All the same, the time had now come for the Fourteenth Army to pass from the vigorous offensive-defensive it had been conducting to a full offensive on the Assam front. Although the road would have to be opened within the next five or six weeks, the immediate object of this offensive would be not so much the relief of Imphal—that would be incidental—but the destruction of the Japanese Fifteenth Army. No one could have been more eager to launch this offensive than my two corps commanders.
The problem for Scoones was whether to make this offensive on all sectors of his front simultaneously or to strike first on one and then on another. He would have found it difficult to stage large-scale attacks all round the plain because, not only was he limited in ammunition and I had cut him heavily in petrol to save air-lift, but the amount of animal transport that would be needed in such extensive operations could not be provided. The monsoon was also upon us. When this came, although it would handicap the enemy more than us, it would, as far as we were concerned, halve the rate of movement off the few main roads and make air supply hazardous. Our offensive could, therefore, be on only part of 4 Corps front. Scoones decided, with my full agreement, to launch it against the weakened Japanese 15th Division in the north and north-east, with his 5th and 20th Divisions, while he continued for the moment the wearing-down process on the Palel and Bishenpur fronts, with the 23rd and 17th Divisions. This plan had the advantage that not only did it attack the enemy in his weakest link, but by operating along the Kohima road it helped to reopen our line of communication to Dimapur.
On the Palel sector of 4 Corps front the relief of the 20th by the 23rd Division began on the 13th May and continued, a battalion at a time, until the end of the month. During this time both divisions refrained from major undertakings, although 1 Brigade of 23rd Division continued the clearing of the country east of Palel begun by the 20th Division. The 23rd Division had consolidated its positions, when, from the 16th to the 20th May, the Japanese fiercely attacked the Shenam Pass in the Palel area. Some of our defences were temporarily lost, but counter-attacks regained them all. The enemy resumed his attacks from the 9th to the 12th June and lost heavily, for no appreciable gains. At Shuganu attacks and counter-attacks alternated, and, as a result, the 23rd Division advanced slightly and improved its positions. We had been considerably inconvenienced during the first half of May by the intermittent shelling of the Palel airfield by Japanese medium artillery. The advance of 1 Brigade, which combed the hills for ten miles to the east of Palel, put a stop to this nuisance. It also disposed finally of the Jiffs of the Gandhi Brigade, large numbers of whom, urged by leaflets dropped from the air, hastened to surrender. Minor activity continued throughout the area, but very few Japanese patrols managed to evade our forward troops. One enemy party of an officer and seven other ranks did, however, as late as the night of the 3rd/4th July succeed in reaching Palel airfield. As a farewell gesture they destroyed eight parked aircraft with magnetic mines and Bangalore torpedoes, and escaped unscathed—a very fine effort.
In mid-May, on the Bishenpur sector the 17th Division was fighting hard to hold the Silchar track with 32 Brigade which it had borrowed from the 20th Division; its own 63 Brigade had just captured Potsangbam. It was typical of our 17th and the Japanese 33rd Divisions that at this time each of them was plotting a bold surprise stroke against the other.
The Japanese plan was, by a series of sudden thrusts at night, to pierce deep into the defences of Bishenpur and then to disrupt the 17th Division from within. Cowan’s plan, instead of penetration, was a wide turning movement with one brigade to come in on the Tiddim road behind the 33rd Division and crush it between this brigade and his two brigades in the north. 48 Brigade of the 17th Division had been taken as Corps Reserve and from the 4th to the 8th May had been engaged in cleaning up enemy parties which had infiltrated north-east of Palel. It was thus well placed, when Scoones returned it to Cowan, to begin the turning movement.
On the 15th May, 48 Brigade set out. Moving rapidly across country, two days later it struck the Tiddim–Imphal road at Milestone 33 and dug in. During the 17th the Japanese hurriedly collecting all available troops, including those of the administrative services, twice attacked this road-block with tanks. They failed to dislodge our troops and suffered heavily. A more serious attack was delivered by troops of the 15th Japanese Division on the evening of the 19th, but this too was repulsed. In these attacks the enemy lost several tanks, three of which were captured and blown up, and left three hundred counted bodies in front of our positions, besides many more in the tall elephant grass. In accordance with the plan, 48 Brigade then moved north up the road to Moirang. The village was taken in two days’ fighting and another road-block established. It was now that the other two brigades of the 17th Division should have come south on a wide front and driven the Japanese 33rd Division against 48 Brigade. Unfortunately the Japanese counter-attack had already been delivered, and 32 Brigade by itself failed to make enough progress. 48 Brigade was therefore ordered north and, fighting its way from village to village against considerable opposition, entered Potsangbam on the 30th May and thus rejoined the 17th Division. This turning movement had inflicted many casualties on the enemy at comparatively light cost to itself, but it had failed in its object—the destruction of the Japanese 33rd Division.
