13 Report, 5 July 1942, TNA HS 9/1343/1.
14 Report, 16 August 1942, TNA HS 9/1343/1.
15 Report, 25 September 1942, TNA HS 9/1343/1.
16 Report by Sergeant Garvin, 19 February 1942, TNA HS 9/9/3.
17 Report by Sergeant Garvin, 6 March 1942, TNA HS 9/9/3.
18 Report by Sergeant Garvin, 26 February 1942, TNA HS 9/9/3.
19 Report by Sergeant Garvin, 6 March 1942, TNA HS 9/9/3.
20 Note by Major C. Roseberry to Major-General J. H. F. Lakin, 23 November 1942, TNA HS 9/9/3.
21 L. Valiani, Tutte le strade conducone a Roma (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1983), p. 30.
22 SOE War Diary, HS 7/236.
23 Interview with I. McGeoch, SA 9859, Imperial War Museum.
24 ‘Appendix ‘O’ to Patrol Report M.3 of the Commanding Officer, H.M. Submarine “P.228”’, undated, by Lieutenant I. McGeoch, TNA ADM 199/1344.
25 Major C. Roseberry to ‘D/Navy’, 10 February 1943, TNA HS 6/877.
26 Appendix ‘O’ to Patrol Report M.3 of the Commanding Officer, H.M. Submarine “P.228”’, undated, by Lieutenant I. McGeoch, TNA ADM 199/1344.
27 Major C. Roseberry to ‘D/Navy’, 10 February 1943, TNA HS 6/877. Three months later, on its sixth patrol, by then renamed Splendid, P.228 became one of the forty Royal Navy submarines lost in the Mediterranean (and one of ten destroyed between November 1942 and May 1943) when it was depth-charged off Capri and forced to the surface. As the attacking German destroyer set about finishing the job, its gunfire killed eighteen of McGeoch’s forty-eight-strong crew as they emerged from the conning tower and jumped into the sea. Ian McGeoch, An Affair of Chances: A Submariner’s Odyssey 1939–44 (London: Imperial War Museum, 1991).
28 Message No. 1 to Moselle, 22 February 1943, in ‘Copy of Messages to and from Avocat’, TNA WO 169/24902. ‘Moselle’ was the SOE codename for the wireless link to Adler’s set. ‘Avocat’ was the mission’s codename.
29 Letter of 12 January 1943 quoted in ‘Extract from “Section II – Part I – Parachutists”’, August 1944, TNA HS 9/9/3.
30 ‘Activities of Italian Counter-Espionage prior to September, 1943 – Source: Col. Mario Bertacchi’, July 1944, TNA HS 9/9/3.
31 ‘Interrogation Report on Faccio, Cesare’, 19 March 1945, TNA HS 9/1343/1.
32 Ibid.
33 ‘Interrogation Report on Sergeant Major Silvestri’, 17 February 1945, TNA HS 6/877.
34 ‘Annex Nr. 1’ to ‘Report on a mission performed in Sardinia from July to September 1943’, 23 September 1943, NARA RG 226, Entry 190, Box 90, Folder 32.
35 ‘Interrogation Report on Sergeant Major Silvestri’, 17 February 1945, TNA HS 6/877.
36 Ibid.
37 ‘Part 1. Action S/A’, 11 August 1944, TNA HS 9/9/3.
38 Message No. 3 from Moselle, received 26 February 1943, in ‘Copy of Messages to and from Avocat’, TNA WO 169/24902.
39 ‘Moselle’, Major Phillips to Colonel Nicholls, 27 February 1943, TNA HS 6/877.
40 ‘Second Interrogation of Prisoner of War Bergadano’, 8 March 1943, TNA HS 6/877.
