ports, 2, 31, 153, 170–72, 187
prepper beliefs, 144–45
Puerto Rico
dependency on merchant ship runs by, 65–66, 81
Walmart’s stores on, 66n
Puerto Rico run (Jacksonville–San Juan run)
crew family life and, 70
crew’s preference for, 70, 79
delay clauses in contracts and, 66, 103
El Faro’s first assignment to, 108
fuel loaded for, 120
Joaquin forecasts and, 142–43
Tote’s LNG/diesel vessels for, 106
Tote’s management style and safety on, 113
Tote’s price-fixing activities on, 110
Tote’s tracking of ships on, 104–5
Pusatere, Richard J. (chief engineer), xvi
captain’s relationship with, 68
cargo loading and, 24
El Faro’s evacuation and, 217
engine room routines and, 59, 60, 61, 99, 100, 130
hurricane conditions and list issues and, 168, 179, 180, 186–87, 190, 205
Tote’s planned promotion of, 106
Quammie, Theodore E. (chief steward), xvii, 36, 136, 151, 203
radar
loss of, 190, 198, 218
navigation by, 9, 20, 48, 50, 52, 57, 65n, 74, 104, 137, 161
Randolph, Danielle L. “Dany” (second mate), xv
Captain Davidson and, 68, 159–60, 161
cargo loading and, 24, 29, 30
coffee-making habit of, 118, 158, 199
course change suggestions and, 157–58, 160–161
distress messages from, 198, 201, 223, 224, 230
doubts about trip expressed by, 29
evacuation preparations by, 209, 229
family background of, 27–29, 37, 43–44
Joaquin forecasts and, 117, 118, 123–24, 126–27, 157–58
Joaquin’s impact and, 161–64, 167, 169, 173, 189, 190–91, 196, 198–99, 206, 208–9
last message to mother from, 11, 174
new third engineer Meklin and, 43–44
personality of, 69, 78, 80, 107, 118, 127, 158
sleep between watches and, 158–59, 160
watches of, 37n, 67, 85, 115–16, 117, 123–24, 157, 159–60, 161, 173, 189
registries, ship, 9
rest periods, on watches, 159
riding gang. See Polish riding gang
Riehm, Jeremie H. (third mate), xv, 198
background of, 63
cargo loading and, 24, 30
course change suggestion from, 157–58, 160–61
departure and, 47, 49–50
inspections by, 67, 96–97
Joaquin monitoring by, 114, 116–17, 137–43, 157–58, 174
navigation by, 66, 67, 137, 141
watches of, 29, 37n, 63, 65, 101, 136
risk matrix (Coast Guard), 63
Rivera, Lashawn L. (chief cook), xvii, 10, 170
arrival and boarding by, 19, 20–21, 22
background of, 21, 77
galley and meals and, 35, 36, 77, 203
hurricane preparations and, 97, 151–52
roll-on, roll-off (Ro-Ro) container ships
cargo loading and, 22
Davidson’s experience with, 184
El Faro’s conversion from, 22, 96, 108, 155
rose boxes, 134, 186
Roth-Roffy, Tom, 113
routes (runs). See also Old Bahama Channel; Puerto Rico run; Tacoma–Anchorage run
captain’s authority over, 103–4
cost and schedule pressures in choosing, 66, 102–3, 144
runs. See routes (runs)
rust problems, 30, 32, 92, 93, 156, 186
safety issues
Alternate Compliance Program (ACP) on, 154–55, 232
captain-crew interactions and, 102
captain’s responsibility for, 47, 70, 105, 106, 107, 120, 136–37, 143, 160, 200–201
chief mate’s responsibility for, 37n, 43n
course changes and, 107
crew whistle-blowers and complaints about, 80–81, 107, 139, 231
engine room gates and, 31n
federal regulations on, 81–82
GM margin and, 49n
hurricane precautions for, 8, 42, 47
lifeboat upgrades and, 96, 232
NTSB’s report on, 232
Polish riding gang and, 97
regular equipment inspections and, 9
Tote’s guidelines on, 47, 66, 105, 232
Tote’s management style and, 112–13
Tote’s responses to complaints about, 107–8, 112, 144, 200–201, 231
Saffir-Simpson scale, 8, 9, 114n
sail effect of wind, 67, 182, 184
Saltchuk Resources, 108–9, 110, 111, 113
San Juan–Jacksonville run. See Puerto Rico run
SAT-C
