Obama’s statement on loss of, 228n
off-watch social activities of, 78, 79
over-the-counter meds used by, 29, 158–59
overtime limits and, 79
Polish riding gang (workers) and, 11, 36, 83–84, 98–99
reasons for working on ships given by, 76–77, 98
safety issues and, 79, 107–108
San Juan route and family life of, 70
sleep amount and fatigue of, 29
tension between officers and, 80–81, 84, 102
Tote’s response to maintenance requests and, 67
Tote’s treatment of, 107
unlicensed members of, 21, 35, 36, 79–80, 91
whistle-blowers and complaints from, 80–81, 107, 139, 231
work assignments for, 91–92, 93
crew families
hearing about El Faro sinking by, 6–7, 10–11
life of, after investigation, 233–34
questions about El Faro sinking from, 13
Tote’s treatment of, 229
Crooked Island Passage, 12, 13, 41, 129, 138, 140, 143, 158, 162
Crowley Maritime, 106, 110, 127, 144
Davidson, Michael C. (captain), xv, 21, 68–71
abandon ship command and ship evacuation and, 209–10
Alaska experience of, 38, 41, 115, 133, 175, 184
authority of, 103, 160–61
awareness of hurricane’s peril by, 160, 175, 182, 184, 190, 202n, 206
background of, 28, 37–38
Coast Guard’s comments on, 213n
confidence in El Faro by, 143–44, 149, 174
confidence of, 143–44, 164–65, 206
cost and schedule pressures on, 102–3
course changes by, 114, 117, 123, 124, 126, 182, 183
crew’s concerns about hurricane and, 124, 126, 137, 142, 162
crew’s course change suggestions to, 128–29, 142–43, 157–58, 160–61, 162
crew’s feelings about, 68–70, 138–39, 142, 160, 174
delegation of duties by, 37
departure and, 36, 47–48, 49
distress alert (SSAS) to crew and, 198, 201, 230
“doomsday prepper” beliefs of, 144–45
engine loss and, 6, 191, 195, 196–97, 198
engine slowdowns and, 175
family of, 47, 70–71, 106–7
feelings about El Faro’s qualities held by, 55
feelings about Tote’s treatment of, 106–7, 129–30, 144
general alarm and, 207–8
hurricane preparations and, 97–98, 151
initial route choice by, 41–42
Joaquin forecasts and course change by, 72–74, 117
job insecurity feelings of, 106, 144
need for Tote’s approval of course changes by, 102, 105–6, 107
notifications to Tote from, 6, 101–2, 117, 199–201, 202
NTSB’s comments on, 202n
personality of, 143–45
rough weather experience of, 183–84
route planning for return northbound trip by, 101–2, 105–6
safety responsibility of, 47, 70, 105, 106, 107, 120, 136–37, 143, 160, 200–201
San Salvador hurricane detour and, 128–29, 136, 149, 157, 158
ship’s list problems and, 175, 176, 182, 185, 186–87, 188, 191, 201
ship’s sinking and, 213–15
“shoot under” strategy of, 47, 101, 144
steering into storm by, 182, 183, 184
Tote’s confidence in, 69–70, 106
Tote’s hurricane warnings to, 8
Tote’s passing over for promotion of, 105
voyage plan and night notes of, 68
water accumulation in holds and, 188, 189, 190, 197–98, 205–6
weather forecast monitoring by, 38–41, 42, 114–15, 127, 136, 139–41, 143, 174
Davidson, Theresa, 231
Davis, Larry “Brookie,” xv, 21, 76, 107, 126
Bruer’s last image of, 5–6, 10, 233
course during hurricane and, 116–17, 169, 173–74, 203
first watch of, 67, 85
hurricane preparations and, 118, 123–24, 127, 157, 158, 167
Joaquin’s impact and, 161–64
sailing experience of, 152
dead reckoning, 67, 75, 125, 158
delay clauses, in contracts, 66, 103
Delgado, James, 75, 143
Dixon, Jeffrey L., 231–32
docking card, 48
Doherty, William, 156
“doomsday prepper” beliefs, 144–45
drug tests and searches, 79, 80
ECDIS (Electronic Chart Display and Information System), 67, 128n
Edmund Fitzgerald (ore carrier), 134, 203