41 Extract from CSDIC report, 4 March 1943, TNA HS 6/877.
42 Extract from CSDIC report, 3 March 1943, TNA HS 6/877.
43 Cipher telegram, Major C. Roseberry to Massingham, 26 February 1943, TNA HS 6/877.
44 SOE War Diary, TNA HS 7/262.
45 Message No. 12 to Moselle, 28 April 1943, in ‘Copy of Messages to and from Avocat’, TNA WO 169/24902.
46 Message No. 20 from Moselle, received 1 May 1943, in ‘Copy of Messages to and from Avocat’, TNA WO 169/24902.
47 Message No. 21 from Moselle, received 7 May 1943, in ‘Copy of Messages to and from Avocat’, TNA WO 169/24902.
48 ‘Minutes of the 37 Committee Meeting held on Friday, 14.5.43’, TNA WO 169/24888.
49 SOE War Diary, TNA HS 7/263.
50 ‘Minutes of the 37 Committee Meeting held on Friday, 7.5.43’, TNA WO 169/24888.
51 Message No. 23 to Moselle, 3 June 1943, TNA WO 169/24902.
52 Message No. 25 to Moselle, 11 June 1943, TNA WO 169/24902.
53 Message No. 23 from Moselle, received 12 May 1943, in ‘Copy of Messages to and from Avocat’, TNA WO 169/24902.
54 Message No. 28 from Moselle, received 8 June 1943, TNA WO 169/24902.
55 Message No. 30 from Moselle, received 30 June 1943, TNA WO 169/24902.
56 Cipher telegram, Major C. Roseberry to Massingham, 6 May 1943, TNA HS 6/877.
57 Report by Major A. Kennedy, 20 October 1942, TNA HS 6/890.
58 Report by Lieutenant F. Basett, 15 April 1943, TNA HS 9/1013.
59 SOE War Diary, TNA HS 7/263.
60 Cipher telegram, Major C. Roseberry to SOE Algiers, 11 May 1943, TNA HS 6/877.
61 Sortie report, 16/17 July 1943, TNA AIR 20/8352.
62 A Force Narrative War Diary, 1 January to 31 December 1943, TNA CAB 154/3.
63 ‘You should now speed up your plans for the organisation of local sympathisers,’ read one in early August. ‘It is imperative that you keep in constant touch with us from now onwards,’ added another the next day. Messages No. 33 and 35 to Moselle, 4 and 5 August 1943, in ‘Moselle Traffic’, TNA WO 169/24902. Algiers also sent a ‘questionnaire’ designed to draw ‘Italian smoke’. ‘Minutes of 40 Committee Meeting held on 13th Aug. 1943’, TNA WO 169/24888. ‘We urgently require further information on the following points,’ Sardinia was told. ‘What areas are forbidden to civilians? Which beaches suitable for large scale operations are mined or wired? What other means of defence are there? By what strength of troops are the beaches held? Description of any fixed coastal defences including type and calibre of weapons. State of alertness on all defences …’ Message No. 36 to Moselle, 5 August 1943, in ‘Moselle Traffic’, TNA WO 169/24902.
64 Cipher telegram, SOE London to SOE Algiers, 14 June 1943, TNA HS 6/877.
65 Message No. 34 to Moselle, 4 August 1943, in ‘Moselle Traffic’, TNA WO 169/24902.
66 ‘Minutes of 40 Committee Meeting held on 27.8.43’, TNA WO 169/24888.
67 Message No. 42 to Moselle, 30 August 1943, in ‘Moselle Traffic’, TNA WO 169/24902.
68 Message No. 44 to Moselle, 3 September 1943, in ‘Moselle Traffic’, TNA WO 169/24902.
69 Message No. 45 to Moselle, 6 September 1943, in ‘Moselle Traffic’, TNA WO 169/24902.
70 ‘Part 1. Action S/A’, 11 August 1944, TNA HS 9/9/3.
71 A Force Narrative War Diary, 1 January to 31 December 1943, TNA CAB 154/3.
72 Abwehr Operational Material, No. 832, 13 August 1943, TNA CAB 154/77.
73 Abwehr Operational Material, No. 833, 13 August 1943, TNA CAB 154/77.
74 ‘Annex Nr. 1’ to ‘Report on a mission performed in Sardinia from July to September 1943’, 23 September 1943, NARA RG 226, Entry 190, Box 90, Folder 32.
