by Bob Woodward
Schwarzkopf briefed the Joint Chiefs and Cheney in the Tank that afternoon. Giving a status report on the location of the 100,000 Iraqi forces, he said they were positioned in a way to give Saddam lots of options—not just an attack. He did not predict an invasion or border crossing.
Cheney agreed that everything Saddam had to do to prepare for an invasion was exactly what he also had to do if his intention was simply to scare the Kuwaitis. There was no way to distinguish between the two. The bluff was only credible if Saddam did all the things he had done: uncoiled the tanks, moved them to the line, and moved in all the communications, munitions and logistics. Saddam might suspect the United States would pass its intelligence information to Kuwait, and the figure of 100,000 troops had been in The Washington Post the day before.
Schwarzkopf said that there was little or nothing he could do. There were only 10,000 U.S. military personnel in the region, almost all naval forces. CENTCOM had no ground forces nearby.
Briefly, Schwarzkopf referred to the Central Command’s Operations Plan 90–1002, a top-secret contingency plan for moving about 100,000 ground troops to the region over three to four months. “Ten-oh-two,” as it was called, had its origins in the early 1980s when the JCS had drafted standard battle plans to fight the Soviet Union or Iran. It included a detailed transportation and logistics plan. On Day 1, according to the plan, tactical F-15 fighters could be sent to the region; by Day 7 the most ready ground force, the so-called Division Ready Brigade of some 2,300 troops from the 82nd Airborne, would be on the ground; on Day 17, the Marines would arrive from the United States and be joined up with ammunition, supplies and equipment that would be sent on the MPS ships from Diego Garcia; not until Day 27 would the first heavy tanks start arriving.
There was one big hitch. All of this assumed 30 days’ advance warning for preparation before the actual commencement, or C-Day, of the deployment.
Powell found the field commander’s perspective sobering. But there was also an air of incredulity in the Tank. It was difficult to believe that Saddam would use or need 100,000 troops to invade Kuwait, a country that could be taken over with much less force. It was too much for too little. No one, certainly not Powell, could say for sure what Saddam was going to do. Absent any indication, it seemed there was no immediate response for the U.S. military to take.
But Powell himself now no longer believed that Saddam was bluffing. He suggested that Cheney sound the alarm at the White House. This was the moment to mobilize the President, perhaps get him to issue a presidential warning to Saddam through secret diplomatic channels. We’ve got to do something, Powell told Cheney.
They pushed the White House. As far as Powell could tell, either the White House had another idea about how to handle the problem, or the suggestion just fell through the cracks.
• • •
General Tom Kelly still judged an invasion to be unlikely, despite the intelligence. And Operations Plan 90–1002 was not ready. It had been updated only by junior staff officers and given none of the high-level attention and analysis the Panama BLUE SPOON plan had received. About 60 percent of Kelly’s time was being spent on the drug war. Every day there were small deployment orders—two or three men being sent to some country for liaison or training or some essentially passive activity to help other nations fight narcotics trafficking. Kelly, expecting to retire the next year, did not have his heart in the small details of a war on drugs that was not his operation.
At 4 p.m. Powell went to an award and farewell ceremony that Cheney was hosting for his departing military assistant, Rear Admiral Bill Owens, who was leaving at the end of the week. Owens was effectively skipping two-star rank and going to three stars to take over the prestigious Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean.
Schwarzkopf went back to Florida.
Cheney wasn’t alarmed. He didn’t take the CIA or DIA warnings as absolutes. There seemed to be a continuing flow of such warnings. Almost weekly, a message arrived in his office warning of a coup in the Philippines. And everyone out there in the Middle East—Mubarak of Egypt, Fahd of Saudi Arabia, King Hussein of Jordan, the Kuwaitis themselves—was saying that Saddam would not invade. It was all a ploy, they said, a move to obtain leverage.
Cheney was also a little put off by the United Arab Emirates’ response to the assistance that the Pentagon had provided. America’s friends in the region like the UAE wanted it both ways—protect us but don’t let anyone know. The attitude seemed to be, you guys hang around the neighborhood but keep the ships and planes that protect us over the horizon.
