by Bob Woodward
Welch said he agreed that the mistreatment of the Navy couple was more indicative of an environment of chaos than was the shooting of the Marine. He wanted to make sure both actions were not the work of some errant PDF soldiers.
Powell and Kelly said that they were as sure as they could be. Not only the accounts of the Navy couple, but the intercepted signals intelligence on Noriega showed he was personally covering up for his own organization.
In that environment, Welch responded, the choice for the United States was either to get out of Panama entirely or get in all the way. Given the international responsibility to protect the Panama Canal, the United States could not retreat to a Panama equivalent of Guantanamo Bay, the only remaining U.S. enclave in Cuba. So in that sense there was no choice.
Still, Welch, holding his audience with a careful pause, said they had to understand and consider the downsides of a massive invasion.
Powell and the others seemed to want to hear what he had to say.
The first downside, Welch said, was that they had to expect that the other Latin American nations would, at the least, posture against what the United States was doing. U.S. policies in the region could be set back years. The issue would likely be whipped up by the media. There was no way the United States realistically could expect any public expressions of support from Latin American friends.
Though Powell agreed, he replied that the Latin American leaders privately would be as delighted as anybody to be rid of the Noriega embarrassment.
Nonetheless, Welch said, it was a downside that had to be faced. In addition, the reaction was likely to be negative in other countries where the United States had large bases, such as the Philippines.
A second downside, Welch said, was the possibility that the PDF might be far more resistant than expected. The United States had to be prepared to commit whatever force was necessary for whatever time was necessary to clear up the situation. BLUE SPOON includes what we think is a totally adequate force, Welch said, and that could lead the President or anyone else to conclude that that is the limit of the commitment. That could be a big problem. He hoped a quick fix had not been promised.
A third downside, Welch pointed out, was that there would be critics who would say that the Department of Defense was running out of enemies and had seized on this opportunity to demonstrate the need for military force.
Fourth, Welch said, was the David and Goliath problem—the real possibility that popular feeling, due partly to the impact of the media in this country, would see Noriega as the little guy, unfairly overwhelmed.
And fifth, they had to be sure that they didn’t have a Gulf of Tonkin situation, Welch said, referring to the ambiguous nature of the 1964 North Vietnamese attacks on U.S. ships, which had led to a congressional resolution granting President Johnson extraordinary authority to respond in Vietnam. This time, Welch said, the American military had to be certain that the provocation was genuine, that they had a situation in Panama they couldn’t live with, that they couldn’t ask their people down there to live with.
It was a long list of negatives, and it was not clear where Welch was going with his argument.
He finally summarized. As long as they went in with their eyes open to these downsides and were committed enough to overcome them as events unfolded, he supported the operation. There was no other solution, he said.
Powell took the floor. He and Kelly were going over to see the President, he said. My recommendation is going to be that we execute BLUE SPOON. “I want to make sure that we’re all agreeing.” He went around the room once again asking for final recommendations.
All four chiefs said they were with him.
Carrying large poster-board maps showing the assault points in Panama, Powell and Kelly climbed into the Chairman’s car and were driven to the White House.
That Sunday was a beautiful wintry day. The city streets were decked out for Christmas. It was a time for family and peace, perhaps the most difficult season in which to recommend an offensive military operation to the President, Powell reflected.
Kelly and Powell were wearing casual civilian clothes as they trooped through the White House up to the second-floor residence for a two o’clock meeting with Bush. One of the Bushes’ many Christmas parties, this one for some of their closest family and friends, was winding down on the first floor. Carolers in 18th-century costume were singing off to one side and a few hangerson lingered.
Cheney, who had attended a few Christmas parties since his morning meeting at the Pentagon, arrived. Baker, Scowcroft, Bob Gates and press secretary Marlin Fitzwater also came in. Bush was wearing a white shirt, blue blazer, gray slacks, brown shoes and a pair of bright red socks, one emblazoned with the word “Merry,” the other with “Christmas.” Kelly thought they were the most God-awful socks he’d ever seen.
