Our affair was incredibly romantic. And ever so slightly dangerous.
Now four years had passed since my friend got ordered back to Baghdad. It was November 28, 2001, and I was visiting the embassy for a meeting with other diplomats.
When I looked up, I saw my old lover, larger than life, standing in the doorway watching me, a haunted smile on his face.
My heart stopped for a moment. Then I jumped up from the couch in mid-conversation with another diplomat.
I grabbed him and kissed him without any thought for the reaction. There was a gasp around us, I recall, and a few shocked expressions. And some embarrassed laughter.
As it turned out, Mr. A——was traveling as part of an Iraqi Delegation to New York after 9/11. And he was carrying a message from Iraq’s top Leadership.
A message for me.
A decision to resolve all outstanding obstacles to peace had been reached in Baghdad. The haggling was over. At this meeting on November 28, 2001,185 my friend was authorized to communicate Iraq’s acceptance of all parts of the CIA’s demands.
Strikingly, Saddam chose my old lover to courier the message.
The substance of the agreement was relayed to Andy Card and Dr. Fuisz in a letter dated December 2, 2001.186 It made our peace framework official, final and complete:
Most notably, as of the November 28, 2001 in New York, Iraq agreed to resume weapons inspections “with no conditions—” the operative phrase sought by the CIA.187 That committed Baghdad to the most rigorous standards of compliance demanded by the United States, with maximum transparency and swift access to all sites, including the rights to interview scientists outside the presence of Iraqi authorities.
When I heard this, I cheered out loud and threw up my arms in a “V” for victory. We had worked so hard for those three little words—“with no conditions.” It appeared so simple. Yet it meant so much. It required that Iraq would not equivocate in its commitment to the inspections. Iraq would accept what had to be done, without complaint.
That meant everything.
Secondly, once more Iraq authorized an FBI, Scotland Yard or Interpol Task Force to operate inside Baghdad, with full rights to conduct terrorist investigations, interview witnesses and make arrests. The FBI would have authority to review all documents and financial records, proving a Middle Eastern link to the 1993 World Trade Center attack and the Oklahoma City bombing.188
In a further show of good faith, Iraq granted the FBI immediate authorization to interview Mr. Al-Anai, the Iraqi diplomat from Prague who allegedly met with Mohammad Atta, the alleged mastermind of 9/11 in April or May, 2001.
My Iraqi friend, Mr. A— assured me that he had personally interviewed Al Anai, who denied that such a meeting ever occurred. Mr. A— extrapolated that Al Anai was a secular leaning Muslim, who would not have sympathized with Islamic radicalism in any regard. He drank. He smoked. He chased women. However, the Iraqi Embassy agreed that FBI agents would have permission to speak with Al Anai one on one, and hear it for themselves.189
That was significant. Earlier that very day, November 28, 2001, future Republican Presidential hopeful John McCain had demanded that Iraq come clean on this alleged meeting in Prague. On ABC’s Nightline, McCain issued a fierce demand for Iraq’s cooperation with the 9/11 investigation, with special rights for law enforcement to interview Mr. Al Anai.190 Two weeks later, on December 9, 2001, Vice President Cheney repeated the accusation on “Meet the Press.”191
It was a done deal before Vice President Cheney opened his mouth. Baghdad agreed to the FBI interview on the very same day that Senator McCain issued the first demand.
White House Chief of Staff Andy Card was notified of Iraq’s agreement to that effect by December 2, 2001—one week before Vice President Cheney added his voice to the outcry.192 From the sidelines, it appeared Cheney was grand-standing to maximize the impact when America was informed that Iraq had capitulated to Republican leaders. But Republicans knew they’d already scored.
Stunningly, despite all of that posturing by top Republican brass, no action was taken on Iraq’s offer. The demand to interview Al Anai was another false flag—part of the cynicism with which politicians in Washington began to manipulate the emotional tragedy of 9/11 for their own political advantage.
