99 who were antsy about the course: Barrow testified that year at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing: “My concern is that we may not be able to retain our capability [for amphibious assault] until the arrival of the new aircraft that has been proposed.” Hearing on Department of Defense Authorization of Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1983, Senate Commmittee on Armed Services, Ninety-eighth Congress, First Session, Feb. 25, 1982, p. 1095. White told the House Armed Services Committee a couple of weeks later that the Marines were “planning to procure an off-the-shelf helicopter” as insurance “until this new program, the JVX, becomes a reality.” Hearing on Department of Defense Authorizations of Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1983, House Committee on Armed Services, Procurement and Military Nuclear Systems Subcommittee, March 9, 1982, p. 402.
100 For a fitness report, Balch once: Magnus provided the author copies of his fitness reports from the period.
101 After the program was announced: Atkins, Lehman, interviews. Atkins recalled the dialogue.
102 JVX program office invited representatives from twenty-five companies: “Services Favor Tilt Rotor For Vertical Lift Aircraft,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, July 5, 1982.
102 The three service secretaries had finally signed an agreement: 4 June 1982 Memorandum of Understanding on the Joint Service Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft Development Program (JVX).
102 Fitch would tell a Senate committee: Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee hearings on Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1984, Ninety-eighth Congress, First Session, July 28, 1983, p. 283.
103 The Army, though, which had started out: Lt. Col (ret.) Bob Hodes, USA, Amoretta Hoeber, Col. (ret.) Matthew Kambrod, USA, James Ambrose (by e-mail), interviews.
105 The XV-15 weighed about 10,000 pounds: Maisel et al., History of the XV-15, p. 131, as well as Cannon, Erhart, interviews.
105 The tiltrotor the services wanted: Joint Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft (JVX) Joint Services Operational Requirement (JSOR), Dec. 14, 1982 (hereafter 1982 JSOR).
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107 he quickly lived up to his introduction: Rotating Wing Aircraft Meeting Proceedings, p. 11.
110 A couple of years before the JVX came along: Spivey, Rodney, Wernicke, interviews.
111 Atkins had favored the bigger machine: Atkins, interview.
111 He was utterly absorbed: Kenneth G. Wernicke, Gaffey, interviews.
111 When he saw them, he hit the ceiling: Kenneth G. Wernicke, interview.
113 the tip of the closest rotor would have to clear: 1982 JSOR, p. 6.
113 envisioned a tiltrotor weighing about 20,000–25,000 pounds empty: Magee, interview.
113 requirements for “survivability” that far outstripped: 1982 JSOR, Magnus, Magee, interviews.
113 Navair set an upper limit of 31,886 pounds: Ross Clark, interview. V-22 Osprey Specification Change Notice No. 280, provided to the author by Clark, cites the 31,866 pounds figure as a requirement in Naval Air Systems Command document SD-572–1, the engineering specifications for the Osprey.
114 Most helicopters have disk loading: “Outlook/Specification: Rotary-Wing Aircraft,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, Jan. 16, 2006, p 89.
114 Thanks to its small rotor diameter and heavy weight: Descriptions of the design process and analysis of the relative advantages and disadvantages of the JVX design come from author interviews with Kenneth G. Wernicke, Bill Peck, Allen Schoen, Stanley Martin, Jr., Derek Hart, David Woodley, Robert Lynn, Troy Gaffey, and other engineers who took part in the project.
126 observed a 1989 master’s thesis: Danny Roy Smith, “The Influence of Contract Type in Program Execution/V-22 Osprey: A Case Study,” Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Calif., December 1989, p. 34.
128 Grina didn’t want “that junk on my airplane”: William Rumberger, interview.
129 The flex ring was 300 pounds lighter and cost: Osprey Fax, A Bell-Boeing Team Publication, vol. 2, no. 10, Sept. 23, 1991.
129 One of the most stinging arguments with Navair: Schoen, Mike J. Dubberly, Martin, Hart, interviews. The quote from Grina was recollected by Hart.
130 “Honeycomb with you guys is like a fungus”: Dubberly, interview.
130 refused to meet or talk with him anymore: Hart, interview.
130 One day Dubberly’s boss came to him: Dubberly, interview.
131 “Get your ass down here”: Hart, Dubberly, interviews. Hart recollected the quote. Dubberly didn’t dispute it.
132 structure cost about $1,000 a pound: Ben R. Rich and Leo Janos, Skunk Works (Boston: Little, Brown, 1994), p. 64.
