The Indians’ circular movement from the White Bird battlefield was a master stroke, as it left Howard and Perry in the hostiles’ rear, and avoided the danger of running into Major Green’s three companies of cavalry and twenty Bannock scouts en route from Fort Boise. Besides, it gave the chiefs an open road to Looking Glass’s band in the Clearwater Mountains. Thus, although the attack on Randall’s party had cost the Nez Perces the lives of nine warriors—according to the volunteer testimony—these unschooled Indians had, for nearly a month, succeeded in outwitting West Point’s skilled tacticians without losing an engagement—part of the time by playing hide-and-seek with them!
Yellow Wolf credits the two greatest warriors in the Nez Perces’ fighting forces, Five Wounds (Pahkatos Owyeen) and Rainbow (Wahchumyus), as counseling the trick of turning back by recrossing the Salmon so as to elude the soldiers. They planned this strategic maneuver, he states, “while in Lahmotta [White Bird] camp.”23 Rainbow and Five Wounds had joined the hostiles here upon their return from a buffalo hunt in Montana the day after the White Bird battle.
The Indians admitted only two casualties—one killed and one wounded—in the Randall fight, not nine as claimed by the volunteers.24
But this cheap victory for the red men would soon prove their undoing on the Clearwater because of their overconfidence.
14
The Battle of the Clearwater
News of the Indian victories spread throughout the Northwest. There were, at the time, about twelve thousand Indians residing in that part of eastern Washington and northern Idaho now called the Inland Empire.1 However, only a score of treaty Nez Perces and a few Coeur d’Alenes threw in their lot with the warring bands. The majority of those who favored war against the whites decided to await further developments before they started a general uprising. Others who were unfriendly to the Americans preferred to let the hostiles do the fighting. If they should meet Howard in pitched battle and score a decisive victory, the number of malcontents probably would swell to thousands. Such a victory might even precipitate outbreaks among all tribes in the Columbia River Basin.
The warring chiefs were not concerned with the plans of other tribes, their first interest being to effect the coalition of their forces with those of Looking Glass. This they accomplished after leaving Craig Mountain and Cottonwood ranch by retreating rapidly toward the northeast until they reached their ally’s camp a few miles from Grangeville. Together the hostiles encamped near the mouth of Cottonwood Creek where it debouched into the South Fork of the Clearwater River. The foothills and prairies in that region provided excellent forage for the tired ponies and the large herds of cattle, while the streams offered good fishing. To the east rose the Bitterroot Mountains, on the timbered slopes of which numerous deer, elk, cougar, and bear could be hunted.
Knowing Howard’s troops to be several days behind, the Nez Perces rested, repaired their camp equipment, grazed their thousands of animals, and hunted for game. Small parties raided nearby farms of reservation Indians and settlers, stealing cattle and horses.
In the meantime, having learned from two friendly Nez Perce scouts that the hostiles had cut him off from his supply base at Fort Lapwai and were devastating the countryside, General Howard ordered the troops to retrace their line of march through the Salmon River Mountains. But after their departure from Brown’s ranch at the head of Sink Creek on July 3, fog, rain, and snow added to the difficulties of the march. It required two days (July 3 and 4) to haul the heavy artillery guns and supplies up steep and muddy ridges. Several mules, unable to gain a footing in the mud on precipitous hills, slipped over the edge and crashed to their deaths in the canyon two thousand feet below. On the way the troops found and destroyed several caches of the Indians’ provisions at Canoe Encampment, about eight miles below Pittsburg Landing on Snake River. They recrossed the Salmon at Billy’s Crossing.
Cold and drenched to the skin, the cavalrymen suffered from exposure, as they were without bedding or food until noon of the following day (July 4) when the supply train caught up with them. With their clothes steaming from the rays of the sun, the cavalry pushed on to White Bird Canyon, leaving Captain Miles’s infantry to follow later. Upon their arrival at the battleground, the troops found that the heavy rainfall of the past few days had washed away many of the grave mounds, leaving the corpses exposed. The cavalrymen paused to rebury their dead comrades and then resumed the march toward Craig Mountain.2
Howard’s column made rapid progress across the rolling prairie where the wide trail left by the Indians plainly showed their line of retreat from Cottonwood. The general by forced marches reached Grangeville the night of July 9. He replenished his stores of food and ammunition from the supplies which the Cottonwood defenders had saved in that skirmish. Here Perry’s and Whipple’s cavalry reenforced his command, and Miles’s infantry arrived later that night.
