As it is more than probable with such a large number of newspaper correspondents in camp, that many false impressions may be circulated and sent home regarding our operation … Their presence in the camp will make no difference to myself, and you may depend upon my pursuing ‘the even tenour of my way’, uninfluenced by the knowledge that I am surrounded by those who will not be sparing in their criticism if everything is not rearranged exactly to their liking.11
With the column steadily approaching Ulundi, Chelmsford received news from London that Sir Garnet Wolseley had replaced him; this was the government’s response to his earlier plea to be replaced. Now that Chelmsford was on the verge of victory the news came as a psychological setback, but within days he learned that all was not lost as Wolseley was being thwarted in his attempt to take command. Wolseley’s intention of being landed by boat at a location only one day’s ride from the column failed due to stormy weather, and his boat had to return to Durban, leaving Wolseley no option but to chase after the column on horseback. Wolseley’s misfortune made Chelmsford even more determined to press on with the attack on Ulundi; only then could he resign with honour. Wolseley nevertheless put Chelmsford under even greater pressure when on 30 June he telegraphed to him:
Concentrate your forces immediately, undertake no operations and flash back your moves. Astonished at not hearing from you.12
Aware of Wolseley’s temporary inability to join the column, Chelmsford merely acknowledged receipt of the message. King Cetshwayo was also in a delicate position; when the envoys, Nkisimane and Mfunzi, returned to brief the king, they were prevented by the king’s own advisers from reporting back to him. Like Chelmsford, King Cetshwayo and his advisers needed this battle. Surrender to the British was not an option for the Zulu king; he knew he must suffer a military defeat in order to retain his credibility and bargaining position after the battle.
For the British soldiers, now camped only 5 miles from the Zulu army at Fort Nolela, sometimes mistakenly referred to as Fort Victoria, their anxiety was proportionately matched by their inexperience. Both sides were now concentrated for battle and it was impossible for the nervous soldiers not to be aware of the Zulus. During daylight, British water-collecting parties came under sporadic Zulu rifle fire from the far river bank and at night the sounds of Zulu chanting and battle preparations could be clearly heard. Late on 3 July, King Cetshwayo attempted one last call for peace: as a desperate gesture he sent a herd of his finest cattle towards Chelmsford’s camp but the warriors guarding the river, the uKhan-dempemvu, indignantly sent them back – they wanted to fight the British invader. Chelmsford was later to write of the incident, ‘A large herd of white cattle was observed being driven from the King’s Kraal towards us but was driven back again shortly afterwards.’ 13
CHAPTER 15
The Battle of Ulundi
A bloody but barren victory.1
JOHN WILLIAM COLENSO
On 3 July Chelmsford dispatched Colonel Buller with a strong mounted force of some 500 mounted men from the 1st Squadron Mounted Infantry, the Frontier Light Horse, Transvaal Rangers, Baker’s Horse, Natal Light Horse, and the Edendale Troop of the mounted black auxiliaries. Buller’s main objective was to reconnoitre the terrain and locate a suitable site for the final battle; he was also to ascertain the Zulu dispositions. The Mahlabatini plain, with Ulundi and its vastly sprawling conglomeration of hundreds of huts at its hub, stretched between two distant ranges of hills and Buller was especially interested in a small rise just 1 mile from the king’s homestead. As Buller approached the grassy plain he detached sixty men of the Transvaal Rangers under Commandant Raaf to serve as a rearguard.
Uncharacteristically, Buller was led into a carefully prepared Zulu ambush near the Mbilane stream when a party of Zulu scouts suddenly appeared from the waist-high grass about 200 yards from him and then ran off towards the king’s homestead. Buller’s men gave chase. Buller’s ADC, Captain Sir Thomas Fermour-Hesketh, shouted out that he saw another body of Zulus hiding in the grass ahead. Buller ordered his men to halt and as they reined in, some 4,000 Zulus, under the command of Chief Zibhebhu, rose up around them. The Zulu trap had been sprung, albeit prematurely; the Zulus had plaited and woven grass into a series of ropes, specially designed to trip the horses, which they rapidly pulled in to tighten. Buller’s men managed to extricate themselves before the ropes could entrap them but the flanks of Zulus were already rushing to surround them. Another group of Zulus armed with captured Martini-Henry rifles then fired a volley from about 50 yards’ distance which panicked several of the horses. Sergeant Fitzmaurice of the 1/24th Regiment, attached to the Mounted Infantry, fell and became trapped beneath his wounded horse; two troopers, Pearce of the Frontier Light Horse and Peacock of the Natal Light Horse, were shot and killed outright. Trooper Raubenheim of the Frontier Light Horse was mortally wounded and fell from his horse.
