During their reconnaissance the troopers found sign of more Indians. Their Osage guides suggested Comanche had made the sign, possibly the same ones who stole the army horses. The Osage advised that the column go no further without more troops, as they greatly feared the Comanche. The troopers took the advice and returned to camp.
Boone led a much larger group to the plain the following day but was unable to find the salt deposit. During the mission the men saw significant numbers of buffalo and deer.
Boone’s force marched on to the northwest and crossed the present line between Kansas and Oklahoma. He noted increased numbers of prairie dogs and fewer buffalo. On June 5th, the company surprised a group of Osage, one of whom was riding an army mule that had been stolen earlier from Boone’s force. Boone confiscated the Osage’s guns and four ponies, telling them that they would be returned when his own animals had been restored. The four ponies were to replace officers’ stock that had been taken. Officers privately owned their mounts and such losses would have meant out-of-pocket replacement expenses for them. Boone was fair-minded enough to wait until he had definite proof before taking the replacements. That evening three Osage tried to trade some ponies for those that had been taken but Boone would have nothing of it repeating his terms that he would return the ponies and the property when his own stock had been replaced. The Indians left with no further progress in the matter.
Boone’s force then advanced to the location of present-day Hutchinson, Kansas. Once through the sand hills that surround the area, he advanced north to the Santa Fe Trail.
Frequent rains caused discomfort among the troops, but provisions, including an elk, lifted their spirits. The expedition found a small party of traders, who expected the governor of Santa Fe to arrive shortly with an escort for them.
Part of Boone’s mission was to investigate the late-April murder of Don Josi Antonio Chavez. Chavez was a wealthy merchant who lived in Santa Fe and annually made trips to Westport Landing and St. Louis where he bought goods for trade. During a period of tension between the Republic of Texas and Mexico, Texas President Sam Houston authorized commerce raiding on the Santa Fe Trail, but ordered raiders not to infringe on United States Territory. When Texans began raiding Mexicans along the trail, border ruffians had taken up the “cause” and begun raiding as well. Despite warnings of danger Chavez left Santa Fe with fifty-five mules, two wagons and five servants. He also took a load of furs and an estimated $10,000 to $15,000 in cash and bullion.
Because of the winter’s severity, Chavez lost most of his stock and abandoned one of the wagons. When Chavez’s caravan reached the Big Bend region, present-day Great Bend, Kansas, a group of raiders led by John McDaniel, whom Texas had recruited in Missouri and who in turn recruited fifteen men to follow him, took the Mexicans hostage. The bandits killed the servants immediately but kept Chavez alive while they tried to get him to tell if he had any more money. When the merchant finally seemed of no further value, the thieves murdered him.
Boone found what he thought was the outlaws’ camp, but he was unable to gain any real knowledge of their location. Eventually another group of soldiers and frontiersmen apprehended several of the ruffians including McDaniel and his brother David. John McDaniel and Joseph Brown were hanged and several of the others were jailed. A few received clemency because they thought they were on a military mission for Texas.
On June 11th, Lieutenants Buford, and Anderson with twelve men went out in search of buffalo. They had little luck. The following day, Lt. Johnston, who also had been looking for buffalo, returned to camp with a severe wound. While chasing some buffalo his gun had accidentally discharged and shot a hole through his right foot. His wound was dressed and he was placed in a wagon where he remained out of service, for the remainder of the expedition.
The next day Boone encountered another detachment of dragoons from Fort Leavenworth under the command of Captain Phillip St. George Cooke. Cooke, a Virginia native, would later serve with distinction as a cavalry general with the Union’s Army of the Potomac in the Civil War.
The captains conferred about the relative strength of “Colonel” Charles A. Warfield’s Texas force that was raiding along the Santa Fe. Traders believed that Warfield led only thirty men rather than a rumored 600-700. The dragoon units had been requested to meet this threat and defend trail caravans. Warfield later linked with Texas forces led by Colonel Jacob Snively to defeat a force under General Armijo of the Mexican army, headed up the trail to fight the banditry.