132 Composites were supposed to make the JVX: Schoen, Hart, Clark, Kenneth G. Wernicke, interviews.
132 Three or four out of every ten frames and formers: Hart, interview.
134 ‘Screw those guys’: Kenneth G. Wernicke, interview.
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136 Bell’s suggestions were: Spivey work diaries.
138 Ambrose announced he was pulling the Army out: James R. Ambrose, Memorandum for Director of the Army Staff, Subject: Army Withdrawal from JVX Program, 13 May 1983, Department of the Army, Office of the Under Secretary.
139 The July hearing was held: Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee hearings on Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1984, Ninety-eighth Congress, First Session, July 28, 1983, p. 283.
139 Chu’s staff had done some back-of-the-envelope: David S. C. Chu, interview.
140 Magnus had armed the general: Magnus, interview.
140 Marsh preferred to deal with policy: John O. Marsh, Jr., interview.
141 The DRB met: Defense Resources Board attendance record Sept. 19, 1983, and JVX briefing slides prepared by Magnus, provided to the author by the Office of the Secretary of Defense Historian’s Office.
141 Wickham began the discussion: Kelley, Wickham, interviews. The quotes were recalled by Kelley. Wickham didn’t recall Kelley’s wisecrack but said he and Kelley were good friends and the quip would have been in character for Kelley.
144 Spivey assured reporter Joe Simnacher: Joe Simnacher, “Tilt-rotor aircraft utilizes copter, plane technologies,” Dallas Morning News, May 16, 1983.
145 One of the first projects that caught Mark’s eye: Hans Mark, interview.
146 One of Lehman’s big ideas for the Osprey: Lehman, interview.
147 Bell-Boeing’s teaming agreement: Bell Helicopter Textron Inc.–Boeing Vertol Company JVX Teaming Agreement, May 28, 1982, p. 2. Copy provided to the author by a former Boeing official.
147 Bell and Boeing Vertol started negotiating: Dan McCrary, interviews; also, Smith, “Influence of Contract Type,” p. 8.
148 hoping to reason with Lehman: Horner, Mallen, Beverly Dolan, Lehman, Brig. Gen. (ret.) Harry Bendorf, USAF, interviews.
149 it would probably cost at least $100 million more: McCrary, Horner, interviews.
149 The new deal set a target price: Dean G. Sedivy, Bureaucracies at War: The V-22 Osprey Program. Executive Research Project, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C., 1992, p. 47.
150 Lehman soon threw the companies another curve: John Arvin, Lehman, Martin, Schaefer, Barbara Smith, Thomason, Woodley, interviews.
152 Necessary finished his study: Douglas Necessary, interview; “Unusual Rebuttal by Bell-Boeing Challenges House Panel’s V-22 Osprey Report,” Defense News, April 14, 1986, and “Programming a Revolutionary Aircraft: An Interview with Col. Harold W. Blot, USMC, Program Manager for the V-22 Osprey,” Amphibious Warfare Review, Fall/Winter 1986, p. 50.
154 That spring, the Corps asked the Center: The paper was among eighty studies on the V-22 Osprey done by the Center for Naval Analyses between 1983 and 2006, according to a list provided to the author by a CNA official. A more senior CNA official declined by e-mail to release this and other studies to the author, explaining that they were “infor
mal documents” and thus “not available for further dissemination outside of CNA.”
157 Blot showed them what he meant: Blot, Cannon, Erhart, interviews.
159 Blot went to Ridley Park one day: Blot, Philip Dunford, interviews.
159 In June 1986, Lehman announced: Navy Secretary John Lehman, letter to Senator Barry Goldwater, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, June 17, 1986.
159 By November, Bell and Boeing had selected: “V-22 Review Will Focus on Coast, ASW Mission,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, Nov. 17, 1986, p. 23.
159 Bell got the Federal Aviation Administration: “Civil Tiltrotor Missions and Applications: A Research Study,” Summary Final Report, (NASA CR 177452), Contract NAS2–12393, July 1987.
160 The FAA and the U.S. Department of Transportation: “VTOL Intercity Feasibility Study, June 1987, for The Port Authority of NY & NJ,” by Hoyle, Tanner & Associates, Inc., in association with J.A Nammack Associates, Inc., William E. Broadwater. John Zugschwert provided the author a copy of the executive summary of the report.
