by John Hackett
It was still true, however, that in comparing the two blocs, geography, so important a factor in sea power, did impose constraints. The advantage of unified political control enjoyed by the Soviet Union, as compared with the autonomy of the countries comprising the Western coalition, was offset by the continued existence of four major threats to the freedom of Soviet movement by sea. The British Isles could act as an unsinkable aircraft carrier in the north-west approaches to Europe. The exits from Murmansk to the Atlantic, and from the Baltic to the North Sea, could not be regarded as secure. Nor could the Dardanelles, so long as Turkey was imprisoned in the capitalist camp. In the Far East, Japan was so placed as to be able to impose serious limitations on the use of Vladivostok. Soviet policy would sooner or later have to eliminate these four constraints upon her sea power.
Turning now to the comparison of actual naval forces, the paper first referred to the criteria of relative capabilities which had been used in determining the shape and size of the Soviet Navy in accordance with its various missions. Formerly, ‘like fought like’ at sea; a direct comparison of the numbers of similarly armed ships which could be brought into action at a given place and time had always formed the basis both of strategy and of tactics. Now, the balance of naval capability had to be calculated by mathematical systems analysis, solving multi-criteria problems for various adversary situations and different combinations of heterogeneous forces and means. Objective analysis of this kind permitted determination of the necessary and sufficient composition of forces and their combination into balanced groups. Because the application of such methodical, indeed scientific, analysis was indispensable to a proper assessment of the naval-air situation in the Middle East, it was deemed essential to explain it in some detail.
The central concept in modern naval force comparison, the paper affirmed, was the weapon system, not the ship, the submarine or the aircraft, though these were considered as targets for the various weapon systems. In defining a weapon system a choice had to be made. At one end of the spectrum, a club in the hand of a caveman could be called a weapon system; at the other, a ballistic missile submarine. In the present context, the elements of a weapon system were:
1 A means of detecting and identifying a possible target.
2 A warhead capable of destroying or neutralizing that target.
3 A vehicle to carry the warhead to the target.
4 A launcher for the vehicle.
5 A means of controlling the vehicle so that it will hit the target.
6 Protection for the vehicle and warhead against counter-measures designed to prevent either or both from hitting the target.
Certain features of the operational environment profoundly affected weapon systems, the paper went on. If the target was under water the system would be dependent upon the acoustic properties of seawater; if it was above water, it would be dependent upon electro-magnetic radiation. Weapon systems which required a homing device of any kind for target acquisition could always be decoyed or otherwise countered. Those guided by radio command were susceptible to electronic jamming. The tactics used in bringing weapon systems to bear were governed by their characteristics. The principle of concentration of force required continuous reinterpretation in the light of complex and varied weapon systems.
Taking the targets in turn, studies had shown that:
1 Surface ships are vulnerable to surface-skimming, submarine-launched, horizon-range missiles; to tactical surface-to-surface missiles; to air-to-surface missiles; and to torpedoes and mines.
2 Submarines are vulnerable to submarine-launched, wire-guided torpedoes; to aircraft-launched torpedoes and nuclear depth charges; and to ship-launched torpedoes.
3 Aircraft are vulnerable to surface-to-air short-range missiles; to surface-to-air medium- or long-range missiles; and to aircraft-launched missiles.
It had been established, the paper continued, that the latest Soviet weapon systems performed as well, if not better, than their equivalents in service in the US Navy. Soviet strategic deployments and tactical dispositions, therefore, must always aim at bringing to bear a superior concentration of appropriate weapon systems, while denying to the enemy the opportunity to do so. In the field of underwater warfare, two special factors had to be borne in mind. First, owing to the relatively low speed of sound waves in water, it was not feasible for submarines to operate in close formation with each other in order to bring to bear a concentration of weapon systems upon a hostile submarine or surface target. In a submarine versus submarine action, therefore, victory was likely to go to the one which first detected the other. And because noise levels depended mainly upon speed, the submarine whose mission required it to move rapidly would be at greater risk of being surprised. Second, mines could be used with great effect in certain circumstances.
A reminder was then given of the effect upon naval operations of the almost continuous reconnaissance, by satellite or aircraft, now available. The movements of all major surface ships, whether naval or merchant, were now known, and could, if required, be shown direct on TV screens anywhere in the world. Only the submarine forces remained secure from observation, and even in their case good estimates could often be made of the number and types at sea in various areas. But one very serious constraint remained in regard to submarine operations: the need to avoid mutual interference between friendly submarine and anti-submarine forces.
