A second off-shore company called Oil Field Services, Ltd., based in Bermuda, “supplied manpower and technical assistance to the Syrian oil industry from 1989-1990, with offices in Damascus, Syria.”36
And finally, Medcom Inc. founded by Dr. Fuisz in 1970 “specialized in medical military training throughout the Middle East and North Africa.” Medcom “trained thousands of Arab nationals in professional skills,” mostly in Saudi Arabia.37
Scratch that surface and Dr. Fuisz had been a top CIA operative in Syria and Lebanon in the 1980s, something he admitted proudly. In private conversations, he described how his team in Beirut coordinated the hostage rescue of AP journalist, Terry Anderson; Anglican emissary, Terry Waite et al in Lebanon. It was Dr. Fuisz’s team that located the make-shift prison cells in the back alleys of Beirut, and called in the Delta Force for a daring rescue. Outrageously the rescue got postponed for several months in the original “October Surprise—” until weeks before the 1988 Presidential election of George H. Bush, Sr. Dr. Fuisz never forgave the CIA for using the hostages in Lebanon as trump cards for politicians in Washington.
In the urgent search to locate the hostages’ whereabouts, Dr. Fuisz had become a first-hand protagonist to the events building up to the bombing of Pan Am 103.38
The CIA fought desperately to block his testimony in the Lockerbie Trial. As a compromise, when Dr. Fuisz gave his deposition at the Federal Courthouse in Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. District Judge White sealed his testimony.39 The Lockerbie Defense was barred from revealing any part of his deposition inside the United States. It could only be read overseas.40
Even so, Scottish solicitors were barred from reviewing the deposition in total, because parts of it are double-sealed. What’s more the Court took the unusual step of prohibiting U.S. attorneys who conducted the deposition in Virginia from conveying critical information of what the double-seal contains to their Scottish colleagues. Thus, Scottish solicitors have no idea of the value of Dr. Fuisz’s testimony. Only a Scottish Judge can unlock it and review the entire document.
And they should. Because the double seal contains the names of 11 men who participated in the Lockerbie conspiracy.
Why the cloak and daggers? Because a few weeks after we met in 1994, Dr. Fuisz was declared legally out of reach on national security matters. U.S. District Judge Royce Lamberth issued a definitive court ruling on October 14, 1994 in Washington, DC: “The claims of state secrets privilege asserted by the United States [regarding Dr. Fuisz] shall be and is hereby UPHELD.”41
“Information described in the United States’ ex parte, in camera classified submission shall not be subject to discovery or disclosure by the parties during all proceedings in this action, and shall be excluded from evidence at trial.”
“As the United States deems necessary, U.S. attorneys may attend all depositions and make objections as necessary to protect national security information.”42
“Ex parte in camera” applies to an extraordinary category of evidence beyond the sight of defense counsel, presented only for the Judge’s eyes. The defense attorney is not entitled to know that it exists, and cannot dispute any part of its contents. In the early 1990s before the Patriot Act, this special classification was rarely invoked.
Judge Lamberth’s ruling forever empowered the U.S. government to bar Dr. Fuisz’s testimony on any criminal or civil matter, by invoking the Secrets Act. Only the President of the United States could override the Director of the CIA, in a written memorandum to compel Dr. Fuisz to reveal his knowledge and sources on matters linked to national security, large or small.43 Neither the Secretary of State nor any member of Congress could override that provision. Even if Dr. Fuisz himself desired to contribute to an official inquiry, he would be prohibited from doing so.
That would apply to Lockerbie, to any 9/11 inquiry — and to my own criminal case as an accused “Iraqi Agent.”
Word of Dr. Fuisz’s first-hand knowledge of Pan Am 103—and his strange inability to testify— got reported in Scotland’s Sunday Herald at the height of the Lockerbie Trial, when Scottish families recognized the Crown’s lack of evidence against Libya, and started demanding real answers.
