Poor children formed the major target for food industry advertisements and new school lunch products. But paying children were still critical to school lunch budgets. To maintain a solid cadre of paying students, school cafeterias offered what they assumed the market desired. Lunchroom operators basically capitulated to the appeal and the lure of the consumer market in order to keep students—whether paying or free—in the lunchroom. In the mid-1990s, for the first time, federal rules allowed nine fast food chains to operate in the schools. These included Pizza Hut, Little Caesar’s, Domino’s, Taco Bell, Subway, Chic-Fil-A, McDonald’s, Blimpie’s, and Arby’s. PepsiCo, which owned Pizza Hut, opened business in about 5,000 of the nation’s 94,000 schools.22 Schools also began to offer “brand days” in which the fast-food chains competed with one another for children’s lunch money. Brand-name products and fast foods promised to keep school lunchrooms financially solvent.23 Indeed, by the year 2000, the Centers for Disease Control estimated that one in five schools participating in the National School Lunch Program had brand-name fast foods in their lunchrooms.24
The strategy appeared to work. School lunch operators reported that participation rates soared when brand-name fast foods were offered.25 One Delaware school district claimed that lunch participation went up by 18 percent when Pizza Hut was brought in. The Henrico County School District, which included Richmond, Virginia, actually dropped out of the National School Lunch Program and began to contract exclusively with private companies, including Domino’s, Subway, and Taco Bell. According to the district’s food service director, Tim Mertz, “branded concepts” accounted for ever increasing portions of school food sales. Mertz’s goal was to “have branded food courts in all of its high schools by the turn of the century. “26 The lure of the market was difficult to resist, particularly when public funds were insufficient to maintain lunchroom operations.
School children also provided a potential long-term market for food industry products. Food-service industry advertisers viewed school lunchrooms as the perfect place to create and solidify brand loyalty. “Market ing surveys say the younger generation is brand conscious,” said one pizza industry representative in what could only be characterized as an understatement. The ads, said Tim Wellenzohn, product manager at Rich Products Corporation, “helps us get a foot in the door to give the school food service operator an option.” Domino’s Pizza encouraged franchisers to enter the school lunch market, offering a royalty rebate to any of their businesses participating in the school lunch program. Admitting that “the profit margin is not very good on school lunch sales,” Domino’s spokeswoman Maggie Proctor nonetheless encouraged the company’s franchises to get into the program “for the product exposure—to get our relatively new thin crust and deep dish products out there to kids.” One foodservice manager commented that by the time children entered school they were already “intimately familiar” with the different pizza brands. Families eat pizza at home, he pointed out, almost as often as they eat potatoes.27 The children were, in effect, a captive audience for corporate advertisements, and the schools implicitly endorsed the products. As San Francisco school board member Jill Wynns observed, the food industry viewed children simply as future customers.28
Food service companies provided more than fast food to school lunchrooms. The National School Lunch Program budget had never adequately funded nutrition education. With the budget cuts of the 1980s, however, education became an even greater problem for school lunch operators. Private food-service companies happily stepped in with elaborate promotional materials that they offered to the schools for nutrition education. Neither the schools nor the Department of Agriculture’s Food and Nutrition Service could compete with the marketing appeal of the private industry—or with the new products offered on trial in school lunchrooms. When it came to brand names, product advertising, and educational materials, school lunch professionals were complicit partners. The American School Food Service Association regularly consulted with food-service companies and advised them on how to bring their products into compliance with USDA nutrition guidelines. According to one report, the educational materials supplied by food companies ranged “from interactive classroom lesson plans and videos on exercise and nutrition to songs, games, quizzes, and cards filled with fun facts.”29 The Apricot Producers of California, for example, presented at the ASFSA 2001 Trade Show a new Advisory Panel ready to distribute “new activities and recipes” for school lunchrooms and professional development materials for school lunch administrators.30 These products and services were particularly attractive in poor districts where supplies and equipment were difficult to obtain and where funds for professional development were in short supply.
