Personally I did not like this plan at all. Above all, I disliked sending any British formations into China. Their administration in a famine-stricken area would be practically impossible, they would arrive in a shocking state and be no advertisement for us, while the men, both British and Indian, would be horribly depressed at the prospect. I urged that, if my corps had to come out, it should do so intact through Kalewa into India. It would then be of some value for the defence of India. I also asked that the 38th Chinese Division should come out that way with us, the remainder of the Chinese armies going via Lashio to China.
I still thought there was a chance that even now we might turn the tables on the Japanese and thus avoid abandoning Burma. I had come to the conference armed with a suggestion, worked out by Davies and myself, to take advantage of the exposed position of the Japanese 33rd Division in Yenangyaung, to attack and destroy it. To do this I hoped to get on loan for a short time another, or, if possible, two more Chinese divisions to join my 38th. With these I proposed to attack Yenangyaung from the north and east, while the 17th Division, at last released from Taungdwingyi, swept up through Magwe and fell on the enemy rear from the south. With the reconstituted 1st Burma Division to hold various ‘stops’, I felt we had a good chance, if we acted quickly, of smashing the 33rd Division. When we had done that, and I calculated it would take a week from the time the attacking divisions reached Yenangyaung, we should be in a position to move over to the Sittang and take the Japanese opposite V and VI Chinese Armies in flank and rear. A little ambitious, I know, but still a chance and, as both Stilwell and I recognized, about our last chance. I found him, as he always was, ready to support an offensive move and prepared to go a long way to help me. He was naturally anxious also to do anything that would prevent any further withdrawal of my corps to the north, as that would expose V Army to flank attack from the Japanese Irrawaddy forces. He promised me the 200th Chinese Division from V Army, and I asked for it at Kyaukpadaung as soon as possible. I had some hopes too of his sending another from Mandalay to follow it, though I could not get this firm. General Alexander gave this transfer of a Chinese division his blessing, but he still refused to sanction the withdrawal of the 17th Division from Taungdwingyi as he felt that to do so would expose the Chinese flank. This, of course, took a good deal of the sting out of our plan, but I felt the main thing was to get the Chinese to Kyaukpadaung. Then we would see what would happen to the 17th Division. I returned to my headquarters at Gwegyo more cheerful than I had been for some time, and Davies got down to preparing our masterpiece—Burma Corps Directive No. 5, which was to put paid to our account with the redoubtable Japanese 33rd Division. Alas, it was never issued!
Events on the Chinese front were moving to a climax. By the 21st April, their VI Army had practically disintegrated. The Japanese, moving swiftly in relatively small columns with motorized infantry, tanks, and armoured cars, had constantly hooked round and cut off the Chinese forces trying to hold main roads on narrow fronts. On that day, the Japanese reached Hopong; the next, the 22nd, they drove the Chinese out of positions to the east of it and towards Loilem on the road to China. Loilem itself was bombed from the air and burnt, while the Chinese again tried to hold astride the road, some eight miles west of it. Another hook, and the Japanese had Loilem, and General Kan, the Chinese Army Commander, with three hundred men, all that was left to him, was a fugitive on the Lashio road. The Chinese 93rd Division had advanced from Kengtung to within twenty miles of Loilem, when it heard the Japanese were in the town. It turned and withdrew. General Kan with his remnant came across country to Kengtung, where he joined what was left of the 49th and 93rd Divisions and the stragglers of the 55th Division. Having collected these, he, and with him the last traces of VI Army, moved into China. Kengtung was then occupied by Siamese forces under Japanese control. The road north to Lashio was open to the enemy.
All unconscious of these disasters, we at Burma Corps were very pleased at the speed with which Stilwell carried out his promise to send us the 200th Chinese Division from the V Army. In spite of difficulties in finding transport, it reached Meiktila, and the leading regiment began to roll in by lorry to Kyaukpadaung. From the look of it I thought the 200th would be nearly as good as the 38th Division. I had come back to our headquarters in the evening of the 20th after spending some time seeing Chinese soldiers debussing, and Davies and I were sitting after dinner putting the finishing touches to our famous Directive No. 5, when a staff officer came in and said ‘Do you know that all the Chinese at Kyaukpadaung are packing up and going back again?’ And they were!
