A third problem left over from the colonial days, like Rhodesia and the Falklands, was Hong Kong. For 150 years the city had been a British protectorate, and an island of capitalism in a sea of communism. The lease on Hong Kong was due to expire in 1997. In 1983, she was reassuring the British public that talks were under way, and that the Hong Kong way of life would continue. It will be quite tragic if between us, between China and Britain, we cannot make an arrangement which enables that way of life, that stability and prosperity, to continue, because it’s compounded of two things – the enormous enterprise, hard work, inventiveness of the Chinese character in Hong Kong, and the system which has been run under the British in Hong Kong. Now it’s trying to get the continuity of that system, together with the wonderful character of the Chinese people that we’re struggling to maintain.18
After 1984, she embarked on a series of speeches designed to reassure Hong Kong residents and the world. In Hong Kong itself she stressed three principles: The first point I wish to make about this Agreement is that it assures the continuation of Hong Kong as a free trading capitalist society for a very long time to come – into the middle of the next century. This means that Hong Kong can plan long-term with confidence. I believe Chairman Deng [Deng Xiaoping] intends his bold concept of ‘one country-two systems’ to last. My second point is that you have my absolute assurance that Britain will administer Hong Kong wisely and well between now and 1997. We shall honour our obligations to the full. My third point is that Britain will not merely do all in its power to work for Hong Kong’s steady development and a smooth transition; we shall also seek to win the widest possible acceptance of the Agreement in the rest of the world.19 The agreement was broadly accepted, and was carried out. These negotiations were different from both her obduracy in the Falklands, and her boldness in Rhodesia. Her major concern was that capitalism should continue: once she felt that aim had been met, her primary interest ended.
A constant thread throughout her office, and indeed her political life, was the vexed question of Northern Ireland. The Irish Republican Army touched her life very directly, in the death of Ross McWhirter, which resulted in her being given a police guard that is still with her: in the death of Airey Neave, her close friend and ally;20 in the bombing of the Brighton hotel where she and her Cabinet were staying in 1984, injuring Norman Tebbit and his wife and killing five; at the end of her government, when Ian Gow was killed at his home. There were other high profile actions less close to her – the year that she entered office as Prime Minister was also the year that Lord Mountbatten and 18 soldiers were killed on the same day.
True to her background, Margaret Thatcher was staunchly Unionist – it would be surprising if she had not supported a largely Protestant movement that wished to retain close ties with Britain and British history. This would be the same argument as that which took her to the Falklands to protect the people, and made her prioritize Hong Kong people and their rights to capitalism. In opposition, in the unsanctioned speech that made her the ‘Iron Lady’ she made her views clear. But we cannot afford, in Labour’s view, to maintain our defences at the necessary level – not even at a time when on top of our NATO commitments, we are fighting a major internal war against terrorism in Northern Ireland, and need more troops in order to win it.21 To call the situation ‘war’ was a major slip: in government policy, it was always referred to as troops supporting the civilian government. But it made her position clear, and presaged the 21st-century ‘War on Terror’ fought today.
Unsurprisingly, Margaret Thatcher’s public statements promised that Ireland would remain British for as long as the majority of her people wished it to. This was one area where she did not benefit from her usual meticulous briefings. The BBC’s political editor John Cole, a Protestant Ulster man who could be expected to be sympathetic to her view, wrote that she had ‘a total lack of feeling for a province that was remote from her own background’.22
More revealing, off-the-cuff remarks, that Irish Prime Minister Garrett Fitzgerald reports her making in 1985 when the Anglo-Irish Agreement was signed and Ireland was eligible for European Union funds, show her as disliking Irish demands: More money for those people? Why should they have more money? I need that money for my people in England.23 Her choice of Northern Ireland secretaries did not dispel the picture. Airey Neave, in opposition, was a right-wing Unionist with only a nod towards nationalist views: his successors were little different. Margaret Thatcher took the killing of Lord Mountbatten with her customary courage and defiance. She flew to Ireland, did a walkabout in Belfast, and was photographed in a combat jacket and Ulster Defence Force beret. She went again at Christmas, and visited almost every year of her term of office.
In 1980, Charles Haughey took over as Irish Taoiseach. Margaret Thatcher liked him, staunch Nationalist though he was. The reports of their first meeting were positive: ‘British sources agreed that a good personal relationship had been struck between the two prime ministers. They were now to hold regular meetings for the first time. But Mr. Haughey, while meticulously observing the confidentiality of the meeting, trumped all that by his bold performance. He said it was the most successful meeting he had had with any politician before an international news conference.’24 When talks in December were reported equally positively, Margaret Thatcher wrote reassuringly to the Unionist leader the Reverend Ian Paisley: Finally, let me stress that it remains a fundamental assumption of all government thinking on these matters that Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom and will remain so unless its people and the Westminster Parliament decide otherwise. I could hardly have made that clearer than I have done in recent days both in the House of Commons and outside it.25
It remains a fundamental assumption of all government thinking on these matters that Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom and will remain so unless its people and the Westminster Parliament decide otherwise.
