Two days later, on 12 August, UNHCR met in Baghdad with Ali al-Yasseri, Director of Operations from the Prime Minister’s office and head of the so-called ‘Ashraf Committee’. He told the UN team that following the attack on Ashraf, the Iraqi authorities had discovered rockets and rocket launchers in the camp, proving the PMOI were intending to launch terrorist operations. The fact that the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior, the Governorate of Diyala Province and the US military and intelligence services had repeatedly searched the camp and discovered no weapons of any kind, exposed the absurdity of this claim. In April 2009, teams of the Iraqi Ministry of Interior with police dogs spent three days searching all parts of Ashraf and officially confirmed that they had found no weapons. Nevertheless, UNHCR decided to keep the ludicrous allegations about weapons being discovered in Ashraf secret and their apparent acceptance of al-Yasseri’s absurd claims perhaps helped to explain their reluctance later to offer tangible help to the residents of Ashraf. Al-Yasseri later told Tahar Boumedra that the MEK had shot their own people during the attack of 28 and 29 July, to try to discredit the Iraqi forces.
Despite all the lies, excuses and propaganda, UNAMI found the Iraqi forces entirely responsible for the deaths, injuries and looting during the attack. Tahar Boumedra and his UNAMI team conducted interviews with some of the US military observers who had witnessed and filmed the entire massacre. Unable to intervene because of the US agreement with the government of Iraq over the withdrawal of American troops, they had to watch helplessly from the sidelines. They confirmed UNAMI’s conclusion that the Iraqis were entirely responsible for the brutal assault and they even promised to provide a copy of their film if it wasn’t classified. This film was, in fact, never handed over, presumably in case it upset the Iraqis; the Americans were still determined to back Maliki and to assure the world that, after all the horrendous costs of the Iraq campaign to the West in blood and treasure they had left behind a ‘functioning democracy’.
It was shocking for me to watch a film by Fox News, showing a group of wounded Ashraf residents during the 28-29 July attack, asking American soldiers for help, but the soldiers, who had instructions from their high command, just ignoring them. This was a callous and scandalous attack made worse by the fact that we had predicted it was going to happen. We had urged the Americans to retain responsibility for the protection of the residents, warning that this duty must not to be handed over to the Iraqis.
I had written letters about this to the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, to Barack Obama and to the then UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown. My pleas fell on deaf ears. No one was prepared to lift a finger. The PMOI were still on the US terrorist list, so there was a reluctance to do anything in Washington, and the FCO in Whitehall was still smarting from their humiliation at the hands of the courts, having been forced to remove the PMOI from the UK and EU terror lists. Ban Ki-moon was fully focused on the bloody insurgency in Iraq and refused to be diverted by what he surely regarded as a minor incident at Ashraf. The signals from the West were being received and understood in Baghdad and Tehran. The message from the West was clear: Do what you like to the PMOI – the West won’t interfere.
UNAMI, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and Baroness Ashton, the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs, lodged strong objections with the Iraqi government and called for a full independent inquiry. Tahar Boumedra advised the Iraqi government that they should identify those responsible for the attack and hold them to account. Later he was shown a document drawn up by al-Yasseri from the Prime Minister’s Office, which consisted of photos of a table on which were displayed hand grenades, pistols and knives, and an adjoining caption claiming that these were weapons discovered in Ashraf, proving that the PMOI was a terrorist organisation and had mounted a lethal assault on the Iraqi forces. Boumedra advised them not to circulate the document because it was so palpably amateurish and absurd as to be laughable. But as far as the UN and the West were concerned, the matter was now closed; it was already history and the calls for an independent investigation would not be repeated. The Iraqis literally had got away with murder!