The final section of the Soviet naval staff paper reviewed the situation in the Red Sea, Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf. In comparing the naval and air forces, it assessed the available weapon systems on both sides as approximately equivalent. The Soviet naval object was to support Soviet foreign policy, in exerting pressure on the United States forces in the area, and assisting the fraternal United Arab Republic forces to deny full control of the Persian Gulf to Iran. The course of action recommended was to reinforce the Soviet naval air squadron re-established at Aden with an additional squadron of Backfire bombers, and one of Foxbat fighters. The task group based on a Kiev-class, anti-submarine carrier, now visiting Mauritius, should proceed to the Red Sea, preparatory to the declaration of a War Zone there, should this become necessary. Under the heading ‘Command Communications and Control’, the naval staff advised the establishment forthwith of a Flag Officer Soviet Middle East Forces (FOSMEF), with headquarters ashore at Aden. The agreement of the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) government should not be difficult to obtain. FOSMEF would require a full operational staff, an air deputy and a political adviser. A communications echelon would be set up, with an organization appropriate to the major operational task envisaged. FOSMEF would, for the time being, be responsible administratively to the Commander-in-Chief Soviet Black Sea Fleet, at Sevastopol. Operationally, he would be directly responsible to the Commander-in-Chief Soviet Fleet.
When the Soviet naval staff paper was taken by the Main Military Council, together with several other important papers, the Conclusions and Recommendations were approved.
APPENDIX 3: NATO Naval Command Structure
It was natural in 1951 to create first an Allied Command Europe, in order to establish US forces on the ground, where they would discourage the Soviet Union from any further westward advance. It was also natural to create an Allied Command Atlantic, in order to ensure the reinforcement and re-supply of the US ground forces. It was inevitable, also, that both supreme commanders should be US officers. It was, perhaps, equally natural, and inevitable, that Great Britain, especially with Winston Churchill once again returned to power as Prime Minister, was not ready to subordinate the Royal Navy entirely to an American admiral with his headquarters on the far side of the Atlantic. Not until it had been agreed, therefore, to set up an Allied Commander-in-Chief, Channel, with supreme commander status, and a British admiral in the post, would Churchill agree to the activation of SACLANT. The Channel command was confined to the southern North Sea and the English Channel; and it was hoped that the worst possibilities of operational misunderstanding, at the co
mmand boundaries, would be eliminated by ensuring that the same British officers who exercised certain British national commands, and appropriate subordinate commands in Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT), would also hold the subordinate posts in the Channel Command. The wartime mission of SACLANT would be to maintain intact the communication lines of the Atlantic Ocean, to conduct conventional and nuclear operations against enemy naval bases and airfields, and to support operations carried out by SACEUR, while the Commander-in-Chief, Channel (CINCHAN) was ‘to control and protect merchant shipping, to endeavour to establish and maintain control of the area, and to support operations in adjacent commands’.
Since 1951, a number of important developments had taken place, both political and strategic. Although no single one might have justified a change in the command structure, their cumulative effect would do so. The developments were these: the post-war recovery of Western Europe, despite severe economic setbacks, which had transformed the relationship with the USA from dependence to interdependence; the advent of submarine-launched ballistic missiles, which had relegated the US Strike Fleet from being the primary naval strategic force, and only secondarily a general-purpose force, to being primarily a general-purpose force, with a nuclear strike capability; the rapid increase in the number of nuclear-powered general-purpose submarines in both the Soviet and the US Navies; the continued failure of scientific research and technological development to provide an effective means of detecting and accurately locating submerged submarines (while this failure preserved the second-strike capability of the SSBN forces, and hence contributed to the maintenance of strategic nuclear stability, it augmented the threat of submarine attack on shipping and surface warships, already far more serious than in the worst period of the Battle of the Atlantic in the Second World War); the discovery and exploitation of oil and natural gas in the North Sea and the Norwegian Sea; the withdrawal of British naval forces from permanent stations outside the NATO area, and full dependence upon NATO for national security; the closer political association of the Western European members of NATO, and their desire to have a greater say in the conduct of the affairs of the Alliance, vis-à-vis the United States; the adoption of communication networks, data exchange systems, warning systems and air defence systems which needed to be matched by appropriate command and control arrangements if full advantage was to be taken of these techniques; the fact that nuclear-powered general purpose submarines operate with so much less effectiveness, and are indeed much more susceptible to detection, location and destruction, in the shallow waters of the Continental Shelf (200 metres or less) than in the deep ocean beyond; finally, and most important, the adoption of a strategy of ‘flexible response’ in place of the originally declared strategy of ‘massive retaliation’ against the first identified aggression.
Thus, while the basic requirement remained, that the NATO ground forces in Western Europe should be reinforced and supplied across the Atlantic, almost every other condition which governed the original NATO command structure had altered. What was, in effect, a continuation of the Second World War-winning set-up would no longer serve. A flexible response strategy meant nothing if it did not mean the demonstration, in peacetime, of both the determination and the capability to engage major enemy forces by land, sea and air, if put to the test. Given the speed of movement and scale of attack which had to be expected, as well as the range of tactical missiles, the whole land and sea area of the north-west European Continental Shelf would have to be regarded, from the outset, as part of the central front battlefield. True, the nature of the operations thereon would be three-dimensional; and the area would retain its character as the terminal and entrepôt for transatlantic support. But one thing was certain: the purely political character of Channel Command, squeezed between a subordinate command of SACLANT, who was far away in Norfolk, Va., and the presumably hard-pressed SACEUR, across the Channel, could not be expected to meet the requirements of war.