75 Lieutenant-Colonel C. Roseberry to Commander J. Senter, 6 March 1945, TNA HS 6/877.
76 A Force Narrative War Diary, 1 January to 31 December 1943, TNA CAB 154/3.
77 ‘Activities of Italian Counter-Espionage prior to September, 1943 – Source: Col. Mario Bertacchi’, July 1944, TNA HS 9/9/3.
78 ‘Interrogation Report on Faccio, Cesare’, 19 March 1945, TNA HS 9/1343/1.
79 ‘Interrogation Report on Sergeant-Major Silvestri’, 17 February 1945, TNA HS 6/877.
80 Ibid.
81 Cipher telegram, Major C. Roseberry to Squadron Leader H. G. Crawshaw, 12 May 1943, TNA HS 6/877.
82 Information provided by the SOE Adviser to the Foreign & Commonwealth Office.
83 Messages Nos. 2 and 3 from Moselle, received 22 and 26 February 1943, in ‘Copy of Messages to and from Avocat’, TNA WO 169/24902.
84 Message No. 2 to Moselle, sent 27 February 1943, in ‘Copy of Messages to and from Avocat’, TNA WO 169/24902.
85 ‘Activities of Italian Counter-Espionage prior to September, 1943 – Source: Col. Mario Bertacchi’, July 1944, TNA HS 9/9/3.
86 Ibid.
87 ‘Interrogation report
on Sergeant-Major Silvestri’, 17 February 1945, TNA HS 6/877.
88 Sources agree that Scamaroni committed suicide, but James Hutchison, an RF Section officer who investigated his death, felt the more lurid stories were untrue. In October 1943, Hutchison travelled to Corsica ‘and during my visit there I made numerous enquiries as to the fate of my friend Scameroni [sic]. There is no doubt that he committed suicide in prison, but it was by hanging himself and the stories of extreme torture are probably exaggerated. I interviewed and obtained this information from his uncle and aunt who had seen his body.’ Pencil annotation in ‘RF Section History 1943–1944’, Volume Two, TNA HS 7/124. I am grateful to Nigel Perrin for bringing this to my attention.
89 M. Cobb, The Resistance: The French Fight Against the Nazis (London: Simon & Schuster, 2009), pp. 189–90.
90 Report by Corporal Mangeolles, 23 April 1942, TNA HS 9/690/3.
91 ‘Sea Urchin’, report by C. H. Harmer to Colonel Robertson, 11 April 1943, TNA KV 6/12.
92 ‘They have been taken and have “sold me”,’ Hellier is alleged to have said. ‘I’ve waited 24 hours before speaking, hoping everyone would get clear, and now in my turn I have “sold” everything.’ ‘RF Section History 1943–1944’, Volume Two, TNA HS 7/124.
93 V. Sias, Il controspionaggio italiano in Sardegna e Corsica (1943) (S’Alvure, 1991).
11
‘The Explosive Topo Lads’
In August 1943, beneath a bridge in Sicily outside the coastal town of Barcellona Pozzo Di Gotto, a British Army officer was made to dig his own grave. Caught in enemy territory dressed as a farmer and carrying explosives, he had been interrogated by German officers and earmarked for execution at the hands of a firing squad of Italian Carabinieri. According to an eyewitness, he dug with mock deliberation, refused to be hurried, and, in a final show of defiance that astonished the men preparing to kill him, said the hole must be comfortable and lay down in it to check. Finding it too narrow at the shoulders, he dug a little more and declared he was ready. Then he stood at the foot of the pit, bid farewell to his mother, cursed the Germans, and was shot.