Stilwell, at last having received something approaching accurate information of the VI Army débâcle, had recalled the 200th Division for a desperate attempt to retrieve the situation. Any message he sent saying he was doing so never reached Burma Corps, but with his makeshift staff arrangements and Chinese signals that was not surprising. When the Japanese had driven the VI Army out of Loilem they had also occupied Taunggyi, to the west of it, on the main Loilem-Thazi road. A further advance on Thazi would place the Japanese behind V Army, still about Pyinmana, and would threaten them with the same fate as had befallen VI Army. Collecting the 200th Division and one regiment of the 22nd Division, Stilwell himself led them to the recapture of Taunggyi, which he attacked on the 23rd April and took on the 24th. He was again greatly handicapped by the Chinese reluctance to obey his orders, and it was only by offering the stimulus of a considerable cash reward that vigour in the attack on the town could be assured. Pushing on eastward, the 200th Division drove the enemy out of Hopong on the 25th, killing some five hundred, and occupied Loilem. It was a magnificent achievement and only made possible by Stilwell’s personal leadership with the very front units. Gallant as it was, this could only be a last effort; the disintegration of the Chinese forces had gone too far. VI Army had vanished, now the bulk of V was involved in scattered, confused fighting against small Japanese forces over a wide area. StilweU himself, without staff or signals, had to command local minor engagements until he was needed so badly at his headquarters that he had to return, and the counter-stroke petered out. Left to themselves, the Chinese moved north up the Loilem-Lashio road.
Headquarters of LXVI Army with the 28th Division (less a regiment) and part of the 29th Division were sent to hold the Lashio area. They arrived there between the 26th and 29th April, probed a little south, but, coming in contact with a Japanese column, withdrew again to Lashio. Meanwhile transport and armoured vehicles of V Army, which had also met with disaster as the Japanese turned on it, were pouring through Lashio on the way to China. These would have been invaluable to General Chang, commander of the LXVI Army, trying to organize some resistance to the advancing enemy. However, such was the lack of co-operation and the jealousy of the Chinese commanders, coupled with the failure of higher control, that he could obtain none. Dumps of stores and ammunition in Lashio were now destroyed, though much was left to fall into Japanese hands. On the 29th April, the enemy attacked Lashio and, after what was described as heavy fighting, took it. The Japanese forces engaged amounted to thirty light tanks, a few armoured cars, twelve guns, and only two battalions of lorry-borne infantry. Chang withdrew from Lashio with only three thousand men, fought a couple of small rearguard actions, and made his way out into China. The Japanese pressed on for Bhamo. They rushed the Shweli River bridge, imperfectly guarded by a local Burmese battalion, before it could be demolished and swept on unhindered. They were in Bhamo on the 4th May and Myitkyina on the 8th.
The 200th Division and the regiment of the 22nd Division which Stilwell had led to Taunggyi reached Hsipaw on the Mandalay-Lashio road, and finding Lashio occupied by Japanese went back to Maymyo. They then wandered north again to Mogok, where they found the regiment of the 28th Division left behind when the rest of that formation went to Lashio. The combined party then made its way out to China. The only Chinese troops now left in Burma were the remains of V Army and my 38th Division.
Pressure against V Arm
y had increased while we were holding our conference on the 19th April, and next day the Chinese were forced out of Pyinmana. The 96th Division fell back some twelve miles, but was again bundled off its positions and one of its regiments cut off, surrounded, and dispersed. The 22nd Division, less the regiment that Stilwell had taken to Taunggyi, was holding Pyawbwe behind it, but this division in turn was outflanked on the 25th April and forced to evacuate that night. Its motor transport had already, in a sauve qui peut dash, made Lashio, adding to the confusion of LXVI Army, also trying to reach that area. By this time both the 96th and 22nd Divisions had ceased to be fighting formations and were streaming back in disorganized groups through Thazi towards Mandalay. These divisions, especially the 22nd, had fought well, but the Japanese hooking tactics had been too much for them.
