Gracey, meanwhile, searched for crossing places. He had a couple of weeks in which to do this, as at least that time was needed to build up in 33 Corps area the supplies and equipment that would be required for the Irrawaddy battle. This build-up was not easy. I gave preference in transport and air-lift to 4 Corps, who not only had the more difficult and hazardous operation, but would, I hoped, be the decisive factor. This meant some restriction on the operations of 33 Corps, before the crossings, and a slowing up of its preparations, which were very galling to them, but which were unavoidable if the Pakokku crossing was not to risk discovery. 33 Corps, which up to now had been the favoured child in the Fourteenth Army, found some of these things hard to bear, especially as its troubles were added to by some ominous creaking in the new air transport machine as it got into top gear. However, in spite of several minor crises, the whole forward concentration of the corps, including its tank brigade, and the assembly of the stores and equipment allotted to it for the battle, were completed in time.
The actual 20th Division crossings, covered by several feints, began on the night of the 12th/13th February. There were two—a main one by 100 Brigade just west of Myinmu, and a subsidiary by 32 Brigade about seven miles downstream. Firm ground led down to the water and there was some cover for forming up, but the sites were selected mainly because reconnaissance had shown that there were no Japanese permanently posted to cover them and their patrolling was not frequent. The spot chosen for 32 Brigade crossing was also on the exact boundary between the Japanese 31st and 33rd Divisions as shown by captured maps. Experience had taught us that to attack at such a point was always an advantage, as the Japanese rarely seemed properly to interlock their junction points.
At 0400 hours on the 13th February the leading flight of 100 Brigade, the Border Regiment, pushed off in silence. The night was dark but throughout the evening the wind had freshened and it now proved troublesome to heavily laden and underpowered boats. The river here was fifteen hundred yards wide, but obstructed by partially submerged sandbanks, between which ran strong currents. Several boats grounded and there was difficulty in getting them off. At first there was luckily no opposition, and it was not until some time after the first troops had landed that light and ill-aimed small arms and mortar fire was directed against them. Once the first landing had been made, the rest of the brigade followed rapidly, and by eight o’clock the whole of it was over—an excellent piece of organization. A well-directed and heavy air strike on the Japanese artillery that was likely to cover the crossing places had been put down the previous day, and the enemy guns were in process of moving or taking up new positions at the critical time. A few 75-mm. shell burst on the beach with little effect. The landing could be claimed as a complete surprise and practically unopposed. By dusk on the 13th February, 100 Brigade had established a small bridgehead.
32 Brigade had a longer water crossing and suffered greater difficulties from wind, currents, and sandbanks. The outboard motors were, as usual, unreliable and very difficult and noisy to start. However, here also the crossing was a surprise and by dawn the first battalion, the Northamptons, were over and digging in. All ferrying at both crossings stopped at daylight, but neither bridgehead was seriously attacked through the day. Again the Japanese were slow to recognize main crossings and to collect their troops to attack. Real opposition did not begin until the 15th when Japanese aircraft straffed the beaches, damaging a number of boats but inflicting few casualties. This was followed by a heavy night attack on 100 Brigade, during which the Japanese landed by boats behind our men and used flame throwers. The attack was repulsed and, pushing on, our troops extended their bridgehead until it was over three miles long by half a mile deep.
Fighting now became fiercer as each enemy reinforcement arrived, to be thrown in, as usual, piecemeal. By the 15th February, in spite of pressure, our bridgehead was six miles by two, so that on the 16th we were able to start ferrying by day and our build-up rapidly increased. There followed a series of suicide attacks, mainly on 100 Brigade, by waves of Japanese infantry supported by tanks, but the two bridgeheads had now joined up and they held firm. The enemy losses were heavy; five of their attacks were in daylight, and on several occasions our aircraft caught them as they assembled for the assault. Rocket-firing Hurricanes proved our most successful anti-tank weapon, and their best day was the 20th February, when they knocked out thirteen medium tanks. The fiercest fighting with the heaviest casualties on both sides occurred between the 21st and 26th February. When the Japanese counter-attacks were finally thrown back and they recoiled exhausted, on one sector of our defences five hundred enemy corpses were buried by bulldozers and on another over two hundred. The commander of the Japanese 33rd Division, Tanaka, said later that during this period two of his battalions delivered an attack with a strength of twelve hundred men, only to lose nine hundred and fifty-three. By the 27th February, fighting strongly, the 20th Division had expanded its holding to eight miles by two and a half in depth. Some of the hardest fighting of the campaign had taken place in this narrow bridgehead.