160 On November 18, two House subcommittees: Joint Hearing before the Subcommittee on Transportation, Aviation and Materials of the Committee on Science, Space and Technology, and the Subcommittee on Aviation of the Committee on Public Works and Transportation, U.S. House of Representatives, One Hundredth Congress, First Session, Nov. 18, 1987.
160 the Osprey section of the shop floor at Ridley Park: Jim Curren, interview.
160 A few months later, the Army: Naval Air Systems Command Chronology of V-22 Airframe Program (hereafter Navair Chronology).
161 The fuselage wasn’t really complete: Curren, Hart et al., interviews.
162 They hired Hollywood producers: Bob Torgerson, Spivey, interviews; Bell Helicopter video of the event.
164 In a September 1988 interview: “U.S. Pursues Sales of V-22 to Foreign Military Services,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, Sept. 12, 1988.
164 overrun their $1.8 billion FSD contract badly: McCrary, Horner, Spivey, Webb Joiner, William Anders, interviews.
166 The aircraft’s total weight was 39,450 pounds: The weight was cited in the “Mondo Cucina Accords.” Other details of the first flight come from author interviews with Cannon, Dunford, Spivey, and others who were present.
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169 he had been a $10,000-a-month consultant: The figure comes from Tower’s Jan. 19, 1989, Financial Disclosure Report to the Office of Government Ethics. A summary of his consulting work included in the record of his confirmation hearings listed, among other things he did for Textron, “Briefed senior management on defense and commercial future for V-22. Attended V-22 roll-out.”
170 Weyrich himself had seen Tower: 1989 CQ Almanac, p. 404.
170 Four days later, President Bush: 1989 CQ Almanac, p. 410.
170 Cheney thought the balance of power: Christopher Jehn, interview. Other former Cheney aides agreed with Jehn’s assessment.
171 Bush agreed to take an additional $10 billion: 1989 CQ Almanac, p. 427.
171 When the budget deal was announced: Spivey, interview. Bendorf was unable to recall the conversation.
172 His parents had derived “S.C.” from Chinese characters: Chu, interview. The quotation from the Analects of Confucius can be found on the website of Brooklyn College at http://academic.brooklyn.cuny.edu/core9/phalsall/texts/analects.html
176 Cheney had known he would face resistance: Hearings on National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1990—H.R. 2461, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, One Hundred First Congress, First Session, April 25, 1989, p. 1.
177 Three days after Cheney testified: Letter to Commander, Naval Air Systems Command, from R.C. Broadhurst, Senior Manager, V-22 Contracts Bell-Boeing Team, April 28, 1989. Copy provided to the author by Curt Weldon.
177 the companies didn’t want to pour: McCrary, Robert C. Broadhurst, interviews.
178 Cheney signaled his first week in office: Lee Ewing and Charlie Schill, “Cheney Criticizes Gen. Welch for contacts with Hill,” Air Force Times, April 3, 1989.
179 First Gray called the Osprey: Hearings on Amended Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, One Hundred First Congress, First Session, May 4, 1989, p. 173.
179 A week after Gray’s testimony: “The Civil Tiltrotor: Is It Economically Viable?,” Rotor & Wing International, August 1989, p. 34; Carl H. Lavin, “Copter-Plane Called a Cure for Crowded Airports,” New York Times, May 15, 1989, p. A12.
179 A few days later, Blot was confronted: Blot, Glosson, interviews.
180 Within days, Blot got orders: Blot, Lt. Gen. (ret.) Chuck Pitman, interviews.
182 “We are not going to build an airplane”: “European Firms Agree to Joint Bell-Boeing in Marketing V-22,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, June 19, 1989, p. 37.
183 When the Armed Services Committee took up: Weldon, Pete Rose, Parker Miller, Larry Smith, interviews; 1989 CQ Almanac, p. 433.
184 If the next defense budget included: “Bell, Boeing Push V-22 Flight Test Program,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, Oct. 16, 1989, p. 38.
184 Cheney and his aides recognized: Sean O’Keefe, interview.
184 A week later, Cheney showed them: Kathryn Jones, “V-22 backers seek to restore funding,” Dallas Morning News, Dec. 6, 1989.
185 Weldon already had organized an Osprey team: Weldon, Rose, Parker Miller, Nancy Lifset, interviews. Weldon provided the author a copy of his “V-22 Action Plan,” which outlined the tasks assigned to members of his strategy group.