In May, 2000, Scottish journalist, Ian Ferguson asked Dr. Fuisz directly if he worked for the CIA in Syria in the 1980s.44 His response was less than subtle. “That is not an issue I can confirm or deny. I am not allowed to speak about these issues. In fact, I can’t even explain to you why I can’t speak about these issues.’ Fuisz did, however, say that he would not take any action against a newspaper which named him as a CIA agent.”
The verdict was unanimous among my Arab contacts: Dr. Fuisz was a master spy. My own interactions with Dr. Fuisz affirmed his superior intelligence background. So when he commanded that I must compel my Iraqi diplomatic sources to divulge any intelligence of an emerging conspiracy involving airplane hijackings and some sort of aerial strike on the World Trade Center, I took his request very seriously. I had good reason to trust him.
As it happens, there were extraordinary reasons for Dr. Fuisz’s concern. The “chatter” between terrorist cells monitored by the National Security Agency reached unprecedented levels by May 2001, which accelerated until September 11, 2001.45 In mid June, an Al Qaeda video became public, in which Osama bin Laden announced, “Your brothers in Palestine are waiting for you. It’s time to penetrate America and Israel, and hit them where it hurts the most.”46
July turned out to be pivotal for the 9/11 warnings.
On July 10, 2001, CIA Director, George Tenet, was so alarmed by a classified debriefing he received on the terrorist threat from Al Qaeda that he marched straight to the White House. A top CIA analyst suggested a major attack was coming in the next few weeks, but cited no specific date. To his credit, Tenet wasted no time providing that information to Condoleezza Rice in writing. He also brought along one of the CIA officers tracking bin Laden, who gave Rice and others an oral debriefing.47 Former Anti-Terrorism Czar, Richard Clarke strongly endorsed the importance of the report. The CIA officer who gave the briefing said the nation had to “go on a war footing now.”
More remarkably, the Foreign Minister of the Taliban provided a direct warning to Washington that Bin Laden was preparing to launch a huge strike on the United States.48 Prior to 9/11, the Taliban received financial support from the U.S. to destroy Afghanistan’s poppy crop, which supplies 85 percent of the world’s opium and heroin. Their warning should have been treated with utmost seriousness.
Though short on actionable intelligence, U.S. Intelligence was onto the 9/11 plot. Friendly foreign intelligence agencies relayed serious warnings of a late summer, early autumn attack that would utilize airplanes as weapons to attack targets inside the United States. Israel, Jordan and Egypt, all long time collaborators with US intelligence, provided similar warnings of an imminent terrorist strike four weeks prior to 9/11.
On September 7, 2001, French intelligence sent an urgent message, of an imminent attack using airplanes as weapons inside the United States.49
The German press reported that 206 international telephone calls were made from the 9/11 hijackers prior to the attack. The NSA has refused to provide detailed list of the calls, but they were reportedly made to Saudi Arabia and Syria.50
Perhaps the most damning indication of prior knowledge about a major upcoming terrorist strike came out of the State Department’s regular warning system to American citizens traveling overseas.
On Friday, Sept. 7, the State Department issued a worldwide alert— “American citizens may be the target of a terrorist threat from extremist groups with links to [Osama bin Laden’s] al Qaeda organization.” That report cited information gathered in May, 2001 as suggesting an attack was imminent. It warned “individuals in Al Qaeda have not distinguished between official and civilian targets.”51
As a senior intelligence operative with a specialty in Middle Eastern terrorism since the 1980s, Dr. Fuisz enjoyed privileged access to that sort of raw intelligence data.
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What was missing was actionable intelligence to prevent the attack— who were the terrorists, how many, which airport, what airlines, what flight numbers.
Just a name. A number. A fragment. All summer Dr. Fuisz pleaded with me exhaustively to bring him anything at all. He swore that if I could get it, the NSA and CIA would bust overtime to flesh it out, so that we could stop the attack.
By August, that hunt was becoming frenetic. I have physical proof that our team was not the only one ferreting for intelligence the weekend of August 4-5. During a pre-release book tour in Japan, I spoke extensively about our team’s aggressive actions in the critical week after Robert Mueller’s Senate nomination hearing on August 2nd.
