Further complicating the case and adding to my discomfort was the manner in which the evidence was being gathered. The FBI has specific, rigid procedures and policies governing evidence collection. However, the CVPD had already been processing the arrest scene and gathering evidence using methods and procedures that I was unfamiliar with. I had no idea how to handle transferring evidence between separate law enforcement entities, which I knew would be tricky due to the way the chain of evidence is tracked and documented. I decided to continue to leave all evidence collection to capable CVPD, which included collection of large sums of cash that were stolen during the commission of the robbery.
I finally gathered the courage to pass along the word that the FBI was interested in pursuing federal criminal charges, and that we would need to take custody of the prisoner. In other words, “Thanks for doing all of the dirty work. Why don’t you guys finish up, and we’ll be taking that prisoner off your hands and chalking up a nice arrest statistic for the FBI. And you’re welcome for all of the help. No really, no need to thank us.” I felt ridiculous having to pass along this information, and by the face of Sergeant Eisenberg, I knew he was in no way amused or appreciative of the FBI’s “help.”
Laura finally joined me, and we took custody of the prisoner. We drove in to the FBI office to conduct an interview of the subject. We booked our prisoner into the FBI's system, complete with fingerprints and all identifying body marks, including piercings, tattoos, and birthmarks. This information feeds AFIS (Automated Fingerprint Information System) and NCIC (National Criminal Information Center) databases, which are nationally utilized by federal and state law enforcement.
We then began the interview and spoke with the subject for almost an hour. He broke down and cried and told us that he had committed the crime because he wanted money to try to get back together with his girlfriend, which would enable him to see the child that he had had with her. As he told us this information, I honestly believed him. Or at least, I did not doubt that he believed what he was telling us at that point. I could tell that he was sincere and sad; I genuinely felt sorry for this person. However, he had gone into a bank, was presumably drunk or high, and brandished a machete at the bank teller. He likely did not intend to harm anyone, but the mental anguish that he inflicted on those people in the bank could haunt them forever, and his actions could have resulted in someone being hurt or killed. Given his situation, he certainly had not done the right thing, which would have been getting a job and being a dedicated father for his child. But I did not see him as a truly bad person since he apparently did not intend to cause harm to others. However, the justice system does not make allowances for “nice” criminals; the reality was that he was just in the beginning stages of learning a lesson that he would have years to think about while in prison.
Our FBI office amazingly did not have a holding cell for prisoners. Our standard operating procedure was to interview prisoners while handcuffed in an interview room, and upon conclusion of the interview we were supposed to take them to the federal prison. However, San Diego’s federal prison hours were severely limited, which left us in the position of having to temporarily lock up a prison in a non-federal facility overnight while waiting for a federal prison booking window. Ironically, we wound up transporting the prisoner back to Chula Vista, which was where he was originally arrested. We booked him to spend one night in the CVPD jail. Already on my second day I saw that working well with the local authorities was absolutely critical in being able to do our job successfully. And I saw that the local police often do the majority of “real” police work involved with solving crimes and arresting criminals, especially with violent crimes such as bank robberies.
The following morning, my partner and I drove to Chula Vista to pick up the prisoner. We had to get him out by a certain time, or the FBI would be charged for an extra day of “rent” to handle the prisoner; this was not unlike hotel check-out policies that I have encountered. However, our federal prison booking window was much later than our check-out time from CVPD, so we had time to kill in between. Our plan was to simply pick up the prisoner and take him back to the FBI office until it was time to head to the federal prison.
When we entered the prisoner booking area at the Chula Vista Police Department, we had to lock up our weapons in a secure area prior to entering the locked-down area of the prison facility. After locking up the weapons, we used our handcuffs and safely transitioned the prisoner from a holding cell to our car by the book. We then transported the prisoner back across the city to the FBI office. Our arrival was met with some anticipation. The majority of FBI workers are not agents, and those who are agents are typically focused on terrorism, cybercrime, or white-collar crime with more time spent at a desk than on the streets. They are as anxious as any member of the public to see a real-life bank robber. I felt proud as we pulled into the office with our bank robber in custody. I was enjoying the brief moment of being in the spotlight at the San Diego office.
The moment was short-lived. As I stepped out of the car, out of habit I instinctually felt for my gun, which an FBI agent must always keep in mind to ensure that it is secured and safe from unintended use. My face must have turned a deep shade of purple as my fingers danced around an empty holster. I plunged my fingers to the bottom of the holster, as if my gun had shrunk and I might find it if I reached far enough. I felt like Indiana Jones when he is confronted by two sword-wielding villains in the Temple of Doom and he smirks, reaches for his gun, and finds nothing but air. I thought to myself, “Wow, it is now day three and I’ve REALLY screwed up this time.” I quietly motioned to Laura and explained her that I did not have my gun, and that I suspected that we had managed to leave our guns at the Chula Vista Police Department. Unarmed FBI agents being in charge of the custody of a bank robber is clearly not in line with the FBI's policies and procedures. I was terrified of the repercussions, but my fellow agent stayed calm and collected; she knew how to handle the situation. She would quietly get back in the car, rush back to Chula Vista, pick up our weapons, and fly back to the office. If things went smoothly, nobody would know a thing. For the third day in a row, my poker face was coming in handy.
