Lincoln ordered that an expedition sail to Florida as soon as possible. The next morning when Seward informed Scott of the president’s directive, the general exclaimed: “the great Frederick [of Prussia] used to say that ‘when the King commands, nothing is impossible!’ Sir, the President’s orders shall be obeyed!”77 Scott then consulted with his military secretary, Colonel E. D. Keyes, who argued that it would be extremely difficult to reinforce Fort Pickens. Scott directed him to share his thoughts with Seward. When the colonel pointed out the problems he had mentioned to Scott, Seward interrupted saying, “I don’t care about the difficulties,” and ordered him to fetch Meigs forthwith. Ten minutes later the captain and the colonel stood before Seward, who commanded them to devise a plan for reinforcing Pickens and present it at the White House no later than 3 P.M.
At the Executive Mansion, Meigs and Keyes read their proposals to Lincoln, who approved them despite his puzzlement at references to scarps, terreplains, barbettes, and the like. To command the ships involved, Meigs suggested a friend, Lieutenant David Dixon Porter, an ambitious, bold young officer who had distinguished himself seven years earlier on a mission to Cuba. “Gentlemen,” the president directed, “see General Scott, and carry your plans into execution without delay.” When they did so later that day, the general approved their scheme and wrote orders implementing it.78
Meanwhile, that same day, the Confederate commissioners called Justice Campbell’s attention to a telegram from South Carolina Governor Pickens complaining that Lamon had failed to honor his promise to arrange for the evacuation of Sumter. Two days later, Seward told Campbell “that the President was concerned at the contents of the telegram. … that Colonel Lamon did not go to Charleston under any commission or authority from Mr. Lincoln, nor had he any power to pledge him by any promise or assurance; that Mr. Lincoln desired that Governor Pickens should be satisfied of this.” Seward then handed the judge a note stating that “the President may desire to supply Fort Sumter, but will not undertake to do so without first giving notice to Governor Pickens.” This represented a dramatic change from the secretary’s earlier assurances to Campbell, who protested that if such a message were conveyed to Charleston, the authorities there would bombard Sumter immediately. Seward then consulted briefly with Lincoln and returned with a modified version of a message for the South Carolina governor: “I am satisfied the Government will not undertake to supply Fort Sumter without giving notice to Governor Pickens.” This was still a far cry from what Campbell had been told previously. When the judge asked if Lincoln really intended to supply Sumter, Seward replied: “No, I think not, it is a very irksome thing to him to evacuate it. His ears are open to everyone, and they fill his head with schemes for its supply. I do not think that he will adopt any of them. There is no design to reinforce it.”79 Clearly, the secretary was deceiving the commissioners, unless he believed that he could sabotage the Sumter expedition and thereby thwart Lincoln.
On April 1, Porter and Seward reviewed the plans to reinforce Pickens. The lieutenant suggested that Lincoln, not the secretary of the navy, issue a direct order to ready the Powhatan. At a conference with Porter, Meigs, and Seward, Lincoln approved these arrangements, though he felt uneasy about bypassing normal channels and having his secretary of state in effect act as secretary of the navy.
“But what will Uncle Gideon say?” he asked.
“I will make it all right with Mr. Welles,” Seward replied.