When I returned from Japan, I was astounded to discover the original newsprint edition of the Wall Street Journal dated July 30, 2001— pinned on my desk by a rose quartz paper weight next to my computer, so that it would not get thrown away. The faded 10 year old newspaper was addressed to my boss at the consulting job I held during the summer of 2001. That’s where I phoned Dr. Fuisz on the day of Robert Mueller’s nomination hearing.
Weeks before 9/11, somebody had gone to the trouble of tracking down where my phone call to Dr. Fuisz originated. That individual “visited” my office, no doubt seeking any scribbles or papers that I might have left around my desk, which might have provided some clue what our team had discovered about the 9/11 conspiracy so far.
It’s standard practice to grab a newspaper off a desk in situations like that, as an accurate snapshot with the company’s name, address and date. It’s like a “proof of life.”
Yes, it indicates that another intelligence team “picked the locks” to get into the office. There’s a time when that sort of thing is necessary. And this would be it!
The original Wall Street Journal was tucked on my desk too late for inclusion in the first release of Extreme Prejudice. I am revealing it now, because I have been deeply moved by the public’s desire to learn as much of the events before 9/11 as possible.
That Wall Street Journal, dated July 30, 2001, could only have been grabbed the week of Robert Mueller’s nomination hearing. The newspaper would have been tossed out weeks before the 9/11 investigation kicked off. That’s physical proof that other intelligence teams were aggressively hunting for intelligence to block 9/11, like us. And I’m grateful for that. Our team urgently desired as much help as we could get.
This was a race to stop violence against the United States—not a competition. All of us gravely worried about what was coming. Our teams are structured to function independently and overlap, but (most of the time) we’re on the same side, with the same shared goals.
On that note, I take umbrage at the lies invented by Neo-Conservatives on Capitol Hill after 9/11. The Intelligence Community was accustomed to functioning on a superior and pro-active footing. Until Republicans gutted the intelligence community to impose political conformity in the cover ups of 9/11 and Iraq, U.S. Intelligence had rapid fire reflexes, and a reputation for attracting brilliant case officers. These were creative strategists and problem solvers. They were the best and the brightest.
Before 9/11, the Intelligence Community was at the top of its game.
My Iraqi sources just did not have actionable intelligence. On my last trip to New York on August 4, 2001, diplomats threw up their hands. They’d been warned of the consequences for months if something awful happened. Retribution would be swift and severe. None of that changed the hard truth. Iraq had nothing to give us.
In Baghdad’s defense, diplomats protested how the U.S. would demand cooperation, yet take no action to send the FBI. If the CIA thought the conspiracy was real, we had options. Failure to move forward exposed a dysfunction among Washington’s new Republican leadership. Alas, the rest of us had no choice but to work within those limitations.
But categorically, that was not—I repeat not—the CIA’s fault.
At our next face meeting on August 6, 2001, Dr. Fuisz was grim.
Something would have to be done. We needed help.
Locked in the holding cage of the Baltimore Federal Courthouse—an accused “Iraqi Agent—” I recalled with grief and fury what Dr. Fuisz and I hashed out.
Above all, I recalled that on August 6— at the same hour on the same day, down at Crawford Ranch in Texas, President Bush was handed a memo from the CIA outlining the severe threat of a terrorist attack by Osama bin Laden’s network on the United States. I’m told President Bush tossed aside the CIA’s Daily Briefing Memo: “Well now, you’ve covered your ass. Let’s go shoot some golf balls.”
I’m told a video captured the Crawford meeting for posterity. But ten years later I cannot bear to watch it. The laziness and indifference of President Bush and other White House officials, while the rest of us raced to stop 9/11, enrages me to this day.
Former Clinton advisor, Sidney Blumenthal said, “[Richard] Clarke urgently tried to draw the attention of the Bush administration to the threat of Al-Qaeda. They do not want it to be known what happened on August 6, 2001. It was on that day that George W. Bush received his last, and one of the few, briefings on terrorism. He told (Clarke) that he didn’t want to be briefed on this again, even though Clarke was panicked about the alarms he was hearing, regarding potential attacks. Bush was blithe, indifferent, ultimately irresponsible... The public has a right to know what happened on August 6, what Bush did, what Condi Rice did, what all the rest of them did, and what Richard Clarke’s memos and statements were.”