--THATCHER
All this in the shadow of the hunger strikes by Republican prisoners seeking for recognition that they were prisoners of war. Asked on television whether she was willing to see an ‘endless procession of young Irish men die’, she replied: That is a matter for those who go on hunger strike and those who are encouraging them to do so. I am not urging them to go on hunger strike. I am urging them not to die. I am urging them to choose the way of life and not the way of death. What I am saying and I believe I have the whole population behind me, I am saying I will not give political status or special category status to people who are in fact criminals and who are the enemies of society.26 Her ruthlessness was breathtaking. 1981 was the year that mainland Britain saw riots in Brixton and Toxteth, her personal popularity was at an all-time low, there were 73 deaths in Ireland, and seven hunger strikers died. The strike was finally called off in October. Was this a victory? It impressed the American government, but American money continued to flow to the IRA. It ensured her reputation for determination but Bobby Sands, the first striker to die, became a martyr to the Republican cause. Public opinion had seen young Irish men die, and blamed her. Furthermore Haughey supported General Galtieri during the Falklands War.
In her second term, Fitzgerald returned as Taoiseach. Disappointed in Haughey, Margaret Thatcher got on better with him. In 1983 she authorised the preparation of secret proposals to end the impasse. On 17 December of that year, the IRA left a bomb outside Harrods department store in London, killing three shoppers and two policemen. But Margaret Thatcher was becoming more aware of the nuances of the Irish situation, and beginning to believe with her customary passion that the law-abiding constituency of nationalistic Catholics should be represented and reconciled with the British state. Northern Ireland was also straining her special relationship with Ronald Reagan – with Irish Catholic in his own background, he was susceptible to the American lobby that saw Britain as a colonial power in Ireland. Also, much as she disliked the Foreign Office, she was swayed by their argument that no solution could be found without the support of all of the N
orthern Irish population.
This could all have been derailed by the bomb at the Grand Hotel in Brighton on 12 October 1984 during the Conservative Party conference. She was extremely lucky to escape that attack without serious injury. Millar, who had just left her after a session on her speech, describes her sitting very still in the secretaries’ room – I think that was an assassination attempt, don’t you?27 she said finally. Her first thought had been for Denis, who was asleep in the bedroom and unhurt. In her memoirs, she talks about the importance of the lights remaining on. For some months afterwards she slept with a torch by her bed.28 She refused to be taken to Number 10 for safety that night. She had a copy of her speech, rescued by Millar and the secretaries – she was determined to give it. Her personal assistant, Cynthia Crawford, had collected some clothes – Margaret Thatcher was still in the ball gown she had been wearing earlier. Denis had dressed and collected a spare pair of shoes, worn later by the American Ambassador who had lost his. She slept that night in a twin room at the police training college in Lewes, with Crawford. Denis shared a room with the detectives. She woke up to the six o’clock news, and saw images of Norman Tebbit and his wife injured and trapped in the rubble. She was interviewed by the BBC and at 9.30 exactly she was walking onto the conference platform. Many of the people with her had lost their clothes, but Marks and Spencer’s had opened early and it was an impressive turnout that opened that day of the conference.
I knew that far more important than what I said was the fact that I, as Prime Minister, was there to say it.
--THATCHER
She had spent the night adapting the speech – We removed most of the partisan sections of the speech: this was not a time for Labour-bashing but for unity in defence of democracy.29 On the other hand there were tough sections on law and order that could stay. I knew, she said in her memoirs, that far more important than what I said was the fact that I, as Prime Minister, was there to say it.30 She was there to say it, looking immaculate and never faltering. It was a performance worthy of the Britain she knew and admired, the Britain that had survived worse bombing than this during the Blitz. After the conference she went to the hospital to visit the injured. From there she spent ‘hours’ on the phone to find doctors with the expertise they needed – in the end, she found a doctor from El Salvador with earthquake experience. Then it was back to Chequers – faster than she had ever been driven in her life and with a full motorcycle escort. Emma Nicolson, an admirer of the early Thatcher, felt she was never the same again after the bomb. She became locked away from people, unable to see and hear and touch her admirers.
In the short term, relations with Ireland were difficult. A unified Ireland was out. Confederation of the two states was out. Joint authority was out. There would be no derogation from sovereignty. But, in November 1985, the Anglo-Irish Agreement was signed. The deal gave the Irish Republic a consultative role in Northern Ireland, setting up an inter-governmental conference of ministers and civil servants with its own secretariat. No future changes would be made without a democratic vote. It was a bargaining position to maintain security, not the end result either side wanted. It failed to deliver cross-border cooperation on security, and the ‘war’ with the IRA continued. In 1987, she prevailed on Douglas Hurd to ban the broadcasting of the voices of Sinn Fein or the IRA. This was a double-edged sword – broadcasters used actors to speak the words, and by so doing increased the credibility of the comments. By 1993, she was convinced that the Agreement had been a fundamental mistake. She argued for an alternative, but neither had an alternative nor had the time in office to find one. Successive governments had not found a better approach, and despite her intentions rather than because of them the Agreement has been the foundation of a slow process leading to peace.
