The fighting between Johnson and Bobby Kennedy during the early years of the Kennedy administration led the White House to exclude Johnson from the drafting of the 1963 civil rights bill. Unable to meet with the president even to discuss it, Johnson—still in charge of the Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity—complained behind the scenes about how it was being mismanaged with Congress. He underestimated the importance of the bill’s proposed mandate for equal access to public accommodations, and minimized the need to abolish segregation as a means to accomplish economic and education gains. His apparent wariness was no doubt caused by his exclusion from the development of the bill; however, Bobby Kennedy had come to regard Johnson as an obstructionist in the effort. RFK told John Bartlow Martin that “he [LBJ] very rarely helped when he could help when we were trying to get votes in the Senate. He was against sending any civil rights legislation up.”203
The attorney general’s attitude about Johnson was more than a reaction simply based upon personal differences, however. The scandals Johnson was associated with in 1961–1963, first related to Billie Sol Estes and then to Bobby Baker, threatened the credibility of the administration to its core, and therefore were jeopardizing the 1964 election. Johnson had convinced himself (correctly, it turns out) that Bobby Kennedy instigated the stories detailing these scandals as a way to remove Johnson from the 1964 ticket. By the late summer of 1963, rumors were rampant that JFK would replace Johnson as vice president, despite the obligatory public denials. JFK’s secretary, Evelyn Lincoln, has stated that Kennedy told her he had already decided to drop Johnson and was planning to replace him with another Southerner, Governor Terry Sanford, of North Carolina. Arthur Schlesinger Jr. succinctly described these machinations in his book Robert Kennedy and His Times:204
Robert Kennedy was [Johnson’s] nemesis. The younger brother had begun by trying to deny him the vice presidential nomination. “He repeated that to me over a period of weeks,” Pierre Salinger recalled of Johnson’s first months in the White House. After the inauguration, said O’Donnell, Johnson felt Robert Kennedy “had taken over his rightful position as the number two man in the government.” The Attorney General was the man who humiliated the Vice President at the Committee on Equal Employment Opportunities; who, Johnson assured Hugh Sidey, Times’s White House correspondent, “bugged him all the time during the time he was Vice President”; who, in the autumn of 1963, Johnson believed, was fomenting the Bobby Baker case in order to deny him re-nomination. “President Kennedy worked so hard at making a place for me, always saying nice things, gave me dignity and standing,” Johnson said to Helen Thomas of United Press International after the 1968 election. “But back in the back room they were quoting Bobby, saying I was going to be taken off the ticket.”
Lyndon Johnson’s Character: A Summation
The abridged history thus far provided, minus the deference ordinarily accorded to those having held the presidential office, details the real persona of Lyndon B. Johnson: he was anything but the magnanimous, good-hearted and public-spirited man often portrayed by other biographers. The thirty-sixth president was cruel, mendacious, narcissistic—concerned only about the pseudolegend he worked an entire lifetime to create, resulting in the false legacy that has persisted today. The character traits assessed previously can be traced throughout the remaining chapters, and the worst—the most narcissistic, megalomaniacal, and criminal—will become ever more predominant.
Johnson’s powers of calculation, agreed upon by practically all of his biographers, directly account for how he ingratiated himself into official Washington and the position from which he would springboard into the presidency. William Manchester elegantly and vividly described Lyndon Johnson’s overall strategy:205
Johnson approached a strongly fortified position by outflanking it, or burrowing under it, or surprising the defenders from the rear, or raining down obstacles upon them from the sky, or starving them into submission. Rarely, and then only reluctantly, would he proceed directly from A to B. To him the shortest distance between two points was a tunnel. His supreme talents were those of the man behind the scenes. But his complexities do not even end there, for few men in public life had found less comfort in anonymity. When the circus catch was made, he wanted the fans to note the LBJ brand on the fielder’s glove. They noted it. It could not be missed. Yet the feeling persisted that bat, batter, and umpire had been stamped with the same brand—that the play had been set from the start. It was only a feeling. Nothing was ever proved … [but] Johnson always managed to be out there in center field at the finish, his mitt outstretched to snag the descending ball.
