The Cuban missile crisis became front-page news in October of 1962. The information that Penkovsky supplied long before that date, coupled with CIA's own aerial photography of missiles, gave the type, the technical characteristics, the potential readiness and the capabilities (including their range and destructive power) of the missiles to be deployed. He had provided the manuals on the SS-4, the principal missile deployed there; and when aerial photography identified these as the missiles under construction and ultimately in place, the analysts knew just what coverage the missiles could have of the United States and what threat they might be. Penkovsky also revealed that there were no ICBM forces operational in the Soviet Union at the time, which now gave President Kennedy two aces in the hole during the negotiations. Kennedy, therefore, ultimately reacted to the missiles in Cuba in a more decisive manner than was his custom.
Khrushchev had bullied Kennedy in their diplomatic encounter on June 1961 in Vienna. The Berlin Wall had risen on Kennedy's watch. Khrushchev thought of Kennedy as an inexperienced boy president who could easily be intimidated. Certainly, Kennedy was determined not to be embarrassed by Khrushchev again, and he now knew a nuclear exchange was unlikely. Kennedy also knew from Penkovsky that the ultraconservatives in the Kremlin were terribly frightened by Khrushchev's affinity for freewheeling nuclear poker and might well force Khrushchev to retreat. Therefore, armed with these and other pieces of information and for other reasons as well, Kennedy decided to act. He ordered the naval blockade and the heart of the world skipped a beat, not being privy to the actual circumstances. Ultimately, Khrushchev realized that he had lost his desperate gamble and proposed a solution to end the confrontation.
CHAPTER 15
Reflections
The British case officers, Shergie and Mike, got on very well with George personally and greatly enjoyed working closely with him. They found him to be operationally compatible, someone who agreed with them about the needs of Penkovsky. Bulik wanted to play things more by the book than by the personalities.
Although every significant action taken during the entire operation was done with joint approval of the SIS and CIA, inevitably there would be legitimate differences of opinion between the services as to how the case should be advanced. One such difference centered upon the number of meetings Penkovsky should have with Janet Chisholm. The CIA, represented by Bulik, early on began to be disturbed at the high frequency of the rendezvous. After all, going slowly would certainly seem to be the safe thing to do. Moreover, the intelligence community at one time seemed to be nearing saturation with the type of information that Penkovsky was providing.) Perhaps he should have been put on ice and saved for the earlywarning notification of a nuclear strike, at least until a safe means of transfer of the clandestine material could be effected.
However, George shared with the British the notion that, in dealing with people of Penkovsky's sort, one has to accept that they are not quite of the ordinary run. That is why they do the things they do. Therefore, one has to go along with their desires and motivations to a degree; one has to be very careful about directing them. Accordingly, the team had to keep Penkovsky's confidence up. On the other hand, there was the matter of his safety. Penkovsky had this burning desire to become the greatest spy in history. He had on numerous occasions said this. Having achieved contact with the West for that purpose, he was not likely to let anything get in the way of that goal. Penkovsky directed that the meetings be frequent. Moreover, the great volume of intelligence justified great risk.
Of course, in the end, Penkovsky did provide an early warning of sorts on the Cuban crises when he provided the vital information that later enabled Kennedy to take the actions that he ultimately did. It may have been the supreme early warning of all time. The information that he had provided to the United States made its position during the crises far superior than it otherwise would have been. So, perhaps he achieved his goal of being the greatest spy of all time. But he would not have done so if the CIA-SIS team had not kept up his morale and motivation. The British continue to believe that the team was correct in playing the act at Penkovsky's speed. Otherwise, he would have lost his confidence in them. In retrospect, and in spite of the ultimate outcome, they maintain that there was no option but to run the case pretty much the way he wanted it run.2
George shared some of his personal recollections: "Later I became good friends with the British. Sir Dickie Franks eventually became chief of SIS. He took me to lunch in Bonn, Germany, one day in 1964, when I was dealing with another case. I have about ten pictures of him and his lovely British home with a little lake and a miniature golf course, a wonderful and attractive wife, daughter, and son. I visited with him and took the photos. Sir Dickie Franks, a fine officer. He holds the KCMG: Knight Commander of the Most Distinguished Order of St. Michael and St. George. It is quite an award; it is presented for exemplary service, professionally, and other such things as loyalty and character. He was the case officer separately for Greville Wynne. He kept Wynne under control separately and out of our hair.
"Ultimately Shergie became a very dear friend, and recently made a lecture, praising me to the sky. My daughter, Eva, stayed with him when she was in England. He is intelligent, about my age, retired now and holds the CMG: the Commander of the Most Distinguished Order of St. Michael and St. George. He is a wonderful person who raises and trains seeing-eye dogs for a hobby. His wife, Bevis, just died. She was a great British athletic champion in her youth, a powerful woman. She held the British championship in shot put, javelin, and discusall at one time-the only one to ever have done that. She competed in the Olympics of 1948 in England. She also was a vegetarian, so he and I had to sneak out of the house at dinnertime for steaks.3
"In his book The Man from Odessa, Wynne stated that he and Penkovsky had been flown in black to meet with President Kennedy. That is all baloney. The concept wasn't even original. It was stolen from Penkovsky's story about the man flown back black to visit General Cabell. Nevertheless, about twenty years later, this fabrication caused a little heartburn to some of us who were involved.