Unaware that President Bush had just blown off the CIA’s explicit warnings, Dr. Fuisz and I decided the best way forward would be to request emergency assistance from the Justice Department.
It was the week of August 6 – 10. The September 11 strike was a month away. There was plenty of time to block the attack.
At the instructions of Dr. Fuisz, I telephoned the private office of U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft, consisting of about 20 senior staff members. Quickly I identified myself as the chief U.S. Asset covering Libya and Iraq at the United Nations on anti-terrorism. That way I could make sure the bureaucrat on the other end of the phone would appreciate my special access to high level intelligence as a primary source, which should be weighed carefully before disregarding my call.
Once I had the staffer’s attention, I made a formal request for Attorney General Ashcroft’s office to “broadcast an emergency alert throughout all agencies of the Justice Department, seeking any fragment of intelligence pertaining to possible airplane hijackings or airplane bombings.” I explained that we believed “a major attack on the United States was imminent, with a high probability of mass casualties.” And we believed “the target would be the World Trade Center, which would suffer some sort of aerial strike.” I provided as many specific detail as I could to help focus the investigation.
Given the dangers and timing of the attack, I asked that “our request for emergency cooperation should be given the highest priority.”
Attorney General Ashcroft’s staff advised me to contact the Office of Counter-Terrorism at the Justice Department immediately, and repeat what I had just told them.
I did so without delay. I repeated the warning in full detail, and requested that any possible information should be submitted immediately.
Locked in that holding cage in the Baltimore Federal Courthouse, the memory of it was cold and harsh. I seethed with fury.
I shouted for the bailiffs, so I could yell at them, too. I was hopping mad!
But I already knew. Our 9/11 warning to the Justice Department was not something Republican leaders wanted American voters to learn about— not with the 2004 Presidential Campaign in play—nor the 2008 Campaign, for that matter.
Oh yes, I would be gagged through two presidential elections.
With those calls to the Attorney General’s private staff and the Office of Counter-Terrorism, the U.S. government lost its cover of deniability. If I testified before the 9/11 Commission or any congressional inquiry—the
Justice Department would have been forced to admit that some of its own top staff received formal warning about 9/11, along with urgent requests for assistance, when there was still time to coordinate a response, and thwart the demolition of the Towers.
I didn’t stop there. Most Americans would be stunned to know that in mid-August, 2001, our team was so convinced that a 9/11 style attack was “imminent,” that I took further proactive measures, visiting my second cousin, Andy Card, Chief of Staff to President Bush, to request his intervention at the Justice Department, too.
I parked on the street outside his house in Arlington, Virginia, and waited in my car, chain smoking for almost two hours. (I quit in 2005.) Occasionally, I could see neighbors peering out of their windows and frowning at me. In my head, I rehearsed what I would tell Virginia police or the Secret Service, if they showed up to investigate this strange car parked outside the home of the Chief of Staff to the President of the United States.
Unhappily, Andy did not return that afternoon. I finally left without sharing our fears.
Driving away, I distinctly recall asking myself if I might be making the greatest mistake of my life. Throughout all these years, it is one of my few regrets.
Oh I see. You prefer the official, sanitized story that nobody in U.S. Intelligence had a clue about the 9/11 conspiracy.
Is that really more comforting? Let’s see, the greatest intelligence community in the world, with vast technological superiority, was “incompetent” to anticipate 9/11? That’s what you think?
Sorry to disappoint you. It doesn’t make sense. And it’s not true.
We knew that a conspiracy was in play. The CIA knew. The Justice Department knew. The Office of Counter-Terrorism knew.
I know that for a fact—because I told them. (And they told me.)
I was arrested to stop me from telling you.
Symbol Susan, indeed!
What I could not know, unhappily, is that another intelligence faction was also working aggressively opposite us.—
EXTREME PREJUDICE: The Terrifying Story of the Patriot Act and the Cover Ups of 9/11 and Iraq Page 5