Despite the special vitamin-enhanced products, fast food continued pose a problem for school lunch administrators. Often, the pizza, tacos and hamburgers offered by private companies did not meet the Department of Agriculture’s minimal nutrition requirements. During the 1990s, for example, the department guidelines required that children receive no more than 30 percent of their calories from fat. As late as the mid-1990s, however, one study found that overall 38 percent of the calories in school lunches came from fat, and 15 percent from saturated fat.31 When parents, nutritionists, and even school officials worried that fast-food companies were not meeting nutritional standards, the USDA assured them that “the Government and private vendors are working together to bring more tasty, nutritious, healthy meals to our Nation’s school children.”32 In truth, however, the fast-food school lunch often did not meet the test. Taco Bell, for example, tried to re-formulate its products for the school lunch market, but its chicken and bean enchiladas and “fiesta casseroles” were found to contain some 35 percent of their calories from fat. ChicFil-A similarly promised to deliver schools a reimbursable fried-chicken sandwich, but it turned out to contain 27 percent of calories from fat. Subway was the only company that did not need to modify its products to meet the USDA fat requirement. The USDA school lunch administrators were not hard to convince. By the 1990s any qualms about commercial products in school lunchrooms had all but vanished. Agriculture Department spokesman Phil Shanholtzer, for example, had no problem recommending pizza as “a healthy food.” Nutrition guidelines, he pointed out, “are judged over a week’s menu cycle rather than an individual meal,” so schools could offer “a relatively high fat item one day and make up for it on other days.”33 In 2004, the Physicians Committee for Responsible Medicine warned of an impending obesity crisis among American children. School meals, the physicians feared, contributed to children’s “over-consumption of calories, fat, cholesterol, salt, and sugar.” Finding child obesity to be at “an all-time high,” the committee ominously predicted that this generation “may be the first to have shorter lives than their parents.”34
Department of Agriculture nutrition guidelines were not entirely without effect. To enter the school lunch market, companies did re-formulate many of their products. Thus, although children ate Domino’s Pizza and Taco Bell tacos, these products were different in important respects from the pizza and tacos sold outside the school. Taco Bell, for example, offered schools an enhanced breakfast burrito that included an egg, cheese, and sausage that, it assured school lunch administrators, met the USDA nutritional requirements. The case of pizza was instructive. One of the most popular items on school lunch menus, pizza was also one of the most problematic when it came to nutrition. Under the school lunch nutrition standards, any pizza sold as part of the school lunch program had to meet the “2–ounce protein” requirement. That is, in order to qualify as a main dish offering, the pizza had to contain at least two ounces of protein. When Pizza Hut, a major national chain, sought entry into the school lunch market, a company report noted that “the greatest challenge” was trying to reduce the fat content of its pizza slices. Pizza sauce and pepperoni are high in salt, and cheese is a high fat food. After spending “enormous amounts of resources” on a complete nutrition analysis, the company was convinced its pro
duct could be presented to schools as part of a reimbursable (and presumably nutritional) meal. “We’ve always said pizza served with fruit, vegetables, whole grain products and low-fat milk meets the Dietary Guidelines for Americans,” noted company spokesman Chris Romoser. The company finally presented its specially formulated pizza to schools, noting that “accompanied by fruit, milk, and maybe a vegetable,” their product would constitute a reimbursable meal. Not wanting their product to become identified with poor children, however, Pizza Hut stipulated that in schools where there were “a lot of kids that qualify for reduced-price lunches,” their pizzas be sold in the regular lunch line. When the Houston Independent School District adopted Pizza Hut products, for example, the cafeteria manager worked with the company to make sure the pizzas did not appear to be only for poor children.35
The extent to which school lunches became part of a national foodservice industry network could be seen in the heavy competition for the school markets and the wide reach of food industry interests. Styrofoam plates and cups, plastic forks, and the myriad of containers and wrappings necessary for large-scale food service meant lucrative markets for companies, such as Sysco Systems, that supplied restaurants and schools alike. Dupont, for example, sold polyester packing film wrap to school foodservice departments. Other companies supplied the component elements of school meals. Frozen sauces and chicken patties, for example, could be heated on-site. Rich Products, of Buffalo, New York, sold frozen pizza dough in pre-proportioned balls or par-baked crusts so schools could “develop their own brands.”36