Powell noted to himself that the only key players missing were Vice President Quayle and Chief of Staff Sununu. Normally Powell wouldn’t have gone to such a meeting without an advance read on the positions of the various players, but events had carried them so quickly that he had not had a chance to find out where people stood.
Kelly gave a seven-minute summary of the facts they had gathered about Lieutenant Paz’s death and the harassment of the Curtises. The latter incident had been overseen, he said, by a senior PDF officer. Kelly could tell that Bush and the others were more disturbed by this event than by the shooting of Paz. Sticking to the facts, Kelly, who favored an invasion, laid it on as heavily as he could. He said these two actions were unprecedented, even in Noriega’s Panama.
Powell presented only one option to the President: BLUE SPOON.
Why don’t we just go get Noriega? Bush asked. Take me through why we shouldn’t do this with a smaller force.
Reeling off all his arguments about the need to destroy the PDF, Powell said that the massive use of force was in fact less risky than a smaller effort. This was the prudent course, he told Bush. The choice, effectively, was pay now or pay later. You go down there to take Noriega out and you haven’t accomplished that much because he would be replaced by another corrupt PDF thug.
“You’re going to have American blood spilled,” Powell warned, but probably more would be spilled with a small force than if they used a major blow to take the PDF down.
Powell said he would need at least 48 hours’ advance notice to prepare and marshal the forces and air transportation for BLUE SPOON. The ideal H-Hour was 1 a.m., late enough to surprise the PDF but leaving five hours before daybreak to decapitate them. Also, a 1 a.m. start would be close to high tide, a real benefit for the Navy SEALs. At low tide, some of the landing areas would be vast mudflats, so mucky that not even the hardy SEALs could trudge through them. Another benefit was that only one plane was scheduled to land after 1 a.m. at Torrijos international airport, a key target.
BLUE SPOON would be a complete take-down of the PDF and the Panamanian government. “We are going to own the country for several weeks,” Powell said, underscoring that this plan was not a surgical strike, or a simple in-and-out operation. Bad things will happen, Mr. President, the Chairman said. There will be casualties, ours and theirs, military and civilian. “We will do everything we can to keep them at a minimum.”
Scowcroft inquired about casualty levels.
“We are going to hurt people,” Powell responded. “There will be loss of life and there will be chaos. We are going to be taking down the law enforcement operation.” He avoided naming a specific number. He said he could guarantee rapid success but could not give a specific time of how long it would take.
“Don’t ask us in two days when we are coming home, Mr. President,” Powell said. “The PDF could surrender at the first landing and be out there with ‘Welcome Yankee’ signs, or there could be nasty firefights for weeks.”
Bush probed. He had all kinds of questions that challenged the plan, some of them very specific; for example, how long it would take to get from one road to another. “Well, I don’t know,”
the President said at one point.
Powell feared that the meeting was drifting like a sailboat tacking back and forth across a bay, and he didn’t know where it would end up. After answering the questions put to him, he concluded: “My recommendation is that we go with the full plan. I can tell you that the chiefs agree with me to a man.”
When Powell was finished, Cheney spoke up. “I support what the Chairman just recommended to you,” he told Bush.
Kelly had the impression that Cheney’s relative silence meant he’d talked with the President separately before the meeting, and felt that since his position was already on the table, he didn’t need to say a lot.
But, in fact, Cheney had not spoken privately with Bush. It was simply that after the failed coup, it had become clear to him that the President wanted this problem solved. It had been up to Powell, he felt, to carry the ball by outlining the military plan.
“I think we ought to go,” Baker said. “As you know, the State Department has been for this for a long time, but these are the downsides of doing it.”