While these events were happening on 33 Corps front, 4 Corps, to the west of the Chindwin, had been collecting and driving south towards the Irrawaddy at Pakokku. When on the 10th January the Lushai Brigade captured Gangaw, the 7th Indian Division, leading the secret 4 Corps advance, was stretched out over three hundred and fifty miles of road from there to Kohima. By the 18th practically the whole division was collected in the Kan area, one hundred and sixty miles from its objective, Pakokku. Messervy, the corps commander, and Evans, the divisional commander, appreciated the need for speed, as I had given the 15th February as the last date acceptable for the crossing. They feared that even small Japanese rearguards on the difficult main track through the hills could cause fatal delay, and so they planned the advance on a wide front to outflank enemy holding the track. Ahead, as advanced guard, was to go 28 East African Brigade to conceal the arrival of other troops in the area; behind them would follow at a respectful distance one brigade (114) and the headquarters of the 7th Division. 89 Brigade, all on pack transport, was to push out by jungle tracks on the left flank and then swing in on the main route again at Pauk, only forty miles from Pakokku. It was hoped that this would cut off the Japanese rearguards facing the East Africans, or would at least make them withdraw. Out to the left towards the Chindwin, 4 Corps sent the Lushai Scouts and Chin Hills Battalion to guard the flank of the marching columns, and farther still on the west bank of the river itself a Punjabi battalion formed a link with 33 Corps now approaching Monywa on the other bank. On the right of the 7th Division the Falam Scouts moved through the hills to cover that flank. One brigade (33) was to remain at Gangaw, and ferry forward later as transport became available.
This advance, which began on the 19th January, went well. The Japanese rearguards astride the main track, which were small and obviously under orders only to delay, relied largely on obstructions and mines. In one stretch of three miles through the hills they felled across the path several hundred trees. With the help of the ‘Quads’, gun-towing vehicles of the field artillery, and ten elephants, the divisional engineers cleared this in one day. Half way through the march a Japanese force counter-attacked the Falam Scouts out on the right and drove them in towards the column. For the moment there was some alarm, but an Indian battalion, hurriedly sent out, stiffened the Scouts and held off the enemy, who proved to be not in great strength. 89 Brigade carried out its hook without meeting any opposition until on the 28th January it seized Pauk, and had a skirmish to gain the high ground across the main track fifteen miles farther on, overlooking the Irrawaddy Valley. Here 4 Corps got its first distant view of its objective.
At Pauk the 7th Division took over the lead. 114 Brigade passed through 89 Brigade on the 3rd February to attack Pakokku, the approaches to which were known to be strongly defended on the west bank. The East African Brigade was sent south to make a feint at crossing opposite Chauk, forty miles downstream from Pakokku, and 33
Brigade was brought forward to Pauk. The march had been a trying one. When I saw the troops at Pauk their jungle green uniforms and their faces were red from the dust, and the jungle itself on each side of the track was red too, every leaf thick in dust. But there was no rest, even for the units halted at Pauk. Every available man was turned out to build airstrips and to improve the road so that tanks, heavy lorries, and transporters carrying the precious boats for the crossings could come forward.