During the interim the volunteer companies under command of Edward McConville, James Cearley, who had been elected captain in Randall’s place, and Hunter were in the field again engaged in scouting duty for Howard’s regulars. The citizens discovered the main camp of the Nez Perces on the night of July 9, and learned from a friendly Indian of Kamiah that the red forces could muster 313 warriors. They were having a war dance and powwow. Being on the same side of the river as the Indians, the volunteers at once entrenched themselves in rifle pits on top of a hill about a mile from the Clearwater. A brief skirmish followed. McConville sent a message to Howard informing him of the discovery of the hostiles and requesting him to aid the citizens.
The next night the volunteers, still holding their position, were again attacked, but the Indians withdrew at daybreak after capturing forty-three head of the citizens’ horses. The civilians were ten miles from Howard, who was on the opposite side of the Clearwater River.3
Later in the day a band of thirty Nez Perces attempted to cut off a small party of Mount Idaho volunteers, led by Major George Shearer, who were coming to McConville’s assistance. But twenty men commanded by Captain Cearley and Lieutenant Wilmot, acting under McConville’s orders, managed to check the Indians and bring in the citizens without losing a man. Howard had sent Shearer’s party to inform McConville that the regulars had crossed the South Fork of the Clearwater at Jackson’s Bridge.
The next day, receiving no reenforcements from Howard, the volunteers left their fortifications and marched on foot to Three Mile Creek, about six miles from Mount Idaho, where they encamped to protect the town against a possible attack.
On the morning of July 11, Howard ordered the command to march on to the Clearwater. Guided by the citizens, Troop E of the First Cavalry under Captain Winters led the column, followed by Perry’s F troop, Whipple’s L troop, and Trimble’s H troop. Captain David Perry commanded the cavalry battalion which preceded four companies of infantry under Captain Evan Miles. Four artillery companies led by Captain (Brevet Colonel) Marcus Miller came next in line with two Gatling guns. Their complement of cannoneers brought up the rear.
The column had proceeded four miles through woods and gullies and along the ridges between the forks of the river, when Trimble’s advance troopers “reported the presence of two Indian herders driving stock over the bluffs down the Clearwater river.”4 The troops took their position on the east side of the South Fork of the Clearwater, while the volunteers were on the west side of the same stream. Thus the Nez Perce camp was between these two forces in a deep ravine near the mouth of Cottonwood Creek. Guided by Lieutenant Fletcher, who had discovered the village at noon, Howard’s command suddenly appeared on the right ridge above the river. They could see the ponies, guarded by herdsmen, grazing in the canyons. The general writes:
Trimble’s troop . . . was sent forward to watch, toward the front and right, while I rode to the bluff at the left, where Fletcher was, and saw plainly the hostiles, who, judging from their motions, had just discovered our approach. By one o’clock a howitzer and two Gatling guns, manned by a detachment under Lieutenant Otis, Fourth Artill
ery, were firing towards the masses of Indians below.5
Howitzer shells bursting over their heads sent the Nez Perces with their herds scurrying up the canyon on both banks of the river and around a bend out of range. But knowing the soldiers had to travel another mile before they could descend from the ridge and make an attack, the Indians, after driving the herds out of danger, crossed the Clearwater and built rock barricades.
Aroused by the thundering reports of the artillery echoing and reechoing from the canyon walls, the chiefs and warriors in the village seized their weapons and dashed out to support the herdsmen.
To reach the next bluff, Howard had to cross a steep, rocky ravine. He ordered the howitzer battery, supported by Winters’ cavalry, to hasten forward and take a position on the ridge. But the troops had to pass for a mile around the head of the canyon, and so they found the warriors dismounted and in position to receive the soldiers when they reached their objective.