“This looks to me very much like the case of two fellows I once knew: one was a gambler, the other a preacher,” said Lincoln. “They met in a stage, and the gambler induced the preacher to play poker, and the latter won all the gambler’s money. ‘It’s all because we have mistaken our trades,’ said the gambler; ‘you ought to have been a gambler and I a preacher, and, by ginger, I intend to turn the tables on you next Sunday and preach in your church,’ which he did.” The formal order instructed Porter to sail the Powhatan into Pensacola harbor and cover the reinforcement of the fort. It was, as Meigs put it, “extracted” from the president, who may well have been confused about three different warships with Indian names beginning with the letter P (Powhatan, Pawnee, Pocohontas). While signing the various documents, Lincoln said: “Gentlemen, I don’t know anything of your army and navy rules only don’t let me burn my fingers.”80
Because of the secrecy and haste involved, the plan quickly created a bureaucratic nightmare. The Powhatan was under the command of Captain Samuel Mercer, who received an order written by Porter and signed by Lincoln instructing him to turn the ship over to the lieutenant. On April 1, Welles, unaware of the Seward-Porter-Meigs-Lincoln scheme, ordered the Powhatan to be readied for duty as soon as possible. As if this were not sufficiently perplexing, another problem immediately arose: How was the Pickens expedition to be paid for? Congress had adjourned without appropriating money for such purposes. The only recourse was the secret-service fund of the State Department, which could be tapped with the approval of the president alone. So Lincoln authorized this unconventional funding arrangement, and Seward gave $10,000 to Meigs, who distributed it to both Porter and Keyes. The latter was responsible for hiring a steamer in New York and overseeing the preparation of the other ships.
Armed with his orders freshly signed by Lincoln, Porter left for New York on April 1. The next day the acting commandant of the Brooklyn Navy Yard, Andrew H. Foote, hesitated to let the lieutenant have the Powhatan, for the previous afternoon Welles’s order assigning that vessel to Fox had arrived. Moreover, it was highly irregular for a mere lieutenant to replace a full captain in command of an important warship; it was even more irregular for such an order to be issued by the president and not the secretary of the navy. Foote suspected a rebel plot to steal the ship, for he knew that Porter was friendly with pro-Southern naval officers. Perhaps Porter himself was a traitor! After some cajoling, the lieutenant persuaded Foote to honor Lincoln’s directive and to maintain secrecy. The Powhatan was ready to sail by April 6.
On April 1, Lincoln sent Welles copies of some of the documents he had that day approved, one of which seemed to undercut the secretary’s authority. Indignantly, Welles called at the White House to protest. Lincoln, sensing his anger, asked: “What have I done wrong?” In addition to the orders regarding the Pickens expedition, he had signed instructions to Welles to send most of the navy to Mexico; to reassign his trusted assistant, Captain Stringham, to Pensacola; and to replace Stringham with Captain Samuel Barron. Welles explained to Lincoln that Barron’s loyalty was suspect and that he could not work with such a man as his principal subordinate. (Barron soon thereafter joined the Confederate navy.) The restructuring of the department specified in Lincoln’s directive would have put Barron virtually in charge of naval operations. Later, Welles wrote that there “is not in the archives and history of the Government a record of such mischievous maladministration … as this secret scheme.”81 By way of explanation, Lincoln said that Seward, “with two or three young men, had been there through the day, on a matter which Mr. Seward had much at heart; that he had yielded to the project of Mr. Seward, but as it had involved considerable detail and he had his hands full, and more too, he had left Mr. Seward to prepare the necessary papers. These papers he had signed, some without reading, trusting entirely to Mr. Seward, for he could not undertake to read all the papers presented to him; and if he could not trust the Secretary of State, whom could he rely upon in a public matter that concerned us all?” Lincoln “seemed disinclined to disclose or dwell on the project,” but told Welles that “he never would have signed that paper had he been aware of its contents, much of which had no connection with Mr. Seward’s scheme.” The president countermanded the order reassigning Stringham and Barron, but he still did not fully inform Welles about the Pickens relief mission.82
On April 1, Lincoln was so badly indisposed that he declined to see visitors and complained that he was “nearly exhausted by the constant pressure on him.”83 Compounding that pressure, New York mer
chants and bankers lobbied him to have the Morrill Tariff repealed, arguing that it would ruin the country’s finances. Lincoln expressed “apprehension that the treasury would soon be bankrupt” because the new tariff might not be enforceable in the South, and thus goods could be brought into southern ports duty-free and then transshipped north.84 (He was, however, greatly pleased with the success of the first government loan under his administration, offered on April 2 and taken up at rates more favorable than the previous one.)