distress messages from, 198, 201
weather forecasts from, 38–39, 40, 71–72, 87, 113–14, 117, 126, 127, 139, 143, 174, 198
Schoenly, Howard J. (second engineer), xvi, 120, 121, 122, 130, 175–76, 178, 179
scuttle hatch gaskets, 93–95
Seafarers International Union (SIU), 77, 79, 82, 233
Sea Star Lines, 6, 108, 110, 111
Sea Star and Tote Services. See Tote
Shapiro, Leonard, 108, 110
shipping. See also merchant marine
automated vessels in, 104
captain’s authority in, 103–4, 160–61
construction and maintenance regulation loopholes in, 154–56
cost and schedule pressures in, 102–3, 106
federal deregulation of, 81–82
Ship Security Alert System (SSAS), 39, 198, 201, 230
Shultz, Steven W. (chief mate), xv, 28n
captain’s relationship with, 68, 106, 129–30
cargo checks by, 92–93
cargo loading and, 22, 24, 26, 27, 30
crew and, 79, 92
El Faro’s evacuation and, 208, 209, 210
feelings about Tote’s treatment of, 107, 129–30
hold flooding and, 205–6, 207
hurricane and course changes and, 158, 173–76, 182
Joaquin forecasts and captain’s course change and, 72–74, 104, 107, 117, 126
list problems and, 176, 182, 185, 187–89, 190, 191, 197, 200, 207
pilots and El Faro’s departure and, 47
proposed course change by, 129–30, 138
responsibilities of, 37n
stability calculations and, 26, 43, 49, 50
watches of, 29, 37n, 68, 124, 136, 173
weather monitoring by, 114, 124–26, 127–29
work assignments from, 91, 92
Solar-Cortes, German A. (oiler), xvi, 83
stability, 14
components affecting, 25
computation of, 25–26, 43, 67, 98, 207n
container load affecting, 24, 67, 155
El Faro’s construction and, 155
fuel tanks and, 120–21
issues affecting, 16, 120–21, 184–85, 207–8
sail effect of wind and, 67, 182, 184
Tote’s guidelines on, 207
sump. See also lubrication system
list and problems with, 180–81, 182, 189–90, 190, 205
oil collection in, 62, 131, 179–80, 181
pump leakage issue and, 132
Sun Shipbuilding (Sunships), 108–9, 113
Tabbutt, Mark, 109
Tacoma–Anchorage run, 11, 56, 99–100, 134, 149
target list (Coast Guard), 63
Texas Enterprise (cargo ship), 5
Thomas, Anthony “Shawn” (oiler), xvi, 82, 122, 133, 179, 185–86, 204
Thresher (submarine), 13n
Titanic, 95, 216
Tote (Tote, Inc., Sea Star, and Tote Services), 6, 107–13, 189
background of ownership changes and expansion at, 108–9, 113
cargo loading and, 24, 26, 27<
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Coast Guard/NTSB hearings and, 231
Coast Guard risk matrix and target list and, 63
cost and schedule pressures on, 66, 102–3, 144
crew’s treatment by, 107
Davidson’s being passed over for promotion by, 105
Davidson’s feelings about treatment by, 106–7, 129–30, 144
Davidson’s hurricane notifications to, 6, 101–2, 117, 199–201, 202
Davidson’s management style and, 69–70, 106
Davidson’s need for route approval from, 102, 105–6
Davidson’s route planning for return northbound trip and, 101–2, 105
delay clauses in contracts and, 66, 103
El Faro’s structural conversion by, 22, 96, 108, 155
families’ hearing about El Faro’s loss from, 10–11
families’ lawsuits against, 112
families’ treatment by, 112
hurricane recommendations from, 8, 42, 47, 143
Joaquin’s underestimation by, 8
lashing guidelines of, 27, 30n, 93, 177
liability of, 229
lifeboat updating and, 96, 155
LNG/diesel vessels of, 56, 60, 100, 106, 112
maintenance requests to, 66–67, 111
overtime limits by, 79
penalties assessed on, 233
personnel and workload issues at, 112
price-fixing activities of, 110, 113
profit pressures on, 111–13
Puerto Rico’s dependency on regular runs by ships of, 65–66
regular runs and profits of, 65
renovations for Alaska run by, 99–100