Likewise, Washington refused to accept Baghdad’s treasure cache of financial documents on early Al Qaeda. Instead the Justice Department seized bank accounts of legitimate Islamic charities engaged in community building— feeding widows and orphans, financing hospitals and schools— which offset the hopelessness and despair that foments into alienation and violence.
Seizing those charity funds does not— I repeat, does not— interrupt the flow of finances circulating through terrorist pipelines. Any politician in Washington who goes on CNN or FOX News Channel to claim otherwise has just proved he’s a fool!
As the Asset responsible for securing Iraq’s cooperation, I was appalled by the deception— and not for the last time, unfortunately. So much of 9/11 was a circus performance of political grandstanding. It was all showmanship and spectacle. I just didn’t know it yet.
Third on our agenda, and a particularly great victory for the United States, Iraq promised U.S. Oil Corporations would be guaranteed exploration and development contracts on equal par with Russia and France. The United States would not be penalized for supporting U.N. sanctions, or its many acts of military aggression.
Already some first tier oil concessions had been granted to Russia’s LUKoil and French oil corporations. Iraq would not violate its prior commitments. However, effective immediately, the U.S. could bid for 2nd tier and 3rd tier concessions on those projects. And in the future, the U.S. oil would receive lucrative first tier contracts for all exploration and development projects.193 U.S. companies would likewise receive special preference for all oil equipment purchases for production and pipeline construction.
Fourth, another huge win for the CIA—Baghdad agreed that U.S. Corporations could return to Iraq in all economic sectors, and function at the same market share as they enjoyed prior to the 1990 Gulf War. U.S. corporations would suffer no penalties for the decade of cruel U.N. sanctions on Baghdad. “Dual use” production would still be controlled. (Again, given that my CIA handler, Dr. Fuisz testified before Congress about U.S. corporations that supplied weapons to Iraq before the first Gulf War, there was no worry that he would neglect that concern.)194
As an additional show of friendship, Iraq offered U.S corporations preferential reconstruction contracts for Iraq’s hospitals and health care system, including pharmaceutical supplies and medical equipment. U.S. telecommunications corporations would also receive priority contracts. All of it amounted to tens of billions of dollars in long term corporate revenues—jobs and major profits for shareholders.195
During my trip to Baghdad, officials added another tempting carrot to this bundle: Iraq would guarantee the purchase and import of one million American manufactured automobiles every year for 10 years. That would have a secondary benefit of creating market density for U.S. automotive spare parts. The upshot would be thousands of high-paying union jobs in the economically distressed Rust Belt of the American Heartland—Ohio, Michigan and Indiana.
That deal would have saved the U.S. automobile industry. In turn, the domino effect would have saved the Detroit and Michigan economies and housing market. At the very least it would have cushioned other blows.
It would be a lot to gain. And a lot to lose.
Last and finally, Iraq agreed to cease firing on U.S. and British fighter planes patrolling the no-fly zone over northern and southern Iraq for 30 days before any direct talks occurred, or before a comprehensive settlement got implemented. If the U.S. would consent to resolve the outstanding issues, Iraq would demonstrate its good faith with this ceasefire, effective immediately.196
And so it came to pass that on November 28, 2001— fully 16 months before the Invasion— Iraq agreed to the full scope of demands put forth by the CIA.
Every possible U.S. objective would be protected, once sanctions got lifted.
I was elated. We had accomplished something momentous for the 9/11 investigation and for peace in the Middle East overall. I expected our team to be supremely praised by the White House, bipartisan members of Congress and the Intelligence Community. America’s leaders had defined the objectives, after all. Our team met the challenge to fulfill them. It was a stunning victory.
Our success was reported to Andy Card in a letter dated December 2, 2001, and copied to Dr. Fuisz.
Given the ramifications of the Peace Framework, it would have been extraordinary not to tell the White House. Indeed, why would I have done so much work without reporting it? What would be the point? My actions depended on communication to the CIA, in order to validate our progress. Moreover, my handlers swore numerous times the Intelligence Community would be irresponsible not to pay attention. That’s their job. Denying it would be the ultimate perjury. Anyone standing in front of a Judge, swearing so under oath, would be guilty of obstruction of justice. They could face prison time for that. And believe me, I would demand maximum sentencing.