"The libel laws of England are so peculiar that you would have to stand on your ear to believe them. It is as if the English people cannot say the things they believe. If someone said to you, 'I saw the Second Coming of Jesus Christ yesterday,' and you called him a liar, you'd be subject to libel if you couldn't disprove him. Moreover, you might then be vulnerable to a heavy monetary penalty. Don't ask me why. I cannot explain such a thing. I don't understand these laws at all. That is their society. You can believe it or not. I have it all in writing, right now, everything that I am telling you.
"Rupert Allason, who then was a member of Parliament, and later a noted author of spy thrillers, writing under the pseudonym of Nigel West, called Wynne a liar for stating that he and Penkovsky had flown to the United States, black, to meet with President Kennedy. Greville Wynne instituted a suit against Allason claiming, I believe, `defamation of character.' The suit could have cost Allason 200,000 English pounds, according to the estimate he gave to me. Allason, of course, wanted me to come over and testify, and he offered to pay all of my expenses. He knew that I had complete cognizance of Penkovsky's schedule and movements while he was with its, and he knew that my testimony would put the lie to Wynne's tall tale. I did not want to get into this argument about money and I did not wish to go to England. I did, however, feel an obligation to help reveal the truth, so I endeavored to assist him without going over there. His lawyer, a woman, came over to my house in Virginia from London and took a deposition from me. I also told her to do her homework. I said, `We have a Secret Service. They can tell you from the White House log the people who saw the president and whether or not Wynne saw him. They will not tell you what was said between the parties, but at least you can find out whether or not it is conceivable that the dates corresponding to Wynne's dates that allow for the possibility of such a meeting. It may be that the president was not even in town on those days.4
&nbs
p; "Now Shergie, Mike, and their English friends are subject to restrictions regarding the British Official Secrets Act. By saying something that they shouldn't, they could be severely punished. Consequently, they couldn't readily help Allason. Moreover, when Allason asked Len McCoy to help him, all Len could do was to agree with him verbally. McCoy's wife was still at the CIA at the time and it would not have been appropriate or practical for McCoy to get into the fray. Anyway, the lawsuit precipitated by these ideas about black visitations cleared for good, by the grace of God, with Greville Wynne dying in 1990 of cancer. That ended the legal action."5
Through personal interviews with Harold Shergold, Mike Stokes, and Yuri Nosenko, a coherent picture of the Penkovsky arrest emerges. Also, some of the elements of this account are attested to in the comprehensive treatment of Penkovsky, The Spy Who Saved the World, by Jerrold L. Schecter and Peter S. Deriabin.
The story of the detection and apprehension of Penkovsky is one of sheer serendipity in favor of KGB surveillance, foolish arrogance on the part of Penkovsky, and deserved results for an incredible effort by the KGB "Department of Dirty Tricks." It begins with the series of clandestine meetings between Penkovsky and Janet Chisholm. Everything went perfectly well from the first of these meetings, on 2 July 1961 in Tsvetnoy Park, through the tenth meeting, on 5 January 1962 at the Kommission store. By this time there had been four successful meetings in the park and six successful meetings across town at either the Kommission store or the nearby Praga restaurant/deli. Additionally there had been the November 1961 social event at the British Embassy where Penkovsky had officially met Janet Chisholm.
On 12 January, Penkovsky picked up Janet at the deli and they proceeded down the street as usual. Almost by accident, a KGB surveillance team in the area saw a Russian man enter an apartment door and a Western woman follow him. The KGB team did not know the identity of either person, but they took note of this unusual circumstance, and in short order they identified Janet. It was simply a matter of following her back to a location that suggested her identity, the British Embassy. Then, comparing her surveillance photo with those in their files of embassy personnel, they knew who she was. They did not, however, identify Penkovsky, who took evasive actions that were beyond their means of a successful pursuit at the time. They knew that they had made an exciting discovery. A British Embassy woman was having a surreptitious rendezvous with a Russian who seemed adept in clandestine matters, judging by his ability to escape their track. They resolved to follow up on this curious relationship. If nothing else, they might have an opportunity for blackmail. The next time this couple met, the KGB team would be prepared.
Penkovsky suspected that a surveillance team might have witnessed this meeting. He then did a most brazen thing; he attended the appointed meeting with Janet on 19 January. This ultimately cost him his life. The Soviet surveillance team was in attendance for this meeting with great strength. Rather than the two or three members who attended the first detected rendezvous, they now had members in numbers sufficient to completely blanket the actions of both Janet and Penkovsky. The meeting of the nineteenth was conducted without their awareness of the surveillance, and as they departed, he told her that he would see her on the next planned meeting date. Just then, however, he spotted a car speeding away with the members of a surveillance team. His observation was sufficient to obtain the car's license number. He then knew that he was in jeopardy and resolved not to meet covertly with Janet again.
