by Bob Woodward
The CIA man brought out a dozen photos and began a technical interpretation. They showed rows of hundreds of Iraqi tanks dug into the desert, with sand embankments on the front and two sides of each tank. Stabilizing and camouflaging the tanks in this way is a standard defensive tactic. But they could back out and move forward in a short time if the Iraqis decided to mount a quick offensive. There were roughly 70,000 Iraqi troops near or advancing on the Saudi border. The photos also showed seven ground-to-ground SCUD missile launchers outside Kuwait City, aimed south at Saudi Arabia.
Cheney realized the agency man’s presentation was not going to set the world on fire. Act One of the New World Order shouldn’t begin with a technician demonstrating his prowess at reading the tea leaves from overhead photography. Photo interpretation is an obscure subject, and not terribly convincing. Only the experts can tell what the blobs, dots and shadows mean. It was not a presentation that would impress King Fahd.
Scrub the CIA briefing, Cheney said. Schwarzkopf and he would incorporate the information in their own remarks.
As for Schwarzkopf, he had a three-inch-thick, blue vinyl three-ring binder marked “Top Secret” that contained Operations Plan 90–1002. When the general opened it, Cheney went to his own compartment. He already knew the plan.
The day the President pushes the button, executing the plan, Schwarzkopf said, this is what happens. On Day 1, C-Day, the F-15s would be sent. Then in daily increments the various land, sea and air forces would be alerted and deployed. It would take 17 weeks to implement the plan, though it could be stopped at any point. “One of the lessons of Panama was send a big force and get it done quickly,” Schwarzkopf said. Because of the distance to the Middle East and the size of the force that was called for, it would take a full 120 days.
There was no discussion of alternatives. None were presented. Williams observed that once Schwarzkopf opened that little blue binder, they all just marched right through it. The White House called to report that Bush had made a public statement and wanted Cheney to have a transcript. Williams took it down and then read it to Cheney. It was the President’s “This-will-not stand” remark, his pledge to reverse the invasion.
Well and good, Cheney thought, but he didn’t have any forces on the ground to stop Saddam from going into Saudi Arabia, let alone reverse the accomplished invasion. The American shirt tail was flapping and Cheney wanted to focus on the problem at hand—defending Saudi Arabia. “Thanks for the information,” he said matter-of-factly. “It’s good to know that.”
The Secretary wanted to refine his presentation. He invited Gates, Wolfowitz and Ambassador Freeman in to his compartment individually and as a group. Each stressed that Cheney was swimming against a strong current. It was unheard of for the Saudis to ask the United States for forces. Wolfowitz said that Cheney would be asking the Saudis to confront a decision they had spent their lifetimes shying away from. It would be a radical departure to accept forces of any size.
Freeman said Fahd was a master of indecision. The Saudis could spend days and weeks arguing among themselves. Royal family deliberations could make the American Congress seem fast.
They also told Cheney that the biggest worry might be that the Saudis would agree to accept an American deployment but insist on an upper ceiling or cap of so many troops, perhaps much lower than the 250,000 called for in the Operations Plan.
Cheney said that he was going to push to get the deployment started and then deal later with any limits the Saudis might try to impose. During the Iran-Iraq War, the United States had frightened the Saudis with CIA intelligence reports alleging that Iran was coming across the narrow Persian Gulf to attack them. The Reagan administration had formally requested permission to deploy U.S. Air Force fighters to stop these expected attacks. The Saudis had refused. The attacks never materialized, and the Saudis concluded that the United States used intelligence for its own political and strategic purposes, this time to attempt to get Gulf basing for U.S. forces.
After he’d listened to all the advice, Cheney said that they had to be careful. We don’t know Saddam is going to invade Saudi Arabia, he said, so let’s not go in there and suggest it is inevitable, or that we have inside knowledge. He wanted a hard sell on the capability of the U.S. force that could be sent, and on the political commitment from the President. He wanted a soft sell on the intelligence. The Kuwait invasion spoke loudest about Saddam’s willingness to overrun his Arab neighbors.