Captain D’Arcy of the Frontier Light Horse immediately rode back to where Raubenheim was lying on the ground. D’Arcy dismounted and, while holding the reins of his now frightened horse, helped him to his feet. D’Arcy then hauled the wounded trooper up onto his horse behind him. With the leading Zulus almost upon them the terrified horse managed a few yards and threw both riders. Though severely winded by the fall, D’Arcy rapidly remounted but was forced to abandon Raubenheim to his fate – his body was later found cut up by the Zulus for their muti or medicine.2 Nearby, Lord Beresford and Sergeant O’Toole of the Frontier Light Horse had seen Sergeant Fitzmaurice fall and both dashed to his aid; with O’Toole dismounted and pushing Fitzmaurice onto the horse, Lord Beresford managed to get Fitzmaurice to hold onto him and galloped off to safety, though O’Toole barely escaped with his life. For their gallantry D’Arcy, Lord Beresford and O’Toole received the Victoria Cross. The bravery of Sergeant Major Simeon Kambula of the Edendale Troop, who determinedly held off a group of charging Zulus, was also recognized with the award of the Distinguished Conduct Medal.
Buller’s men were forced to ride for their lives and near the kwa-Nodwengu homestead they were reinforced by Raaf’s men who poured volleys into the pursuing Zulus. The fleeing riders managed to recross the river to safety and the Zulus withdrew. For the soldiers about to go into battle, the level of the Zulus’ spirited attack left them in no doubt that the following day was not to be a foregone conclusion. That night the Zulu army completed its noisy and ritual preparations for battle, which added to the anxiety of the British, few of whom slept. It is known that King Cetshwayo departed from Ulundi just before dawn.
Lord Chelmsford and his men planned to cross the river to meet the Zulus at Ulundi for what all hoped would be the final battle. The newly reconstituted and inexperienced 1/24th Regiment was to be held in reserve, two companies already having been left at Fort Marshall, and the remaining five would be held at Fort Nolela. The regiment’s soldiers were displeased at not being able to avenge their defeat at Isandlwana but Chelmsford was not prepared to take completely inexperienced soldiers into a major battle; they would have to be content with watching from afar.
It was from King Cetshwayo’s dusty and impoverished capital at Ulundi that Britain’s sophisticated political and military domination across South Africa had been so suddenly and seriously challenged. Situated on the Mahlabatini plain just 55 miles from the site of the inconceivable Zulu victory over Lord Chelmsford’s force at Isandlwana, Ulundi consisted of an estimated 1,500 huts spread over an area later measured to be no more than 90 acres in total with the king’s personal quarters, the ikhanda, located centrally. Another nine amakhanda were located within 2 miles of Ulundi. Movement through Ulundi was via a labyrinth of passageways radiating out from the royal household which dominated the capital. During the three weeks leading up to 4 July, the population of Ulundi had swollen by the influx of some 20,000 warriors responding to the king’s call to resist the British invasion. Now most of the women, children and other non-combatants had begun to move away towards the protection of the surrounding hills t
o the north and east; carrying their bundled possessions, they clogged the tracks through the bush in their desperation to escape the consequences of the forthcoming battle.
