by Bob Woodward
• • •
On Sunday, August 12, Cheney appeared on NBC Television’s “Meet the Press.” “The fact of the matter is that the United States has a significant military force in the area this morning,” the Secretary said without any specifics. “There’s more on the way.”
Pressed for numbers, he replied, “I would not want to put an upper level on that. . . . No one should assume this is easy or is going to be wrapped up very quickly or without a significant U.S. effort.” Of course, he knew the real timelines—17 weeks to defend and perhaps 8 to 12 months for a full offensive capability. But no one was even hinting that the nation had started down that road.
Bush decided he would go to the Pentagon. On Tuesday, August 14, Cheney and Powell held a one-hour rehearsal in the Tank of a briefing for the President. The next day, Wednesday, Bush visited the Tank.
Powell was alarmed about all the troops and military force he was beginning to pour into the Gulf, without any clear notion of where the buildup would end. Where was it all leading? The question had been on the Chairman’s mind since that Sunday afternoon ten days earlier when he’d watched the President get off his helicopter on the White House lawn and state unequivocally, “This will not stand.” It seemed to him like a crucial moment, perhaps a definition of a new mission. If the invasion of Kuwait were going to be reversed, what did that mean in practical military terms? How much force was needed and what kind of action should they be planning for?
It seemed to Powell that the military was rolling down a highway, uncertain which off-ramp it was supposed to take. After the Tank session, Bush, Cheney and Powell went to Cheney’s office.
I want to tell you how the buildup is going, Powell told the President. It was his first chance to talk to Bush since the deployment had been ordered. He showed the President a chart that illustrated graphically, week by week, the U.S. forces going into the Gulf. The chart ended on December 1, the closure point for the mission, when 250,000 troops would be there.
We have our mission to deter and defend, Powell said. There will be no question you can defend Saudi Arabia at the end. We have no other job, Powell said, and this is what the future looks like to December 1, when we will be completed. We’re at risk now, but we are deterring.
“If you want me to do more, the curve goes up. If you want more, I need to know whether it’s two miles or three miles down the road that I get off and exit here.”
At some point Schwarzkopf will report to you, mission accomplished, Powell told Bush. What we need, Mr. President, is for you to tell us before that mission is accomplished what you want us to do next—so if we have things in the military supply pipeline, do we stop the pipeline or keep it going, or whatever?
Powell wasn’t looking for an immediate new mission from the President. He was not pushing for a decision, just inquiring whether they had or were going to get a new military mission. There was no response from Bush, but Powell felt that he had, at least, put the President on notice that a decision would have to be made soon.
Later, Bush spoke to Pentagon employees at the River Entrance overlooking the Potomac. With Cheney and Powell standing behind him, he said:
“Saddam has claimed that this is a holy war of Arab against infidel—this from the man who has used poison gas against the men, women and children of his own country; who invaded Iran in a war that cost the lives of more than half a million Moslems; and who now plunders Kuwait. Atrocities have been committed by Saddam’s soldiers and henchmen. The reports out of Kuwait tell a sordid tale of brutality.”
It was a fiery attack on Saddam. “It is Saddam who lied to his Arab neighbors. It is Saddam who invaded an Arab state. And it is he who now threatens the Arab nation,” Bush said, his voice rising.
Standing near Bush before the crowd, Cheney thought to himself that it was far too personal an attack, harsh and overdone, ratcheting up the rhetoric way too much. The text of the speech had come over from the White House only an hour before and there had been no chance for Cheney or anyone else in the Pentagon to suggest changes.
Cheney later mentioned his concern directly to Scowcroft. Saddam now had roughly 200,000 troops in Kuwait to the 20,000 of the United States—a 10 to 1 advantage. The possibility of a slaughter still could not be ruled out and Cheney did not want some debate-team flourish by the President to provoke Saddam.
Though Bush had gone to Kennebunkport trying to take his summer vacation, Cheney had canceled two weeks of fishing scheduled to begin that day. He did not see how the Secretary of Defense could be ordering hundreds of thousands to the Saudi desert and then go fishing.
