by Bob Woodward
Two to three months to get them in place, Johnston said.
He hoped his briefing proved that the existing forces were inadequate for an offense.
Bush’s reaction was similar to Cheney’s, particularly on the Phase Four ground plan. The military was not ready for an offensive operation; they didn’t have enough strength.
What would be enough? Bush asked.
Cheney promised the President a detailed answer soon.
• • •
Bush had asked Powell to appear and speak for him at the anniversary celebration of President Eisenhower’s 100th birthday, to be held in Abilene, Kansas, that Sunday, October 14. Over the years, Powell had become a minor student of Ike. He had discovered that the great combat leader of World War II was also very much a believer in limits and restraint. Deeply suspicious of power and the military, as President he had pursued a policy of containment instead of war.
Powell worked hard on the Kansas address. He sensed a kinship with Eisenhower and aspired to be like him. This speech was from the heart. Powell said:
“General Eisenhower was no proponent of war. He was a proponent of peace. At the foot of the great statue here at the library we see the words, ‘Champion of Peace.’ And so he was.”
• • •
On Wednesday night, October 17, Bush was scheduled to attend the second game of the World Series, but he canceled to have a veal and pasta dinner alone with Scowcroft to review the Gulf crisis.
That week Cheney was on a trip to Europe and the Soviet Union to confer with allies and supporters of the U.N. resolutions against Iraq. Powell made lots of public appearances while Cheney was away—remarks to the American Stock Exchange, a short briefing on counternarcotics programs, a memorial service, a military artwork presentation, a meeting with the military aide to the president of France, a few interviews and receptions.
When a story appeared in the newspapers about Air Force Secretary Rice using an Air Force jet to attend the Air Force-Notre Dame football game at a cost of over $5,000, Powell called in one of his aides.
“What the fuck is the Air Force doing now?” he asked. Air Force officers were quoted by name contradicting each other, leaving the impression that someone had willingly spent the taxpayers’ money for a football weekend and that others were trying to cover up. “Don’t they know how to answer questions like that up there?” After raging at the Air Force some more, he finally calmed down. “I just wanted to get that off my chest.”
Powell’s Plans and Policy staff, J-5, sent him an option paper for the Gulf. J-5 was headed by Lieutenant General George Lee Butler, who was slated to be promoted to four stars and take over the Strategic Air Command. Butler outlined four possibilities: (1) maintain the status quo to deter and defend; (2) prepare for long-term containment, ratcheting up the sanctions that would have to be in place for six months to one year to be effective; (3) go to war; (4) up the ante by adding sufficient forces for a credible offensive threat.
Butler favored option two: long-term containment, with increased pressure through the sanctions. According to Butler’s analysis, a war would be very messy.
Powell listened to the summary but didn’t indicate his preference—not by so much as a lifted eyebrow, Butler noted.
Powell still wasn’t positive which way the President might go, but he had a pretty good idea. This was a political choice, it was going to be made in the White House. He felt he had to mask his conclusions on this question even from his most senior staff.
After the Johnston briefing, Cheney leaned hard on the system. He wanted the planners to move away from throwing all the forces straight through the Iraqis’ front-line barriers. He asked Powell to think about making a ground assault into Iraq somewhere far west along the Saudi-Iraq border, 300–400 miles from Kuwait, out toward the Jordanian border. Such an unexpected attack on the western approaches to Baghdad would put a ground force in a location where there would be no Iraqi fortifications or resistance, would cut the lines of communication between Baghdad and Jordan, and would allow a direct ground attack on the fixed SCUD missile sites in western Iraq that threatened Israel.
Powell quickly came back with an answer: No, it was way too far to take U.S. forces.
• • •
On Sunday, October 21, Powell left Washington for Saudi Arabia. He arrived in Riyadh late the next day and went right to Schwarzkopf.