Meanwhile a party of mounted Indians had galloped beyond range to strike the left flank of the soldiers’ advancing line. Other warriors opened fire on the right, putting the troops on the defensive and in a perilous situation. Caught between the cross fire, the soldiers desperately held their ground until Major Mason with Burton’s infantry company came from the rear and, deploying to the right, forced back the flankers. More warriors, emerging from two ravines, charged the main line. Winters, with his dismounted cavalry, was able to repulse the assaults on the left. The four hundred soldiers then maneuvered into a line two and a half miles in extent,6 cavalry to the left, infantry and artillery battalions to the right. All pushed forward until they enveloped the bluff and commanded the heights in that vicinity.
Undaunted by the raking fire of the Gatling guns and howitzer, the braves shouted taunts at the soldiers. From an exposed position on the rocky hillside one warrior enacted the motions of a dance, leaping up and down with arms outstretched and swinging his red blanket in defiance. Cheered and goaded by their leaders, whom the soldiers believed to be Joseph and White Bird, the Indians charged to the bayonet points of the troops.
That Joseph inspired his men by his daring courage is attested by Howard’s aide-de-camp, Lieutenant C. E. S. Wood, who recounts:
Joseph, White Bird and Too-hul-hul-suit, all seemed to be in command, but—and as one of Joseph’s band told the writer—Joseph was after this fight called “the war-chief.” He was everywhere along the line; running from point to point, he directed the flanking movements and the charges. It was his long fierce calls which sometimes we heard loudly in front of us, and sometimes faintly resounding from the distant rocks.7
However, recent Indian testimony denies Joseph’s part as war leader. Alokut’s wife declared that the middle-aged Chief Tuhulhutsut led the first charge to meet the soldiers, which Yellow Wolf confirmed. The preeminent warrior, Rainbow, led another group of young braves. Although Five Wounds was said to be the recognized battle leader, McWhorter also states “each of the five separate bands was under its own recognized chief with the exception of the Wallowa, Joseph’s band, which was led by Chief Ollokot [Alokut]. . . . While it is known that Chief Looking Glass joined the patriots early at their camp on the Clearwater, no mention of his taking any part in the battle was made by any of the Nez Perces.”8 But Yellow Bull declared to Curtis that “Joseph was there [at the Clearwater] and fought like anybody else.” Although not one of the main leaders, apparently Joseph did act as a fighting warrior.
The first packtrain to bring up supplies of ammunition and food safely entered Howard’s lines. It had left Kamiah escorted by Captain Rodney’s company several hours after the main force. Then a smaller one appeared on the road nearer the troops than the Indians. Forty or fifty mounted warriors espied it and made a wild charge. In a swift flanking movement they killed two packers and disabled two mules loaded with howitzer ammunition. Harassed by the attackers, the supply train raced forward to Howard’s position, guided by Lieutenant Wilkinson. Trimble’s men dashed from their rifle pits to the rescue of their comrades. Rodney’s artillerymen with Perry’s and Whipple’s cavalry directed their fire to cover the packtrain until it reached the lines. This train, Captain Trimble explains, was
. . . moved to the high ground in the rear of the location where the principal fighting was going on, and Rodney’s and my company forming a line in the rear, the whole position was thus defended.
The other troops of cavalry were, or had been, dismounted, the horses assembled on the plateau on which the train was halted, and the men became engaged beside the infantry in what was now a defensive fight. Assaults were made on the Indian position which was established in the woods on the edge of the bluff, but each one was repulsed by the hostiles, who finally only engaged the troops at long range, although there was some fierce fighting at times and a dozen or more men were killed with a proportion of wounded. . . .
The lines were separated about eight hundred yards and extended about half the circle inclosed, though a defense was maintained around the whole. . . . The cavalry horses and pack animals to the number of about three hundred were collected and held in the center of the circumference, and suffered much from want of water. For thirty hours or more they were thus confined.9
Beyond the Clearwater, five miles in a straight line to the north, was a high, round hill where the volunteers were located. Farther away loomed Craig Mountain, from the slopes of which Cottonwood Canyon traced a crooked course toward the troops to vanish behind their bank of the Clearwater. Steep, high bluffs and numerous side ravines flanked the river’s course. The Indian village, with its pony herd of hundreds in nearby gulches, was across the Clearwater. Some of the canyons near the battlefield contained slopes grown with trees and open bottomland strewn with boulders.