response to El Faro’s distress by, 223
rest period violations by, 159
safety coordinator position at, 112
safety guidelines from, 47, 66, 105, 232
safety issues and, 80, 96, 97, 102, 105, 106, 107–8, 112–13, 143, 144, 200–201
safety record of, 80n
salvage tug hired by, 13
stability guidelines from, 207
statement on El Faro’s sinking from, 229
Tacoma–Anchorage route and, 11, 56, 99–100, 134
tracking of El Faro’s route and weather changes by, 104–5, 113
whistle-blowers and complaints to, 80–81, 107, 139, 231
Totem Ocean Trailer Express (TOTE), 108
TOTE Resources, 108
Tropical Analysis and Forecast Branch high seas forecast (TAFB), 38–39, 87
Tropical Storm Erika, xiii, 41, 42, 74, 143
Truszkowski, Andrzej R. (Polish worker), xvii
unions, 70, 77, 79, 82, 83, 109
unlicensed crew members, 21, 35, 36, 79–80, 91
VHF channel emergency calls, 12, 124
voyage data recorder (VDR, or black box), xix, xx, 72n, 115, 139n, 156, 160, 186, 213, 219, 229, 231, 236, 238
voyage plan, 37n, 68
Walashek Industrial & Marine, 122, 123
Walgreens, 65, 110
Walmart, 65, 66, 103, 110
watches, 138
activities during, 137
cargo loading and, 21, 29, 47
change routine during, xx, 68, 115–16, 157
crew assigned to, 37n, 52
El Faro’s flouting of rules on, 159–60
fatigue during, 29, 159–60, 169n
hours worked on, 159–60
hurricane preparations and, 119, 167, 203
Joaquin’s growing strength and, 168, 172, 173, 175, 179, 203, 228
night lunches for, 70, 151
regulations on rest periods with, 159
requirement for, 138
riding gang not part of, 36
shifts during, 50, 57, 58, 63, 67, 68, 70, 83, 91, 122, 124, 127, 130, 132, 136, 165, 167–68, 202
sleep between watches and, 29, 158–59
wave changes noticed during, 101
watch status of hurricanes, 124
Weather Channel, 40
weather forecasts
captain’s authority in route choices and, 104
Captain Davidson’s monitoring of, 38–41, 42, 114–15, 127, 136, 139–41, 143, 174
crew’s monitoring of, 71–74, 75, 113–14, 116–17, 137, 139–41, 157
direction predictions in, 165
inaccuracies about Joaquin’s strength and course in, 86–87, 88, 114–15, 165
Joaquin’s early development on, 71–74, 75
lag between data and prediction in, 115
models used in, 87
predictive models on Joaquin’s growth using, 46
range of sources consulted in, 38–41
Tote’s guidelines on, 47
Tote’s tracking of El Faro’s route and, 104–5
Weather Underground, 137
Westward Venture (cargo ship), 108, 134
wheelhouse. See bridge of El Faro
wind shear, 34, 86, 165, 195
World Meteorological Organization, 46
“Wreck of the Edmund Fitzgerald, The” (Lightfoot), 134, 203
Wright, Mariette (deckhand), xv, 27, 76, 79, 84, 91, 93, 203
Zdobych, Rafal A. (Polish worker), xvii
END NOTES
Part I
I. Emerald Express’s crew later claimed to have heard VHF calls from El Faro, but those calls were not recorded. It could be that El Faro’s officers used handheld VHF sets to make distress calls while abandoning ship; there is no way to verify this.
II. One nautical mile, corresponding to one minute of latitude, is equal to 1.15 standard miles.
III. Two worse or comparable civilian disasters occurred in inland waters: a small car ferry, the George Prince, sank in 1976 on the Mississippi, killing seventy-eight; and an ore carrier, the Carl Bradley, sank in a 1958 storm on Lake Michigan with the loss of thirty-three crew. Several military ships, including the nuclear submarine USS Thresher, sank with significantly greater casualties.
Part II
I. Traditionally spelled boatswain, pronounced bo’sun: the highest-ranking deckhand, essentially foreman for all deck-related work aboard ship.