In our fingerprinting and booking room, I sat with our prisoner by myself in an unarmed state, which was permissible since the subject was secured to a bench. The subject had no idea of our predicament, which could have been much worse if he had realized we were unarmed during our entire drive from Chula Vista back to the FBI office.
I waited for Laura to drive all the way back to CVPD to retrieve our weapons. The wait seemed like an eternity, and I was terrified that our incredibly careless error would be discovered. I even spoke with several agents who wandered down to see the prisoner, and I outwardly demonstrated my apparent boredom in having nothing to do but watch the clock, while internally I was screaming and desperate for my partner to stroll back in with weapons secured and nobody the wiser. My partner finally made it back in just over an hour, told me she could watch the prisoner and relieve me, and whispered to check her trunk as she passed me her car keys. I popped the trunk and found my beloved Glock 22 intact. I felt a wave of relief pass over me as I slipped the barrel back in the holster and secured the snap over the handle. Disaster had been averted. And a lesson had been learned, fortunately without any repercussions.
As we waited for the remainder of the afternoon, fellow squad members brought all of us burgers, fries, and shakes. They even brought food in for the prisoner. I knew this would be appreciated as something of a “last meal” since the prisoner was likely to be on a prison diet for years to come. In the FBI I always treated our prisoners with a high degree of respect and dignity, despite the crime they had committed. Aside from being the humane thing to do, it also was a potential future benefit in that an agent never knew when a prisoner’s testimony or information could help the FBI down the road. If prisoners had been treated well, the
y were much more likely to be cooperative.
We finally escorted our prisoner to the federal prison and dropped him off, nearing my first full cycle of going to a bank robbery, performing an investigation, conducting a search, and taking a subject to jail. The only remaining part was the paperwork, which is not nearly as interesting or exciting, but consumed much more time and effort than our activities on the street. While I did not enjoy this aspect of the job, I put in my best effort at writing effectively. The importance of FBI investigative reports, which frequently are the subject of courtroom testimony and scrutiny, cannot be overstated; a well-written report can help put a criminal behind bars, and a poorly written document can result in a guilty person walking free.
CHAPTER 20
Coworkers in the Bureau
My squad mates were an interesting mix of individuals from various backgrounds. Some were former law-enforcement officers, although most were not. The agents whom I worked alongside for the most part were just normal people who had all pursued a common dream. There were a number of pranksters as well; I quickly learned never to leave my computer unattended without being password locked, and one of my squad members sent out an email to my entire squad from my account proclaiming my love for “Pookie Bear,” which was intended to reflect my pet name for Jennifer, and it also proclaimed how fortunate I was to have her dress me in the morning. In some workplaces this type of prank could probably lead to an HR complaint, but FBI agents have to be thick skinned and be able to tolerate all types of behavior; I personally welcomed the spirit of trying to have some fun in a job that is frequently comprised of serious life-or-death incidents. Some of the agents were serious to a fault, but others were the kind of people who were fun to cruise around with while singing to the radio and laughing at each other’s horrible vocal abilities.
My first supervisor had a background in finance prior to joining the FBI, but he loved working violent crime. Over my time spent in the San Diego office, I would have four supervisors; they all had their strengths and weaknesses, but were uniformly dedicated to the cause of fighting crime. An interesting aspect of the management structure over FBI agents is that the management comes from the ranks 100% of the time. There is no supervisor who supervises investigations and agents who did not start out as a low level agent. The only exception to this rule is the Director of the FBI, who is appointed by the president of the United States, and some of the high-level employees who are not directly over any investigative areas, such as the Chief Technology Officer, who typically come from outside the FBI due to his or her unique and specialized skill sets. But everyone who is directly involved in the management of investigations is a former agent.
The varying levels of management include supervisors who manage squads that typically range in size from a couple of agents up to twenty. Above the supervisor is the Assistant Special Agent in Charge, whom agents refer to as the ASAC. For the San Diego field office, which had approximately 250 agents, there were four ASACs. One was over all traditional criminal investigations, including my bank robbery and kidnapping squad, as well as the drug squad and alien smuggling squad. There was an ASAC for white-collar and cybercrime investigations, the area in which I felt my true talents could have been applied, but unfortunately were never taken advantage of. Another ASAC was responsible for all terrorism related investigations, both domestic and international, and finally there was an ASAC dedicated to all administrative matters, including supervision of functional areas that do not have agents, including analysts, finance, human resources, evidence handling, and photography. Interestingly, two-thirds of the FBI is comprised of these non-agent personnel. They tend to rank lower on the social totem pole, not unlike the students in a high school who are not sports stars. Despite being a gun-toting agent, I would have been happy with being a nerd behind the scenes, putting together clues to help solve crimes, but without the pressure of performing arrests, testifying, or any of the other stressful duties that accompany an agent.