Many men dream of, and establish complex plans to achieve, becoming president; but no one has ever been more obsessed than Lyndon Johnson, whose desire was so absolute it was in practically all of his thoughts, awakened or not. He considered the presidency his destiny, and nothing—least of all any other person—could stop him. One of the attorneys in Ed Clark’s Austin law firm, Barr McClellan, described Johnson’s determination as being insuperable, that he would allow nothing to stand in the way of his becoming president.206
Johnson’s ability to deceive people, to make planned events seem spontaneous, and his willingness to take great personal risks to satisfy his need for more power—so thoroughly described by Robert Caro, Robert Dallek, and, before them, by J. Evetts Haley, William Manchester, and others—facilitated his quest to become president. The evidence presented in this book, deeply hidden in most other stories and books about him, shows convincingly that his unique powers over people, especially as president after the assassination, could have only been held by a man in a position to choreograph in macro detail the “crime of the century.”
Notes
1. Caro, The Path, p. 100.
2. Dugger, p. 122.
3. Ibid., p. 124.
4. Caro, The Path, p. 102; Dugger, p. 77.
5. Caro, The Path, p. 130.
6. Ibid., p. 153; Haley, p. 14.
7. Caro, The Path, p. 130.
8. Ibid., p. 90.
9. Ibid., p. 94.
10. Busby, Horace, Oral History Interview I, April 23, 1981, by Michael L. Gillette [Transcript], Internet copy, LBJ Library. http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/oralhistory.hom/BusbyH/Busby1.pdf
11. Caro, The Path, p. 95.
12. Ibid., p. 97.
13. Dallek, p. 44.
14. Hershman, p. 21.
15. Ibid., p. 172.
16. Hershman, pp. 319?320.
17. Ibid., p. 28.
18. Margolis, p. 281.
19. Kessler, Inside the White House, p. 32.
20. Summers, Official and Confidential, p. 339.
21. Goodwin, Richard N. President Lyndon Johnson: The War ithin. New York Times, 8?21?1988.
22. Summers, Official and Confidential, p. 339.
23. Caro, The Path, p. 104.
24. Hershman, p. 31.
25. Caro, The Path, pp. 75–76.
26. Ibid., p. 90.
27. Ibid., p. 91.
28. Ibid., p. 84.
29. Caro, The Path, p. 142.
30. Ibid., p. 196.
31. Ibid., pp. 143–145.
32. Ibid., pp.145–153.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid., p. 153.
35. Ibid., p. 199.
36. Ibid., p. 160.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid., p. 160.
39. Ibid., p. 198.
40. Ibid., p. 219.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid., p. 230.
43. Ibid., pp. 227–231.
44. Ibid., p. 231.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid., p. 233.
48. Caro, The Path …, p. 235.
49. Ibid., p. 237.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid., p. 238.
53. Ibid., p. 239.
54. Goodwin, Richard, pp. 256–258.
55. Caro, Master …, p. 122.
&n
bsp; 56. Caro, The Path …, p. 155.
57. Hershman, p. 211 (ref. Booth Mooney, LBJ: an Irreverent Chronicle, New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Col, 1976, p. 73).
58. Dallek, Flawed …, p. 491.
59. Haley, pp. 234–235.
60. Caro, The Path …, p. 200.
61. Hershman, p. 44.
62. Dallek, Flawed Giant … p. 255
63. Caro, The Path …, p. 399.
64. Ibid., p. 403.
65. Ibid., p. 404.
66. Ibid., p. 436.
67. Ibid., pp. 532–533.
68. Caro, The Path …, pp. 369–385, 459–462.
69. Ibid., pp. 462–465.
70. Dugger, p. 239.
71. Caro, Means, pp. 24–25.
72. See http://www.b-26mhs.org/archives/manuscripts/lbj_fake_silverstar.html
73. Caro, Means, p. 51.
74. Ibid., p. 52.
75. Ibid., pp. 52, 53.
76. Ibid.
77. Transcript, Clifton C. Carter Oral History Interview I, 10/1/68, by Dorothy L. Pierce, Internet Copy, LBJ Library, p. 3–5.