El Faro (cargo ship), 2
age and condition of, 82–83
Coast Guard risk matrix and target list on, 63
conversion work on, 99–100
crew’s doubts about trip of, 29, 64–65
crew’s feelings about, 55–56
description of, 19–20
earlier conversion work and renaming of, 22, 96, 108, 133–34, 155
early incident of drifting by, 62–63
fishing boat rescue by, 83
as a machine and world of systems, 14–15
main deck and inboard profile plans of, iv–vi
Puerto Rico’s dependency on regular runs by, 65–66
size of, 9
smell of, 56–57
as a Southern ship, in terms of crew, 77–78
Tote ownership changes and acquisition of, 108, 113
US ownership and registry of, 9
El Faro investigation, 113, 221–34
Coast Guard search-and-rescue operations and, 10, 11–13, 223–26, 227
debris field in, 12–13, 226–27
expeditions to site of wreck in, 229–31
hearings and reports on, 231–33
“last known position” issues and, 223, 224
El Morro (cargo ship), 21, 99, 154
El Yunque (cargo ship)
age and condition of, 82, 96
Coast Guard report on, 155–56, 231–32
El Faro debris spotted by, 226–27, 228
El Faro memorial and, 228
hurricane route changes of, 123, 124–25
lifeboats on, 96, 97, 146
San Juan trips of, 65, 78, 105
Emerald Express (coastal freighter), 12, 226n
emergency beacons (EPIRBs), 7, 9, 65n, 142, 225–26
engine room, 31n, 58–63. See also boilers
access to, 58
closed, two-phase cycle of, 61–62
control station of, 59, 130, 131, 132–33
crew assigned to, 59, 60, 130–31, 132
El Faro’s evacuation and, 217
fuel tanks and, 120–21, 172, 219
hurricane preparations in, 118–19
levels of, 59–60
lubrication system in, 59, 62, 131–32
noise in, 59, 168
propulsion plant of, 61–62
steam culture of, 60–61
temperature in, 58
EPIRBs (emergency position-indicating radio beacons), 7, 9, 65n, 142, 225–26
Erika (tropical storm), xiii, 41, 42, 74, 143
Ethisphere Institute, 109, 111
fatigue of crew, 29, 159–60, 161, 171, 232
Fisker-Andersen, Jim, 66n, 70, 102, 106, 126, 129, 199n
forecasts. See weather forecasts
foreign-flag vessels, 63, 81n, 134
Foss Maritime, 108, 109
Frudaker, James, 47, 49–50
fuel tanks, 37n, 120–21, 172, 219
Garvey, Michael, 108, 109, 113
George Prince (ferry), 13n
Global Marine Distress and Safety System (GMDSS), 39, 198, 223
GM margin, 25, 49n, 121
GPS navigation, 57, 67, 74, 75, 137, 143
Great Land (cargo ship), 100, 108, 134
&nbs
p; Green, Harold L., 10, 21
Griffin, Keith W. (first engineer), xvi, 106, 122, 179
Gumby survival suits, 142n, 152, 157, 203, 204, 208, 211, 212, 227
Hamm, Frank J. III (able seaman), xv
background of, 83
El Faro’s capsizing and, 213–15
El Faro’s evacuation and, 209
family’s hearing about loss of, 10
Joaquin forecasts and, 126–28, 151
Joaquin’s impact on navigation and, 176, 182–84, 190, 198–99, 206
watches of, 68, 124, 136, 173–74
work schedules of, 91, 93–94
Hamm, Rochelle, 10
Hargrove, Joe E. (oiler), xvi, 167
Hatch, Carey J. (able seaman), xv, 78, 84, 91, 93, 152, 203
Hearman, Marvin III, 80, 107
Hearn, Jack, 21, 30, 97, 105n, 107–8, 111, 144, 155
Hill, Schmiora, 10
Holland, Michael L. (third engineer), xvi, 37, 59, 132, 167, 186, 197
Holt, Michael B., 110
Horizon Lines, 110
hull
failures of, 133–34
flaws in, 133
inspections of, 133
metal fatigue and, 134–35
Hurricane Danny, 8, 42
Hurricane Hugo, 139
Hurricane Joaquin
broken anemometer issue and, 137
Coast Guard’s search-and-rescue operations and, 11–12, 224–26, 227
crew’s awareness of peril from, 160
crew’s calculation of intersection with, 157, 158, 162–63, 174
crew’s monitoring of, 71–74, 75, 113–14, 116–18, 123–24, 125, 126–27, 137–42, 157