The dead man had been a member of a small SOE team accompanying regular British forces taking part in Operation Husky – the invasion of Sicily – launched four weeks before: the first major thrust by the Allies into southern Europe and the first serious attempt to occupy any part of Italian or German soil. Until the Allied invasion of Normandy, Husky was also the largest operation of its type ever attempted. Under the overall command of Dwight Eisenhower, the assault forces alone numbered more than 150,000 troops, comprising George S. Patton’s US Seventh Army, Bernard Montgomery’s British Eighth Army, and two airborne divisions, with thousands of aircraft and naval vessels in support. SOE’s contribution was a handful of men with a couple of trucks and jeeps, some rucksacks of explosives, a few wireless sets and the dangerous job of doing whatever they could to assist with the battle while searching the island for sympathetic Sicilians.
The decision to proceed with the Sicily landings was taken by Churchill and Roosevelt at Casablanca in January 1943. The hope was that a successful invasion would help knock Italy out of the war, divert Axis forces away from the Eastern Front, and provide the Allies with valuable experience of amphibious landings prior to invading Northwest Europe. In February, with planning for Sicily well under way, SOE was directed by Eisenhower’s headquarters in Algiers to make cautious but ‘immediate’ preparations for ‘the establishment of communications and the formation of an organisation’ to assist the coming invasion.1 The importance of this task was underlined in March when SOE received its yearly directive from the British Chiefs of Staff. ‘One of the first objects of our offensive strategy in 1943 is the elimination of Italy,’ the Chiefs declared. ‘You should encourage revolt against the fascist government and the Germans. Sabotage in Italy itself should be mainly conducted against communications, and electric power stations, preparations being made for attacking specially vital points in the enemy’s communications when the right moment to strike comes.’2
Ultimately SOE proved powerless to establish in Sicily any agents or contacts of any sort before the landings on the island began. In fact for a long time it seemed likely that SOE would contribute nothing to the invasion at all. What SOE wanted was permission to send in with the invading troops ‘a small SOE staff party’ to make and handle local contacts, search for suitable sea and air bases, and generally ‘seize any opportunities which may arise’.3 The planners took some persuading. The concept of ‘a small SOE staff party’ was based on the model of a similar unit, codenamed ‘Brandon’, that had participated in the Allied landings in Northwest Africa in November 1942 but contributed little.
While trying to secure a berth in the invasion fleet bound for Sicily, SOE was not alone in feeling stymied. Max Corvo, a young and precocious Sicilian-American who was head at the time of the overseas Italian desk of OSS’s Secret Intelligence section, would later record that OSS hopes of operating in Sicily had also been frustrated. OSS would achieve very little in the way of operations into Italy before the Italian surrender, and, though it had been agreed that the Mediterranean would be a British sphere of influence, Corvo wondered if this exclusion from Sicily was another example of excessive British obstruction.4 It is true that the British were often worried by the growing presence in the Mediterranean of energetic Americans whose ideas, plans and policies might conflict damagingly with their own. But it is also the case that contemporary files do not suggest that obstacles were put deliberately in the way of OSS’s desire to work in Sicily. The reality seems to have been that senior planners were wary of any clandestine organisation, British or American, taking part.