The events of the first three weeks of April had made it necessary to recast Burma Army’s plans, and on the 23rd April a revised directive was issued to Stilwell and me, which was not to be put into force unless the Chinese lost Meiktila. Under this, the 17th Division and what was left of the 1st Burma Division were to stand astride the Chindwin to cover Kalewa; 7 Armoured Brigade with the 38th Chinese Division was to hold from the Mu River to the Irrawaddy; the Chinese V Army, with the 22nd, 28th, and 96th Divisions in and south of Mandalay, was to defend the crossings over the Myitnge River. All other Chinese to the east of the Mandalay-Rangoon railway were to make for Lashio, and reorganize there. It was still the intention that, if the evacuation of Burma became necessary, some British forces, including 7 Armoured Brigade, would accompany the Chinese into China. I was, of course, not in a position fully to assess what would be the political effects of this, but I was more than ever convinced that to send any of our British units in their present state to China would be a grave military and political error.
On the 25th April, General Alexander and I met Stilwell, just returned from the taking of Taunggyi, at Kyaukse, twenty-five miles south of Mandalay. The complete disappearance of the VI Army and the rapidly spreading disintegration of the other two Chinese armies were the dominating facts of a grim situation. There was no longer any chance of staging a counter-offensive; the Japanese were about to seize Lashio and with it would go our hopes of holding Northern Burma. With the Chinese rapidly passing out of the picture, realism demanded that we should now decide to get out of Burma as intact as we could, with as much as we could. Recognizing this, the Army Commander ordered a general withdrawal north of Mandalay, and, as the Chinese were no longer able to protect themselves during such a move, he ordered my corps to extend to its left and act as rearguard to the fugitive Chinese V Army as it made north along the Meiktila-Mandalay road and railway. The retirement was to begin at once; indeed, as far as the Chinese were concerned, it was already in full disorderly swing.
There was no time to be lost if we were to stop the Japanese pouring over the Irrawaddy at Mandalay on the heels of the fleeing Chinese, and 7 Armoured Brigade was ordered at once with all speed to Meiktila. Back once more at Corps Headquarters, Davies and I, instead of our precious, stillborn Directive No. 5, issued orders for:
(i) The 38th Chinese Division to cover Kyaukpadaung.
(ii) The 1st Burma Division (less its 2 Brigade on the west of the Irrawaddy) to complete its reorganization and be ready to move on Taungtha.
(iii) The 17th Division to evacuate Taungdwingyi, move rapidly to the area Mahlaing-Meiktila-Zayetkon, and, with 7 Armoured Brigade, cover the withdrawal of the Chinese V Army.
On the evening of the 25th, tanks of 7 Armoured Brigade interposed east of Meiktila between the Chinese and the pursuing Japanese. They surprised an enemy armoured and mechanized column, shot it up, and dispersed it with considerable loss. The corps, terribly stretched out, was now on the line Seikpyu (on the west bank of the Irrawaddy)–Chauk–Kyaukpadaung–Zayetkon–Meiktila. The 17th Division, having evacuated Taungdwingyi and Natmauk, was firmly established in the Meiktila-Zayetkon area, supporting 7 Armoured Brigade in its thrusts against Japanese columns advancing astride the main road and railway. There were many small parties of fugitive Chinese scattered over the country, and these were passed back and directed on Kyaukse. Several small engagements between our troops and the enemy took place around Meiktila. A typical example was when a detachment of our tanks and infantry caught a small Japanese motorized column infiltrating north and engaged it. The Japanese at once took refuge in one of the numerous villages, scattered over the plain, and our infantry prepared to attack, but were delayed by machine-gunning enemy aircraft. On the disappearance of these the attack was resumed and the village taken. In hand-to-hand fighting, one hundred and fifty Japanese were accounted for and twelve lorries and one gun captured, while we lost two tanks, ten men killed, and some wounded.
As the Chinese were now clear of the Meiktila area, I ordered Cowan to fall back on Wundwin, which he was to hold until 1600 hours on the 27th and then to withdraw through Kyaukse. His 63 Brigade, around Wundwin, was bombed almost continuously throughout that day, while our tanks held off strong Japanese infantry and artillery groups which tried to force their way up the main road. A number of Japanese light tanks appeared but, when engaged by ours, hurriedly withdrew behind the shelter of their own guns. 63 Brigade remained in Wundwin until midnight, 26th/27th April, when it fell back through 48 Brigade, now established in Kyaukse, and occupied positions covering the road and railway bridges over the Myitnge River south of Mandalay. I was extremely pleased at the way the 17th Division and 7 Armoured Brigade were carrying out the difficult rearguard tasks so hurriedly thrust upon them.