Powell immediately saw that everyone in the command, including Schwarzkopf, was pretty raggedy. They had been deterring and defending for nearly three months. The uncertainties, risks and discomforts had been building on each other.
Schwarzkopf was still angered about the short-notice order to send Johnston to Washington with an offensive war plan that was not ready.
Orders were orders, both soldiers knew.
Powell reported that he did not have a decision from the President about the next stage—whether they would be directed to continue the current mission or prepare the offensive option.
Whatever the case, Powell said, they now had to come up with a fully scrubbed offensive plan. More important, Schwarzkopf had to state what additional forces he would need for that mission. Powell remembered that in the first days of the crisis, Schwarzkopf had told President Bush at Camp David on August 4 that it would take 8 to 12 months to build up U.S. forces to a level sufficient to push Iraq out of Kuwait. Saddam had had 100,000 troops in Kuwait then. He now had 430,000.
Powell said he needed Schwarzkopf’s wish list. He pledged to back him up.
Schwarzkopf had said in a recent Life magazine article that he was no fan of war: “In a lot of ways I am a pacifist—though that might be too strong a word. But I know what war is. I am certainly anti-war. But I also believe there are things worth fighting for.”
Frankly, he told Powell now, he was not sold on an offensive operation as the solution. Pushing Saddam out of Kuwait at this point would be dirty and bloody. “Do they know that back in Washington?”
“They know,” Powell replied.
Schwarzkopf estimated that it would take about twice the force level he had. Double the Air Force presence; double the Navy carriers from three to six; double the Marine and Army ground forces. “I want the VII Corps,” he said finally.
The VII Corps was the centerpiece of the U.S. ground defense in Europe—three of the best-trained, best-equipped divisions—two heavy tank and one mechanized. It was a stunning request, inconceivable even a year ago, before the virtual disappearance of the Warsaw Pact threat in Europe. But Gorbachev and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact made it feasible. If the President was serious about offense, Schwarzkopf said, he was going to have to send the VII Corps.
Powell said he would back the requests. He wanted to go even further. He was determined to make the buildup as massive as possible. There was an Army division based in the United States that had trained with the VII Corps. The Big Red One, the 1st Mechanized Infantry Division, would fit in nicely, Powell suggested. Schwarzkopf agreed.
Schwarzkopf’s main staff officers were summoned. Powell wanted to question them personally. He was aware of Schwarzkopf’s tendency to shoot messengers bringing bad news. Powell wanted to sit and listen patiently to see if any hidden facts bubbled to the surface, as often happened when subordinates were given a chance to talk at length. The next morning Powell met for another five hours with Schwarzkopf and his staff. The only major problem was that the mail was not being delivered to the troops as fast as it should.
Powell indicated that President Bush still had not decided; they had to prepare for possible offense and for continuing the defense. If the mission remained only defensive, Powell and Schwarzkopf agreed, some kind of rotation policy would be needed, allowing the units that had served for months to be relieved. Schwarzkopf recommended that the troops be rotated out of Saudi Arabia after serving six to eight months. Overall, he felt the buildup was working and evidence was mounting that the sanctions were beginning to bite. He counseled patience.
Po
well visited some of the troops briefly. He told them: “I know you want to know the answer to two questions: What are we going to be doing here? And when are we going to go home? Because I can’t give you answers to those questions, we are giving our political leaders time to work this out. Not answering those questions gives them that time.”
Powell felt that the troops understood this point. But he was not sure how long their patience would last. Troops would fight for each other and for certain core values: national survival, the lives of American citizens. They would fight for their leaders—presidents, even generals, if the reasoning was presented clearly and honestly. Powell felt they would also fight for American interests but that could get very fuzzy. It was problematical whether they would fight for another country, such as Kuwait, or to ensure that a Saddam was not rewarded for aggression.