When she left government, Margaret Thatcher had reached a conclusion to many of the big issues of her day. The Falklands rumbled on, and future events in Rhodesia discredited the Mugabe government, but neither of these were a direct result of her intervention. Only her issues with the European Union have proved insuperable. Her views were well known. She had spoken in favour of a union for free trade, and been blind to the potential of any other union, from the earliest days of Heath’s government. She bent in other areas – for instance in the need to consult Nationalists in Northern Ireland, or not to recognise Bishop Muzorewa’s government in Rhodesia, but she never changed her view of Europe. The big questions of Europe – how far Britain should be part of the European Union, or indeed what the purpose of the European Union was – are still not agreed by the Conservative Party. Margaret Thatcher was obdurate, but for some parts of her period of office sufficient members of the party agreed with her to make her position tenable if not secure. In the end, the final argument with Howe over the single currency was the catalyst that ended her government. Perhaps if it had not been Europe it would have been some other thing, and certainly she was unpopular in the country and with the party. It almost seems unfair that the policy that unseated her was one of the clearest and most straightforward parts of her personal manifesto.
Ronald Reagan and George Bush
There is probably no more special a relationship in the 20th-century history of the Special Relationship between Britain and the United States than that between Mrs Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. I had been immediately struck by his warmth, charm and complete lack of affectation, she wrote in her memoirs. Above all, I knew that I was talking to someone who instinctively felt and thought as I did; not just about policies but about a philosophy of government, a view of human nature, all the high ideals and values which lie – or ought to lie – beneath any politician’s ambition to lead his country.
It may be that one reason why President Reagan and I made such a good team was that, although we shared the same analysis of the way the world worked, we were very different people. He had an accurate grasp of the strategic picture but left the tactical detail to others. What Thatcher is implying is that Reagan left it to her, especially when it came to the handling of the Soviet Union or Europe. I was conscious that we must manage our relations with the communists on a day-to-day basis in such a way that events never got out of control. (The Downing Street Years, p 324.) Did Reagan ever resent being lectured to by the junior partner in the Special Relationship? He signed a photograph of the two of them at dinner at Number 10 in July 1988: ‘Dear Margaret – As you can see, I agree with every word you are saying. I always do. Warmest Friendship. Sincerely Ron.’
After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait a different picture emerges: For all the friendship and co-operation I had had from President Reagan, I was never taken into the Americans’ confidence more than I was during the two hours or so I spent that afternoon at the White House... The President that day was an altogether more confident George Bush than the man with whom I had had earlier dealings. He was firm, cool, showing the decisive qualities which the Commander-in-Chief of the greatest world power must possess. Any hesitation fell away. I had always liked George Bush. Now my respect for him soared. (The Downing Street Years, p 820.)
Part Three
THE LEGACY
Chapter 7: After Thatcher
Leaving office was hard for Margaret Thatcher. She would never again be the centre of power and attention. There is no obvious role for an ex-prime minister, now 66 years old but with no intention of retiring. It might have been easier if she had been overthrown in an election – then she would have been prepared to move out of Downing Street. As it was, her daily routine and importance vanished overnight. She saw the Cabinet’s advice to stand down as treachery. Her exit from Downing Street was tearful. Cynthia Crawford began packing immediately, but the flat had to be emptied quickly. She had one last weekend at Chequers to collect all the personal belongings of 11 years of Thatcher residency. Her last duty, as she describes it in her memoirs, was to ensure that John Major rather than Heseltine succeeded her.1 He was duly elected leader after the second ballot, and she left Number 10 on Wednesday 28 November with a ty
pical farewell speech for the cameras – Now is the time for a new chapter to open and I wish John Major all the luck in the world2 – and set off to start a new life in Dulwich, in the house she and Denis had bought overlooking the Dulwich and Sydenham golf course.
Public honours followed. In December 1990, she was granted the Freedom of Westminster, an honour previously only given to Winston Churchill. The Queen awarded her the Order of Merit – the highest honour that is in the royal gift. There can be only 24 members of the order at any one time – Laurence Olivier had died, leaving a vacancy for Margaret Thatcher. In 1992, she was created Baroness Thatcher, of Kesteven in the County of Lincolnshire, and entered the House of Lords. In addition, Denis Thatcher was given a Baronetcy (ensuring that their son, Mark, would inherit a title). But honours do not substitute for a job, and there simply was no job for her. With some prescience, in 1987, she said of cabinet ministers who were shuffled out of office: But also there is one other thing which has bothered me such a great deal. It is the only job, I think in the United Kingdom, under which you do not get any severance pay or notice at all. I must say I find this inhuman.3 At first she had no staff, and could not even answer the thousands of letters arriving to offer her sympathy. She was essentially an unemployed workaholic. She was very unlikely to take herself out of the public eye – even if the public, who had loved her and hated her with passion over the course of her career but had never been indifferent, would have let her.
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