Janet also saw the car but she was not so keenly aware of the problem. About two weeks later, she waited as usual at the prearranged site at the prescribed time to meet Penkovsky but he did not show. She went to the alternate meeting place. Again he did not show and did not show for several more meetings. She kept up her normal routine, visiting their usual meeting places, hoping to make it appear that nothing was amiss. She changed to days when he would not be expected to appear, however. Now, she did not wish to meet him, suspecting strongly that she was being followed everywhere she went.
The CIA-SIS team sent the coded radio message to Penkovsky expressing their anxiety but got no reply. They later learned that he had not been able to manage the device for the proper receipt of messages. Evidently, George's initial assessment of Penkovsky's ability to use it was wrong. The team was in the dark until March.
When the KGB surveillance team detected Janet Chisholm and Penkovsky at their meeting on 19 January and after the team had identified him by following him back to his office, they still did not know just what they had. Their next step was a full-scale investigation of his associations and habits. They began a full-time surveillance of him. They planted microphones in his apartment and set up cameras to watch his every action within his own home. They placed a camera on the balcony of his apartment during a routine incursion and remotely controlled it from another apartment afar. Initial photographs were obtained.
The KGB then acquired the apartment directly above Penkovsky's for a period of about a month, while that family was given a vacation on the Black Sea. From that apartment a tiny peephole was drilled into Penkovsky's ceiling. A probe with a tiny lens was inserted to scan Penkovsky's entire apartment and witness his every move. After sufficient observation, the search entry into his apartment was planned. While the family was away, Penkovsky was poisoned. He did not eat a poison but contacted a substance surreptitiously placed in his office chair by the KGB. It consisted of a caustic agent suspended in a wax base. His body heat melted the wax, the agent was absorbed into his buttocks, and he then became severely blistered as well as ill. He was taken to the hospital, perhaps unwitting as to the cause of his malady. While there, and with his family not at home, entry into the apartment was attained. Only one entry was required and access to the desk was a trivial task for the much-experienced intruders.
Penkovsky was released from the hospital and returned home. So, the KGB again waited and watched. Finally, on a date sometime in October, he was observed removing from his desk the internal passport that Rodney Carlson had given him. The cameras witnessing his action were of sufficient definition to actually allow recognition of the document. He signed the counterfeit internal passport, thus enabling its use. Fearing that they might lose him, the KGB arrested him. The date was 22 October, the very date that Kennedy spoke to the American public, announcing to them, for the first time, the presence of the missiles in Cuba and that he had sent a message to Khrushchev regarding their removal. It was by mere chance that Penkovsky's arrest occurred amidst the events of that crisis, while both the Soviet Union and the United States were attempting to deal with the missiles that he so completely defined. The timing must have been a shock to Khrushchev, not knowing just what the Americans had learned from Penkovsky and just when they had acquired that information.
There has always been some confusion about the meaning of the telephone signals and the marking of the dead drop. What did Penkovsky do when they arrested him and why? What did he tell them and why? The signals and the arrest, of course, are related. Some things are clear. He talked and maybe he talked a lot. He probably made a deal, but CIA/SIS analysts don't know for sure. The Soviet press announced that his family was innocent of all misdeeds. This information was printed in the public news, in Izvestiya. Evidently, he made a deal that if his family were spared, he would cooperate with the KGB and tell them what he had divulged as well as what he could about his spymasters. It is likely that the KGB had the declaration of the innocence of the family members published in Izvestiya in order to assure him that they would honor their agreement. It would have been even more embarrassing to them if they had published such a message and then reversed themselves. They were not above this type of duplicity, but it is clear that they never did persecute the family members in any significant way in the future. They are today healthy and reasonably well off, but reclusive.
It is always standard procedure in such a situation for the offended agency to try to do damage control as well as to turn the agent around for a double-cros
s operation. So, apart from trying to find out just how much Penkovsky had told the team, they wanted also to take the opportunity to clean out as many embassy personnel as was possible. Penkovsky would anticipate this without a hint from them. He, of course, could not begin to tell them of the volumes of data that he photographed. He didn't know himself. There probably was no reason to tell them too much else of what he knew. He could, however, have had a reason to tell them a number of truths-particularly ones that they could check out for themselves. Such action might gain their confidence that he indeed was attempting to cooperate and thereby might promote their willingness to exonerate his family.
The telephone signals as well as the dead-drop location and procedure would fit nicely in that category of revelations that Penkovsky could share with them to garner their confidence. He probably gave them the location of the dead drop. At any rate, they most assuredly knew it. He certainly told them how to execute at least one of the telephone signals and how to mark the lamppost. He could very well have told them everything about the signals except, most importantly, their true full meanings.
It is worth recalling that after Penkovsky and the CIA/SIS team got to know each other, he related to them various schemes for dropping atom bombs in garbage cans all about Moscow. This passion clearly had been evidenced at the series of London meetings. He was incredibly motivated. No one, of course, knows what was going through his mind when he was first apprehended by the KGB, but one can speculate that the minute he found himself in trouble, he determined that he would play games with the authorities. After all, he was extremely bright and tremendously dedicated to his beliefs.
CIA Spymaster_George Kisevalter Page 23