• • •
On Wednesday, October 24, Cheney was summoned to the White House. The administration had finally reached a budget compromise with the Democrats after a bruising and politically damaging six months, particularly the last two. Now Bush had time to focus on some of the answers to the question he had left with Cheney—how much additional force? The President said he was leaning toward adding the forces necessary to carry out offensive operations to expel Iraqi troops from Kuwait. Nothing could be announced for two weeks, until after the November 6 elections, because any move would be assumed to be an attempt to influence the elections. Cheney said that he was waiting for Powell’s report from Saudi Arabia, and they should wait.
It was apparent to Cheney that Bush would be happy with some public hint. Cheney was already scheduled the next day to go on the early morning shows of the three major networks and CNN. He felt that the White House’s inept handling of its budget talks with Congress had cast a pall over the entire administration, and raised fundamental questions about whether Bush and the cabinet knew what they were doing. It had affected Bush’s standing in the polls and the way people looked at Washington and government, even eroding confidence in the Gulf operation. Cheney also felt that it was best to prepare the public for the likely decision. He had consistently stated that there was no upper ceiling on the troop deployment and had repeatedly warned that the United States was in for the long haul.
Later that day Cheney joined Baker in giving a classified briefing to legislators in the secure room, S-407, in the Capitol. Neither dropped a hint that a reinforcement was being considered.
But in the television interviews the next morning, October 25, Cheney intentionally laid the seed. “We are not at the point yet where we want to stop adding forces,” he said on ABC. On CBS he was asked if the Pentagon was getting ready to send another 100,000 troops. Cheney replied, “It’s conceivable that we’ll end up with that big of an increase.”
He repeated this point on NBC, but added that this would not affect the relief of troops already there after six to eight months. “There clearly will be a rotation policy. . . . I would guess we’ll end up around six months.”
The big news of Cheney’s statements reached Powell, who was on a stopover in Europe. “What is going on?” he asked an aide. When it sank in, he told one person, “Goddammit, I’ll never travel again. I haven’t seen the President on this.” There had been discussions but no decision as far as he knew. But there it was in clear language from Cheney, a man who chose his words carefully.
Bush, Scowcroft and Sununu were making decisions again without a full airing of views. Powell was tired of learning of major administration decisions after the fact. Sununu had been advising and urging the President to speak out strongly and to back up his words with a military threat. He or someone else apparently had won.
One thing that could be said for Bush: he had stated consistently that the Kuwait invasion would not stand. Powell, however, felt that the economic sanctions still loomed as the large unknown. When might they work? When would they be deemed to have failed? He was eager to get back to Washington.
In Saudi Arabia, Schwarzkopf also heard Cheney’s remarks. Before his own surprise and distress could fully register, the Saudis were on the phone pounding him with questions: What is this? What’s going on? Where were the consultations before making such a decision or announcement? Schwarzkopf tried to stumble through with some answers. He was fuming. Not only did he have to learn about something this important from the media, but he had to explain it to the Saudis without any guidance from Washington.
Schwarzkopf gave a long interview to The Atlanta Journal and Constitution that week. “Now we are starting to see evidence that the sanctions are pinching,” Schwarzkopf said. “So why should we say, ‘Okay, gave ’em two months, didn’t work. Let’s get on with it and kill a whole bunch of people?’ That’s crazy. That’s crazy.” He recounted how in Vietnam the United States, unopposed in the air, would pound the villages with bombs and then go in and find the North Vietnamese coming right out of their holes fighting like devils. Schwarzkopf also said, “War is a profanity because, let’s face it, you’ve got two opposing sides trying to settle their differences by killing as many of each other as they can.”
Wolfowitz, who visited the Central Commander around this time, felt that Schwarzkopf was making these statements partly for the benefit of his troops, to make it absolutely clear that if there was a war, it would be the civilians who would be taking them there.
Schwarzkopf told Wolfowitz that he had had some discussions with Middle East experts who had convinced him that while war would be damaging to the United States in the region, a failure to go to war would be far more damaging. Schwarzkopf said he felt that a prolonged stalemate would be a victory for Saddam.