• • •
About 9 p.m. Cheney received a phone call at home from Rear Admiral Owens. The Iraqi forces had crossed the border into Kuwait at both tank lines. Hundreds of main battle tanks were racing south and east toward Kuwait City.
Cheney wasn’t entirely shocked. He told Owens to keep him informed.
Powell also received a call at home. The Chairman decided to stay home and get updates. Vice Chairman Admiral David Jeremiah went to the Pentagon for the night. General Kelly was called about 9:10 p.m. and 20 minutes later was in the Crisis Situation Room overseeing a team of operations specialists and intelligence analysts. He sat in the center of the long table in the front. Before him were three large projection screens. One screen had a time log that scrolled up, marking key events, communications and intelligence. Another was tuned to CNN’s 24-hour news coverage because Kelly wanted to know what was going out publicly. He knew that if it wasn’t correct, Powell would want to take steps to fix the impression.
Kelly kept open a secure line to Schwarzkopf at the Central Command headquarters in Florida. Iraqi tanks made it to Kuwait City in about three and one half hours. The DIA had sent a major who was an intelligence specialist to the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait City several days earlier. He was able to funnel out both human intelligence and signals intelligence to describe the virtual sacking of the city. Kelly was concerned about the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait as fighting went on all around it. The small Kuwaiti Army was putting up a fight, but it was hopelessly outnumbered.
Scowcroft had already returned to his home in suburban Maryland when he received his call. He was astonished. He had been sure it was all bluster. Saddam had been talking tough for months, but the talk had been about oil and oil prices, and about a few territorial disputes, not the basic sovereignty of Kuwait. There had been nothing substantial in Saddam’s most immediate rhetoric or declared aims to suggest that Iraq was treating the government of Kuwait as illegitimate—the rhetorical foundation he would have expected Saddam to lay before taking this sort of dramatic action. Scowcroft felt that there were some pretty obvious downsides for Saddam to invade his neighbor, and world reaction would be strong.
Scowcroft returned to the White House and informed Bush. The President said he wanted something done right away. Since Bob Gates was on vacation, Scowcroft called an emergency meeting of the deputies committee by secure video link and chaired it himself from the Situation Room.
A public statement was drafted and Scowcroft gave it to Bush for approval. At 11:20 p.m. a statement was issued that strongly condemned the invasion and called for “the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces.”
Scowcroft, legal counsel Boyden Gray and Treasury officials went to work on a plan to freeze Iraqi assets in the United States and prohibit any transactions with the aggressor. Since it was clear that Kuwait was being overrun, a second plan was drafted to freeze Kuwaiti assets so that Saddam could not get at any portion of the estimated $100 billion in investments held abroad by Kuwaitis. Both plans were reduced to emergency executive orders for Bush to sign.
With the deputies committee, Scowcroft pressed for more actions that would demonstrate that the United States was taking the Iraqi invasion seriously.
What about ground forces? he was asked. That would be the ultimate demonstration of seriousness.
No, Scowcroft said. He wanted something that (a) could be moved very, very quickly and (b) would
not be an immediate, visible presence. He proposed a squadron of Air Force F-15 fighters—about 24 planes that could be offered to Saudi Arabia if the kingdom would accept them.
The others—Kimmitt from State, Wolfowitz and Jeremiah from the Pentagon, and Kerr from the CIA—agreed.
Scowcroft also called an NSC meeting for first thing in the morning. The Pentagon reported that General Schwarzkopf was in town and he might be a good resource to have at the meeting because he knew the disposition of all the forces in the Middle East.
Schwarzkopf, however, was already back at his headquarters in Florida. About 2:30 a.m., Powell called Kelly in the Crisis Situation Room. Call Schwarzkopf, Powell directed, and tell him I want him back in my office at 7 a.m. because there’s an 8 a.m. NSC meeting at the White House I want him to attend.