• • •
After a 16-hour flight, at about 1 p.m. Saudi time on Monday, August 6, the Americans arrived in Jiddah. They were taken to very elaborate quarters. Their meeting with the king had been scheduled for two hours later, but word came that His Majesty, a night person, preferred to delay it six to eight hours. Unbeknownst to Cheney, Fahd was checking with Muslim religious leaders to see if they would tolerate a U.S. deployment.
The journey to Saudi Arabia, equivalent to two back-to-back transatlantic crossings, had taken a major whack out of Cheney. He seized on the down time to take a nap.
• • •
Fahd ibn Abdul Aziz, King of Saudi Arabia and Custodian of the Holy Places of Mecca and Medina was his preferred title. Fahd’s realm was very secretive and conservative, consisting of an area one quarter the size of the United States with only 14 million people. The king had been a playboy in his youth. CIA reports said Fahd used to take teenage girls for lovemaking sprees on his Boeing 747 jet. But the king had finally settled down. He basically had run the kingdom as crown prince in the late 1970s before succeeding to the throne in 1982.
That evening, Cheney, Gates, Schwarzkopf, Wolfowitz and Ambassador Freeman were conducted to the royal family’s private council room in the summer palace. Fahd and half a dozen key members of his government and the royal family, including the foreign minister and the deputy defense minister, were there. Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah was off to one side.
Prince Bandar was going to do the translation for both sides.
Cheney expected that at the end of the presentation, the king would say: thank you very much, we’ll get back to you. He would then send Cheney off to sit and wait while the Saudis made up their minds.
The meeting began with small talk about Fahd’s long relationship with Bush. When Bush had been CIA director in 1976, Fahd, who’d run Saudi intelligence for 13 years as interior minister, was overseeing Saudi foreign policy as crown prince.
Ordinarily at these royal meetings, the king would open with a lengthy statement. This evening he turned to Cheney rather quickly.
The Secretary began by reminding his hosts that the United States had come to the assistance of Saudi Arabia in 1962 against Yemen and Egypt. He cited the protection of oil tanker shipments in the Gulf in 1987–88 as another example of the United States backing its allies in the region. “It’s not a commitment that we take lightly,” Cheney said. “Saudi Arabia faces what may be the greatest threat in its history.”
After a pause, he continued, “The President sent me out here to reaffirm what he told you on the phone. He stands personally behind the American security guarantee. . . . Saddam Hussein has used lies, deceit and naked aggression to already change the balance of power. He will only become more dangerous if he goes unchallenged. . . . The President’s engaged in active diplomacy. He’s contacted all the major arms suppliers” used by Iraq.
France, the Soviet Union and China had all agreed to take action, Cheney said. Secretary of State Baker was going to Moscow, where a joint statement would be issued; President Bush had spoken personally with the leaders of Great Britain, France, Germany, Turkey, Japan and Italy.
“If this is not countered, there will be grave consequences for Saudi Arabia, and serious consequences for the United States,” Cheney said. He had carefully selected his adjectives—“grave” for the Saudis and “serious” for the United States—to indicate it was Saudi Arabia that had its ass on the line.
“We all have to cooperate to see that this man does not succeed,” Cheney
said. He proposed a two-part strategy: first, cooperation to defend Saudi Arabia against a future attack; second, the strangulation of Iraq. “Economic measures are important, but in future months, as Saddam Hussein begins to feel the pressure, he could lash out and attack.” So it was important to carry out both parts of the strategy at once: defense and strangulation.
Cheney then introduced Schwarzkopf. The general showed King Fahd the satellite pictures of Iraqi tanks on the way to the Saudi border. “If you put it all together,” he said, “this is one division of the best forces that Iraq has. Some place between there”—he pointed out the 50 miles—“and Kuwait City, there are two more of these divisions. After having taken Kuwait City, they moved units in to free up these so they could go to the border. But of even more concern, there are three more divisions moved down from the Basra area. We’re watching carefully to monitor what’s going on. There’s a large amount of resupply.”
