To begin with, they were usually formed by attracting the best men from normal units by better conditions, promises of excitement, and not a little propaganda. Even on the rare occasions when normal units were converted into special ones without the option of volunteering, the same process went on in reverse. Men thought to be below the standards set or over an arbitrary age limit were weeded out to less favoured corps. The result of these methods was undoubtedly to lower the quality of the rest of the Army, especially of the infantry, not only by skimming the cream off it, but by encouraging the idea that certain of the normal operations of war were so difficult that only specially equipped corps d’élite could be expected to undertake them. Armies do not win wars by means of a few bodies of super-soldiers but by the average quality of their standard units. Anything, whatever short cuts to victory it may promise, which thus weakens the Army spirit, is dangerous. Commanders who have used these special forces have found, as we did in Burma, that they have another grave disadvantage—they can be employed actively for only restricted periods. Then they demand to be taken out of the battle to recuperate, while normal formations are expected to have no such limits to their employment. In Burma, the time spent in action with the enemy by special forces was only a fraction of that endured by the normal divisions, and it must be remembered that risk is danger multiplied by time.
The rush to form special forces arose from confused thinking on what were, or were not, normal operations of war. In one sense every operation of war is a special one, whether it is attack, defence, withdrawal, penetration, raids behind the enemy’s lines, destruction of his detachments, assault over a beach, river crossings, jungle or mountain warfare, or any of the rest; each has its peculiar requirements. Yet all are and have always been familiar operations of war; any standard unit should expect that, at some time or other, it may be called upon to engage in any of them. The level of initiative, individual training, and weapon skill required in, say, a commando, is admirable; what is not admirable is that it should be confined to a few small units. Any well-trained infantry battalion should be able to do what a commando can do; in the Fourteenth Army they could and did. This cult of special forces is as sensible as to form a Royal Corps of Tree Climbers and say that no soldier, who does not wear its green hat with a bunch of oak leaves stuck in it, should be expected to climb a tree.
I would lay it down that any single operation in which more than a handful of men are to be engaged should be regarded as normal, and should be carried out by standard formations. The only exception I would allow to this is a parachute landing, which, until facilities for training much larger numbers in the drill of jumping are available, must require something of a special force. The absence of such forces does not, of course, mean that ordinary units would not, as they have always done, practise and train for particular operations, but it would avoid having large numbers of picked troops, either waiting long periods to be used for short periods, or eventually being employed for something quite different from that for which they have so long and laboriously prepared. Private armies—and for that matter private air forces—are expensive, wasteful, and unnecessary.
There is, however, one kind of special unit which should be retained—that designed to be employed in small parties, usually behind the enemy, on tasks beyond the normal scope of warfare in the field. There will be an increasing need for highly qualified and individually trained men—and women—to sabotage vital installations, to spread rumours, to misdirect the enemy, to transmit intelligence, to kill or kidnap individuals, and to inspire resistance movements. They will be troops, though they will require many qualities and skills not to be expected of the ordinary soldier and they will use many methods beyond his capacity. Each small party would study and train intensively for a particular exploit and should operate under the direct control of the Higher Command. They should rarely work within our own lines. Not costly in manpower, they may, if handled with imaginative ruthlessness, achieve strategic results. Such units, based on the Army, but drawing on all Services and all races of the Commonwealth for specially qualified men and women, should be an essential component of our modern Armed Forces.
The question of control of these clandestine bodies is not without its pitfalls. In the last war among the Allies, cloak and dagger organizations multiplied until to commanders in the field—at least in my theatre—they became an embarrassment. The trouble was that each was controlled from some distant headquarters of its own, and such was the secrecy and mutual suspicion in which they operated that they sometimes acted in close proximity to our troops without the knowledge of any commander in the field, with a complete lack of co-ordination among themselves, and in dangerous ignorance of local tactical developments. It was not until the activities of all clandestine bodies operating in or near our troops were co-ordinated, and where necessary controlled, through a senior officer on the staff of the commander of the area, that confusion, ineffectiveness, and lost opportunities were avoided.
The Future
In Burma we thus developed a form of warfare, based more on human factors than on lavish equipment, which had certain characteristics. The chief of these were:
(i) The acceptance as normal of the regular movement and maintenance of standard formations by air.
(ii) Great tactical freedom for subordinate commanders.
(iii) The operation, over wide distances in most difficult country, of comparatively small forces in tactical independence but strategic combination.
(iv) Reduced scales of transport and equipment, supplemented by ingenuity and improvisation from local resources.