While the two expeditions camped together another storm with high winds and hail, wrecked the camp. After the storm, troops went out to help rescue some travelers whose wagon had become mired in quicksand, and in the effort lost a mule which sank in the sand.
On June 19th the soldiers met a group led by William Bent of Bent’s Fort, Colorado. Bent and his fourteen wagons were waiting for elements of trading caravans that he was to accompany on to his fort several hundred miles west on the Arkansas River. This large concentration of caravans was the result of a determined effort by both the United States and Mexico to escort beleaguered travelers along the trail. The Big Bend region presented a good staging site, with its game for the men and lush grazing for the animals. Several different tribes also claimed the area as hunting grounds and it was a good location for travelers to present a show of force.
Boone began his return toward Fort Gibson after he and Cooke agreed that his troops were not needed. He swept south through present-day St. John, Kansas, crossing and taking note of the salty Rattlesnake Creek.
Boone’s force continued south until they reached the Gyp Hills and another band of Osage under Tshonga Sabba, or Black Dog. The Indians tried to convince Boone to turn over the confiscated guns and ponies but Boone declined saying that the owners were not of Black Dog’s people. News apparently traveled fast among the Osage and they seem to have been trying several ploys to regain the ponies.
Boone located his salt deposits just as earlier travelers had described them, on June 30. He took careful note of the position, five miles east of the 98th meridian near the present Oklahoma-Kansas border. Boone correctly surmised that the river through the plain was the Cimarron. His force spent several days hunting and examining the deposits before continuing on south.
On July 6 a Private Bean of E. Company died of what Boone termed “a disease of the brain of old standing.” Boone noted that Bean had been carried in one of the wagons since the force had left the Arkansas River. Bean was buried the following day and the soldiers named Dragoon Creek in his honor.
As the force continued south, game steadily diminished. Caddoe Indians visited the campsite on the night of July 10 and informed the soldiers that the buffalo were extremely scarce. Boone’s men took two bison on July 12 temporarily bolstering their dwindling food supply. However, two buffalo would not feed a force of ninety men for long.
Boone crossed into lush grass country and reported herds of wild ponies. As the force went on, however, water and game became scarce. By July 18 the group found large concentrations of plum thickets with ripe fruit. They also met friendly Absentee Shawnees (a Shawnee tribal division), who informed Boone that he was near Auguste Choteau’s trading post, a point from which he would swing southeast back to Fort Gibson. Chouteau established the trading post in 1838 to trade with Kiowa and Comanche who disliked traveling through forested country.
By the time Boone reached the post, his men had exhausted their provisions. He began searching for signs of Indian activity hoping to barter for some food for his men.
By the July 23 he located a band of Creeks and secured food from the tribe. He spent the next day managing the jerking of beef and visiting with friendly Indians.
On July 25, while the force was fording the wagons and supplies at a river crossing, one of the men of Company H was accidentally shot to death when a rifle leaning against a tree fell over and discharged. The ball struck the soldier in the back and he died within fifteen minutes. Boone’s men car
ried flintlock weapons that were prone to accidental discharge. The primitive design of the flintlocks, their frequent and often careless handling and the men’s habit of keeping the pans charged in Indian Territory, increased the likelihood of accidents.
As Boone neared Fort Gibson he was again running out of provisions. He sent a small detachment under Lieutenant Anderson and Lieutenant Johnston ahead to search for supplies. The group became lost along the Blue River, and Anderson went on ahead when the group ran out of provisions, leaving Johnston, five men and one wagon behind. He found nothing until he reached Fort Holmes, some forty-five miles away.
The exhausted force trudged though a constant drizzling rain, finally reaching Fort Gibson on July 31. The expedition had lasted sixty days and lost only two men and a third seriously injured. They had had no serious clashes with hostile Indians. At times when the expedition could have become life threatening, Boone’s cool and competent leadership kept it disciplined and orderly.
Boon had produced a thorough and expert journal on the trip. The document not only provides an excellent description of the terrain and environment of the plains but also illustrates an insightful and accurately portrays dragoon life in the 1840s. General Taylor praised Boone’s journal as “a source of valuable and curious information.”