To abolish CINCHAN, and incorporate his command in ACLANT, would merely invite that well-known over-centralization syndrome known as ‘apoplexy at the centre and paralysis at the extremities’. To subordinate CINCHAN to SACEUR, with whatever title, would cause the latter to be continually looking over his shoulder. There remained a third alternative, namely to create, out of CINCHAN, a new Supreme Allied Command, which would comprise the existing Channel Command, and part of the existing Eastern Atlantic Command, adjusted so as to be approximately contiguous with the United Kingdom Air Defence Region. The new command, which it was decided to call the Joint Allied Command Western Approaches (JACWA), would be a joint sea-air command, held by the British Naval and Air Commander-in-Chief. The British Flag Officer Submarines, and a US flag officer, would be deputies, and the chief of staff a NATO admiral of another nationality. The EASTLANT-Channel naval-air headquarters became the home of JACWA, and fairly soon the structure of subordinate commands, based upon retention of national command, but flexibility of operational command and, to an even greater extent, of operational control, was in being and working well.
The Commanders-in-Chief of JACWA discovered first that, whether they liked it or not, they would become, early on in a typical ‘invasion from the East’ situation, engaged in a battle for the Baltic Exits; they might also find themselves arranging for the withdrawal from West Germany and the Netherlands of warships and submarines nearing completion, or refitting, lest they should fall into enemy hands. In fact, had they not existed at the outbreak of the Third World War, Cs-in-C JACWA would have had to be created. Their task included the entire planning and operational responsibilities which had fallen to the Admiralty during both the previous world wars, in its capacity as a command post for operations in home waters and the North Atlantic. It was still in his capacity as C-in-C Fleet, however, and not as Naval C-in-C JACWA, that the British admiral set in train the NORSECA plan (see above).
APPENDIX 4: The Home Front
I: A summary of events in civil defence in the seven vital years 1978-85
1978
Government allocation for civil defence at approximately style='font-size:12.0pt;font-family: "Calibri","sans-serif"; color: black'>£2 million (in real terms about one-twentieth of the 1968 budget) is totally inadequate. Government directives and plans for dealing with emergencies are out of date and irrelevant. Except in a few counties there is little or no interest in civil defence or emergency planning.
1979
Formation of National Emergency Volunteers (NEV) — a voluntary, self-financing organization formed to recruit, train and equip civil defence workers at parish/community level and to encourage parishes and urban communities to plan and organize as survival units in an emergency — with the emphasis on self-sufficiency.
In a period of massive unemployment and uncertainty the NEV rally strong support. Under imaginative and forceful leadership it begins to impress government and local government with the urgent necessity of taking positive action to restore a civil defence capability.
In late 1979 the government passes legislation facilitating the embodiment of TAVR in an emergency.
1980 and 1981
The NEV increase rapidly in all counties. Fifty per cent of all rural parishes now have workable emergency plans and are equipped with radiac instruments and chemical detector papers, and 65 per cent have one or more civil defence advisers. In urban communities the proportions are 12 per cent and 18 per cent.
1982
In March 1982 a US bomber carrying five 10-megaton nuclear weapons collides in mid-air with a Jumbo jet over Hampshire and crashes in flames on Fawley oil refinery. There is no nuclear explosion, but a substantial escape of radioactive cloud which blows across Southampton Water. Radiation is detected by a NEV operator in Warsash. His early warning makes possible rapid evacuation of population in the path of the fall-out as far inland as Petersfield. Casualties treated number 631 and include five deaths. Population in southern counties alerted.
Later in the year the IRA threaten to detonate a
nuclear warhead in the Bristol Channel. The partial evacuation of Bristol is started before the threat is disposed of. The public is now aroused to demand that the government provide proper protection in an emergency with a faster reaction time.
1983
The government passes the Civil Protection (Emergencies) Act, giving statutory recognition to the NEV with an annual allocation of style='font-size:12.0pt;font-family: "Calibri","sans-serif"; color: black'>£2 million per annum for the purchase of civil defence equipment at parish/community level, and to defray administrative and training costs.
The total grant for civil defence and emergency is increased by £30 million per annum; this includes provision for the hardening of essential communications systems against EMP (electro-magnetic pulse).
This Act sweeps away the former emphasis on secrecy, and introduces a new two-stage emergency warning — Phase 1, ‘Warning Stand-by’; Phase 2, ‘Action’ — and stresses that each level of authority in an emergency — region, county, district, parish, ward, street association, etc. -must plan and equip to be self-contained at immediate notice and to survive for at least a week without help from outside.
