During the last three months of 1878 Wood was constantly on the move, visiting the small settlements, recruiting support and obtaining wagons and draught animals for the planned invasion. He later wrote:
The incessant work, however, now began to tell on me, and my glands swelled as they had done when I was overworked in the Amatola Mountains, although for pleasure and on principle I played either lawn-tennis or polo for an hour or two every evening, the subalterns of the 90th being always available for a game.11
Despite ruthless and brutal raids by the abaQulusi against the Boers’ black workers, led by the renegade Swazi chief Mbilini, the Boers could not bring themselves to support the hated British, whose motives they distrusted. Piet Uys was the only Boer leader to offer his services and he proved his commitment by bringing about forty of his family who acted as irregular cavalry.
Wood had the shortest distance to advance and typically entered Zululand on 6 January, four days before the ultimatum expired. Crossing the Blood river, Wood’s 2,278-strong column marched 10 miles to a flat-topped hill called Bemba’s Kop where he built a fortified camp. His force was made up of eight companies of the 13th and 90th Regiments, six guns of 11/7 Battery, about 200 Volunteer Cavalry and 300 natives given the rather flattering title of ‘Wood’s Irregulars’.
On 11 January Wood proved his fearlessness by riding south through some 50 miles of Zulu territory accompanied only by a small escort; his intention was to discuss the advance with Chelmsford whom he met at Rorke’s Drift. Wood was ordered to delay his advance to allow the other two columns to catch up the extra distance. Chelmsford was so confident of success that he suggested Wood’s mounted Colonials, under the command of Colonel Redvers Buller, should indulge in some cattle raiding. Ever the gentleman, Wood had warned the Zulus of his intention to invade; although the majority of Zulu warriors had since departed for Ulundi, the remaining Zulus were unprepared for the speed of Wood’s advance and had not yet moved their sizeable herds to safety. Such cattle raiding was highly profitable to Buller, whose mounted troops swiftly rounded up the unprotected herds thus depriving the Zulus of their valuable cattle.12 Wood was also orally instructed to occupy himself with the tribes to his front and left flank, mainly the fiercely independent abaQulusi Zulus. By this unfortunate change of plan the whole area, some 600 square miles to the left (north) of the advancing main Centre Column, was completely exposed; the Zulus took full advantage of this serious error by moving their main force of some 40,000 warriors and supporters across this empty area to within 5 miles of Isandlwana unseen by the Centre Column’s scouts.
No. 5 Reserve Column
Chelmsford’s orders to Colonel Rowlands VC were:
To observe any Boer military activity whilst maintaining a state of readiness in northern Zululand.13
No. 5 Reserve Column was based at the Transvaal settlement of Utrecht under the command of Colonel Hugh Rowlands VC. Rowlands was still experiencing Chelmsford’s displeasure following the unsuccessful British attempt in the preceding September and October to overcome the Pedi tribe of Chief Sekhukhune; the expedition had been controversially abandoned by Rowlands when in sight of Sekhukhune’s stronghold. Chelmsford was also aware of the anti-British sentiment of the Transvaal Boers since the publication of the Boundary Commission report and, accordingly, Rowlands was instructed to await orders. The column took no part in the invasion of Zululand other than to support some local skirmishing near its posts at Derby and Luneburg. Rowlands and the bulk of his force of 1,565 officers and men remained in situ until Rowlands was returned to Pretoria in February 1879. At that point, the remaining troops of the No. 5 Column were attached to Wood’s command.
VIEWED OVERALL, Chelmsford’s main invasion force was remarkably small when the magnitude of the undertaking is considered. His force of regular troops consisted of the two battalions of the 24th; the 90th; single battalions of the 2/3rd and 1/13th; and a battalion of the 80th held in reserve at Luneburg. This force was initially divided between four columns and amounted to a total of nearly 6,000 highly professional and well-armed soldiers. In support were a similar number of native troops, known disparagingly as the ‘untrained untrainables’, who were divided into seven battalions and led by white officers and NCOs, not necessarily with any military training. To this force were added irregular units based on the quasi-military Natal Police together with frontier guards and local defence groups with grand names such as the Natal Hussars, Natal Carbineers and Durban Rangers.