The Secretary of State then made a tour of the world, predicting the responses the invasion would prompt. The Organization of American States would feel an obligation to denounce the interference, he said, but that was predictable. Individual Latin American governments and Third World nations would feel the same obligation. Mexico would take a real shot for sure. Even the allies, the friendly governments of Western Europe, would give the United States some flak just because it would be a good opportunity to bash Uncle Sam. The Soviets would also make their usual negative statement. But overall, Baker said, he did not think that any nation’s heart would be in the criticism, and he anticipated that privately most of these governments would send back-channel word that they were neutral or even pleased.
Baker said that State could handle the notification process with other governments—the allies, the Soviets. The President, of course, would want to make many of the calls.
Scowcroft reentered the fray. As Powell saw it, Scowcroft was doing Bush’s sharpshooting.
What about the casualty levels? Scowcroft asked again, raising his voice.
Powell said no number could be given.
Damage levels?
Again it was hard to say, but a large force was planned and the damage would be extensive, though they were not going to go in just to shoot up the place, Powell said. Each of the 28 targeted assault points was there for a reason—concentrations of the PDF, possible Noriega hangouts, the main power distribution center, and Madden Dam, which controlled much of the water in the canal and had to be protected. Loss of Madden Dam could render the canal unusable for up to a year. The CIA man Kurt Muse was targeted for rescue—the old ACID GAMBIT rescue plan had been incorporated into BLUE SPOON.
Would Noriega be captured?
The best special operations people would be on his trail.
One of the President’s stated goals in Panama was to bring about democracy, Scowcroft noted. Would this do it? And how?
The plan was to secretly swear in Endara, the winner of the May election, as president just before the invasion.
Soon they turned away from the BLUE SPOON plan itself, and began to ask about the aftermath. At this moment, Powell thought it finally looked as if Bush were going to approve. The sailboat had finished its tacking and was heading directly to its destination.
Someone asked about the public and press reaction.
Marlin Fitzwater, who had said very little, now remarked that he thought both would generally be positive. “Of course, you’re going to have that element in the press that will criticize you,” he told Bush. But he himself did not think that would be a major problem.
After an hour and 40 minutes, Bush said, as if to summarize the view of Noriega that had emerged, “This guy is not going to lay off. It will only get worse.”
In Powell’s own mind, the six key questions had been asked and answered. Was there sufficient provocation? Powell thought yes. Has the PDF changed and gone out of control? Again yes. Would BLUE SPOON resolve the problem? Yes. Would the plan minimize damage and casualties? Yes. Would it bring democracy? Yes. And public and press reaction? Probably positive.
“Okay, let’s go,” Bush said. He looked at Powell, and said very quietly, “We’re going to go.”
“Roger, sir.”
Kelly felt an immediate rush to his gut, the first time in his two years as director of operations. They were committing young Americans to combat and some of them were going to die. The safety had been taken off the loaded guns.
Because BLUE SPOON required a 48-hour minimum advance notice, H-Hour was set for 1 a.m. Wednesday, December 20.
Who could know about the decision without compromising operational security? someone asked.
The minimum number of people essential to successfully carry out the operation, Bush directed. He made it clear that he meant the absolute minimum.
• • •
Powell and Kelly were quiet in the car going back to the Pentagon. “I want you to get this information out,” Powell said, referring exclusively to the key operations people in the commands that would be involved. “I don’t want an order published. I want you to just call people on the [secure] telephone.” Powell said that the Vice Chairman, General Bob Herres, and the current director of the Joint Staff, Lieutenant General Michael P. C. Carnes, could be told the next day.
Both Powell and Kelly pondered how long the secret could be kept. They hoped to make it through the Monday evening news without some direct information leaking. They thought something would get out on Tuesday for sure, but perhaps the leak would be late enough or unclear enough that they would still have a chance for some kind of surprise at H-Hour.
Back at the Pentagon, Powell called the four CINCs who would be immediately involved.
One was Max Thurman. Powell told him that BLUE SPOON had been approved but the formal order would not come until the next day.
“Roger.”