At the end of the week, Bush signed a top-secret intelligence “finding,” authorizing CIA covert actions to overthrow Saddam. The CIA was not to violate the ban on involvement in assassination attempts, but rather recruit Iraqi dissidents to remove Saddam from power.
• • •
On Friday, August 17, Cheney left for Saudi Arabia and a four-day swing through other countries in the region. He planned to visit Bahrain, Oman, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt to obtain more support. Attempting to duplicate his success with the Saudis, he was seeking landing and staging rights for U.S. forces, particularly Air Force fighters, bombers and cargo planes.
There was one scare when some reports came in that the U.S. Navy had boarded an Iraqi tanker. Cheney was concerned that some Navy officer way down the line was going to start a war. It took half an hour to get through to the Pentagon to learn that the Navy had only fired across the bow of the ship.
Visiting the U.S. units already in Saudi Arabia, Cheney was dramatically reminded of their precarious situation. Everyone seemed consumed with logistics, transportation and just getting settled. The atmosphere was like the first night at camp. Suppose there was a fight before all the U.S. forces got in place? Were they assuming the initial deployment would deter Saddam?
Cheney called Powell on the secure line. Is Schwarzkopf making certain that we are ready for any short-term contingency? he asked. What if Saddam just moves a little further and comes into Saudi Arabia? What if he goes for the oil fields?
Powell agreed they were vulnerable. But if Saddam was going to move into Saudi Arabia, why hadn’t he done it earlier? Powell said each day the United States is better off.
There was another problem on the ground in Saudi Arabia. Too many officers and staff people had been sent in the initial waves, and the commanders were urgently requesting more privates and troops who could fight.
When Cheney returned to Washington, he and Powell flew to Kennebunkport on Wednesday, August 22, to brief the President and discuss the next steps.
It was a bright sunny day at Walker’s Point, a beautiful piece of oceanfront real estate. Cheney and Powell joined Bush, Scowcroft, Sununu, Gates and Larry Eagleburger around a small circular garden table overlooking the craggy Maine coast. Baker was in Wyoming on vacation, attempting to put on an August-as-usual face.
Cheney and Powell sought Bush’s final approval to call up some 50,000 reservists. Certain critical military specialties such as logistics, transportation, medical services, construction and intelligence were concentrated in the Reserves. Frustrated by President Johnson’s refusal to fully mobilize the military in the Vietnam War by calling up the Reserves, the Pentagon had intentionally organized the services so that the specialists that would be required in a large deployment were in the Reserves. This would force a president to use the Reserves for any major military action, making it difficult if not impossible to slide slowly into war without the public’s participation.
Having committed to the large operation in the Gulf, Bush, Powell and Cheney knew the Reserve call-up was inevitable. Bush now authorized it.
The United Nations, which already had approved economic sanctions against Iraq, was now considering a resolution approving a blockade. The immediate question was whether to wait for the U.N., or go ahead unilaterally and board Iraqi ships. The Navy had stopped some Iraqi vessels, but had not yet boarded any.
Cheney could see that it was a huge decision for the President. Bush was clearly eager to assert the right of the United States to act by itself and wanted to demonstrate some muscle. Two days earlier, he had been asked by a reporter whether he was prepared to stop Iraqi tankers. He had replied with one of his dares, “You just watch. You just watch and see.” Nonetheless, Cheney recommended that the President not rush to board ships, but wait for the United Nations.
Powell pointed out that shooting up a ship for a short-term gain would not be worth it. The ship was part of the capillary system of supply and not at the heart of the problem. From Wyoming, Baker had made it clear that was his view also.
Bush was skeptical the U.N. would come through. When he was U.N. ambassador in 1971–72, the Soviets had blocked everything the United States tried to do. But this was a new era. He decided he would wait for a ruling from the U.N. Security Council.