From these hillsides and ravines Indians thrust themselves into view, took quick aim, fired, and then dropped behind the rocks. Lieutenant Wood relates: “. . . their brown naked bodies were seen flying from shelter to shelter. Their yells were incessant as they cheered each other on or signalled a successful shot.” Such tactics as rock entrenchments, and the besieging of superior numbers of troops, were never known before in Indian warfare.
The red men also commanded the only source of water in the vicinity—a spring. Deprived of that precious liquid, the troops suffered from the burning rays of the July sun. As the long hours of the hot afternoon wore on, they became parched with thirst and fought desperately to gain control of the coveted spring.
The Indians made sallies on foot and horseback to attack the flanks of the troops’ position, but were stoutly repulsed. Late in the afternoon Captain Miles’s infantry battalion led a vicious countercharge on the right down into a ravine where Nez Perce sharpshooters were entrenched too close for comfort. Captain Bancroft, Fourth Artillery, and Lieutenants Williams and Farrow, Twenty-first Infantry, were seriously wounded. But the sortie forced the Indians to leave their dead and withdraw from the canyon. Thus the disputed ravine was cleared of all the enemy within close range. Time and again the troops drove snipers from behind the stumps and boulders, only to retreat in their turn before the main body of Indians.
A gap in the army’s lines permitted braves to sneak up the river bluff and enfilade the soldiers. General Howard ordered Captain Miller to hurry his men to that point near the center. While hostile bullets were flying through the air all about him, Miller nonchalantly smoked a shortstem pipe as he executed this movement. He so placed his artillery troops that their backs were toward Company B of the Twenty-first Infantry. In the excitement of battle, Miller’s artillerymen mistook the infantrymen in their rear for Indians. Then occurred one of those episodes in combat which are tragicomic. In a moment Company B and the artillery unit started firing at each other. Fortunately, high grass obscured the aim of each.
The incident is best described by Major (then Lieutenant) H. L. Bailey, one of the participants:
It was while I was back at the center [headquarters] for cartridges and hospital men that his
men [Miller’s] took the men of my company [infantrymen] for Indians, all being in the prone position in rocky grassy ground, and as I was returning the artillery company and the infantry company were bobbing up and down firing at each other at a lively rate.
Lieut. Peter Leary, Fourth Artillery, commissary officer, rushed out with a carbine flourishing in the air, shouting: “Packers to the rescue, packers and scouts to the rescue.” I saw and knew the situation at a glance, as I had seen Captain Miller lead his men out, and I passed Leary, rushing between the two lines, yelling: “Cease firing, you’re firing into your own men.”
The trouble was quickly ended, though at least one poor man (Winters of my company [not Captain Winters]) always believed his dreadful hip wound was by a friendly bullet. This was during the first day of the battle. It was Captain Jocelyn (now Colonel General Staff, and I hope soon the next Brigadier-General) who got General Howard to send Captain Miller out to that vital part of our lines.10
The acute water shortage caused Howard to order Perry’s and Whipple’s dismounted cavalry and Morris’ artillery to countercharge on the left and drive back the Indians who held the spring. On the right Lieutenant Wilkinson led a charge by using the artillery, infantry, and every man of the cavalry, including horse holders, orderlies, and extra-duty men. Lieutenant Fletcher directed the howitzer fire inside the Nez Perces’ rock barricades.
At three-thirty in the afternoon the troops stormed the canyon, while additional charges were being made on the center. Miller’s onslaught gained the ridge in front and captured the ravine near Winters’ position. The Indians gave way before the assault and then counterattacked.
Although unsuccessful in retaking the canyon, Nez Perce snipers still commanded the spring and prevented the soldiers from obtaining more than a meager supply of water during the afternoon and night.
Saga of Chief Joseph Page 18