Throughout the march, daily planning conferences had been held at 4 Corps Headquarters and later at Divisional Headquarters, when the most thorough instructions were issued for the crossings. The exact sites would, of course, have to wait on actual reconnaissance, but Messervy had already decided that they would be in the neighbourhood of Nyaungu, at the narrowest part of the river. He realized that because of this, Nyaungu was rather an obvious place, but the slowness and fewness of his power craft and the need to build up quickly on the far bank forced him to choose a short crossing. Even here the river was a thousand yards wide. Deception was essential. He planned to divert the enemy from his real crossing place by having, in addition to that of the East Africans at Chauk, two other demonstrations—a main one at Pakokku itself and another at Pagan, six miles south of Nyaungu. So much depended on these deceptions that they were elaborately and carefully prepared. I longed to be able to give Messervy a battalion or two of parachute troops, who would have simplified his problem a great deal, but we had none.
Daily photographic air reconnaissance along the Irrawaddy, combined with other sources of intelligence, gave us a fairly complete idea of the Japanese dispositions on the sector which 4 Corps was approaching. The enemy had no suspicion that a major crossing was about to be attempted here. His troops were strung out along the river. On the west bank in the Letse area, fifteen to twenty miles north-west of Chauk, he had 153 Regiment. The four battalions of 72 Independent Mobile Brigade with the 2nd Indian National Army Division, whose strength was variously reported as between five and ten thousand, held a wide stretch from Chauk to Nyaungu. Farther north about Pakokku was 214 Regiment. For some fifty miles of river this was not much. The enemy were thin on the ground, and, if we could draw them away from our crossings, we might hope to have a substantial grip on the far bank before they could collect force enough to oust us. One advantage of Messervy’s choice was that, like the 20th Division, he was crossing at the junction of two Japanese formations. 214 Regiment at Pakokku was the extreme left of the Japanese Fifteenth Army and 72 Independent Brigade was the right of Twenty-eighth Army; the boundary between the two ran practically through Nyaungu.
4 Corps’ threefold advance to the river was pushed with determination. 114 Brigade, approaching Pakokku, soon ran into strong opposition, eight miles west of the town, where the enemy were well dug in on high ground at the Kanhla crossroads, and seemed determined to fight it out. Our first immedate assault failed, and it was not until the 10th February that a deliberate attack by the brigade with tanks drove the Japanese out and inflicted severe casualties on them in the open. The brigade was then given the tasks of clearing the west bank of stragglers and preventing any interference with the crossings from Pakokku which appeared to be held in force. 89 Brigade reached the west bank opposite Pagan, and by night slipped a patrol of Sikhs across, who reported by wireless that the south end of the town was unoccupied. This patrol remained hidden on the east bank and continued to send back most valuable reports of the enemy movements around it. Three or four large country boats with Burmese crews were captured near Pagan, and this, together with the reports of the patrol, decided Evans to turn the feint at Pagan into a subsidiary but real crossing. The plan was for one company to cross silently in the country boats, to be followed by the rest of the battalion. 28 East African Brigade also reached its objective, Seikpyu, without serious opposition, and began realistically to stage the first moves of a crossing. 33 Brigade, selected to make the main crossing at Nyaungu, occupied Myitche and, under cover of the village, made its preparations.
The most thorough reconnaissance possible with the enemy on the opposite bank was made to select the actual crossing places. The water had again dropped in February and it was found that the river had considerably changed its bed. New sandbanks had appeared, and no direct crossing was possible. The oblique courses that had to be followed were from fifteen hundred up to two thousand yards long. In fact, one of those eventually used was just over two thousand, the longest opposed river crossing attempted in any theatre of the Second World War. Soundings were made by night by men of the Special Boat Section and frogmen who painstakingly charted the only practicable channels. The west bank was low and cultivated with rice fields at practically river level; the east bank, a line of rugged cliffs one hundred feet high, broken by eroded gullies, completely overlooked it. Defences could be seen in places along these cliffs, but as the days passed no increase in them showed on our air photographs. On the other hand, more digging appeared opposite those places where we were making feints.