Kelly picked up his secure line to Schwarzkopf.
“Sir,” Kelly said, “Tom Kelly. The Chairman just called and said he would like you in his office at seven a.m.”
Long pause.
“Yes, sir, this morning.”
Long pause.
“Yes, in four and one half hours.”
• • •
At about 4 a.m., Scowcroft went to sleep in his office. He awoke about 45 minutes later and by 5 a.m. was at Bush’s bedroom door in the residence, so the executive orders on freezing the assets could be signed.
Powell arrived at the Pentagon at 6 a.m. At about 6:50 Schwarzkopf also appeared and the two had a closed-door meeting until 7:30, when they left for the White House.
The full National Security Council gathered at 8 a.m. in the Cabinet Room. In addition to Powell and Schwarzkopf, Cheney and Wolfowitz were there. Kimmitt was sitting in for Baker, who was in Siberia meeting with his counterpart, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze.
Before the meeting began, Schwarzkopf had to be asked to put away his top-secret maps and slides. Bush was going to answer a few questions from a media pool so he could be seen on television stating his concern about the invasion.
“We’re not discussing intervention,” Bush told the reporters.
“You’re not contemplating any intervention or sending troops?” one of the reporters asked.
“I’m not contemplating such action,” he said.
Scowcroft believed that Bush didn’t mean what that sentence said. He was talking off the cuff. Clearly it was too early to rule out anything; the statement would have to be corrected later.
Bush said there was no evidence that any other countries in the Middle East were threatened, but he said that he wanted to “have this invasion be reversed and have them get out of Kuwait.”
He also said, “I’m sure there will be a lot of frenzied diplomatic activity. I plan to participate in some of that myself.”
Powell noticed yet again the sharp contrast between Bush and Reagan. Bush had spent eight years watching Reagan operate, and delegate. Unlike Reagan, Bush wanted the details, all the details. He wanted to be the player, the guy who made as many of the calls as possible. It was not a matter of one style being good and one being bad, Powell told himself. It was just different. On occasion, Powell had to remind himself that the people had elected Bush, not his advisers. The net result was that principal military adviser Powell had a much smaller role under Bush than national security adviser Powell had under Reagan.
When the reporters left, Scowcroft began running down an agenda, attempting to be discreetly directive, but the President immediately took charge of the meeting.
CIA Director Webster opened with an intelligence briefing. Kuwait had been overrun by more than 100,000 troops, well beyond what was needed. The Iraqi forces in Kuwait were being resupplied and reorganized, in some cases just ten miles from the Saudi border. They could easily continue their march and punch through meager Saudi defenses. Saudi Arabia had a military of less than 70,000 and only one small unit stood between the Iraqi units and the vast Saudi oil fields. He presented the situation as serious but not grim.
Next, Bob Kimmitt summarized the diplomacy. The U.N. Security Council had met most of the night and had condemned the invasion; the Arab League was being convened; but no one had yet joined the United States in freezing Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets.
The President said they needed to think about additional economic sanctions. He had acted quickly to freeze the assets and he indicated with pride that he did not think Saddam or others normally accustomed to the slow-moving American bureaucracy would have expected such fast action.
Bush, the former U.N. ambassador, wanted to make sure the United Nations was moving forward on additional measures. U.N. Ambassador Thomas Pickering, who had arrived from New York City on a 6:30 a.m. flight, said they were. The President and Scowcroft had talked with Jim Baker, who was working with the Soviets.
Bush, the former ambassador to China, asked if the Chinese government would come through in support. He indicated he expected some help since he had tempered his criticism of the previous year’s slaughter of students in Tiananmen Square.
Scowcroft and State were working the situation.
Bush said that he wanted the diplomatic effort to be massive and he ordered that nothing be left undone that might add to the pressure and help organize world opinion against Iraq.
Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady next explained that Iraq would be getting potential oil profits of about $20 million a day from Kuwait production. In all, Iraq now held 20 percent of the world’s known oil reserves. If Saddam were to take over Saudi Arabia, he would have 40 percent.