At 4 a.m. on the morning of 4 July Chelmsford’s 5,000 men camped around Fort Nolela were roused from their sleep and as dawn broke at 6 a.m. they set off in one column towards Ulundi; it was the largest force deployed by Chelmsford for any battle during the Zulu War. At 6.45 a.m. and unopposed by the Zulus, this cumbersome force waded across the shallow White Mfolozi river and then, in a tightly packed column, marched towards the previously reconnoitred small rise in the middle of the Mahlabatini plain. All the while, Buller’s riders patrolled the high ground along the route. To protect the slow-moving column, mounted men rode out to cover the column’s front and flanks while the 17th Lancers covered the rear. The cumbersome column enclosed Chelmsford’s headquarters staff and the ammunition and entrenching-tool carts, as well as the Royal Artillery’s guns, although these were positioned so as to enable them to come into action on each face without delay. With the sprawl of huts that was Ulundi now in view less than 3 miles distant, the Zulus could be seen forming up in opposition to the advancing column; visibility over the Zulu army’s position was still partially obscured by drifting smoke from a thousand Zulu campfires and from the early morning mist hanging over the Mbilane stream that wound its way between the two armies. Many thousands of Zulus could also be seen assembling on the more distant hilltops to the north. Chelmsford ordered the advancing British column to ‘form square’, which it did, turning slowly and menacingly to face the advancing Zulus. A few minutes later the British gained the high ground they sought and settled down to await the expected Zulu charge.
The assembled Zulu army was to the north and east of the square, in the direction of Ulundi, and totalled over 15,000 men with another 5,000 along the hills in reserve; all were formed up in regimental order and began to advance steadily for their first attack. Just as Chelmsford had anticipated, the Zulus were relying on their traditional attack formation and their ‘horns’ or flanks began to encircle the square. All the Zulu regiments that had fought in the previous battles were present and command at Ulundi appears to have been shared between Chief Mnyamana Buthelezi, Chief Ziwedu and Chief Ntshingwayo kaMahole (the victor of Isandlwana), while the vigorous Chief Zibhebhu kaMaphitha of the Mandlakazi commanded the left horn. A captured Zulu prisoner commented:
All the army was present today. We had very sick hearts in the fight when we saw how strong the white army was, and we were startled by the number of horsemen.3
The Zulus’ advance slowed down as it approached the square. Chelmsford presumed this indicated their reluctance to fight so at 8.20 a.m. Buller and his mounted troops moved out of the square and, using Buller’s proven tactic of provocation, rode to within 100 yards of the massed Zulu force and raked its leading ranks with several volleys of rifle fire. This blatant and bloody taunt enraged the Zulus, who charged; Buller and his men rapidly withdrew back into the relative safety of the square, which enabled the artillery and riflemen to commence volley fire. The men forming the square were prepared for the imminent onslaught; the infantry were lined up in four ranks, two kneeling and two standing, with the artillery pieces and Gatling guns sited at the corners of the square and in the centre of the sides.
Battle commenced about 8.45 a.m. with the mounted men on the right and left of the square becoming the first to be committed. The most determined Zulu attack came from the left horn under the command of Chief Zibhebhu. Watching the attack alongside Chelmsford’s staff was the war correspondent Melton Prior, who clearly believed that the battle was not at all one-sided:
I ran down to where the 21st and 58th Regiments were heavily engaged with some Zulus, said to be 6000 strong and 30 deep, who were charging, and it was then that I heard Lord Chelmsford say to the troops, ‘Men, fire faster;can’t you fire faster?’ Now it is not my business to question the wisdom of this remark, but I cannot help contrasting it with Lord Wolseley’s well-known order, ‘Fire slow, fire slow!’ However, the Zulus who charged this corner did not succeed in breaking it;the terrific fire of our men made them stagger, halt, and fall back in a straggling mass, leaving a heap of dead and dying on the ground.4
For a period of twenty minutes the British rate of fire was so steady and accurate that the Zulus were unable to get close enough to inflict any serious damage upon the British line. Another journalist present, Charles Norris-Newman, wrote that
the Zulus were checked by the heavy, regular and well sustained fire from the various regiments, which swept the plateau, and gradually brought the Zulus to a stand, checked by the withering effects of that hail of bullets, which did such murderous execution as all their efforts could not prevail.5