(v) The high quality of the individual soldier, his morale, toughness, and discipline, his acceptance of hardship, and his ability to move on his own feet and to look after himself.
War in the future may vary in scope from unlimited nuclear war aimed at the complete annihilation of a whole people, to a restricted tactical employment of nuclear weapons, or even to the small war of traditional pattern. Whatever form it takes, especially when nuclear weapons are employed as they will be in any war between great powers, one thing is reasonably certain. Modern war, with its destruction of bases, disruption of communications, and disorganization of control, will, if they are to operate at all, compel armies to disperse.
Dispersed fighting, whether the dispersal is caused by the terrain, the lack of supplies, or by the weapons of the enemy, will have two main requirements—skilled and determined junior leaders and self-reliant, physically hard, well-disciplined troops. Success in future land operations will depend on the immediate availability of such leaders and such soldiers, ready to operate in small, independent formations. They will have to be prepared to do without regular lines of communication, to guide themselves and to subsist largely on what the country offers. Unseen, unheard, and unsuspected, they will converge on the enemy and, when they do reveal themselves in strength, they will be so close to him that he will be unable to atomize them without destroying himself. Such land operations, less rigidly controlled and more individualistic than in the past, will not be unlike ours as we approached the Chindwin and the Irrawaddy, and stalking terrorists in a Malayan jungle is today, strange as it may seem, the best training for nuclear warfare. The use of new weapons and technical devices can quickly be taught; to develop hardihood, initiative, mutual confidence, and stark leadership takes longer.
The air attacks we sustained and delivered were, compared with what they might be now, feeble things. Yet determined troops, especially in close or broken country, who are prepared to jettison all but fighting essentials and move in small, self-contained formations, will, I believe, make their own way even through the chaos of atomic bombing. In unlimited war, after the first shock of mutual devastation had been survived, victory would go, as it did in our other jungle, to the tougher, more resourceful infantryman. The easier and more gadget-filled our daily life becomes, the harder will it be to produce him. It took us some time to do so in Burma. It can be done in peac
e; in war there will no longer be so much time.
Until the very horror of modern mass destruction forces men to find some more sensible way of settling national disputes, war will remain, and while it remains it will continually change. Yet, because it is fought between men rather than between weapons, victory will still go, when armaments are even relatively equal, to the side which is better trained and of higher morale—advantages which are obtained neither easily, quickly, nor without the sacrifice of more than money in peace. War remains an art and, like all arts, whatever its variation, will have its enduring principles. Many men, skilled either with sword or pen, and sometimes with both, have tried to expound those principles. I heard them once from a soldier of experience for whom I had a deep and well-founded respect. Many years ago, as a cadet hoping some day to be an officer, I was poring over the ‘Principles of War’, listed in the old Field Service Regulations, when the Sergeant-Major came upon me. He surveyed me with kindly amusement. ‘Don’t bother your head about all them things, me lad,’ he said. ‘There’s only one principle of war and that’s this. Hit the other fellow, as quick as you can, and as hard as you can, where it hurts him most, when he ain’t lookin’!’ As a recruit, I earned that great man’s reproof often enough; now, as an old soldier, I would hope to receive his commendation. I think I might, for we of the Fourteenth Army held to his Principle of War.
In these pages I have written much of generals and of staff officers; of their problems, difficulties, and expedients, their successes and their failures. Yet there is one thought that I should like to be the overall and final impression of this book—that the war in Burma was a soldiers’ war. There comes a moment in every battle against a stubborn enemy when the result hangs in the balance. Then the general, however skilful and far-sighted he may have been, must hand over to his soldiers, to the men in the ranks and to their regimental officers, and leave them to complete what he has begun. The issue then rests with them, on their courage, their hardihood, their refusal to be beaten either by the cruel hazards of nature or by the fierce strength of their human enemy. That moment came early and often in the fighting in Burma; sometimes it came when tired, sick men felt alone, when it would have been so easy for them to give up, when only will, discipline, and faith could steel them to carry on. To the soldiers of many races who, in the comradeship of the Fourteenth Army, did go on, and to the airmen who flew with them and fought over them, belongs the true glory of achievement. It was they who turned Defeat into Victory.