Powell informed the President that, for the first time since the deployment had begun, the situation was not dicey. There were some 35,000 troops in Saudi Arabia or on the way, and another 20,000 U.S. sailors were on ships in the region. General Schwarzkopf, of course, was not satisfied, but Powell never expected a commander to be satisfied. There were now about 200,000 Iraqi troops in Kuwait. The situation was improving each day, though no one would be really comfortable until the tanks of the 24th Mechanized Division were fully in place. Saddam probably would not attack now, Powell said, because he had not taken the chance when he really had the upper hand during the first two weeks, when the U.S. forces had been considerably smaller.
Yet, Powell said, the Iraqi military was still capable of inflicting tremendous damage. He had pulled together lots of intelligence and updated work from the Joint Staff. One big factor was the Iraqi ground-to-ground missile force, including large quantities of the Soviet-supplied SCUD-B, which had been modified to have a range of 615 kilometers. Intelligence was not sure how many the Iraqis had, but the estimates said 800 to 1,000. Chemical weapons could be placed on some of the missiles. The Iraqis didn’t always get the fuel-to-air ratios correct, making missile performance erratic. The performance of the SCUD depended on a number of factors, such as whether the wind was blowing the right way.
Saddam’s forces in Kuwait were digging in. As the United States brought in heavy armored forces, two of the world’s large armies eventually would be facing off. If there was conflict, it would be major land warfare. This was nothing like the liberation of Grenada or Panama.
Bush asked Powell for his view—not just his military advice, Bush added, but on what course of action to take. The President wanted an overall assessment. Powell said they were doing fine defending Saudi Arabia.
By the end of the meeting, Powell saw that Bush was somewhat sobered. Talk of liberating Kuwait was no longer on the front burner.
In the following days, the President toned down his public attacks on Saddam.
On Saturday, August 25, the United Nations Security Council voted to give the navies of the United States and other countries the right to use force to stop trade with Iraq. It was the first time in the U.N.’s 45-year history that individual countries outside an umbrella U.N. command were authorized to enforce an international blockade, an extraordinary diplomatic victory for the administration.
Bush, who had sweated out the U.N. vote, was euphoric.
• • •
At the Joint Staff, General Kelly made an assessment of the situation three weeks after the start of the deployment. First, the Air Force deserved a gold star for its performance in achieving what looked like early air superiority in the region. Kelly’s major concern was what he called “the mind-set of this beast Saddam.” He had reviewed the intelligence reports from the Iran-Iraq War. Though they were not absolutely reliable, they had the grim ring of truth. In addition to the well-publicized reports that Saddam personally had executed senior advisers and ministers who disagreed with him, there was information showing how he treated his senior military commanders. Iraqi Army generals who lost 20 kilometers to the Iranians during the Iran-Iraq War had been executed, according to the intelligence. In the Iraqi Air Force, generals had been executed if they lost a certain number of planes. Consequently, they had made sure the planes weren’t flown much, leaving Iraq with mostly inexperienced and untrained pilots.
But given his mind-set, Saddam might well use his chemical weapons, and there was some intelligence that he could soon have biological weapons as well. The biggest problem, Kelly concluded, was that Saddam, his military and the Iraqi people were used to doing without, used to the pain and suffering and deprivation of an eight-year war. In fact, Kelly felt Iraq could last longer at these things than the United States.
• • •
A delegation of 16 senators, ten aides and eight military escorts left for Saudi Arabia on August 31 aboard a C-137 jet. The next day their first briefing was given by General Schwarzkopf at his temporary headquarters in Dhahran. The general put a map on the wall. He said, here are the Army units, the Marines, the Navy ships, the Air Force, the Saudi forces and the Iraqis. There was no discussion of contingency plans or options.
Later, one of the senior U.S. generals commanding troops in the Gulf told some of the senators very privately that the U.S. side was not ready to fight and would need at least another ten days. The senators then visited Marines in forward positions nearer Kuwait and had lunch—the latest version of the field ration, called MRE, for Meals Ready to Eat. Troops joked that MRE stood for Meals Rejected by Ethiopia.