Four days later Seward and his son Frederick called on the navy secretary late at night with a telegram from Meigs and Porter asking for clarification of orders regarding the Powhatan, since confusion reigned at the Brooklyn Navy Yard. Seward demanded that Welles retract his order assigning that warship to Fox. Puzzled, Welles insisted that they consult the president immediately, even though the hour was late. En route to the White House, Seward “remarked that, old as he was, he had learned a lesson from this affair, and that was, he had better attend to his own business and confine his labors to his own Department.” (In fact, the meddlesome Seward continued to poach on the domains of his cabinet colleagues, much to their annoyance.)
Around midnight they arrived at the Executive Mansion, where Lincoln was still up. Surprised by the telegram from Meigs and Porter, the president suggested that he may have misunderstood which vessel would serve as flagship for the Sumter squadron, confusing the Pocahontas with the Powhatan. (Fox’s squadron consisted of the Pawnee, the Pocahontas, the Powhatan, and the Harriet Lane.) The navy secretary quickly retrieved documents from his office indicating that Lincoln had authorized the assignment of the Powhatan to Fox. To set things aright, Lincoln told Seward “that the Powhatan must be restored to Mercer—that on no account must the Sumter expedition fail.” Seward said he “thought it was now too late to correct the mistake” and that “he considered the other project the most important, and asked whether that would not be injured if the Powhatan was now withdrawn.” According to Welles, Lincoln “would not discuss the subject, but was peremptory—said there was not the pressing necessity in the other case. … As regarded Sumter, however, not a day was to be lost—that the orders of the Secretary of the Navy must be carried out.” When Seward opined that it might be too late to send a telegram to New York, Lincoln insisted that it be done nevertheless.85
Reluctantly, Seward obeyed, drafting a telegram to Porter ordering him to do as the president had instructed. Amazingly, it did not arrive until 3 P.M. the next day. Seward signed the message with his own name, not the president’s. The frigate, which had already set sail, was overtaken and the message handed to Porter, who refused to obey it because it bore the signature of the secretary of state and he was operating on orders signed by the president. The headstrong Meigs approved Porter’s action. Whether Seward deliberately sabotaged the change in plans by signing his own name rather than the president’s is not known for certain, but it seems probable. He was trying to thwart the Sumter expedition, which he opposed fiercely. Calling Seward “that timid traitor” who “paralizes every movement from abject fear,” Fox accused him of “treachery” by “interfering with the other dep[artment]s as the last hope of preventing the reinforcing of Sumpter.”86 Gideon Welles always believed that “to save himself,” Seward “detached the Powhatan from the expedition and sent her to Pensacola.”87 Without the Powhatan, Fox would probably not be able to carry out his orders.
On April 6, another Seward-inspired act threatening the Sumter expedition tends to confirm their suspicion. That day Seward’s friend, James E. Harvey, the influential Washington correspondent of the Philadelphia North American, telegraphed a leading lawyer in South Carolina, Harvey’s native state: “Positively determined not to withdraw Anderson. Supplies go immediately, supported by a naval force under Stringham if their landing be resisted. A Friend.”88 This dispatch reached the Palmetto State before the messenger sent by the president did. It may have induced the Confederates to attack Sumter while Fox’s task force was still steaming toward Charleston. Seward was aware of this telegram and doubtless provided Harvey with the sensitive information. Soon thereafter, Seward had Harvey appointed minister to Portugal. Later, when the senate wanted to investigate Harvey’s questionable conduct, the secretary of state blocked their plans. Seward brushed off the incident, saying that Harvey merely “thought he was in honor bound” to do what he did and that he should not be punished “for a piece of folly that did no harm & intended no disloyalty.”89
