XV. NTSB investigators deleted multiple names and chunks of dialogue that they judged irretrievable or irrelevant while editing the VDR transcript. In all, the NTSB excised over half of the twenty-six hours of recording.
XVI. Survival or immersion suit; the nickname comes from the obvious fact that a survivor might be stuck in the suit for hours with no way to relieve himself outside it. The totally enclosing garment, of thick orange neoprene, with hood and face flap to protect the head, will in theory keep the occupant warm and floating for hours if not days. The suit is also called a Gumby suit, from the rubbery cartoon character it resembles.
XVII. 2017 prices.
XVIII. Authored by Daisy Yuhas. “There may also be comfort in being able to attribute doom to some larger cosmic order . . . such as an ancient Mayan prophecy. This kind of mythology removes any sense of individual responsibility,” Shmuel Lissek, a professor at University of Minnesota, writes in the same article.
Part V
I. One megawatt of electricity would power between four hundred and nine hundred American homes for one year. Even a smallish storm wave covers a thousand meters in area and could, if its power were harnessed, illuminate Washington, DC, for a year.
II. Three specific rest violations by Tote ships will be cited. Serious collisions in 2017 (with multiple fatalities) involving the US Navy ships Fitzgerald and McCain, in which both fatigue and inexperience were listed as contributing factors, have increased regulatory concern about fatigue issues among watch-standing officers on American ships.
III. The author, while standing watch six hours on, six off, as mate on British tramp coasters, made a practice of drinking strong tea and nibbling on cola nuts to stay awake—then, off watch, downing a shot of whiskey to help him fall asleep (alcohol was not taboo on those ships, in those days). He never fell asleep on watch, but the specter of doing so, and the underlying fatigue, never left him either.
IV. They have also set up classes in “bridge resource management,” a team-oriented approach to handling risky maneuvers at sea that emphasizes concepts such as a “shared mental model” that will encourage consultation and cooperation between officers when danger threatens. And yet, as recent collisions involving Navy vessels have shown, cooperative captaincy can be self-defeating in tight situations, and the tradition of a captain’s absolute authority remains very much alive in both the US Navy and merchant marine academies. Tote’s lack of interest in BRM will be cited by the NTSB (but not by the Coast Guard) as a factor in El Faro’s fate.
V. A mate also has the right to change course while on watch if the master is not present, but practically speaking a major course change would require his approval.
VI. A rough calculation of continuous flow of water through a hatch three feet in diameter, with zero pumping pressure, works out to a total intake of water of 14,100 gallons per minute, or 846,000 gallons per hour, which is equal to 3,638 long tons in weight. No one knows, now or later, how much is actually coming through the scuttle, given the intermittent nature of the flooding on 2nd Deck and the uncertainty as to when it started.
VII. El Faro’s tubes are blown daily, which is standard practice. However, some engineers will wonder why the engineers on El Faro do not systematically call the bridge to warn the navigating officer about the associated drop in rpms, which would also be standard procedure. The likely explanation, yet again, has to do with the “milk run” nature of El Faro’s route, whereby events such as blowing soot happen at the same time, on the same day, every day, to the point where warnings are no longer called for or expected.
VIII. Probably the engineers will also start feeding oil into the sump from the other oil tank, the ten-ton reserve behind the turbines, although they know that, given the trickle that emanates from its one-inch feed pipe, it would take hours for this to have any real effect; but they are trained to take all measures possible.
Part VI
I. Though El Faro’s boilers have problems that might be aggravated by high seas, this is the only reference to boilers, versus repeated citing of oil pressure, as the reason for the engine cutting out. Probably Davidson, who is obviously under stress, conflated “boiler” with “plant.”
II. This call center apparently bungled communication at least once before, when it did not relay a message from Davidson in early September 2015, reporting a minor oil spill. Tote is aware of the problem, according to Jim Fisker-Andersen, but the same center is on call on October 1.
III. That Davidson has not already mustered the crew, at least as a precaution given El Faro’s situation, is probably yet another result of the captain’s stubbornly optimistic view of their prospects. A preliminary wake-up call and orders to report with lifesaving gear to the mess, if not yet to lifeboat stations, would seem reasonable, not to say responsible, given the situation. Both the Coast Guard and the NTSB will fault Davidson for not alerting his crew at this point or even earlier, when flooding was first detected; this would have given everybody more time to grab survival suits and prepare for a possible “abandon ship” command.
IV. Later analysis will conclude that downflooding will start at an angle of heel of twenty-seven degrees, possibly much less if one factors in the probability of leaks or other wastage in the vents, not to mention seas reaching twenty-five to thirty feet and higher.
V. It transpires during hearings that the CargoMax program on El Faro’s computers includes an emergency stability-calculating function that might answer this question and others; but it also appears no one on board knows of its existence, let alone how to use it. In any case, given the near-impossibility of knowing for sure how much water El Faro has taken in, it’s hard to see how useful the function could be at this stage.
VI. Cited in The Perfect Storm, by Sebastian Junger.
VII. Later the Coast Guard will criticize Davidson for not using the satellite phone to send a final Mayday message, a measure his training would demand and that would be crucial for survival, at least in normal circumstances; but these are not “normal” circumstances, and common sense indicates that on a capsizing ship, where every muscle is straining merely to stay in one place, let alone move, it might have been impossible to reach the equipment. And it would have made no practical difference to El Faro’s crew.
Part VII
I. Later, Coast Guard investigators will determine that this signal did not come from the single beacon registered in El Faro’s name, and they’ll suggest it came from the Emerald Express. However, a video shot by a crew member on the Emerald Express after the ship went aground shows her EPIRB still in place, unactivated. The Minouche was far too distant for her beacon to be washed to Rum Cay. It is possible that one of El Faro’s crew included a personal EPIRB in his or her preparations: in the voyage data recording, Jack Jackson refers to two men possessing EPIRBs, and it’s possible he himself had bought a unit for kayaking near New Orleans.
II. The statement also includes a “cautionary mention of predators ashore wanting to exploit the grieving and the possibility of ‘hearing the truth you’ve spoken twisted by knaves to make a trap for fools.’ ” The caution, and the Kipling quote, presumably are a reference to media coverage.
III. On October 7, President Barack Obama issued a statement about El Faro’s loss. “The captain and crew of the El Faro were Americans and Poles, men and women, experienced mariners and young seamen,” Obama said. “They were beloved sons and daughters and loving husbands and fathers. They were dedicated engineers, technicians, and a cook. And these thirty-three sailors were united by a bond that has linked our merchant mariners for more than two centuries—a love of the sea. As their ship battled the storm, they were no doubt working as they lived—together, as one crew,” the president continued. “This tragedy also reminds us that most of the goods and products we rely on every day still move by sea. As Americans, our economic prosperity and quality of life depend upon men and women who serve aboard ships like the El Faro.”
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PHOTO CREDITS pp. iv–vi: United States Coast Guard; p. x: NASA/NOAA GOES Project; p. 2: Tote; pp. xii, 16, 52, 88, 140, 146, 181, 190, 192, 220, 236, 238: National Transportation Safety Board
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