By Christmas everything was ready for the invasion; kit was cleaned and polished, wagons were loaded and the regimental bands rehearsed the stirring themes that would spur on the columns of soldiers as they marched into Zululand. On 6 January 1879, four days before the expiry of the ultimatum, troops of Wood’s Northern Column began crossing the border. Enthused with their general’s optimism, the main British force crossed the Buffalo river into Zululand on 11 January; everyone’s fervent hope was that the Zulus would stand and fight.
On 11 January 1879 the following notification was published in both English and Zulu.
NOTIFICATION
January 11th, 1879
The British forces are crossing into Zululand to extract from Cetewayo reparation for violations of British territory committed by the sons of Sirayo and others;and to enforce compliance with the promises, made by Cetewayo at his coronation, for the better government of his people.
The British government has no quarrel with the Zulu people. All Zulus who come in unarmed, or who lay down their arms, will be provided for till the troubles of their country are over;and will then, if they please, be allowed to return to their own land, but all who do not so submit will be dealt with as enemies.
When the war is finished, the British Government will make the best arrangements in its power for the future good government of the Zulus in their own country, in peace and quietness, and will not permit the killing and oppression they have suffered from Cetewayo to continue.
H.B.E. Frere
High Commissioner.14
A sequence of battles
Regardless of the validity or otherwise of the stated causes, Britain was about to engage the Zulus in a number of vicious battles; they were battles that would be fought to the bitter end with enormous losses on both sides, battles in which neither the British nor the Zulus would take prisoners.
All troops participating in the Centre Column’s invasion of Zululand, apart from the 24th Regiment which had previously been stationed at King William’s Town, had commenced their long and arduous march to the front from the Indian Ocean port of Durban. From Durban at the end of 1878 they set off along the dirt road to Pietermaritzburg and thence to Greytown, known to the Zulus as Mkunkundhlovwane or ‘Little Maritzburg’, and on to the Biggarsberg plateau at Helpmekaar,15 a distance of some 120 miles. Whereas the troops marched, the many hundreds of tons of stores were moved by ox-drawn wagons along the same route to the Centre Column’s main storage area which was located at Helpmekaar on the crest of a range of hills overlooking the Zulu border. For the last two years Natal had suffered from serious drought and, consequently, little thought had been given to the possibility of rain during the forthcoming invasion. The month of December saw the end of the drought and presented the troops with two extremes of African weather, baking heat followed by days of torrential rain. The roadways between the towns were nothing more than rough tracks and from the beginning of December 1878, passage and the movement of supplies were at the mercy of frequent heavy downpours that regularly made the tracks unnavigable, even though gangs of locally recruited black workers toiled to make passable the numerous bogs of slime and waterlogged dongas along the undulating track. Once the force was in Zululand, the invasion route would be even more difficult; there were no accurate maps and Chelmsford would have to rely on locally recruited guides and his reconnaissance patrols for directions and intelligence.
Before the invasion, there was little at Helpmekaar other than two rough farmers’ cottage
s and a tiny church built in 1874 by the Vermaaks family for the Berlin missionary, the Reverend Jacob Döhne. Once they arrived, the soldiers found their destination depressing; it was remote and bleak, and any rain quickly turned the dust into heavy mud. The army commandeered the two houses and immediately constructed three zinc-sheeted sheds and a neat row of thatched huts to protect the column’s perishable supplies and ammunition boxes from the heavy summer rain. A parade of white bell tents was quickly erected around the main store area and within days the camp extended for more than a mile towards the steep winding pass that descended into the valley towards the Zulu border, now only 10 miles distant, at Rorke’s Drift. The centre of the temporary camp soon became a confusing mass of stores as wagons arrived and departed in a continuous flow, which, due to the summer deluges and troop movements, quickly became an unhealthy and deep quagmire of foul, clinging mud. Inevitably, one soldier after another began to suffer from dysentery. Morale among the troops slipped further when the wagons bringing their Christmas supplies became mud-bound at Umsinga, some 20 miles away, and only reached Helpmekaar the following week. However, and regardless of the varied weather of either heat or driving rain, preparations for the forthcoming invasion continued and by the beginning of January Chelmsford’s force was ready to move to the Zulu border.