78. Ibid. p. 6.
79. Ibid.
80. Ibid. p. 43.
81. Busby, Horace, Oral History Interview I, April 23, 1981, by Michael L. Gillette [Transcript], Internet copy, LBJ Library. http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/oralhistory.hom/BusbyH/Busby1.pdf
82. Ibid.
83. Caro, The Path …, p. 334.
84. Ibid., p. 335.
85. Caro, Master of the Senate, pp. 136–137.
86. Ibid., p. 156; Caro, The Path …, p. 275.
87. Caro, Master of the Senate, p. 160. (Uriah Heep is a fictional character from the novel David Copperfield, written by Charles Dickens. He is remembered for his patronizing obsequiousness, his unbridled ambition and greed, his complete insincerity and his chronic attempts to perpetrate fraud while simultaneously portraying his own “’umbelness.”)
88. Caro, Means, p. 120.
89. Caro, Master of the Senate, p. 116.
90. McClellan, p. 92; Haley, p. 39.
91. Haley, p. 39.
* The votes recorded on behalf of the deceased led to a joke making the rounds at the bars on Wisconsin Avenue and elegant Georgetown dinner parties (Johnson himself told it often in the Senate cloakroom). The accent mimicked was that of small Mexican American boy in Nuevo Laredo: Manuel was sitting on a curb one day crying when a friend came up and asked him what was wrong. Manuel said, “My father was in town last Saturday, and he did not come to see me.” His friend said, “But, Manuel, your father has been dead for ten years. Manuel just sobbed louder, saying, “Si, he has been dead for ten years. But he came to town last Saturday to vote for Lyndon Johnson, and he did not come to see me.” (Caro, Means, p. 399)
92. Ibid. (ref. Gordon Schendel, “Something Is Rotten in the State of Texas,” Colliers, pp. 13–14, June 9, 1951).
93. Ibid., pp. 46–47.
94. Ibid., pp. 40–42.
95. Caro, Means, p. 395.
96. Ibid., p. 366.
97. Ibid., p. 356.
98. Ibid., p. 358.
99. Ibid.
100. Lasky, It Didn’t Start …, p. 136.
101. Caro, Means, pp. 360–362.
102. Ibid.
103. Ibid., p. 363.
104. Ibid., pp. 351–368.
105. Ibid., pp. 364–365.
106. Ibid., p. 376.
107. Dallek, Lone Star …, p. 341.
108. Haley, pp. 47–48.
109. Ibid. (ref. Fort Worth Star-Telegram, Sept. 28, 30, 1948).
110. Caro, Means, pp. 377–380.
111. Ibid.
112. Haley, pp. 47–48.
113. Valenti, p. 169.
114. Dugger, p. 341.
115. Sidey, Hugh, “The Softer They Fall,” Time, August 15, 1977.
116. Hersh, S., p. 132.
117. Caro, Master of the Senate, p. 406.
118. Ibid., p. 407.
119. Brown, p. 71.
120. Ibid.
121. Ibid., pp. 71–72.
122. Caro, Master of the Senate, p. 406.
123. Brown, p. 70.
124. Scheim, p. 247.
125. Ibid. (ref. Sheridan, Walter, The Fall and Rise of Jimmy Hoffa, New York: Saturday Review Press, 1972, pp. 380–381).
126. Life magazine, November 22, 1963, p. 40.
127. Baker, p. 34.
128. Ibid. p. 45.
129. Scott, p. 218.
130. Baker, p. 156.
131. Ibid. p. 157.
132. Ibid., p. 219.
133. Ibid. (ref. Moldea, Dan E., The Hoffa Wars, New York: Paddington Press, 1978).
134. Ibid., p. 221.
135. Scheim, p. 250 (ref. Reid, Ed., The Grim Reapers: The Anatomy of Organized Crime in America, New York: Henry Regnery, Bantam, 1970, pp. 140–142).