Boone retired from the army as a lieutenant colonel at the age of seventy-one in 1852. He returned to his home in Missouri with his wife, Olive. During his retirement he was a valuable source for historians about the later years of his famous father. Nathan Boone died in 1857, 102 years after the marriage of his parents.
Chapter 9
Fiasco of the Battalion of Invincibles
The Warfield-Snively Texas Invasion of the Santa Fe Trail – 1843
Phillip St. George Cooke
The early 1840s were trying times for the Texas Republic. Not ten years old, the government was weak, the treasury nearly bankrupt, the citizens oppressed by murderous Indian raids, and the entire Republic fearful of another Mexican invasion. The Republic’s second president, Mirabeau Lamar, boldly attempted to address many of the problems. He tried to mount a campaign to expel all Indians from Texas. He aggressively sought credit from European nations with ruinous results. Most foolhardy of all his schemes was an ill-conceived expedition to expand the boundaries of the Republic into New Mexico in 1841. His 321-man invasion force lost its way, its horses, was captured, and the Texas Republic was humiliated. When Lamar was defeated by the return of Sam Houston to office, in late 1841, he left a bankrupt government and a citizenry thoroughly inflamed with a racist and aggressive thirst for revenge toward Mexico.
With only a handful of ragged and underpaid Texas Rangers to protect the border, Mexican troops began to mount raids across the Rio Grande, attempting to reinforce claims to all lands south of the Nueces River. General Adrian Woll led a Mexican attack on San Antonio, seized the city and kidnapped a number of prominent citizens. A Texas retaliatory force was overwhelmed and destroyed. Houston knew that he could not tolerate aggression from Mexico but was just as certain of the Republic’s weak position and precarious financial circumstances.
In July 1842, Colonel William A. Christy of New Orleans wrote a letter to Houston that outlined a valiant if irrational plan. Charles Alexander Warfield, the youthful, intelligent and well-educated son of a successful New Orleans merchant, proposed to form and lead an expedition of 500 to at least 1000 volunteers to overthrow the provincial governments of New Mexico and Chihuahua. He offered to lead this expedition at no cost to the Republic and split all booty from raids. All he asked in return was appropriate authorization to conduct the expedition under the banner of Texas and the promise of secrecy until the attack could be commenced.
Houston accepted the scheme on the conditions that it would be “civilized and honorable warfare.” Although criticized as a foolish decision by many historians, Houston’s authorization makes some sense. There was no actual cost and the potential of some reward to the cash-starved Republic. Any kind of pressure exerted upon Santa Fe by potentially hostile forces, might force a wider deployment of Mexican troops and reduce aggression against the southern border. An aggressive Republic might intimidate Mexican President Santa Anna just enough to make him draw back from the border for a few months until Texas was stronger. Although Houston agreed to allow Warfield the support of the Texas Republic, he was probably influenced by Colonel Christy’s strong personal endorsement. It should also be noted that Houston’s original venture into Texas was made under similar circumstances with secret support and promises from Andrew Jackson. Warfield’s invasion of New Mexico scheme with Texas support was not significantly different from Houston’s original subversive plot for Texas with Jackson’s support.
Little is known of Charles Alexander Warfield. He was known as a man of “excellent character.” He had spent ten years exploring the Rocky Mountains and was associated with the Taos, New Mexico, Americans including the likes of Kit Carson, Dick Wootton, Bill Williams and the Bent brothers. He is known to have had commercial interests with the Santa Fe Trail trade and was in Missouri with enough frequency that he was often referred to as a Missourian. The Indians referred to him as White Plume because of a habit of wearing a white feather in his hat. He was everything that Houston had been in his own youth; well educated, knowledgeable of the wilderness, possessing an attractive personality, politically connected, daring and ambitious.
Colonel Warfield did not have much luck recruiting men in Texas where he thought he could raise a force of at least three hundred. After a fruitless swing through Arkansas, he went to St. Louis. Newspapers of the period report that he offered the promises of office and rewards from the Texas government and carried blank commissions in Texas military service, the source of his rank. It was hardly the “secret” action proposed to Houston. Word of his activities spread throughout the Southwest within weeks. Immediate preparations were made to counter any Texas offensive by the Mexicans and the United States issued orders for troops to intercept any force on American soil.