II. The lower its center of gravity and the farther away from the centerline its buoyancy center can travel, the more resistant a ship will be to rolling too far or capsizing in rough seas. Stability in merchant ships is therefore reckoned—you can see this as an elegance of graphics, without needing to follow the math—by measuring how far to one side the center of buoyancy shifts at a given angle of tilt. The lower the center of gravity, the farther away from the centerline the buoyancy center can move, the longer will be the “righting arm” that fights to keep the ship upright. The goal is to maintain the minimum length of righting arm necessary to keep the ship from rolling too far or even capsizing in rough seas. Minimum righting arm is called GM, where G stands for the center of gravity and M for a geometric point defining the center of buoyancy; GM margin is the extra margin of stability mariners require before departure (or the difference between the minimum and actual GM). For El Faro the average GM margin at departure is around 0.5, diminishing to 0.25 at arrival due to fuel burn-off. On this trip El Faro leaves with a margin of 0.64, which burn-off will reduce to 0.3.
III. El Faro’s ballasting options were reduced during her 1992 and 2006 conversions, when four of her ballast tanks were permanently filled with iron slurry, which lowered her center of gravity; another effect was to reduce her officers’ ability to counteract a list by emptying extra ballast tanks on one side and filling them on the other, a problem that will have a bearing on the ship’s ultimate fate.
IV. CargoMax—which is not required to be and has never been officially approved as a stability-calculating program by the Coast Guard or any other official agency—is the child of a joint venture between Herbert Engineering, a California marine-software company, and the American Bureau of Shipping, or ABS, a nonprofit, New York–based “classification society.” A classification society is a company that promulgates marine safety standards and ins
pects ships according to those standards worldwide. The involvement of ABS in the software Tote uses might not be a coincidence. ABS, which boasts yearly revenues of over $1 billion, is also the outfit that, for a fee, inspects Tote ships for regulatory compliance.
V. Despite family skepticism as to how she would make money selling makeup on a ship full of men, she once scored her “biggest order ever” with Chief Mate Shultz, who bought almost $500 worth of cosmetics for his wife.
VI. A one-page “guideline,” the authorship of which is uncertain, details minimum lashing requirements for El Faro; by this document’s standards, according to Captain Philip Anderson of the industry group National Cargo Bureau, most of the ship’s container stacks would be deemed compliant. But Anderson also will state in testimony that by normal NCB standards some of the cargo stacks and “a significant” number of the trailers carried below would be considered unsatisfactorily lashed down. Inspectors will later determine that anywhere between three and forty of the trailers on 2nd Deck are stowed off-button. The lashing guideline requires that cars be secured individually to D rings, which is not the case on El Faro. Anderson later will judge loose cargo to have had a “domino effect” on other cargo, and to have become a problem during the ship’s final voyage.
VII. The engine room (technically 4-hold) lies under the house; 5-hold, where steering and propulsion machinery reside, is all the way aft, against the stern, and does not extend to Tank Top level. Regulations require that all gates be shut before sailing, since they are part of the system of watertight compartments that contributes to the ship’s overall safety.
VIII. Sahara sand can weaken the wave by causing a dry haze that screens solar heat, eventually impeding the storm’s growth at sea.
IX. The bottom two levels of the house are narrow compared to the upper four; they mostly consist of the boiler-exhaust casing, plus (off a corridor running port and starboard) the main stairs, a fire-control room, a cargo office, and a toilet. The rest of the area, a semi-open “breezeway” sheltered under the roof of wider upper decks, holds three dedicated containers full of bosun’s supplies, paint, and other ship’s stores.
X. Each mate runs the ship individually, with the assistance of one or two ABs on lookout or general backup duty during his, or her, respective watch. On El Faro the eight-to-twelve watch is assigned to Jeremie Riehm, the third mate; the twelve to four is Randolph’s; the four to eight belongs to Chief Mate Shultz. In addition, the chief mate is responsible for implementing safety regulations and general inspection; the second mate’s remit is navigation and communications systems, supervising the voyage plan, and keeping the wheelhouse (or bridge) in efficient operating order; the third mate usually takes care of hands-on maintenance and inspection duties such as sounding (or measuring the contents of) bilges and ballast and fuel tanks, and checking that emergency supplies on the ship’s two lifeboats are up-to-date.
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