The reason for this failure was that on the night of the 20th/21st May the enemy had launched his penetration attacks on our Bishenpur positions. One strong column pierced our defences and attempted to seize a hill only a few hundred yards from 17th Division Headquarters. A small Indian piquet on the hill held out for several hours against fanatical assaults. Cowan stoutly refused to move his headquarters, but was compelled to call on the 20th Division for help, and also to divert troops who should have been co-operating with the 48 Brigade turning movement. Scoones hurriedly organized a small force, about a brigade in strength, under the headquarters of 50 Parachute Brigade, and with this reinforcement the enemy was first pinned down and then surrounded at the foot of the hill. In five days’ hand-to-hand fighting they were almost annihilated, a few only escaping back into the hills to the west. Visiting the site of the battle a little later, I was struck by the way in which several Japanese gun crews had obviously been shot and bayoneted while serving their pieces in the open at point-blank range. While this was going on, another party of the enemy in darkness broke into 63 Brigade area at Bishenpur and entrenched themselves in the mule lines. Our troops surrounded them and, with the help of tanks in several days’ fighting, wiped them out. The slaughter of Japanese, and, unfortunately, of mules also was heavy. Bulldozers had to be employed to bury both.
It was here that some Gurkhas were engaged in collecting Japanese corpses from the corners inaccessible to bulldozers when one Japanese, picked up by a couple of Gurkhas, proved not to be as dead as expected. A Gurkha had drawn his kukri to finish the struggling prisoner when a passing British officer intervened saying, ‘You mustn’t do that, Johnny. Don’t kill him!’ The Gurkha, with his kukri poised, looked at the officer in pained surprise, ‘But, sahib,’ he protested, ‘we can’t bury him alive!’
A third, but minor, Japanese attempt was made in a suicidal attack on our guns just north of Bishenpur. The enemy party was killed to a man. These penetration attacks were remarkable in their boldness and in the desperation with which the enemy fought to the death. They failed in their object—to break through the 17th Division into the Imphal plain—and they lost heavily, but they did prevent us from reaping the results of our turning movement. There can have been few examples in history of a force as reduced, battered, and exhausted as the 33rd Japanese Division delivering such furious assaults, not with die object of extricating itself, but to achieve its original offensive intention.
The order, signed by Major-General Tanaka, on which the 33rd Division launched these forlorn hopes is worthy of reproduction, showing as it does the attitude of the Japanese commanders and the stark way in which they dealt with their troops:
&nb
sp; Now is the time to capture Imphal. Our death-defying infantry group expects certain victory when it penetrates the main fortress of the enemy. The coming battle is the turning point. It will denote the success or failure of the Greater East Asia War. You men have got to be fully in the picture as to what the present position is; regarding death as something lighter than a feather, you must tackle the task of capturing Imphal.
For that reason it must be expected that the division will be almost annihilated. I have confidence in your firm courage and devotion and believe that you will do your duty, but should any delinquencies occur you have got to understand that I shall take the necessary action.
In the front line, rewards and punishments must be given on the spot without delay. A man who does well should have his name sent in at once. On the other hand, a man guilty of any misconduct should be punished at once in accordance with the military code.
Further, in order to keep the honour of his unit bright, a commander may have to use his sword as a weapon of punishment, exceedingly shameful though it is to have to shed the blood of one’s own soldiers on the battlefield.
Fresh troops with unused rifles have now arrived and the time is at hand—the arrow is ready to leave the bow.
The infantry group is in high spirits: afire with valour and dominated by one thought ana one thought only—the duty laid upon them to annihilate the enemy.
On this one battle rests the fate of the Empire.
All officers and men fight courageously!
Whatever one may think of the military wisdom of thus pursuing a hopeless object, there can be no question of the supreme courage and hardihood of the Japanese soldiers who made the attempts. I know of no army that could have equalled them.
To turn now to those sectors of 4 Corps front, to the east and to the north, on which we passed to the offensive. On the Ukhrul road and in the Iril Valley, the 23rd Division had kept up its pressure on the Japanese, and under cover of this, the change-over with the 20th Division from the Palel sector was carried out during the second half of May, and the front taken over by 80 and 100 Brigades. 32 Brigade of the 20th Division was still in the Bishenpur area with the 17th Division. No sooner were the troops of the 20th Division in their new positions covering Kameng and Nungshigum when it was discovered that the Japanese were building up their forces in the Sangshak area, with the obvious intention of launching further attacks astride the Ukhrul road. A considerable concentration of mechanical and animal transport and increased movement was observed on their line of communication right back to the Chindwin. A good deal of sparring for position and heavy patrol activity now began on both sides. As part of the 4 Corps offensive, on 3rd June the 20th Division was ordered to advance with the object of destroying that part of the Japanese 15th Division east of the Iril River and of establishing a brigade group in Ukhrul.
The right wing of the division’s offensive astride the Ukhrul road was at once counter-attacked by two reinforced regiments of the enemy 15th Division. The fight swung backwards and forwards as positions changed hands in local but severe fighting. Indeed at one time the Japanese pressure became so threatening that on the 11th June the 4 Corps reserve of two battalions was moved up. However, on the evening of that day, the 20th Division successfully retaliated, and by the 13th, all lost ground had been regained. During the following week our troops pushed back the enemy still farther and there were definite signs of his resistance cracking on both sides of the Ukhrul road.