The end was in sight. But I wasn’t quite finished.
The Christmas Holidays were fast upon us. That would put a hold on action. Still, I expected the White House and CIA to act shortly after the New Year.
Come spring-time, various Congressional offices, Democrats and Republicans alike, confided in private audiences on Capitol Hill that they received intelligence debriefings about the success of our talks.
I was in the home stretch. Leaving nothing to chance, in January and February, 2002, I held marathon sessions with Iraqi diplomats in New York.197
Now our discussions turned to an examination of conflicts in previous inspections. The U.S. claimed certain Iraqi behaviors aggravated perceptions of non-compliance. For the sake of future success, every problem situation from the past was studied and picked apart exhaustively with diplomats.
Iraq had to agree to do everything differently. Diplomats had to clarify specific changes that would be made, point by point. Nothing was left to chance.
Once again, I can prove the meetings occurred, because the Justice Department cited them in my indictment— though most of the dates are wrong.
Surveillance photographs provide irrefutable evidence that the U.S. (and possibly British) intelligence shadowed us in January and February, 2002.198
We met at a small hotel close to the United Nations. Our meetings could not be conducted in an open setting, like a restaurant or bar. Our conversations ran so late into the night that it was impossible to return home to Maryland.
Half an hour after checking in, like clock-work, the noisy elevator would stop at my floor, and a man and woman would get out and enter the room directly next to ours. It happened every time. That reassured me the Intelligence Community was fully alert. Though I could not know which alphabet agency was surveilling us, I was confident the spooks were tracking our meetings closely.
More comically, at the very start, I suspect the U.S. alphabet agencies hoped to confine us to a single room at the hotel. Diplomats and I returned after a few weeks hiatus to find an astonishing sight: The bed was unmade, the blanket tousled exactly as I left it three weeks earlier. A half empty liter of Diet Coke sat on the table, and the trash was still piled with leftovers from our take-out chicken dinner. Maid service had not cleaned that room in three weeks. And nobody else had slept there.
Iraqi diplomats and I took one look at that hotel room and rapidly leapt to the same conclusion. The room had to be loaded with bugs. The spooks must have showed up an hour after I left, because they’d interrupted the cleaning services. They must have quarantined the room, and reserved it exclusively for us. How considerate!
(The Iraqis demanded another room immediately).
Was I paranoid? Perhaps. Candidly, this was the hottest spook party in town. If you wanted to know what Iraq was up to after 9/11, you had to get inside this room—with us— to find out.
The CIA required this to get done right. They had a legitimate responsibility to secure the integrity of the weapons inspections process and everything else—Nothing could be left to chance. If it was going to happen, it had to be done right.
Weapons inspections didn’t just “happen to work.” They were made to succeed because of rigorous planning and 17 months of upfront effort, which made the difference.
Whatever else you think of the CIA—on Iraq, the agency fulfilled its obligations to the highest degree. These men are warriors who built a strong and reliable framework for peace. It was comprehensive and proactive, covering all possible areas of U.S. interests. It was not flimsy; it was not idealistic. It was constructed to be demanding and rock solid.
I categorically deny that I or my fellow Assets engaged in criminal activity. The obvious proof of surveillance photographs199 prove the U.S. side was fully informed by me when and where those meetings would take place. I was not operating alone. After 9/11, nobody suggested I should break off engagement. Later my Defense Intelligence handler, Hoven, told the FBI he spoke with me 50 to 60 times after 9/11.
After those marathon sessions, by mid-February, it was time to hand over Iraq’s agreement to the United Nations. I grabbed it up, and delivered it myself to the Security Council, and a wider circle of Embassies known to deplore the crippling sanctions. My actions are fully substantiated by faxed documents to Ambassadors all over the U.N.200
I am deeply proud to have done so. It’s pointless for my detractors to deny, since the FBI supplied evidence from wire taps to prove it in court.