PMOI supporters around the world now began hunger strikes in solidarity with the 36 residents detained following the massacre at Ashraf. 136 of the residents of Ashraf had also gone on hunger strike in sympathy. I addressed large protests outside the UN headquarters in Geneva and outside the European Parliament in Brussels. The judge in the Iraqi city of Khalis, where these 36 were detained, had issued three orders for their release, but the office of the Prime Minister blocked it and they were taken to different prisons in Baghdad, although they were each in a terrible physical condition. Finally, on 7 October 2009, the 36 hostages were released thanks to international pressure, but some of them were on their last legs.
Tahar Boumedra went to Ashraf to witness the return of the detainees. Two buses arrived at the gates of Ashraf surrounded by a heavy Iraqi military escort. The 36 had been dangerously weakened by 72 days of hunger strike, and none were able to stand up independently. Nevertheless, Colonel al-Saadi, who had masterminded the original massacre, was determined to prolong their agony. He insisted on the PMOI leadership in Ashraf signing a legal document stating effectively that the 36 were under a form of house arrest and would report instantly to the nearest police station whenever required to do so. This was completely outside the court’s release orders and Tahar Boumedra and representatives from the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) argued that it was illegal.
Meanwhile, with midday temperatures soaring, the 36 were made to suffer inside the buses, with no air conditioning and no water. Finally, in exasperation and to save their colleagues from further suffering, the PMOI leadership signed. But this did not satisfy al-Saadi, who demanded that Tahar Boumedra sign on behalf of UNAMI and that the Red Cross should also sign. Both argued that the document would have to be rewritten to indicate that they were only signing as ‘observers’ to the agreement and more time passed as al-Saadi sent the document away for revision. Finally, with all of the signatures appended, Boumedra was permitted to board the buses.
He said later that when the doors were opened the stench of putrefaction made him reel. Long-term hunger strikes cause the human body to start consuming itself and this quickly leads to organ failure. The 36 hostages were in a state of near-death. They had to be carried off the buses on stretchers and many had to be rehydrated with saline drips. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Geneva quickly put out a press release thanking the Iraqi Government for the release of the 36 detainees and more or less congratulating itself on a successful outcome. There was no mention of the unlawful killings, the wounding of hundreds and the looting. This horror was quickly filed away, and together with the July massacre was never mentioned again in case it jeopardised relations with the government of Nouri al-Maliki. Indeed, the congratulatory tone of the UN press release almost amounted to a stamp of approval for Maliki’s brutal assault. The craven cowardice of the West apparently knew no bounds.
16
Interviews with PMOI Refugees Camp Liberty, August 2014
The Medical Siege of Camp Ashraf
Mahtab Madanchi
‘My name is Mahtab Madanchi. In 2010 I was diagnosed with rheumatoid arthritis. This disease affected my hands, legs, neck and shoulders in such a way that within a time span of two months it left me completely paralysed, unable to accomplish the simplest tasks. I was bedridden for three months; meanwhile my legs and right arm became deformed leaving me unable to perform even the simplest chores.
Given that the outbreak of my disease coincided with the inhuman medical siege imposed on Camp Ashraf by the Maliki government, it took over a month to be able to see a physician, upon which I was told that the disease had reached an irreversible stage and the physicians could only put me on cortisone therapy.
I tried going to the Iraqi clinic with the hope of being sent to a specialist, but the officers from the Ministry of Information kept postponing my
visits. When we were in Ashraf they used to send the patients to Baqubah hospital. They were unable to treat me in Baqubah and the only hospitals which carried the specific medication that I needed, Remicade, were in Baghdad. For over a year Maliki’s agents stopped me from going to a hospital in Baghdad. Finally, after a year’s delay and while I was suffering from excruciating daily pains, I was allowed to go to Baghdad. Needless to say, while I was in Baghdad the officers from the Ministry of Information, who accompanied us, intimidated and cajoled the physicians to make sure that we didn’t receive the proper care we required.
After a month of delays I was sent to a Baghdad hospital to see my attending physician who had insisted I had to be administered Remicade without any delay. Upon arriving at the hospital the officers from the Ministry of Information forced us to return to Camp Liberty without even seeing the doctor.’