INDEX
The index that appeared in the print version of this title was intentionally removed from the eBook. Please use the search function on your eReading device for terms of interest. For your reference, the terms that appear in the print index are listed below
A
‘Aberdeen’
‘Administrative Box’
Japanese threat to
7th Division H.Q. in
Japanese capture and lose
suicide force near
African forces, too many white men with
response of, to spiritual appeal
‘African Way’
Agartala airstrip
Aijal
Air: defence weaknesses
reconnaissance
support lacking for 1 Burma Corps
support for 15 Corps
transport in jungle warfare
transport of Chinese to India
transport for Arakan offensive
evacuation of sick and wounded
support for Fourteenth Army
transport for Burma campaign
organization of Allied forces
supply and transport for Chindits
supply of Arakan campaign
supply of Yunnan forces
supply and support of Imphal–Kohima battle
transportable brigade
transport shortages
bases on road to Rangoon
support of land operations
maintenance of formations. See also Royal Air Force Group; United States Army Air Force.
Air Commando, No. 1, with Wingate’s Force
Airborne troops
in capture of Meiktila
at Palel
in advance on Rangoon. See also Chindits.
Akyab, conference at
Air Wing at
abandonment of airfield at
Japanese forces in
capture of
Akyab Island, withdrawal from
plan to take
Japanese forces in
air base required on
capture of
building airfield on
operation ‘Dracula’ starts at
Alexander, Fieid-Marshal Sir Harold (Viscount of Tunis), impossible task before
escapes from Rangoon
Chinese Armies of
Chief of Staff to
conference with, at Prome
orders offensive to aid Chinese
at Allanmyo conference
orders holding of Taungdwingyi
courage of
sends Chinese Division
discusses disposal of Chinese Armies
sends directive for withdrawal
in conference at Ye-u
Alison, Colonel J. R.
Allagappa
Allanmyo, conference at
retreat through
Japanese withdraw to
capture of
action near
Aung San at.
Mentioned
Allied Air Command
Allied Land Forces, South-East Asia
provides aircraft
provides engineers for boats
orders attack on Mandalay and Rangoon
author in command of
expansion of area under
and Japanese surrender
Alon
railway from
Amarapura
American: training of Chinese troops
airfield construction
railway troops
road construction
attitude to Burma campaign
troops in Burma. See also United States.
American Combat Engineers
American Field Service Ambulance
American Military Police in Calcutta
American Volunteer Group, Third Squadron
Amphibious operations, planning of
abandonment of
off Kra Isthmus
in Arakan. See also ‘Dracula’, operation.
An, attack on
An Pass
Japanese way of retreat
Japanese retain possession of
Andaman Islands, projected operation in
bombardment of
included in area of S.E.A.L.F.
Anstice, Brigadier J. H.
Anthony, mess butler
Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League
Anti-tank Regiment
‘A’ Battery
Apaukwa
Aradura Ridge
Arakan, refugees march to
15 Corps in
author visits
chaos and civil war in
geography of
Giffard visits
supply route to
ration scales in
Japanese strength in
reinforcements for Central front from
author relieved of front in
need for air supply bases in
cut in air-lift to
enemy division withdrawn from
general Japanese withdrawal from
Arakan campaign:
First
planning of
limited objective
preliminary successes of
enemy stand and advance
Air Force in
losses in, of men and morale
learning lessons of
Second
preparations for
plan for amphibious landing in
limited plans for
/> start of advance
armoured support for
ensuring superiority in numbers for
strong enemy defences in
enemy counter-stroke in
air battles over
initiative passes again to British
turning-point of Burma campaign
Third
plan for
Japanese in general retreat in
Arakan Yomas
Arakanese
Armoured Brigade
at Prome
in striking force
covers withdrawal
covers 1 Burma Corps
under Chinese command
escape route for
crosses Irrawaddy
returns to 1 Burma Corps
and withdrawal from Monywa
ferries troops
crosses Chindwin
Armoured Brigade, 50th, at Ranchi
author takes over
in Arakan
Army Group, 11th
H.Q. of
Arnold, Lieut-General H.
Asian fighting man as compared to British
Assam, 1 Burma Corps reaches
unprepared as army base
interrupted communication with India
communications with India
evacuation of non-combatants from. See also Imphal
Assam front
supply routes to
ration shortages on
in 1943
Japanese strength on
Japanese prepare offensive on
reinforcements for
Assam Railway
defence of
Assam Regiment, in Imphal–Kohima battle
establishes bridgehead over Chindwin
Assam Rifles
Atomic bombs
Auchinleck, Field-Marshal Sir Claude
helps solve difficulties of Fourteenth Army
danger of rivalry between Mountbatten and
and repatriation problem
Defeat Into Victory Page 66