Seward’s conduct in this matter was sharply criticized by Charles Francis Adams, Jr., who found it hard to believe that “a man of Seward’s experience, quickness of perception, and aptitude in the use of agents, did not know what he was about when he gave that information to Harvey. He was not a fool. … It was not, on his part, ‘amazing carelessness.’ It was a designed plan.” Harvey’s act was “a crime,” for he was “just as much a spy within our lines as André was within the lines of Washington.” The secretary of state “was using a spy within our lines to convey information to the enemy, in order to effect his own ulterior purposes,—to carry out at a critical moment a plan which had a distinct shape in his mind.”90 According to John Hay, the government had, in addition to the telegrams Harvey sent to South Carolina, “oral and written evidence of Harvey’s complicity with the traitors. His most earnest defenders cannot rid him of the responsibility of so telegraphing the rebels that detection was for a time impossible. If his object was peace, he would have honorably used his own name.”91
Lincoln apologized profusely to Welles, saying that “it was carelessness, heedlessness on his part—he ought to have been more careful and attentive,” and that “we were all new in the administration; that he permitted himself, with the best intentions, to be drawn into an impropriety without sufficient examination and reflection.” He assured the navy secretary that “he was confident no similar error would again occur.” This willingness to “take upon himself the whole blame” was characteristic of Lincoln. As Welles put it, the president “never shunned any responsibility and often declared that he, and not his Cabinet, was in fault for errors imputed to them, when I sometimes thought otherwise.”92 Magnanimity was one of Lincoln’s most extraordinary qualities, one that would serve him well over the coming years.
Welles also demonstrated magnanimity, for much as he resented Porter’s conduct in the Powhatan fiasco, he, with Lincoln’s approval, rapidly promoted the young officer in recognition of his obvious ability and talent. Porter, perhaps recalling those April days in 1861, wrote many years later that Lincoln “was not a demonstrative man, so no one will ever know, amid all the trials he underwent, how much he had to contend with and how often he was called upon to sacrifice his own opinions to those of others, who, he felt, did not know as much about matters at issue as he did himself. When he did surrender, it was always with a pleasant manner, winding up with a characteristic story.”93
Seward’s Offer to Take over the Administration
Meanwhile, Seward overplayed his hand once again. He had failed to learn from his earlier threatened withdrawal from the cabinet that Lincoln could not be intimidated. On April 1, he went even further, virtually offering to take over the administration. In a memorandum entitled “Some Thoughts for the President’s Consideration,” the frantic secretary of state rashly told Lincoln that the government, now four weeks old, had no foreign or domestic policy. The latter should be to “change the question before the public, from one upon Slavery, or about Slavery, for a question upon Union or Disunion.” This could be achieved by shifting the country’s focus from Sumter (which the public associated with the issue of slavery) to Pickens (associated in the public mind with the issue of union). Therefore, Sumter should be abandoned and Pickens reinforced. This rehash of his earlier policy recommendations probably did not surprise Lincoln.
The president was doubtless amazed, however, by Seward’s foreign policy counsel. Alluding to recent events on the Caribbean island of Hispaniola, where Spain and F
rance appeared to be maneuvering to reestablish colonial rule, the secretary urged Lincoln to “demand explanations” from those two European powers, “categorically at once.” If they provided unsatisfactory answers, the president should “convene Congress, and declare war against them.” On top of that eccentric suggestion, Seward hinted broadly that he would be glad to run the country: “whatever policy we adopt, there must be an energetic prosecution of it. … Either the President must do it himself, and be all the while active in it, or devolve it on some member of his Cabinet. Once adopted, debates on it must end, and all agree, and abide.” In case Lincoln did not catch his drift, Seward added: “It is not my special province; but I neither seek to evade, nor assume responsibility.”94
Some commentators have argued that Seward did not mean what he said about declaring war in his memorandum. There is much evidence, however, suggesting that he was in earnest, especially about fighting Spain, which was a much weaker foe than either Britain or France. The idea of war with a European power was clearly in the air; Stephen A. Douglas was advised that “the only way under which we could or can possibly hope to save our union from destruction is to bring about a war with some foreign foe.”95
Abraham Lincoln: A Life, Volume 2 Page 21