Later that afternoon the delegation flew to Bahrain and a small group attended a palace dinner hosted by Emir Sheikh Isa bin Sulman al Khalifa, the leader of the small emirate. The emir inquired why the United States allowed the Iraqis to appear on CNN to criticize America and American policy.
On Sunday, the group visited Navy ships, including the battleship U.S.S. Wisconsin, then went back to Saudi Arabia for a meeting with King Fahd, who had nothing new or startling to say. Later that evening the senators were supposed to meet with senior Kuwaiti officials. The emir of Kuwait, who was in Saudi Arabia, declined to meet with them.
The senators were furious. Here the United States had undertaken this massive military deployment in part to help Kuwait, and their exiled leader wouldn’t meet his potential saviors. Republican Senator William Cohen of Maine was incredulous. It was not as if the emir had pressing government responsibilities, given that his country had been stolen from him.
The Kuwaiti officials sent to visit the senators were really the second team, Cohen could see. Cameras filmed the discussions. Cohen and the others didn’t know whether to laugh or cry when they learned that the filming was being done by the American public relations firm of Hill & Knowlton, hired by Kuwait to do some image-polishing.
On Monday, September 3—the Labor Day holiday in America and the fourth day of the grueling trip—the senators flew the two hours to Cairo and linked up with a House delegation for a meeting with Mubarak. The Egyptian president delivered a two-hour tirade against King Hussein of Jordan, who was staying out of the Arab coalition against Saddam. Mubarak also disclosed that Saddam had tried to bribe him to keep Egypt out of the anti-Iraq coalition. In the afternoon they flew 1,500 miles to Abu Dhabi, the sheikdom that is the capital of the United Arab Emirates, for meetings with His Highness President Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan al Nahayan.
The sheikh delivered a long monologue about the courage of the Kuwaitis. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, the New York Democrat, seated on a beautiful couch alongside his fellow senators, grew increasingly uneasy. He moved to the edge of his seat as His Highness expounded on the magnificence of the brave Kuwaitis.
“Your Grace,” Moynihan finally shouted, his hand in the air as in his days as U.N. ambassador. “Your Grace,” he repeated in his melodramatic voice.
All eyes were on Moynihan. “Your Grace, the Kuwaitis left their wives. They left their servants. They took their money and stuffed it in Swiss bank accounts. That is not my de
finition of courage.”
The sheikh disagreed. He said the Kuwaitis were heroic and in need. His entourage nodded in agreement with their leader, who also noted that the Kuwaitis had been taken by surprise.
“Your Grace,” Moynihan answered, “a warrior nation is never taken by surprise.”
Cohen whispered to Moynihan, “What about Pearl Harbor?” The United States had also been surprised by the Iraqi invasion, he reminded him.
The next day the delegation flew back to the United States. Cohen felt as if he’d been presented with a sound and light show. There had been no real news or information about what really mattered—the decisions or options the President was facing in seeming isolation, with only a handful of advisers.
• • •
The next day, Wednesday, September 5, Bush invited 30 senators and congressmen, most of whom had traveled to the Gulf the previous weekend, to the White House.
Cheney, who attended the meeting, felt that the August congressional recess had been a tremendous advantage. The administration had been able to spend the month doing what needed to be done, rather than explaining itself on Capitol Hill. But Bush and Cheney, both former congressmen, knew that it was important to have congressional goodwill.
Every senator and congressman who spoke at the meeting praised Bush’s handling of the crisis, and expressed support for the military and diplomatic moves.
“Mr. President,” Cohen said when he had a chance to speak, “there is a photograph in The New York Times this morning showing a Marine being helped by his comrades. I don’t have to quote Shakespeare for us to see that if this Marine had been felled by a bullet and not the sun, there would be a wholly different reaction in this country.
“Mr. President, I’d suggest that you convene a special session of Congress and that we deal with the law of the land in the War Powers Act, and that you get a vote while you have the support of Congress for this operation.”