Throughout this time, it was very difficult to get any reliable information of the locations of Chinese troops of the V Army. Obviously both the 96th and 22nd Divisions had disintegrated and were making their way back in leaderless parties as best they could. All higher control seemed to have disappeared and neither the Chinese nor American headquarters could give any reliable estimate of the position or when the fugitives would be over the Myitnge River. An occasional Chinese officer appeared fleetingly at Corps or 17th Division Headquarters with appeals, usually for transport, or with requests for information about his own troops. On one occasion a Chinese colonel, whose men were to entrain at one of the stations north of Wundwin to which a few trains had been sent by night, asked for our troops to be posted on and close to the railway station. If this were not done, he feared that the first Chinese troops to arrive would panic, rush the trains, and drive off, leaving the others behind. In answer to his request, a small detachment from the 17th Division was sent back and duly occupied obvious positions on and around the station. Some of General Stilwell’s staff, vainly trying to get order into the retreat, arrived at the station, saw our troops there and jumped to the conclusion, no doubt confirmed by the Chinese, that this was the rearmost portion of the British rearguard. Knowing many Chinese were still well to the south, the harassed Americans reported that the British were beating the Chinese in the race north. Stilwell, infuriated, sent me a message accusing me in emotional terms of having failed to carry out my duty as rearguard. I dare say my nerves were nearly as stretched as his—we were neither of us having a very good time—and I was furious at this injustice to my troops who were at that moment fighting briskly far to the south of his Chinese. I replied with a very astringent refutation of the charge. This was the only time Stilwell and I fell out, but a few days later he sent me a message withdrawing the accusation and coming as near to an apology as I should think he ever got.
On the 28th April, with Lashio about to fall and little or nothing to stop a Japanese dash for Bhamo and even Myitkyina, I received from General Alexander directives for the final withdrawal to India. Recognizing that our hold on the Mandalay-Irrawaddy line could only be temporary, the plan, given in some detail, was:
(i) Two brigades to fall back astride the Chindwin, delaying the enemy as far south as possible.
(ii) A strong detachment to be left in the Myittha Valley which runs north, roughly parallel to, and s
ome thirty miles west of, the Chindwin.
(iii) The remainder of the corps to move via Ye-u on Kalewa, leaving a detachment to cover this route, and to see out of Burma by the Shwegyin track all administrative, civil, and other refugees not escaping by other routes.
(iv) The 38th Chinese Division and possibly other Chinese troops to accompany Burma Corps.
I had pressed hard that the 38th Chinese Division should come with my corps into India. Sun had welcomed the idea, and I was glad to see that General Alexander now intended the division to march out with me. The remainder of the Chinese were, as far as I could judge, already making their way as best they could to China.
It was not easy to arrange this withdrawal while we were closely engaged in a rearguard action, with the Irrawaddy, one of the great rivers of the world, crossed by only one bridge, behind us. Burma Army had directed the corps to cross by the ferries at Sameikkon and west of Mandalay. I was a bit doubtful about these ferries as we had already experienced the difficulty there was in keeping the civilian crews who manned them at work under air attack and the threat of the Japanese advance. I made a hurried reconnaissance with Swift, my Chief Engineer. It was as well we did so. One ferry consisted of nothing at all, another of one dumb barge aground some yards from the bank, and the third of a small craft capable of taking one or two vehicles at a time. I do not doubt Army Headquarters had made preparations, but it was becoming increasingly difficult to hold administrative detachments in place and our prospects of getting three divisions, with the Japanese on their heels and no air cover, over by these ferries did not look too promising. However, Swift and the Chief Engineer of the 1st Burma Division were not easily defeated. The river fleet of the Irrawaddy Flotilla was being sunk in Mandalay. Swift rushed there, seized some of the vessels and brought them downstream to the ferries, barges were pulled off sandbanks, approaches improved, and ferries of a sort provided. We christened the provision of ferries by Burma Army the ‘Blanket’ system of administration, from the old story, ‘And we says to ’im, “Jump, and we’ll ’old the blanket.” And ’e jumped. And there worn’t no blanket!’ Luckily we looked before we leapt.
Defeat Into Victory Page 11