crew’s mounting concerns about, 127–28, 138–39
Davidson’s preparations for, 97–98
Davidson’s “shoot under” strategy for, 47, 144
difficulty of imagining danger of, 8–9
El Faro’s departure and early path of, 33–34
El Faro’s last position and, 8
El Yunque’s course and, 124, 126
equipment and structural breakdowns during, 152–54
growth to Category 3 storm, 8, 161–62
growth to Category 4 storm, 8, 195–96, 224
lag between data and predictions about, 115
misleading information and inaccuracies about, 86–87, 88, 114–15
naming of, 42, 46
other merchant ships avoiding, 65
physics of heat transfer in, 85
possible alternate routes around, 142–43, 140
precautions observed due to, 117
predictive models on growth of, 46
proposed San Salvador detour due to, 128–29, 136
raw power of, 165–67
rhythms of high waves in, 149–51, 163, 164
slowing down and death of, 228–29
Tote’s lack of concern about, 8
Tote’s tracking of El Faro’s route and, 105, 113
transformation into major storm by, 34–35
underestimation of potential strength of, 7–8, 86
weather forecast inaccuracies about strength and course of, 86–87, 88
winds in development of, 34, 44–46, 86–87
hurricanes. See also specific hurricanes
Saffir-Simpson scale for, 8, 9, 114n
Tote’s guidelines on, 47, 143
watch status of, 124
winds and expansion of, 44–45
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 21, 80
inboard profile plan, iv–vi
Inmarsat system, 7, 11, 39, 57, 101, 113, 117, 127, 174, 223, 224
inspections
Alternate Compliance Program (ACP) for, 154–55, 232, 233
of boilers, 122–23
of cargo lashings, 93
classification societies for, 26n, 133, 155, 156
Coast Guard and, 63, 155–56
of cooling systems, 92
crew responsibilities for, 37n
daily, 92–93, 96–97
of hull, 133
of lifeboats, 37n, 95, 96, 155
International Longshore and Warehouse Union, 109
International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGs), 138
International Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) regulations, 96, 202
Iron Mike (autopilot), 57, 176
Jackson, Glen, 10, 63, 64–65, 233
Jackson, Jack E. (able seaman), xv, 226n
background of, 63–64
departure and, 47, 49
doubts about trip expressed by, 64–65
family’s hearing about loss of, 10, 233
hurricane preparations by, 142, 157, 203, 204, 209
Joaquin monitoring by, 116–17, 137–42, 157
navigation by, 67, 137
personality of, 78, 121
watches of, 63, 65, 67–68, 83, 136, 157
Jackson, Jill, 10
Jacksonville–San Juan run. See Puerto Rico run
Joaquin. See Hurricane Joaquin
Jones, Alex, 144–45
Jones, Jackie R. Jr. (able seaman), xv, 77, 78, 83, 84, 91, 93, 152, 170
Jones Act, 82–83, 108, 154
Jordan, Lonnie S. (assistant steward), xvii, 35, 77, 136, 151, 203
Jules, Vana, 20, 21
Kingfish (container ship), 48, 50
Kipling, Rudyard, 61, 227n
Krause, Anna, 98, 233–34
Krause, Piotr M. (Polish worker), xvii, 36, 98–99, 233
Kuflik, Mitchell T. (third engineer), xvi, 59, 60, 69, 106, 119–20, 132, 168, 210
lashings
boarding process and, 23, 27
crew’s concerns about, 139, 176, 187
inspections of, 69, 93
Tote’s guidelines on, 27, 30n, 93, 177
Lawfield, Earl, 70, 107
Lawrence, John, 6, 7, 80, 101–2, 105, 112, 199, 200–201, 223
Letang, Joe, 55–56
Lewis, Claire, 127
lifeboats
Coast Guard report on, 202, 232
description of old-style, 20, 95, 146
drills for using, 202, 232
inspection of, 37n, 95, 96–97, 155
list and launching of, 202–3
modern style of, 95–96
NTSB on, 232
Tote’s approach to updating, 96, 155
tug spotting of, after sinking, 13
life rafts, 9, 67, 96–97, 202, 203