186 A few months later, Bell delivered one: Weldon, Maj. (ret.) Fred Lash, interviews. Weldon provided the author a copy of the “Dear Colleague” letter. Lash showed the author the poster.
188 The XV-15 had been sitting on the parking lot: Erhart, Spivey, Horner, Weldon, Lionel Collins, David Traynham, interviews. Erhart described the XV-15’s flight.
189 “This is the most significant contribution”: Bell Helicopter Textron video.
189 The Los Angeles Times described how: Healy, Melissa. “Warplane Survives Attacks,” The Los Angeles Times, Nov. 29, 1990.
190 Even General Gray, the commandant: “Washington Roundup,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, May 8, 1989, p. 15.
191 In his memo, IDA analyst L. Dean Simmons: IDA System Evaluation Division, Interoffice Memorandum, 20 August 1989, from Dr. L. Dean Simmons to members of the V-22 study group. Curt Weldon provided the author a copy of the Simmons memo, including the Sikorsky white paper.
192 The Osprey camp was ecstatic: IDA Report R-371, Assessment of Alternatives for the V-22 Assault Aircraft Program (U), Executive Overview, June 1990. Curt Weldon provided a declassified copy to the author.
192 Chu told the subcommittee: Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate, One Hundred First Congress, Second Session, Special Hearing, July 19, 1990, p. 41.
193 Commandant Gray had derided the idea: Nicole Weisensee, States News Service, Subject: Osprey, Feb. 21, 1990.
193 Schaefer had instructions from Cheney’s office: Schaefer, interview.
195 On December 4, a Marine Corps test pilot: “Shipboard Tests Confirm V-22’s Operating Capability,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, Jan. 14, 1991, p. 36; Schaefer, interview.
196 Schaefer was ready: Schaefer, interview.
196 Five seconds into the flight: Grady Wilson, Lynn Freisner, Schaefer, interviews; Bell Helicopter video; 2 March 1992 Judge Advocate General Manual Report, Aircraft Mishap Involving V-22 Osprey Aircraft Number Five That Occurred on 11 Jun 91 at Boeing Helicopter Flight Test Facility, Greater Wilmington DE Airport, (hereafter Aircraft Five Crash Report).
199 “The point of the prototypes”: Kelvyn Anderson and Lyn A. E. McCafferty, “V-22 just off grounding: Osprey tests were in ‘safety stand down’ last week due to problems,” Delaware County Daily Times, June 12, 1991.
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200 Bell Helicopter test pilot Ron Erhart: Erhart, Wilson, interviews.
201 The Navy Department’s investigators didn’t blame: Aircraft Five Crash Report; Wilson, Freisner, Clark, Tom Macdonald, Donald Byrne, interviews.
203 At Weldon’s urging, the United Auto Workers: Weldon, Geren, interviews.
203 Two years later, now sure: “Outgoing Marine Commandant Makes Strong Pitch for V-22,” Aerospace Daily, May 20, 1991.
205 pared the fleet to a mere 234: “U.S. Marines Press for Decision on V-22 Tiltrotor,” Defense News, Sept. 9, 1991.
205 One day that autumn: Col. (ret.) Parker Miller, Weldon, interviews.
205 Shortly after General Carl E. Mundy, Jr., succeeded: Schaefer, interview.
205 In February, after Cheney: Michael D. Towle, “The Osprey’s fate is still up in the air,” Fort Worth Star-Telegram, Feb. 17, 1991.
206 The wing stow mechanism: The description of the Osprey’s shortcomings as of 1992 come from interviews with engineers and program officials at the time as well as the following documents: Naval Air Test Center Technical Report No. RW-21R-91, MV-22 Aircraft Navy Development Test DT-IIB, 16 July 1991; Memorandum for the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition), From: Gerald Cann, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition), Subject: V-22 Osprey; “Review of the V-22 Aircraft Program,” Feb. 28, 1992; and Audit Report, Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense, June 14, 1994.
206 The only way to get the Osprey ready: Schaefer, interview.
207 Miller drafted legislation: Parker Miller, interview.
207 As Miller and Howell sat: Parker Miller, Weldon, interviews.
207 The final bill included $790 million: Letter from Defense Secretary Dick Cheney to Bob Michel, Republican Leader, House of Representatives, July 2, 1992.
208 O’Keefe sent a letter to the House and Senate: Letter from Sean O’Keefe, Comptroller, Department of Defense, to Thomas S. Foley, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Jan. 26, 1992.
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