The spearhead of the Centre Column’s invasion of Zululand, the two battalions of the 24th (2nd Warwickshire) Regiment, consisted of men who were already battle-seasoned and fresh from engagements during the recently ended Cape Frontier War. Chelmsford considered himself fortunate to have sufficient officers and men who were hardened to both battle and the climate; they were fighting fit, suntanned, most were bearded and their patched and repaired uniforms were evidence of many months of constant combat. It was unusual for both battalions of one regiment to serve together as it was War Office policy to maintain one battalion of each regiment on a home posting, partly for recruiting purposes. The 1/24th arrived at Helpmekaar just after the 2/24th who had reached Helpmekaar at the beginning of January, and on 9 January, just a few days short of the thirtieth anniversary of the 24th’s unfortunate experience at the battle of Chillianwallah, the officers of both battalions, sitting on supply boxes, shared a mess dinner at which a toast was proposed, ‘That we may not get into such a mess and have better luck next time.’16
The following day the troops marched the 12 miles from Helpmekaar and off the high escarpment by descending the winding track that led to the border with Zululand at Rorke’s Drift. The whole area was a hive of activity; on arriving at Rorke’s Drift they saw the Royal Engineers detachment commanded by their officer, Lieutenant Francis MacDowell, the Centre Column’s only RE officer, testing the two barrel ponts that would carry them across the Buffalo river into Zululand.
Chelmsford had already visited Rorke’s Drift on 4 January and was impressed with the readiness and enthusiasm of his gathering invasion force. He was looking forward to the first engagement; his intelligence officers incorrectly reported that a large force of Zulus from Chief Sihayo’s nearby homestead would oppose the invasion. Such was Chelmsford’s confidence that, when he was presented with three emissaries from King Cetshwayo bearing a request for an extension of the ultimatum, Chelmsford ignored them just as he had the six previous pleas from Cetshwayo. He also banned further Zulu messengers from entering British positions.
Despite the enthusiasm of the Imperial troops, there was one section that was less than happy. Rather unexpectedly, Chelmsford was faced with the unbelievable threat of mutiny by his previously loyal Colonial troops who took exception to an inadvertent snub to their commanding officer, Major Dartnell. According to paragraph 144 of the Regulations for Field Forces in South Africa any Colonial officer, regardless of his rank, was barred from having command over Imperial troops. Chelmsford had previously decreed that all commanders were to be Imperial officers and command of the Natal Mounted Police together with all the Natal volunteer units had been given to Brevet Major Francis Russell of the Mounted Infantry, which ignored their own experienced commandant. This ruling infuriated the Colonials who paraded at Helpmekaar to take a vote on the matter; they unanimously decided to refuse orders unless they were given by Dartnell, a highly respected officer, especially in the field of African warfare. Chelmsford wisely relented and resolved the issue by promoting Dartnell to the British rank of lieutenant colonel, and gave him authority over Russell. After a short discussion, the Colonials accepted the decision and moved down to Rorke’s Drift.
The Swedish mission station, run by the Reverend Otto Witt, was situated immediately adjacent to the Buffalo river crossing of Rorke’s Drift. It was sited on an elevated ledge of rock and commanded a magnificent view over the Buffalo river into Zululand. The two mission buildings consisted of the missionary’s house and a small church, both made of local stone with thatched roofs. Sheltering the mission was the nearby 700ft high Oskarsberg hill, named by Witt in acknowledgement of his Swedish king. Surrounding the homestead was 3 acres of carefully cultivated land that included an orchard of grape vines, orange, apricot, apple, peach, fig, pomegranate and other fruit trees, all bordered with an assortment of lime trees and quince bushes. Between the vegetable garden and the mission was a 130ft long, 5ft high wall. Witt’s home was the larger of the two buildings and was nearly 30 yards long and spacious. Witt’s church was 40 yards away: small and dignified, it was used by the missionary in his daily work with the local black community. Immediately beyond the church was a small stone cattle kraal and then, below the rock terrace on which the buildings nestled, there was a similar but larger cattle kraal that could hold 100 cattle. The sole link between the mission station and the rest of Natal was a dirt track that led westwards towards the high escarpment of the Biggarsberg and thence to Helpmekaar. In the other direction, the track led to the nearby Buffalo river; it was the only safe route into Zululand for hunters and itinerant traders plying their wares among the Zulus.