The pictures clearly explained why Saudi scouts sent into Kuwait had not been able to find the Iraqi forces Bandar had said he’d seen with his own eyes in the initial overheads. The Iraqis, as was their style, were moving their command, control and communications units ahead of the mass of troops. These units were so small, the scouts had missed them.
The pictures also showed the SCUD launchers pointing menacingly south.
Remembering Cheney’s order to use caution, Schwarzkopf said, “We think Saddam Hussein could attack Saudi Arabia in as little as forty-eight hours. We don’t know what he’s going to do.” Schwarzkopf mentioned that the Iraqis had 22 aircraft loaded for combat at one air base, as well as tankers that would give them additional range. “We don’t know what the purpose of that is. It could be just against the U.S. fleet.”
Fahd said he did not see the ambiguity. “They have forces in position that are not needed just for Kuwait,” he said. “Therefore they must have other objectives.” Fahd seemed disgusted. “We used to think Saddam Hussein tells the truth. He told us, he told the U.S., he told Mubarak he wouldn’t attack Kuwait, but the opposite happened. So we know his bad intentions are there. As long as the right preparations for the right response at the right time are done, that is the best way to roll back these Iraqi actions. And I am grateful this is being done.”
The pause for translation was making it easy for the notetakers to record the meeting, but the exact meaning of the king’s last statement was not clear. It seemed that Fahd was moving in the direction Cheney wanted to take him.
“It’s right,” Cheney said, “that we can’t read Saddam Hussein’s intentions. He can move faster to attack than we can to defend. In the case of Kuwait, we watched the forces build up and the emir waited until he was attacked before he asked for any help. If you wait for unambiguous warning, it will be too late for us to help you. We have to come much further to defend than he to attack.
“We do not want to start a war any more than anyone else, but [we] believe that preparations are the best way to prevent a war. If a war should come, we would stand with you in defense of Saudi sovereignty and take the war to the enemy.”
Cheney also said, “The President asked me to assure you that we will stay as long as you want us. We will leave when you no longer need us. We will stay until justice is done but not stay a minute longer. We are not seeking bases but you are a long way away. We need to make joint preparations now.”
Schwarzkopf described Saddam’s forces. They’re not ten feet tall, he said again, but they are a very tough opponent. The Iraqis are not good in the offensive role, he said. Their chief weakness is a very centralized command system; the officers at all levels wait for the next order. “In the military, we say, ‘If you cut off the head, the body won’t function.’ ”
The U.S. naval forces already in the Gulf area were on heightened alert and it was Schwarzkopf’s opinion that that was probably the reason Iraq had its planes on alert. The aircraft carrier U.S.S. Independence and another half dozen ships were being brought into the region.
Bringing U.S. forces would entail a 7,000-mile journey for those coming by air, and 12,000 miles by sea. Fighter air squadrons would come first, followed by light ground troops. Schwarzkopf then went through a week-by-week description of the buildup. By week 17, it would be a very large force—many Air Force planes, Navy ships, two tank divisions and two other divisions.
“What’s the size of a division?” Crown Prince Abdullah asked.
Schwarzkopf said 18,000. No one asked for the total number of troops and personnel, so Schwarzkopf did not have to give the 250,000 figure. He did say he was convinced that after the 17 weeks, the force could defeat anything that came against it.
“After 120 days, we could build up a force that, together with Saudi forces, could kick them into the sea or anywhere else you want to.” Schwarzkopf did not offer the 8–12-month estimate for a full offensive option he’d given to Bush only two days earlier.
Abdullah then asked a couple of questions about the maps, trying to distinguish between actual and hypothetical Iraqi troop placements.
“The President asked me to emphasize four things,” Cheney said. “The United States is prepared to commit a force to defend Saudi Arabia that can do the job. Though Saddam Hussein possesses a large army and enormous military might, the United States can put in enough force so that Saddam Hussein will be deterred. Should deterrence fail, our forces together will suffice to defeat him.
“The second point the President asked me to repeat: to be successful, we have to have forces in place. We can’t wait until Iraqi forces cross the border. Time is of the essence.