School lunch menus reflected American consumer trends not only in fast-food tastes but in the rise of the ethnic food market as well. Beginning during the 1970s, food markets embraced increasing kinds of ethnic foods and a willingness to expand the definition of “American” cuisine. Schools across the country began to offer tortillas and even sushi on their lunch menus. Casa Christina Foods, which began to sell tortillas to schools during the late 1980s, saw a major increase in demand over the next decade. When they first introduced their product in North Carolina, company president Chester Brunty noted that the tortilla was “a novel food.” Within a short time, however, schools throughout the Southeast began to serve tortilla chips and burritos. Schools instituted “taco day” along with quesadillas and wraps. Happy to accommodate the school market, tortilla companies marketed their product as “low fat, flavored and organic.” Companies like Casa Christina or La Tapatia Tortilleria, in Fresno, California, eagerly attended school food shows and workshops, sponsored by the USDA or by other food corporations, and were happy to assist school food-service directors in devising new menu items using their products. La Tapatia president Helen Chavez-Hansen said she felt “in tune” because most of them were women who shared a deep concern with children’s nutrition and health. “We really are all working moms” she pointed out. Casa Christina’s president got to the bottom line, however. “The kids in these schools are going to grow up with the tortilla,” he observed. “They and their children will be good customers of our products. We’re laying a foundation for our industry’s future.”37
Privatization, fast-food, and national brands dramatically altered the atmosphere in school lunchrooms. School lunch professionals were divided, however, when it came to evaluating the impact of the new trends on children’s nutrition. Some believed that privatization vastly improved lunch programs and made the free lunch program more viable. During the 1990s, for example, Rhode Island adopted a corporate model in order to maintain its free lunch program. In a major budget crisis the state slashed school lunch appropriations, throwing several hundred workers onto the unemployment lines and threatening to eliminate free lunches. School lunch administrators contracted with the Marriott Corporation to take over the system. The company introduced brand-named foods, offered children choices in the lunch line, and invited students and parents to meet with the company’s food-service directors to test products and plan menus. State school officials claimed that student school lunch participation “soared” and nutrition levels improved. Paying children returned to the lunchroom, and even the state’s poorest districts generated a profit in their lunchrooms. According to one report, the project was so successful that the janitors who had previously found tons of wasted food now noticed that the children “cleaned their plates.” Woonsocket principal John Caparco admitted that his fellow state school lunch administrators had been simply “out to lunch” when it came to making food appealing. In his district, over 77 percent of the children qualified for free and reduced price meals. Before privatization he had served 2,652 lunches a day, but after bringing in Marriott his numbers averaged 3,486. A student’s comment proved most revealing. “The other stuff,” this child observed, “was, you know, welfare food, and it tasted like it.” The new menu, she said, is now “regular food.”38
For critics of “big government,” privatization of school lunchrooms signaled a triumph of local initiative over federal policy. In this view, individual school cafeterias or even district-wide food service was simply inefficient. Rhode Island Republicans, for example, favored “devolution” of nutrition programs and a federal block grant system that would send each district a set level of federal reimbursement. When critics argued that the block grants would not cover an unexpected—or even a predicted—increase in student enrollment, the state’s legislators, Republican as well as Democratic, insisted that under the privatized scheme more children would buy their lunches, thus providing a sure subsidy for free meals. This was not a new idea. Indeed, states had long operated under the assumption that paying students would subsidize the poor. In truth, however, the contribution gleaned from student fees had never been sufficient to pay for free lunches for poor children. Rhode Island legislators believed that in privatization they found a way around the dilemma. In what one state representative called a “clever payment system,” schools paid an annual fee to the food-service company to run their programs. The fee was supposed to cover capital improvements, salaries, and food. School districts kept student fees plus the per-meal federal subsidies. If revenues fell short, the contractor assumed the loss. “This way the district can’t lose money and the contractor has an incentive to keep costs down while serving more meals.”39 Under this system, the Woonsocket district claimed to run a “self-sufficient” program that actually earned $24,000 in profit during its first year. The money went to buy a new dishwasher and a truck. Providence claimed a profit of over $100,000. This was fine until costs began to rise and the private companies began to raise their fees. Although the Department of Agriculture contracts prohibited foodservice corporations from making a profit on school lunches, the companies were allowed to collect management fees.”40 In effect, as some critics pointed out, private food-service contracts provided public subsidies to for-profit corporations.