The analysts and other support employees were some of the sharpest and friendliest employees in the Bureau, and often exhibited more personality than the agents that they supported. During most of my time as an agent, Kerry Hallsley supported my squad, was a hard worker, had a great deal of common sense, and kept things running behind the scenes to ensure we operated successfully, and always provided a smile and conversation that helped balance the frequently tiresome and negative nature of my squad’s mission of combatting violent crime.
At the top of the management chain was the Special Agent in Charge, which was abbreviated SAC, but with the letters pronounced individually (versus calling the head honcho a “sack”). This person reported directly to the Director of the FBI. The San Diego office had three different SACs while I was stationed there. The first was clearly not a people person. During my first firearms training exercise as an agent in San Diego, I stood directly next to the SAC, whom I had not yet met. I was not positive that he was the Special Agent in Charge until I saw his name written on the paper target next to mine. I was a bit shy and did not want to disturb him, but I was hoping to have some acknowledgment or brief introduction; a “Hello,” “Nice to meet you,” or “Welcome to San Diego” would have been welcomed. But the SAC made no notice of my existence, which did not exactly build loyalty or respect for the leadership. I later learned that the SAC had been a football player at Notre Dame. As I stood next to him, I cranked out consistent scores of 96 and 98 (out of 100) while he struggled with scores in the 80s. Perhaps the seasoned veteran did not enjoy being schooled by the rookie, at least in this one capacity.
Before I departed the FBI, this particular SAC retired, with the rumor being that he was effectively removed from office. There was a national controversy that began on December 7, 2006, regarding the firings of several United States Attorneys around the country. United States Attorneys are appointed by the President of the United States, but traditionally only vacant positions are filled. The changing of US Attorneys midstream in the middle of the President's term is very uncommon. The Department of Justice, ultimately directed by President George W. Bush’s administration, fired seven US Attorneys around the country, which was considered by many to be politically motivated, since some of the US Attorneys had been involved with aggressively pursuing political corruption charges for some politicians, while practically ignoring similar evidence for others. What was not widely publicized in the national media was the fact that President Bush’s administration had appointed most of these attorneys in the first place.
The role of United States Attorneys is incredibly powerful since they have the ability to decide which cases they will prosecute and which they will not pursue. For every crime that it is committed, few actually make it to prosecution and punishment. There are multiple phases of investigating a crime, each of which filters down the number of crimes that are able to be prosecuted. First of all, when a crime occurs, the odds are high that law enforcement will never learn about the illegal activity; many crime victims are also criminals, and they want to avoid any attention from law enforcement. Assuming a crime has occurred and the FBI is informed, the FBI looks at the evidence and proceeds with an investigation if the FBI management deems that an investigation is warranted. In many cases there will not be enough information, or there will not be a technical violation of the law, even if common sense dictates that someone is up to no good. Out of a hundred crimes that occur on the street that fall in the FBI’s jurisdiction, I would estimate that fewer than five are investigated.
Ultimately, the FBI is a law enforcement agency, with the job of collecting evidence and building cases to hand over to the United States Attorney's office for prosecution. In many cases, the FBI's best efforts will not yield adequate evidence needed to prosecute a criminal, usually because the evidence simply does not exist. For example, many crimes end up being a word-of-mouth accusation which is difficult to prosecute, es
pecially when victims are often in cahoots with the bad guys in some form or fashion. An Assistant US Attorney (AUSA) will frequently pass on pursuing a case because of lack of evidence, lack of AUSAs available to actually prosecute the case, or simply a lack of priority for the office. The US Attorney has the ability to set priorities for his or her office, which can have political impacts and ramifications. If the US Attorney in a particular district is viewed as not pursuing cases that are at the top of the agenda for the political party of the President, then he or she is in danger of being replaced, which is what happened in San Diego and elsewhere around the country. While on the surface the appearance may be that certain cases may not be pursued for political reasons, the actual reason may be due to straightforward issues that make cases virtually impossible to successfully prosecute.
Carol Lam served for a number of years successfully as the US Attorney of the Southern District of California until her abrupt dismissal by the Attorney General under the Bush administration. I have no direct knowledge or inside information regarding her dismissal, but it was not a leap to conclude that the move was strictly political and a sign of the increasing polarization between the two major political parties in the United States. Carol Lam had a stellar reputation and track record of getting results, including the successful prosecution of prominent Republican Congressman Duncan Hunter, which the FBI was heavily involved with from an investigative standpoint. Lam brought down a Republican and was fired. There may be other unknown reasons for her release. Or there may not be; the true cause and effect related to her firing remains unclear.
[2014] Eyes Pried Open: Rookie FBI Agent Page 11