“Third point: After the danger is over, our forces will go home.”
Under his breath in Arabic, Abdullah interjected, “I would hope so.” Bandar did not translate this.
“Because of our cooperation,” Cheney continued on the third point, “your forces will be better able to defend your country after we leave. And we will be able to return more quickly if we’re needed.”
Fahd said, yes, almost like a joint training exercise when the United States leaves equipment behind—a standard U.S. practice.
Schwarzkopf joked, “I think I might want to think about that a little bit.”
Fahd seemed to be looking for a long-run, concrete benefit from such a deployment.
Cheney picked up on it. “Our position would be much easier now if there were equipment in place.” He continued with his presidential message. “Fourth, it will be far more dangerous if we wait. If we fail to deal with Saddam Hussein now, he will only grow stronger and more threatening. I’d like to receive your approval to proceed with introducing U.S. forces. We want to work with you so that this can be an international force, including forces of regional countries, but urge you not to wait for this to be organized before you agree to the deployment of U.S. forces.”
“Our cooperation with the United States is not out of the desire to attack others or to be aggressors,” Fahd said, adding that the basis was the threat to Saudi Arabia and mutual interests. As if thinking aloud, the king continued: “We did not create the problem. The problem was created for us. One has to ask why Saddam Hussein creates these forces.” Fahd noted that Saddam spent all this money on armaments, instead of things that are for the good of his people. “No one is seeking to create a problem for him. . . . This shows how shallow he is. Why should he attack Kuwait—it’s a small country—and create oppression?
“It’s not just his aggression against Kuwait but [he] aspires to something larger. . . . Because he’s egotistical, he thinks he really knows it all. [He] makes the big mistake if he really believes that, and I think he does.
“If we do anything with our American friends, we do it only in self-defense, not as aggressors—shows how deep the relationship is between our two countries. That in itself shows these two countries consider each other’s interest and security.
“We do not do it for aggressive purposes. People all over the world are saying, what will the United States do for Saudi Ara
bia? I am very pleased what I heard just now. We have to work to implement the arrangements to achieve that.” Fahd then turned to his entourage and asked, “Does anybody have any comments?”
A lively exchange in Arabic ensued between the king and Crown Prince Abdullah. Bandar did not translate. On the U.S. side, only Ambassador Freeman understood what was said.
“We have to do this,” Fahd said. “The Kuwaitis waited, they waited too long and now there no longer is a Kuwait.”
“Oh yes there is,” Abdullah shot back, “there is still a Kuwait.”
“Yes,” Fahd replied, “and all the Kuwaitis are living in our hotel rooms.”
After this, the king turned to Cheney. Bandar resumed translation. “Mr. Secretary, we approve of the principle. Let’s believe in God and do what has to be done. We will proceed with the details.
“I don’t care what other people say,” the king added. “The most important thing is to proceed to protect our country together with the Americans, also bringing some people from other Arab countries who are our friends.”
“I think that would be excellent,” Cheney said.
“Very good,” Fahd said. “Some of them have said in the past they’re ready and willing. Some of them are countries that are friendly to you and us, like Egypt and Morocco.”
“I’m very pleased with your approval of our plan,” Cheney said.
The king said they didn’t have the luxury of time; they faced immediate dangers. What needs to be done quickly must be done at once, he said.
Cheney was pleasantly surprised. He had been worried that an international force including other Arab nations might be so important to the Saudis that they would insist it be put together before anything else.
“The United States has no ulterior motive,” Fahd said. “We have taken this country from bushes and stones and built it to a nation that is equal to few in the world. We’ve invested billions of dollars to build this nation. It looks like we’ve been at it for hundreds of years but actually only for a very few. I wish you would have time to see for yourself how we have built things in the middle of nowhere. You could see where the billions of dollars of oil income go. It doesn’t bother me what other media may say. People who see the facts honestly will acknowledge what we have accomplished. What matters to me is what the people of Saudi Arabia think. And as long as they live a decent standard of living, it doesn’t bother me what people may say about me.”