On 9 January the tranquillity and beauty of Rorke’s Drift was severely disturbed by the arrival of nearly 6,000 troops and all the impedimenta of Chelmsford’s invasion force. Row upon row of tents were erected in neat formations on the half-mile grassy slope between the riverbank and the mission station while the Natal Native Contingent (NNC) were instructed to camp downstream of the Europeans. Notwithstanding the protestations of Otto Witt at being allowed to retain only one small room, the commissary staff commandeered his two buildings on behalf of the Crown. On the day before the invasion, Witt’s twelve-roomed house was converted into a makeshift hospital to cater for the growing number of fever cases and a few soldiers with damaged limbs caused by a number of wagon-related incidents, while the church became an ammunition store. In despair at the damage caused by converting his home and church, Witt dispatched his wife and small children to stay with friends at nearby Msinga, some 10 miles south of Helpmekaar.
Due to the incessant rain, the whole area soon became a muddy quagmire strewn with effluent and rubbish, yet the soldiers’ spirits remained high as the hours passed towards the expiry of the ultimatum. A few days earlier, the Natal Witness reported British confidence at a high level.
No attempt to cross the river will be made if opposed, except under the protection of the battery. These Zulus do not yet know what a shell is like or what effect it will have upon them. May they soon learn, and the larger the quantity that is present the better the effect will be.17
Chelmsford arrived at Rorke’s Drift with his entourage of staff officers during the evening of 10 January, a visible sign to the awaiting troops that the invasion would take place the following morning. The excitement throughout the camp that night was so infectious that few men slept. During the night the six guns of N Battery commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Harness RA were relocated to an adjacent small rise overlooking the river in order to cover the troops while crossing. Shortly after 2 a.m. reveille was sounded and within the hour the column approached the river crossing point. One minor diversion occurred whe
n it was discovered that a trader’s supply wagon had been looted and a cursory search failed to discover the culprits or the stolen stores. By daybreak the river was covered in a heavy soaking mist; no sound could be heard and as the mist gradually lifted above the river the far bank and surrounding country-side were bathed in bright sunshine. There were no Zulus; they were already 60 miles away at Ulundi undergoing pre-war rituals in preparation for the defence of their country.
The advance guard of mounted troops cautiously rode their horses through the swirling waters of the Buffalo river using the submerged flat rocks of the original traders’ crossing point. In anticipation of a Zulu attack, they spread out in a wide semicircle but all they found was three Zulu boys tending some cattle. The infantry were then slowly ferried across the river followed by the Native Contingent auxiliaries who had to be cajoled by their officers towards the fast-flowing muddy water. They began the crossing in their customary style by linking arms and entering the water in a ‘V’ formation, those in the front apex being pushed across by those in the rear. Once across, they pulled their colleagues over. The NNC lost several men in the crossing but as their officers did not know how many men they commanded, little concern was shown.
Within a quarter-hour the mounted patrols confirmed the absence of Zulu defenders. A new campsite was prepared on the hillside that looks back at Rorke’s Drift and by noon the slow process of bringing stores and wagons across from Rorke’s Drift was virtually completed. Midmorning, Chelmsford had ridden off to liaise with Colonel Wood, commander of the Northern Column. Wood was already well into Zululand about 30 miles to the north, having ‘jumped the gun’ by crossing into Zululand on 6 January; Chelmsford ordered him to halt his advance while the Centre and Coastal columns caught up.
Crossing the Buffalo Page 11