17
Ashraf Ultimatum
The UN Special Representative of the Secretary General in Iraq in 2009 was former Dutch Minister and Labour Party Leader Ad Melkert. He was sympathetic to the plight of the Ashraf refugees and conscious of the awkward position of UNAMI and UNHCR in being forced to cooperate with Nouri al-Maliki, despite the fact that he had repeatedly violated the core principles of international law and the UN Charter in his actions against the Ashraf residents. Melkert came to the European Parliament in Brussels in late 2009, and I co-chaired a hearing of the Foreign Affairs Committee with Elmar Brok MEP, where we asked him to outline his proposals for the future of Ashraf.
Melkert stated that we needed to identify a key person in the Iraqi government who could be trusted as a serious envoy. Up until now, people like al-Yasseri from the Prime Minister’s office had proved to be unreliable, untrustworthy and unable to take decisions without reference to al-Maliki himself. ‘Once we identify a trustworthy interlocutor,’ Melkert suggested, ‘we can assure the Iraqis that of course they have complete sovereignty over Camp Ashraf, but with that sovereignty comes responsibility for the wellbeing of the 3,400 residents, and that the UN will work hand in hand to ensure their safety in association with the Iraqi Government.’ However, Melkert stated that this was only the essential first step and that he needed assurances from both the US and EU Member States that they would re-settle these refugees to get them out of Iraq as quickly as possible. Time was of the essence, he stressed, or further violence was likely.
Melkert returned to Baghdad and he and Boumedra met with Nouri al-Maliki’s Chief of Staff, Dr Tarik Abdullah. Abdullah made it clear from the outset of the meeting that Maliki wanted no special treatment for the Ashraf residents, as he regarded them as having no legal status in Iraq. He emphasized that they were considered a foreign terrorist organisation, not only by Iraq, but also by the US and many other countries, and their continued presence in Iraq created ongoing problems with neighbouring Iran. Notwithstanding all of these issues, Dr Abdullah said that he was prepared to allow a permanent UNAMI presence in Camp Ashraf so long as UNAMI remained neutral in that position. ‘Those who are not with us are against us,’ Abdullah said. He also agreed that the Iraqi government would cooperate with the re-settlement of the 3,400 residents to the US, EU and other countries, although he reserved the right to exercise Iraq’s sovereignty over Ashraf and to temporarily relocate the 3,400 residents to another camp. This should be done before the elections scheduled for April 2010, a terrifyingly short timescale.
This news set the alarm bells ringing. I arranged an urgent meeting with Baroness Ashton, the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs, to urge her to encourage the 27 Member States to take their share of the Ashraf refugees. ‘If they take 125 each, we will solve the problem overnight,’ I said. In Baghdad, Ad Melkert called together ambassadors from six EU countries as well as the ambassadors from the US, Japan and Australia. He told them that this was a priority issue that required extreme urgency.
As expected, Nouri al-Maliki now issued an ultimatum. Camp Ashraf was to be closed by 31 December 2009. The timescale was impossible. A letter dated 15 November to the protocol section of the European Parliament underscored the decision: ‘The Iraqi Government is left with no choice but to evacuate the camp based on principles of sovereignty, and transfer its residents to other camps in Iraq.’ The letter went on to explain that the Iraqi government regarded the Ashraf men and women as terrorists and claimed that they had no status or protection under the Geneva Conventions or international humanitarian law.
This ultimatum from the Iraqis was tantamount to sending the residents to their deaths, and an obvious prelude to a massacre devised by the neighbouring Iranian regime. Camp Ashraf’s residents were in fact all protected persons under the Geneva Convention. But since early 2009, when the US handed over the security of the Camp to the Iraqi government, Ashraf had been under a suffocating siege. Maliki had done everything possible to provoke a response from the West. Clearly he and his puppet-masters in Tehran were once again testing the international water. If the West displayed its usual pusillanimous response to these provocations, then an all-out assault on Ashraf was inevitable.