Powell also called the CINC of the Special Operations Command, General James J. Lindsay, and the Forces Command CINC, General Edwin H. Burba, Jr.
At the U.S. Transportation Command headquarters at Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, General Hansford T. Johnson was not anticipating an execution order. Several months earlier he had left the Pentagon, where he had been director of the Joint Staff under Admiral Crowe, and he still had good contacts back in Washington. Earlier that Sunday morning he and his people had received informal word to “spin up” their airlift capability for BLUE SPOON. Some of Johnson’s staff people had told him they would not be able to find the pilots fast enough for an execution. But in the afternoon they were told it wasn’t going to happen and to get unspun. When Powell’s call came through, Johnson was a little surprised to be hearing from the Chairman.
“The President has authorized me to tell you we’re going to execute BLUE SPOON,” Powell said.
“We are prepared to go,” Johnson said, in spite of the warnings of a pilot shortage.
Powell called each of the chiefs to inform them of Bush’s approval. He apologized to Vuono for failing to show up at his Christmas party that afternoon. Cheney also had been a no-show.
As a final matter that night, Powell made sure that the key special operations units were dispatched. The lead Delta squadron, code-named AZTEC PACKAGE, and a SILVER BULLET package of helicopters probably would be left back in the States for any terrorist contingency elsewhere in the world. Otherwise, much of the military’s special operations capability was going to be sent to Panama, more than 4,000 men. Many would be involved in tracking and, if all went well, apprehending Noriega in the first hours of the operation.
An order was issued dispatching 20 special operations scout and attack helicopters to Panama on giant C-5 cargo planes. They were to be unloaded at night and hidden in hangars until H-Hour.
• • •
Kelly knew one way he could enforce “opsec,” operational security. Back in his office at the
Pentagon, he called in the Crisis Action Team for Panama and told them to go home. Next, he called in the public affairs officer for the Joint Staff, Navy Captain Erwin A. Sharp, and told him to go on his scheduled Christmas leave.
When everyone had cleared out, Kelly summoned his deputy for current operations, Joe Lopez, and four junior officers on his Latin American team, and sat them down on the leather couches and chairs in his office.
“We’re going to execute BLUE SPOON,” Kelly said, swearing each to maximum secrecy, and instructing that every step was to be carried out with opsec foremost in their minds.
Kelly received a call from General Lindsay, commander-in-chief of the Special Operations Command. Lindsay said he thought it was a terrible name for an operation. “Do you want your grandchildren to say you were in BLUE SPOON?” he asked Kelly.
It could have been worse, Kelly thought. One of the Panama contingency plans was named BLIND LOGIC. Other operations had been given equally strange names over the years. One general had executed a STUMBLING BLOCK and a LIMA BEAN. Kelly tossed around ideas for a new name with Joe Lopez. “How about JUST ACTION?” Kelly proposed.
“How about JUST CAUSE?” Lopez countered.
They agreed that would be much better. The name was sent up the chain of command and approved.
A fax had arrived from Panama, reporting on the Naval Investigative Service’s debriefings of Navy Lieutenant Curtis and his wife, Bonnie. Bonnie Curtis’s detailed account of her treatment was even worse than what had been reported to President Bush, Cheney and Powell. The two-and-a-half-page summary, stamped received at the JCS December 17 at 12:37 p.m., said of Mrs. Curtis’s questioning: “The interrogator made a few lewd comments like, If you don’t tell us the truth, I will stick my finger up inside you, Don’t you want me to put my nine inches inside you?”
Powell went back to Quarters 6. There were a few more calls to make sure that each of the key people knew what the others were doing. After the calls, suddenly with time on his hands, he let the enormity of the decision sink in. They were going to war. He’d personally known, but heard and read more, about the self-doubt the commander feels on the eve of battle. Now such misgivings struck him hard, and thinking through the plans again did not make the doubts yield or go away. BLUE SPOON was an incredibly complex plan, requiring precision—one miscue could set off a string of others, like a pile-up on the freeway.