From St. Louis Warfield went west to Independence and Westport Landing. John and David McDaniel, brothers from Liberty, were attracted to Warfield’s plan. John had spent some time in Texas serving in the militia. He also had a reputation for banditry and was said to have been involved in several killings. Whatever the case, he was able to gain a captaincy from Warfield with the promise of raising a force.
Warfield left Westport, October 30, 1842, with a single companion, mountain man Tim Goodale. He was bound for the Rockies to recruit mountain men. It is believed that he had assembled a force of no more than fifty or sixty men from all his other efforts. The plan was for McDaniel to bring his unit to Small Point of Rocks on the Arkansas River (just west of present-day Dodge City, Kansas) and combine the force in May. He also expected a substantial force from Texas to join them at the same location. Warfield intended to assemble at least five hundred men to raid Mexican merchants traveling east to purchase goods, relieve them of their gold and then advance into New Mexico to overthrow the government. Such an action did not sound implausible to the racist and naïve majority of the population. Houston defeated Santa Anna’s finest army and saved Texas at San Jacinto, with only six hundred.
Warfield and Goodale spent the winter recruiting men in the southern Rockies. All volunteers were to assemble in March at the mouth of the Purgatory River, near Bent’s Fort. Unfortunately, only twenty-four put in an appearance. Colonel Warfield was not overwhelmed by the turnout but he proceeded with the plan. After initial organization activities, he sent a force of ten on a scouting mission into New Mexico. With only fifteen men, he started for his rendezvous at Small Point of Rocks.
McDaniel did not show up and neither was there any sign of the Texas force. After waiting several days, Warfield led his tiny army toward the Rabbit Ears in northwestern New Mexico, to link up with his scouts. It was obvious that his grand conquest of New Mexico was not going to be. Still, he had a commission from the Repub
lic and whatever loot he could steal from New Mexico was perfectly legal as a military operation. He also had twenty-five tough mountain trappers who would not take kindly to such a venture without some form of remunerative action.
As Warfield approached the village of Mora on a branch of the trail, he surprised a Mexican troop. Warfield’s men attacked the force, killed five and sent the remainder into a scattered retreat. Warfield ordered his men to fall back to the main trail to the east. He was in no position to meet a determined assault from military forces. At Wagon Mound, he was attacked by Mexican cavalry and lost all his horses. His ragged little band was forced to walk two hundred miles north to Bent’s Fort. His disbanded his army at the fort and headed east, alone, down the mountain branch of the Santa Fe Trail.
As he neared Small Point of Rocks, he ran into scouts from a force of Texans under the command of Colonel Jacob Snively. The band immodestly referred to themselves as the Battalion of Invincibles. They were encamped not far from the original rendezvous point. Many historians argue that the Snively expedition was not related to Warfield’s plan. Snively and Warfield had never met before. Warfield immediately joined Snively without attempting to take command. The argument is that Warfield would have not taken that position had Snively’s force been the one he was expecting. Another line of reasoning creates a more plausible scenario.
Do not forget Houston’s influence and intervention upon the entire strategy. Warfield had tried to recruit men in Texas and failed. Why would he have been so certain that a Texas force would arrive if not for the promise of support? Could it be just a coincidence that Snively’s force, numbering close to what Warfield expected, assembled in the same general location, with similar general orders, at nearly the same time, with an identical plan of raiding and overthrowing New Mexico? Why would Snively give up a command he had assembled, to a man who had utterly failed to either successfully form large ranks of his own or lead them to any kind of victory? Would an intelligent man such as Warfield reasonably expect men, who had been recruited by another of equal rank, to follow him at that point? His Missouri force never arrived and his Rocky Mountain brigade was limping home after a two hundred-mile foot retreat. Elected commands of such volunteer forces usually went to whoever had the largest number of men or the greatest resources. At that time Warfield had neither resources nor men. It seems doubtful that Warfield had any choice other than join up and provide what intelligence he could from his own experiences.
Heroes of the Santa Fe Trail Page 8