Some school lunch officials were less sanguine about the virtues of private contracts. USDA official Ellen Haas predicted that allowing private companies into the school lunchroom would lead to “short-term malnutrition and a lifetime of serious and costly health problems.” Democratic representative Dick Gephardt, equated the process with “a dagger pointed at the hearts of our children.”41 Indeed, while the private corporations claimed to meet or exceed nutritional requirements, the fact was that they often fudged the numbers. In the Rhode Island case, Marriott measured the nutrition content of its menus over a ten-week period. Like Pizza Hut, Marriott justified high fat offerings by serving lower fat dishes on other days or on the side.42 What they did not do, however, was keep any record of which offerings the children took. Thus a child might end up eating the high fat offering each day even though other foods were available.
The extent to which school lunches were embedded within the vast network of a private, commercial food industry was revealed when the Department of Agriculture set about to publicize new nutrition guidelines during the 1990s. The department formed “Team Nutrition” in which government personnel worked with private indus
try including the Walt Disney Company to shape public relations and develop motivational materials. Calling this a “groundbreaking partnership,” the department looked to Disney to “develop healthy eating messages to be used on television.” With the technical assistance and training from the Disney Company, the Department of Agriculture now depended on the private industry to help shape and modify children’s food habits. The USDA also contracted with Scholastic to produce “age appropriate nutrition information” for children as well as for parents.43
The culture and the politics of food collided as schools attempted to make their lunchrooms financially viable, cover the costs of free meals, and at the same time provide children with nutritious food. Although no longer aimed at Americanizing an immigrant population, nutritionists’ advice still was predicated on the assumption that children would bring good eating habits home to their mothers and families. Teachers, advertisers, and nutritionists alike still believed that education and reason would shape diets and influence people’s eating habits. As Dr. Richard Carmona, U.S. Surgeon General, put it, the importance of “behavior modification” in food choices could not be stressed enough.44 The Surgeon General was specifically addressing the problem of obesity in children, but he could as well have been talking about eating habits in general. Figuring out a way to finance free lunches for poor children was as difficult as figuring out how to change people’s eating habits. Just as children continued to make “bad” food choices, school districts, state legislatures, and Congress itself continued to make political choices when it came to financing children’s meals. Neither school officials nor lunchroom supervisors liked to turn children away from the lunch line. But determining which children deserved—that is, “qualified” for—a free lunch proved to be no easier in the twenty-first century than it had been earlier. Although schools expended extraordinary resources verifying free lunch eligibility applications, some legislators still feared that parents (if not the children themselves) were “cheating” and trying to illegally claim a right to free food.45 The ASFSA, on the other hand, believed that the school lunch poverty levels were too low and that the “near poor,” that is, children who technically qualified for reduced-price meals, could not in reality afford the price of lunch. Even the conservative Hoover Institute recognized the difficulties in trying to determine which children truly needed free meals. “Tighter incomeverification procedures,” a Hoover sponsored study concluded, would mean lower participation rates. No one wanted this outcome. In the end, most schools simply lacked the resources to track and document the often changing incomes of hundreds of families.46
School Lunch Politics Page 27