Bush, the former Texas oil man, seemed horrified that Saddam might get Saudi Arabia. He engaged in an extended analysis of the impact on world oil availability and price. Could the United States and others slap an embargo on Iraqi oil? Would Saddam withhold Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil? Or would he try to flood the world market? What would be the impact on U.S. oil reserves?
With just 20 percent of the world’s oil, Saddam would be able to manipulate world prices and hold the United States and its allies at his mercy. Higher oil prices would fuel inflation, worsening the already gloomy condition of the U.S. economy.
Powell thought to himself that there was lots of loose talk and speculation about oil, but Bush had the advantage over everyone else because he had been an oil man and knew the market.
Sununu suggested that they ought to try to stop Iraq from selling Kuwaiti oil on the open market and gaining an immediate benefit from the invasion.
The marketing of oil could normally not be stopped with economic and political pressure, Cheney said. On the immediate military situation, the Secretary of Defense informed them that U.S. Air Force KC-10s, large tanker planes used for aerial refueling of other aircraft, had been moved to Saudi Arabia.
An attack air package, Powell added, referring to the squadron of F-15s, was on alert to go to Saudi Arabia if the Saudis gave their approval.
Energy Secretary James Watkins, the former Navy chief, pointed out that Iraq moved its oil in pipelines through Turkey and Saudi Arabia. The retired admiral suggested that the pipelines might present interesting opportunities as targets. They were Saddam’s economic lifelines. Could they be hit with air strikes?
Powell said they could. He didn’t know how much Iraqi oil the two lines carried or how permanent their shutdown would be. But as a military matter, he noted, lineal targets—straight lines like roads, railroad tracks and pipelines—were not desirable. They could be too easily repaired and put back into action.
A question was raised about the possibility of shutting down Iraq’s entire oil export business, not just the pipelines but the refineries and terminals and pumping stations.
Cheney said that wouldn’t make a lot of sense. Saddam’s move on Kuwait was, among other things, an attempt to meddle with the world’s oil supply. The United States could not respond by bombing the world’s oil supply.
Scowcroft worried that the debate was wandering and unfocused. They could too easily talk themselves into doing nothing. “We don’t have the opti
on to appear not to be acting,” he said.
Cheney said that the marriage of Iraq’s military of 1 million men with 20 percent of the world’s oil presented a significant threat. They ought to distinguish between defending Saudi Arabia and expelling Iraq from Kuwait, he said, suggesting he favored the protection mission.
“So the problem is not unlike ERNEST WILL,” Scowcroft said, referring to the operation of protecting Kuwaiti oil tankers in the Gulf in 1987–88.
“But the military requirement would be much greater,” Cheney said.
Powell said that the Iraqi military had conducted a very professional operation. The Chairman then introduced General Schwarzkopf, who put up his maps and charts showing the region and the Iraqi attack routes.
Two tiers of responses were possible, the general said. The first tier could be single retaliatory strikes. Since the U.S. Army and Air Force had no forces in the region for immediate action, any strikes would have to be carried out by U.S. naval aircraft based on carriers in the region. Possible targets for such air strikes included the Iraqi Army in Kuwait; military or strategic targets in Iraq itself; economic targets in Iraq such as the pipelines running to Turkey and Saudi Arabia; and Iraqi oil tankers at sea. These would be limited, punitive strikes. Such attacks could not be sustained very long and probably would not accomplish much in terms of hurting the Iraqi military or economy, Schwarzkopf said.
Tier Two, Schwarzkopf continued, was the execution of Operations Plan 90–1002 for the defense of the Saudi Peninsula. That would take months and involve 100,000 to 200,000 military personnel from all the services. This could not be executed unless Saudi Arabia or some other country allowed the United States to set up a series of bases—an unlikely prospect given past Arab reluctance to permit it.
Sununu continued to press on the possibility of some kind of economic move. Isn’t there some way to organize to prevent Iraq from selling not only Kuwaiti oil but its own? he asked. “Whose check does Iraq get?”