Meanwhile the other brigade (80) of 20th Division had on the 7th June struck out north from Nungshigum up the Iril Valley and, in spite of the difficulties of continuous rain, flooded streams, and deep mud that made all movement a desperate labour, had reached a point twenty miles north of Imphal. From there it raided the main east and west lateral communications of the enemy. These raids were most successful and increased the already evident dislocation of the Japanese 15th Division. By the 20th June, 80 Brigade had pushed still farther north and was astride this enemy line of communication. The Japanese 15th Division had suffered heavily. Its supplies were dwindling rapidly, its replenishment routes were cut and now the monsoon made it impossible for the enemy to use other tracks. In this sector the 4 Corps offensive was, at the end of May, going well and with increasing momentum.
On the other northern approach to Imphal, the main Kohima road, we had also made progress. Here the 5th Division, after retaking Kanglatongbi on the 21st May, had pressed north on both sides of the road, aided by a series of short hooks coming in behind the Japanese positions. On the 3rd June 4 Corps orders for intensifying the offensive were received, telling the 5th Division to destroy that part of the Japanese 15th Division west of the Iril River and to open the Kohima road to Karong, some thirty-five miles north of Imphal. Here we must leave the 5th Indian Division preparing in the rain and mud for a further push against the still stubborn but weakening Japanese 15th Division, and move to the other end of the road, to Kohima, where great things had been happening.
After our successes in mid-May and the short pause that followed for reorganization, the Kohima battle entered on its second phase. Although we now had the initiative, our situation was not a particularly good one. We had the town, or rather where the town had been, for the whole area in mud and destruction resembled the Somme in 1916; but the Japanese on the left were still holding the dominating Naga village position and the surrounding hills, while on the right they were along the great Aradura Spur. From both these, they commanded Kohima at close artillery range and, of course, dominated and closed the Imphal road. 4 and 5 Brigades of the 2nd British Division were, therefore, ordered to press on and capture the Japanese positions on both flanks. These were formidable tasks, but it was hoped that, after their defeat on the 13th May, the enemy resistance would be crumbling. These hopes were dashed. The second phase of die battle was to be as hard fought as the first. The capacity of the ordinary Japanese soldier to take punishment and his fanatical will to resist were unimpaired. It was in the enemy higher control that weaknesses were first to appear.
During the five days of reorganization, units had some short periods of rest and 268 Indian Brigade took over part of the forward area. Patrolling and minor attacks by both sides were constant. On the 19th May, 5 Brigade made their find attempt to clear Naga village. After initial success the attack was held up by the usual skilfully concealed Japanese bunkers and by mortar fire from reverse slopes. Casualties were heavy and the attack was called off.
Meanwhile the headquarters of the 7th Indian Division, with its 114 Brigade, had arrived from Arakan and taken its own 33 Brigade and 161 Brigade of the 5th Division, both already in the area, under its command. On the 20th May, the division took over the left sector of the Kohima front, which included Treasury Hill and Naga village. 268 Brigade held Garrison Hill, leaving the main Kohima–Imphal road sector and all to its right to the 2nd Division. 33 Brigade then took up the struggle for Naga village where the 2nd Division had left it. Between the 24th and 30th May an Indian battalion delivered two attacks on the centre of the enemy defences. Twice they occupied them but suffered terribly and were unable to hold on. Medium artillery was then brought up to fifteen hundred yards’ range while a Gurkha battalion infiltrated on to Gun Spur in the enemy’s rear and dug in. At the same time a British battalion skilfully infiltrated in thick mist on to Church Knoll, the highest point in Naga village; the enemy, who still held positions on the reverse slopes, had little fight left in him and did not counter-attack. 33 Brigade was then relieved by 114 Brigade which kept up the pressure until, on the 2nd June, the Japanese gave them best and abandoned Naga village, leaving large numbers of dead in the shattered bunkers and foxholes. Meanwhile 161 Brigade, north of the village, had also made considerable gains against opposition. The northern half of the Japanese position at Kohima was in feet now ours.
On the southern sector, as the enemy outposts fell back before them, the 2nd British Division moved to the attack on the formidable Aradura Ridge. On the 26t
h May, in spite of heavy rain, 6 Brigade reached a point half a mile west of the ridge. The next day 4 and 5 Brigades established themselves on a line running along the front of the northern face of the ridge to mile 48 on the main road, while 6 Brigade continued its climb to the Crest. During the afternoon, 4 and 5 Brigades came under very heavy fire from the reverse slope of Aradura Ridge and were compelled to withdraw to their start line. 6 Brigade under heavy fire had closed up by evening and were digging in south and west of the Crest. The advance up rain-sodden slopes for three thousand feet had been almost as much an ordeal as the enemy fire. Here, owing to the desperate defence of the enemy, his well-sited and concealed positions, and the extreme difficulty of movement on these slippery, steep jungle slopes, a position of stalemate developed.
Defeat Into Victory Page 41