Lightfoot, Gordon, 134, 203
Lightfoot, Roan R. (bosun), xv, 91–92, 203
Lima, Brad, 132n
Lorenz effect, 33
lubrication system. See also sump
Coast Guard review of, 205
description of, 62, 131–32
gravity-fed tank with, 59, 180, 181, 205
inspections of, 61, 167
monitoring flow in, 130, 131, 167–68, 178, 180
problems with, 176, 179–81, 182, 186, 187, 189–90, 190, 192, 197, 198, 201
pumps in, 59n, 60, 61, 62–63, 131–32
reserve oil tank in, 59, 132n, 181, 181n, 205
Maersk, 37n
Main Deck
corrosion around vents on, 231–32
description of, 19–20
loading of containers on, 22–24
plan of, iv–vi
Maine Maritime Academy, 9, 28, 29, 37–38, 43, 59, 60, 127, 161
Marine Electric (cargo ship), 78, 134, 156, 233
maritime academies, 9, 28, 82n, 160
Maritime Administration (MARAD), 82
maritime unions, 70, 77, 79, 82, 83, 109
Massachusetts Maritime Academy, 9, 99
Mathias, Jeffrey A. (riding gang supervisor), xvi, 69, 132
background and family of, 99, 100
devotion to job by, 60
hurricane and, 118, 168, 179, 183, 184, 188, 204, 206–7
Polish riding gang and, 11, 36, 60, 92, 97, 99, 100
Mathias, Jenn, 11, 100
&nbs
p; McPhee, John, 37n
Meklin, Dylan O. (third engineer), xvi, 29, 37, 43–44, 58–61, 132, 168
Melville, Herman, 195
merchant marine
all-powerful captain in, 103, 160–61
construction and maintenance regulation loopholes in, 154–56
decline in number of ships in, 81
government policy on, 81–82, 111
Jones Act and, 82–83, 108, 154
life span of ships in, 82–83
public knowledge of work of, 81
merchant marine academies, 9, 28, 82n, 160
Merchant Marine Act of 1920 (Jones Act), 82–83, 108, 154
mess, 35–36, 42–43, 77, 136, 151
metal fatigue, 14, 134–35, 153–54
Military Sealift Command, 56
Minouche (coastal freighter), 12, 224, 225, 226n
National Cargo Bureau, 30n
National Hurricane Center (NHC), 8, 9, 38, 45, 46, 86–87, 115
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), 7, 9, 38, 84
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
Alternate Compliance Program (ACP) judgment of, 156
hearings of, xix, 13, 113, 231, 232
recommendations of, 156
report notes by, 160n, 184, 202n, 232
voyage data recorder and, 72n, 139n, 229, 236
National Weather Service (NWS), 7, 9, 26, 38, 39–40, 114–15, 117, 165
Neeson, Tim (port engineer), 36, 42, 43, 49n, 112
Neubauer, Jason, 223, 233
news, El Faro sinking reported on, 10, 13
Nita, Marcin P. (Polish worker), xvii, 36
Northeast Providence Channel, 41, 140
Northern Lights (cargo ship), 108, 133
Northland (US Coast Guard cutter), 12, 227
Northwest Providence Channel, 140, 226
NYK, 110–11
Obama, Barack, 228n
officers of El Faro See also specific officers
fatigue of, as factor in sinking, 29, 159, 161, 171, 232
licensing and training of, 9
mess hall for, 35, 36
tension between crew and, 80–81, 84, 102
Tote’s response to maintenance requests and, 67
offset oil, 190
oil pumps, 59n, 60, 61, 62–63, 130, 131–32, 179, 181, 185, 186, 190 See also lubrication system
Old Bahama Channel, 123, 140, 226
alternate routes using, 73, 74, 105, 158
Davidson’s route for return trip using, 102, 126, 128–29, 138, 143, 184
description of, xii, 41–42
navigational challenges of, 74–75
Peake, Frank, 110–11
Podgórski, Jan P. (Polish worker), xvii
Polish riding gang (workers), xvii, 4, 6, 11, 204
crew’s relationship with, 83–84, 98–99
lifeboat drills and, 202, 232
survivors of, 228, 233–34
work of, 36, 91, 92, 97, 99, 168
Ponce class ships, 99, 108, 144
Porter, James P. (deckhand), xv, 76–77, 84, 91, 93, 152
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