136. Caro, Master, p. 229.
137. Haley, p. 234.
138. North, p. 248 (ref. Rowe, Robert, The Bobby Baker Story, New York: Parallax, 1967, pp. 45, 72).
139. Scott, pp. 233–234.
140. Davis, p. 425.
141. Ibid., p. 426.
142. Ibid., pp. 312, 425–426.
143. Scott, pp. 128, 161.
144. Marrs, p. 292.
145. Scott, p. 155.
146. Davis, p. 518.
147. Scott, p. 144.
148. Caro, Means of Ascent, pp. 80–118.
149. Reedy, p. 48.
150. Life magazine, August 21, 1964, p. 62.
151. Life magazine, August 21, 1964, pp. 62–63.
152. Caro, Means of Ascent, p. 87.
153. Ibid., p. 97.
154. Ibid., p. 99.
155. Ibid., pp. 99–100.
156. Ibid., p. 101.
157. Brown, pp. 69–70.
158. Life magazine, August 21, 1964.
159. Ibid.
160. Baker, p. 82.
161. Caro, Means of Ascent, p. 103.
162. Ibid., pp. 104–105.
163. Mollenhoff, p. 298.
164. Caro, Master of the Senate, pp. 232–303.
165. Ibid., p. 232.
166. Ibid., p. 275.
167. Ibid., p. 285.
168. Ibid., p. 303.
169. Ibid.
170. Ibid., pp. 302–303 (ref. Fortune, May 1952).
171. Caro, Master …, pp. 301–302.
172. Ibid., pp. 299–300.
173. Horace Busby, recorded interview by Sheldon H. Stern, Mary 26, 1982, (p. 3), John F. Kennedy Library Oral History Program.
174. Halberstam, p. 446.
175. Transcript, Hubert H. Humphrey Oral History Interview I, 8/17/71, by Joe B. Frantz, Internet Copy, LBJ Library.
176. Transcript, Hubert H. Humphrey Oral History Interview III, 6/21/77, by Michael L. Gillette, Internet Copy, LBJ Library.
177. Dallek, Lone Star …, p. 352 (ref. Arthur Schlesinger Jr. interview, August 3, 1987; Miller, Lyndon, p. 247).
178. Transcript, Hubert H. Humphrey Oral History Interview I, 8/17/71, by Joe B. Frantz, Internet Copy, LBJ Library.
179. Haley, pp. 11, 13.
180. Dallek, Lone Star …, p. 416.
181. Dallek, Flawed Giant, pp. 3–6.
182. Shesol, pp. 11–12.
183. Dallek, Lone Star Rising, pp. 474–475.
184. “Trickster Says LBJ Was Good Model of Deception,” Dallas Times Herald, May 20, 1989; ref. Twyman, p. 813.
185. Caro, The Path … p. xix.
186. McClellan, p. 136.
187. Kilpatrick, James, Human Events, August 25, 1960.
188. Horace Busby, Oral History Interview VIII, April 2, 1989, by Michael L. Gillette [Transcript], Internet copy, LBJ Library.
189. Clifford, pp. 389–390.
190. Dallek, Flawed Giant, pp. 33–36.
191. Dallek, Lyndon B. Johnson … p. 113.
192. Horace Busby, recorded interview by Sheldon H. Stern, Mary 26, 1982, (p. 3), John F. Kennedy Library Oral History
Program.
193. Guthman, pp. 415, 417. 194. Guthman and Shulman, p. 26 (Interview with Arthur Schlesinger Jr., February 27, 1965).
194. Guthman and Shulman, p. 26 (Interview with Arthur Schlesinger Jr., February 27, 1965).
195. Ibid.
196. Lincoln, p. 165.
197. Ibid., p. 166.
198. Ibid., p. 167.
199. Ibid., p. 159. 200. Sherrill, p. 50.
200. Sherrill, p. 50.
201. O’Donnell, Life magazine, August 7, 1970, p. 48.
202. Ibid.
203. Guthman and Shulman, p. 410 (Interview with John Bartlow Martin, May 14, 1964).
204. Schlesinger, RFK, p. 673.
205. Manchester, p. 270.
206. McClellan, p. 149.
PART II
The Context of the Times:
Secrets, Scandals, and Scams
Chapter 2
THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE
CIRCA 1960–1963
The CIA’s growth was like … a malignancy which … [JFK] was not sure even the White House could control … any longer. If the United States ever experiences [an attempt at a coup to overthrow the Government] it will come from the CIA and not the Pentagon. The agency represents a tremendous power and total unaccountability to anyone.
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