Most perplexing, Ambassadors and senior diplomats at the United Nations would only act once they saw Iraq was already committed to the weapons inspections agreement. Until preliminary talks guaranteed success, they would take no action to help solve the problem. Except for the courageous leadership of Ambassador Hasmy Agam of Malaysia201—willing to guide and mentor the rising generation of diplomats, whom he assigned to liaison with me—they would not risk any of their own political capital to find a solution. No diplomat would lift a tea finger to make it happen. It had been the same with Lockerbie.
Attitudes changed with lightning speed forty eight hours after receiving my faxes detailing Iraq’s agreement to inspections “with no conditions.” The Security Council declared it was time for direct dialogue with Baghdad. They invited Iraq to send a delegation to New York, March 8-9, 2002 to hammer out technical language for the agreement.202 As long as Iraq agreed to Washington’s rigorous standards of compliance, the United Nations would draft up language pronto.
My work was almost done. There was just one thing left. Then my 18 month project to resume the U.N. weapons inspections would be finished.
I scheduled a trip to Baghdad the first week of March, 2002,203 flying home the first day of talks in New York.
A great deal was at stake. I had a tremendous personal investment in the success of the talks. It would have been disastrous if Baghdad backed off its commitments.
In any event, the CIA understood my travel plans. I categorically deny that I would have traveled anywhere in the Middle East of all places, without making sure the Intelligence Community could find me if I got into trouble. Some particularly dangerous people did not appreciate my efforts.
That’s one time complaints about my paranoia hit the mark dead on.
My trip to Baghdad had a second purpose to explore how far my relationship with my old diplomatic lover, Mr. A— could evolve, if at all.
It struck me as a grand gesture that Saddam chose my lover to courier his message. In the paranoia of the intelligence world, there’s no such thing as “coincidence.” If this particular diplomat showed up in New York, given our past romance, it signified that Saddam was using him for some purpose. The question was what purpose. For sure, nobody trusted Saddam.
There was an element of danger given our past. I could not afford any mistakes. His safety would become my highest priority. Special pre
cautions would be required to protect him.. There was no danger— Yet. I would have to watch out for it.
There was ugliness on my end, too. I have bitter memories begging Dr. Fuisz for payment of the debts I accrued during the Lockerbie talks. It shocks Americans to discover that in those days, Assets only received compensation after completing a project.
Every one of my projects was considered extraordinarily difficult—Lockerbie was judged impossible. Most Assets would give up, because it was so hard. That accounts for why the CIA withheld rewards until a project’s completion.
That doesn’t mean there wasn’t money. Dr. Fuisz received $13 million from emergency “black budget” appropriations for the 9/11 investigation several weeks after the attack. I was visiting his office, when the glorious news arrived in a phone call.
By this time, Congress owed me a tidy fortune for my successful contributions to Lockerbie, the U.S.S. Cole, and assundry Terrorism projects all the way back to the 1993 World Trade Center attack.
As my handler, Dr. Fuisz controlled my access to funding, though notably, he had no direct contact with Iraq or Libya himself. And so immediately I requested part of that money. Payment was not only for my sake, but for my Iraqi friend in Baghdad. He would be risking his life, if Saddam decided he had become overly friendly with the FBI Task Force on Terrorism. On my trip to Baghdad, I wanted to provide the strongest possible incentive to inspire his cooperation. He would have been worth every dollar, if I could persuade him to help.
Knowing about that pot of money—$13 million, folks— I leaned hard on Dr. Fuisz for cash right up to the date of my departure. That’s what Congress intended it for, right?
A third of that money could have achieved all of our goals in Iraq, with ample funding left over, including payment for Dr. Fuisz, Hoven and myself. By comparison, the 9/11 Commission got $11 million for its entire investigation into the attack.
EXTREME PREJUDICE: The Terrifying Story of the Patriot Act and the Cover Ups of 9/11 and Iraq Page 20