Powell arrived back in Washington, but Cheney was going off the next day to do some fishing in Wyoming with Baker. A White House meeting with the President was planned for early the following week to discuss the Gulf options.
• • •
The new Air Force Chief, General Merrill “Tony” McPeak, told Powell that if they were going to launch an offensive operation, the sooner the better for the Air Force. A 6-foot-2, rail-thin fighter pilot, McPeak, 54, said the airpower combat advantage would be at its maximum from about right now up to November 1. It would deteriorate steadily after that, he said, because Iraqi defensive preparations were reducing the U.S. combat advantage. The Iraqis were digging in deeper in the desert and organizing themselves. They had acquired some U.S. ground-to-air HAWK missiles in Kuwait that they might be able to use against U.S. planes. In addition, the weather was never going to be better.
Powell countered that the other services needed more time to increase their advantages. There was no requirement to take any unnecessary risk in this operation, Powell said. The prudent course was to double the force. The military and the President would be in serious trouble if an offense didn’t succeed.
Come on, Jesus, McPeak said, somewhat overstating his point, this is a Third World country, a little one-city country for Christ’s sake. We’re making it look like World War III. We’re going to get no style points at the end of this thing. We ought to be trying to make it look easy, instead of making it look hard. My worry is that we wait too long.
I understand, Powell said. But if we go later, you’ll still have a combat advantage, and we need the time to do some other things—principally, get the Army ready to go. Get them in there. Get them on shore and unloaded. I don’t care about style points. Too much is at stake. “We go, we win,” Powell said, summarizing his belief that he wanted to be certain.
McPeak didn’t make his arguments to Cheney or the President. He saw he was a minority of one. The other chiefs agreed with Powell.
There was unanimity on one matter, however, McPeak could see. None of the chiefs was itching for a fight. They did not want an offensive operation if there was any other honorable way out for the United States.
• • •
Over the weekend Powell was watching NBC’s Saturday Nightly News broadcast with Mary Alice Williams. She introduced a report on t
roop morale from Saudi Arabia.
“Relief is what they’re waiting for,” Williams said, “or a call to action.” Then reporter Arthur Kent came on, saying that “nerves are being severely strained in Saudi Arabia. . . . U.S. troops here spend most of their energy just killing time . . . many Marines told us they’re fed up with inactivity.” He said that the troops longed for home. “But home is a mirage. The days drag on. . . . There are still no clear military objectives to go after.”
“How deep does the bad morale go?” Williams asked him.
“Pretty deep,” Kent said. “Perhaps half of the troops we spoke to said they were very unhappy with the way things are going.”
What the hell are they talking about? Powell asked himself. The report had offered nothing hard. It was foolish, but it reminded him that if war came, it would be on television instantly, bringing home the action, death, consequences and emotions even more graphically than during Vietnam. The reporters and the cameras would be there to record each step, vastly complicating all military tasks. Powell was sure of one thing: a prolonged war on television could become impossible, unsupportable at home.
• • •
Several times in October, Robert Teeter, Bush’s chief pollster, talked with the President about the Gulf policy. Teeter said he thought the administration had too many messages flying around. There was a lack of focus. He suggested that Bush return to the fundamentals that he had stated in August. The two with the strongest appeal were fighting aggression and protecting the lives of Americans, including the more than 900 Americans being held hostage in Iraq and Kuwait. About 100 had been moved to Iraqi military and industrial installations to serve as “human shields” to deter an American attack.
Bush acknowledged the points, but nonetheless seemed confident. The President said that he felt he knew more than anyone about the region, and also about the diplomacy, the military, the economics and the oil. I have been dealing with these issues for 25 years, Bush said. One night he told Teeter it was important that he had served as United Nations ambassador, U.S. envoy to China, CIA director and Vice President. Those experiences allowed him to see all the pieces. Now he could put them together.
