSE
Having heard the 000 call,8 and seen an analysis of the call, I consider that it has an unusual quality in that Abrahams fails to demonstrate the desperation you would expect from a distressed parent who has just found her child missing. Of course, what we now know that the 000 dispatcher did not know was that the child was dead and buried, some days previously. And, as one commentator pointed out, all the hallmarks you would expect to hear from a distraught mother are missing in that call. Most importantly, possibly, is that although this call is planned Abrahams is not a good liar. She does not know what someone in the position of a distraught mother who has just found her daughter missing would say, and as her focus is on deceiving the dispatcher into thinking the child is missing, she does not show the emotion expected. These calls are recorded, so afterwards the call can be reviewed and analysed, and – as we know – the last person to see the missing child is often the police’s main suspect.
But here we have to be careful as, although there are common responses, people are very different, and often the public falls into the trap of thinking someone doesn’t respond ‘normally’ to the death or disappearance of a child. If a mother doesn’t cry or show the ‘appropriate’ emotion, then we think they are involved. Despite the context of this book, the parents are not always involved, and do not always cry and behave as one might expect. The prime example of this would be Madeleine McCann’s parents, who were publicly vilified and openly accused of involvement with their daughter’s disappearance from their holiday apartment in Portugal in 2007. They have since been entirely cleared of any involvement.
The press reported that throughout Kiesha’s short and violent life, DoCS had received several reports of injuries from their neighbours and family members. The public’s attention therefore shortly turned to DoCS’ role in Kiesha’s death, and its failure to keep her safe when there was a family history of violence and physical assault. This case reignited the debate on the numbers of reports to the department each year that were not investigated because there simply weren’t enough caseworkers and other resources available to meet requirements.
DoCS weren’t the only ones in line for criticism. Judge Harrison commented on the public response:
The offender has been publicly vilified. The death of a child stirs many emotions in the community, not the least of which I strongly suspect is guilt.9
The press reported more angry scenes outside the Supreme Court of New South Wales when Abrahams arrived in the police van for trial. Inside, the courtroom was packed as Justice Harrison handed down his sentence. Abrahams remained withdrawn, with her back to the public gallery, showing no emotion as she learnt her fate. How many of those witnessing the spectacle firsthand, or those who read about it later, would have considered this a strange response? Knowing what we know about Abrahams, her childhood and her emotional and intellectual limitations, it is, I would think, the only way we could have expected her to behave.
The mother did not escape public vitriol; the local community was asked to restrain its anger so that Abrahams could receive a fair trial. It’s questionable whether this happened, with death threats levelled at Abrahams and calls for the reintroduction of capital punishment and summary justice. Some members of the Mount Druitt community formed the ‘Voice of Kiesha’ support group, represented by purple t-shirts carrying their logo. Purple was Kiesha’s favourite colour.
The were abusive shouts of ‘Rot in hell’ from the public gallery as Abrahams was led away. They certainly show the level of public ang
er towards a mother who could commit the worst crime of all – to hurt her own child. Someone else shouted ‘I didn’t even know her and I loved her more than you’. Sadly, and you could argue as a result of Abrahams’ background and intellectual disabilities, that is probably true.
I was a little surprised to find balance in the media coverage of the event. Newspaper articles listed the case details, but they also told of Abrahams’ early life – the abuse, the problems, the violence and neglect. The Sydney Morning Herald ran a particularly interesting piece in July 2013,10 in which the writer noted that all too often criminal offenders have suffered hard and terrible childhoods. This news of course is not novel. Kristi Abrahams was mentioned in the article, as was the fact that she was abused as a child. This information was not presented as an excuse. But it is refreshing that in 2013 we look for reasons rather than just at outcomes, and that the mass media is taking a more responsible view on criminal behaviour, seeing it as more than just a matter of offender accountability, but rather as a problem that should be faced and dealt with by society as a whole. I wholly commend the author and the paper for the piece. Perhaps we have learnt something about why these situations arise after all.
COMPARATIVE CASES
Abrahams had an intellectual disability, an IQ of 68, a significantly disadvantaged background and had suffered a highly dysfunctional childhood. The defence said she was a ‘product of what happened to her’. We can never make excuses for the terrible things people do, and sadly, many, many people grow up in disadvantaged circumstances and suffer from intellectual disabilities. But not all of those people end up murdering one of their children. So on the one hand I think it’s too simplistic to say someone had a hard time growing up therefore what they do can be excused. But on the other, there are certainly patterns to some of these types of incidents – patterns I think we ignore at our peril – and some of these circumstances do at least constitute mitigating circumstances.
Mothers Who Murder Page 13