Chelmsford was especially pleased with the behaviour of the infantry, until now relatively untried; the men were steady and their firing was well controlled on all sides of the square. Volley firing by sections was employed throughout the battle although on several occasions it was necessary to wait between volleys for the volley smoke to clear. For their part, the Zulus were unable to inflict much damage to the British square even though they possessed several hundred Martini-Henry rifles taken from Isandlwana. Their usual firearms, a collection of antiquated flintlock and percussion rifles, were never a threat to the British although Chelmsford was clearly ready for considerable casualties. He wrote:
The fire of the enemy from a few minutes to nine to 9.20 was very heavy, and many casualties, I regret to say, occurred, but when it is remembered that within our comparatively small square, all the cavalry, mounted men, natives, hospital attendants, etc. were packed, it is a matter of congratulation that they were not heavier.6
At about 9 a.m. it became apparent to the British that the Zulus were becoming disorganized and their enthusiasm to attack the British wall of fire began to wane; they nevertheless stood their ground in the face of repeated Martini-Henry volleys, the barrage from the Royal Artillery’s 7 and 9 pound guns and from the column’s two Gatling guns. A number of Zulus had managed to get to within 30 yards of the British line, but under such a hail of fire they could not sustain their attack. As Melton Prior recalled,
A bullet banged into one of our native allies close to us and rolled him over. By the way, it was very funny to see these men lying flat on the ground, with their shields covering their backs. Another bullet killed a horse behind us and made him jump at least three feet in the air. Then all at once there appeared to be a perfect hailstorm of bullets in our direction, and we both wriggled on our knees, until one in particular passed between us with a nasty ‘phew’, and my friend exclaimed,’ My God, Prior, that was close.’7
The attack soon began to falter and it was evident to the British that the Zulus were beaten; many warriors took what cover they could in the long grass and some brave individuals crawled back towards the soldiers to return fire. However, large numbers began to leave the battlefield and this only served to weaken the resolve of those further back and previously keen to engage the British. With the Zulu attack controlled, Chelmsford again sought to inflict the maximum number of casualties upon the Zulus and, as at Khambula and Gingindlovu, he ordered Buller and his mounted troops, along with the 17th Lancers, out of the square to harass the retreating Zulus. Chelmsford wrote:
The fire from the Artillery and Infantry was so effective that, within half an hour, signs of hesitation were perceivable in the movements of the enemy: I then directed Colonel Drury-Lowe to take out the 17th Lancers, passing out by the rear face he led his regiment towards the Nodwengu Kraal, dispersing and killing those who had not time to reach the shelter of the Kraal or the bush below, then wheeling to the right charged through the Zulus who, in full flight, were endeavouring to reach the lower slopes of the mountains beyond.
Numbers of the enemy in this direction who had not taken part in the actual attack were now firing and momentarily strengthened by those fleeing were enabled to pour in a considerable fire on the
advancing Lancers below them. Our cavalry did not halt however until the whole of the lower ground was swept and some 150 of the enemy killed:many of those they had passed in their speed, had collected in a ravine to their rear, these were attacked and destroyed by our mounted natives.8
The Lancers attacked with great enthusiasm; they were still smarting from their previous failed clash against the Zulus when they lost their adjutant, Lieutenant Frith. This time they could charge across open country and they fell upon the Zulus, showing no mercy as they speared and hacked the fleeing and wounded warriors. The Lancers nevertheless took some casualties; the most notable was Captain the Hon. Wyatt-Edgell who was shot dead. Their commanding officer, Colonel Drury-Lowe, wrote of the pursuit with professional pride:
The pursuit was carried out in a most determined manner by five troops of the 17th Lancers and 24 men of the King’s Dragoon Guards (one troop remained inside the square unknown to me). The Zulus fled in every direction and were pursued for a distance of some three miles across the slope of the hills before mentioned, very many being killed with the lance, which proved their decided superiority to the sword in pursuit. It would, I think, be invidious to point out any particular officer or man, when all, I think, showed the same eagerness to reach the enemy, and rode with the greatest determination into the scattered Zulus, for the most time under a galling fire from the hills, where the enemy formed themselves into groups and kept up an incessant fire.9
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