Only in May 1943, after Cecil Roseberry flew out to Algiers to argue its case, did the Husky planners concede that SOE could feature in the landings. And only in June, with less than a month to go, did they finally agree that a uniformed SOE team of two officers, three wireless operators and a driver could land in Sicily seven days after the invasion with a jeep and a fifteen-cwt truck, followed, a few days later, by a second small party permitted to work in civilian clothes. These two tiny teams would be attached to General Miles Dempsey’s XIII Corps, part of Montgomery’s Eighth Army, and operate with the cover-name of ‘G (Topographical) Liaison Unit’. A fortnight before the landings, XIII Corps required a gentle reminder when it was found to have ‘completely forgotten’ that SOE was taking part.5
In overall command of ‘G Topo’, as he christened it, was Malcolm Munthe, a 33-year-old British Army major. He was also earmarked to lead the first team to go ashore. The son of Axel Munthe, the Swedish-born physician who had written The Story of San Michele, Malcolm Grane Ludovic Martin de Munthe had been born in London and brought up there and in Italy. Fluent in French and Italian, he was fluent, too, in Norwegian and Swedish and had already seen secret service in Scandinavia. In late 1939, freshly commissioned in the Gordon Highlanders, he had been sent to Norway to organise clandestine shipments of arms to Finland, which the Soviet Union had suddenly attacked. The following spring, during Germany’s conquest of Norway, he received shrapnel wounds in the head and leg and was captured. Escaping from hospital, he tried several times to flee to the safety of neutral Sweden and finally succeeded after a gruelling journey, on foot and through snow, when he was reduced to stealing clothes from washing lines and eating scraps of the newspapers he was using for insulation. In Stockholm he helped out at the British Legation with the secret formation of guerrilla groups in Norway and the dispatch of agents and supplies, before returning home in August 1941 and working for a while at the London end of SOE’s Norwegian planning. He transferred to Mediterranean duties in 1943 and was hurriedly earmarked for the command role in Sicily. One wireless operator who was to work with him on the island would remember Munthe as ‘a cool customer, dead cool; as crafty as a bag of monkeys’.6
Munthe arrived in North Africa from London only on 20 June. On the eve of the landings he gathered his spearhe
ad team in a busy assembly camp close to the bomb-shattered port of Sousse, in Tunisia, where Dempsey’s XIII Corps was preparing to embark. The last-minute nature of the team’s preparations meant that all were British servicemen. Some joined it only days before the invasion. His three wireless operators were Sergeant Denis MacDonell, Corporal Bill Beggs and Signalman Harry Hargreaves. Corporal Charles Borg, a former policeman in the Royal Maltese Constabulary, had the role of driver and general assistant. Borg spoke some Italian; MacDonell, Beggs and Hargreaves did not.
Munthe’s second-in-command was Captain Gilbert Randall, the Salonika-born son of an Italian mother and a British father. In 1941, as a new lieutenant in the Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry, Randall had been the one man among Peter Fleming’s Yak mission who could actually speak Italian. Blown into the water when the Kalanthe was attacked on its short-lived voyage from Greece, he had made it eventually to Cairo. Unlike the rest of Yak Mission, he was still there six months later when SOE’s office in the city had to find a man to comb for volunteers among Italy’s colonies in East Africa. Promoted captain in June 1942, he had then spent ten months in Palestine as adjutant of SOE’s main Middle East training school on the slopes of Mount Carmel. ‘Capt. Randall I liked very much,’ Denis MacDonell remembered. ‘Steady, easy-going – a typical Englishman type. Many a yarn we had lying under the night skies in Sicily.’7
Equipment, too, was organised. Munthe detailed the kit list down to the last shirt, pistol and mess tin:
Each man had with him in pack and blanket roll – one blanket, 3 pairs socks, black gym shoes, 1 spare shirt, 1 spare khaki shorts, 1 ground sheet, 1 gas cape used as mackintosh, housewife [toiletry kit], double mess tin, feeding irons, 2 pullovers, pistol … [and] each man carried a hip flask of whisky … Over and above the personal weapons carried by each man we had one rifle and 2 Sten guns …
Fearing we might not be able to get stores sent to us from base HQ at an early date, and thinking also that we might need to send personnel through the enemy lines during the first days, we took with us a couple of unobtrusive rucksacks containing the following: 40 lbs 808 [explosive], 40 lbs plastic [explosive], 50 time pencils (half hour to 2 hours), pressure switches, etc, detonators … 12 gammon grenades, 10 Italian pistols, 6 wire cutters … 4 bottles best whisky (for presentation purposes only and when operating with American Army these are of the greatest value), 12 torches with spare batteries and coloured filters, foreign paper and cardboard with which to make passes, also inks, fine pens, rubber gum, etc (essential for making documents to resemble passes used in enemy territory) [and] thinnest Japanese silk for writing messages which are subsequently sewn in the lining of the garments worn by the personnel.8
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