It had originally been intended to make a daylight crossing with full artillery, air, and tank support to overwhelm opposition, but the shortage of air lift and the difficulties of road transportation made it impossible to dump the ammunition required in the time. The idea of a completely silent night crossing was then explored, but there would be no moon and it was thought that boats would be unable to find the tortuous channels in the dark, and this method was abandoned. Finally it was decided that the first flight would be silent just before dawn and would be followed up immediately by the remaining flights in power craft under all available covering fire. It was calculated that, even if all went well, a brigade could not be ferried over in the equipment available in less than seven hours.
Eventually it was decided that the operation should be in four phases:
(i) An assault crossing, the first flight of which was to be silent and at night, launched from points on the west bank, one and a half to three miles upstream of Nyaungu, to seize four beaches and the cliffs one mile north-east of the village on the east bank. The South Lancashire Regiment was loaned for the assault crossing from another brigade as they had had experience in boat work and had taken part in the landing at Madagascar.
(ii) A rapid follow-up in daylight of the three battalions of 33 Brigade and some tanks, under all available covering fire, to build up the bridgehead.
(iii) A rapid advance from the bridgehead to capture Nyaungu and with it the eastern end of the shortest river crossing, which would be organized and put into operation at once.
(iv) Expansion of the bridgehead to take the 17th Division which would cross as soon as possible by the direct Nyaungu route.
On my visits to 4 Corps I had completely approved Messervy’s and Evans’s plans. I was much impressed by the skill and energy with which they overcame the obstacles that confronted them at every step in their preparations and which would have daunted any but the most forceful commanders. As the moment of this all-important crossing approached, on which the whole fabric of my battle plan rested, I devoted myself mainly to doing what I could to support Messervy.
One of the anxieties I had was to ensure that the 17th Division was ready to cross the moment the bridgehead was gained. For surprise, we must strike at Meiktila without delay. I had taken Cowan, still the divisional commander, and his senior officers now at Imphal, completely into my confidence and explained their role to them. They seized the opportunity to study the country they would operate over and to conduct sand-table exercises based on the forthcoming operations. The move from Imphal to Pauk caused anxiety, as the transport shortage, both road and air, was still acute, but, ferrying itself a part at a time in its own transport, the division, less its airborne brigade which dropped off at Palel, was concentrated in Pauk by the 12th February—just in time. Much of the divisional artillery and engineers had already gone forward to help the 7th Division in its crossing.
The night chosen for the 7th Division crossing was the 13th/14th
February. The Engineers could not begin to bring up their equipment until the enemy had been evicted from the Kanhla crossroads, and this did not take place until the nth. Even after that, movement could only be at night. Time was short. Yet to drag these cumbersome loads along sandy, uneven tracks in complete darkness, with the least possible noise, and to have every trace of the feverish activity of the night hidden before daylight from prying eyes that overlooked every yard of our bank, was not only a vast labour but a great feat of organization. Yet by dawn on the 13th February, all the troops and the equipment were assembled in concealment within reach of the crossing points. Here they spent a day in final preparations and in a wait for zero hour, that anyone with a glimmer of imagination must have found trying.
Six miles downstream, the Sikhs of 89 Brigade were similarly and with equal stealth preparing for the subsidiary crossing, while still farther south the East Africans were more openly staging a false crossing.
As soon as darkness fell, equipment, boats, and all the paraphernalia for the main crossing began to move down to the water. Assembly areas were marked and the troops tramped slowly and silently from their bivouacs. The Special Boat Section made a final reconnaissance of the far bank to see if it had been occupied, and in doing so met two Japanese swimming in the river. To prevent their escape they had to be shot and it is possible that the noise put the enemy on the alert.
The night was pitch dark, a strong wind was blowing and there was a distinct lop on the water, as at a quarter to four, the leading company of South Lancashires got into their boats and started the long paddle across. At last their boats grounded on the opposite bank. With as little splashing as they could, they waded ashore and scrambled up the cliffs, while the boats turned and made back. By five o’clock on the morning of the 14th February the company had reached the cliff top, so far without meeting any enemy. There they disposed themselves for defence and awaited the rest of their battalion.
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