On 19 October 2009 al-Yasseri brought a team to Camp Ashraf to meet the PMOI leadership and inform them of the Prime Minister’s ultimatum that they had to get out of the camp. He said that buses would be brought to the camp on 15 December, and the 3,400 residents would be relocated to al-Muthanna province. The PMOI spokesmen, led by Mehdi Baraei, said that they were now regarded with outright hostility in both Iran and Iraq, and that therefore their only option for leaving Ashraf was for them to be relocated to countries of safety outside Iraq. He said that failing this solution, they would refuse to leave Ashraf.
As threatened by al-Yasseri, a convoy of buses duly arrived at Ashraf on 15 December, and the Iraqi army roared up and down the camp’s streets in military vehicles using loudspeakers to blare out orders for the residents to board the buses. They had brought a large contingent of journalists to witness the entire evacuation of the camp. Of course not a single one of the residents agreed to leave. In fact many spoke to the journalists, telling them that they refused to move. Finally, after several fruitless hours, the buses left empty. This humiliating defeat by the Ashrafis caused a predictable reaction by Maliki. He now ordered punitive action against the camp’s residents to soften them up and force them to leave.
Iraqi troops now guarded Ashraf and all visitors were immediately banned. Trucks filled with fuel, foodstuffs, chlorine for water purification and other basic necessities were routinely stopped at the gates and turned back. The Iraqi government had banned the Ashrafis from purchasing fuel in Iraq, so all fuel supplies had to come by road from Kuwait, at huge cost. On one occasion the drivers of two fuel trucks were arrested and held in a local jail for 20 days until released by a judge. Medical supplies were also turned away. The Ashraf workshops were no longer able to sell their goods to the local Arab population of Diyala Province, cutting off all sources of essential income. Lacking fuel to keep their generators working and rationing their dwindling food supplies, the 3,400 residents were now subjected to extreme psychological torture. Banks of giant loudspeakers began to be erected by Iraqi technicians around the perimeter fences of the camp. Over 300 of these speakers were used to roar endless threats and insults at ear-shattering decibel levels day and night, seven days a week, to torture the residents and destroy any chance of rest.
But the stress didn’t stop there. Ominous and threatening news filtered out from the office of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki that senior Iraqi government officials had drawn up a list of 23 leading ‘terrorists’ from Camp Ashraf whom they intended to arrest, while the remainder would be deported to Iran. They also stated that any Iraqi citizen found to be providing aid to any of the ‘terrorists’ in Camp Ashraf would be prosecuted under Iraq’s anti-terrorist legislation. Seriously ill patients from Ashraf who had previously been allowed to attend hospitals in Baqubah and Baghdad for surgery, to treat life-threatening cancer and heart disease, were now barred from leaving the cam
p. Ten died as a direct result.
The European Parliament adopted a strong resolution on Ashraf on 24 April 2009. We had to challenge many amendments from the regime’s apologists in the parliament who tried to turn the text against the PMOI, as instructed by the Iranian embassy in Brussels. I was in charge of coordinating the meeting that prepared the final text for the resolution and we managed to defeat all those amendments in the voting session in plenary, and the resolution became quite an historic document, emphasising the rights of these Iranian dissidents as Protected Persons under the Fourth Geneva Convention and calling for their security and safety.
A year later in the European Parliament I started a written declaration (petition) calling for an end to the siege and the psychological torture of the Ashraf residents, and for their imminent evacuation to countries of safety. More than half of the 752 MEPs signed the petition, which became the official position of the parliament, (adopted on 25 November 2010). I drew attention to the provocative human rights breaches at the camp in repeated letters, articles, press releases and speeches, but to no avail. The EU, UN and US stayed silent and apparently indifferent.
Self-Sacrifice Page 9
