Lincoln thanked Horace Greeley for his paper’s approval of the emancipation plan and suggested that “as the North are already for the measure, we should urge it persuasively, and not menacingly, upon the South.” The place to start might well be Washington, D.C. There slavery could be abolished constitutionally, for the federal government controlled the District of Columbia. Lincoln, however, told Greeley: “I am a little uneasy about the abolishment of slavery in this District, not but I would be glad to see it abolished, but as to the time and manner of doing it. If some one or more of the border-states would move fast, I should greatly prefer it; but if this can not be in a reasonable time, I would like the bill [abolishing slavery in the District] to have the three main features—gradual—compensation—and vote of the people—I do not talk to members of congress on the subject, except when they ask me.”66 Greeley offered to endorse emancipation in the District with Lincoln’s provisos.
Some congressmen and senators favored a more radical approach, for constituents were pressing them to rid the capital of slavery on both moral and pragmatic grounds. Former Representative Jacob Brinkerhoff of Ohio optimistically predicted that if the emancipation bill passed, “Washington will soon become a northern city, and a radiating center for the dissemination of northern ideas.”67 In December 1861, Massachusetts Senator Henry Wilson had introduced a bill abolishing slavery in the District immediately and providing compensation for slaveowners. Four months later, the lawmakers heatedly debated the measure, adding a provision for voluntary colonization to be funded by Congress.
Maryland Unionists denounced the statute as “an act of bad faith on the part of Congress toward our State.”68 The state’s former governor and future senator Thomas H. Hicks opposed the bill. When Maryland Congressman John A. Crisfield called at the White House to protest against the legislation, Lincoln “said he greatly objected to the time, and terms of the bill, and saw the trouble it would cause, and would gladly have avoided any action upon it,” but “he also saw the troubles to arise on its rejection.” He “could not say it was unconstitutional, and he had come to the conclusion, after full consideration of all the pros & cons, that he would do less mischief by approving than by rejecting it; and he hoped that the people of Maryland, would see the difficulties of his position, and treat him with forbearance.” Crisfield told his wife that he was “really sympathetic” with the president, who was “surrounded with immense difficulties.”69
After the bill was adopted, Lincoln expressed to Orville H. Browning his regret that it “had been passed in its present form—that it should have been for gradual emancipation—that now families would at once be deprived of cooks, stable boys &c and they of their protectors without any provision for them.” He delayed signing the bill in order to allow Kentucky Congressman Charles Wickliffe time to remove two sick slaves who, in the president’s view, “would not be benefitted by freedom.”70
Lincoln’s March 6 message recommending compensated emancipation helped pave the way for the bill’s passage. Four days after that bombshell exploded at the Capitol, the National Anti-Slavery Standard reported that “several members who before it was delivered were on the fence have since leaped headlong over on the emancipation side.” The “hint at the close of his message, that a time may come when a decree of emancipation must be made, has worked wonders in Congress. Men who, a week ago, looked with horror upon any proposition to touch slavery in any manner, begin to shift position.” Such men “are the suitors for Executive favor—men who must be with the Administration, and sleep under the wing of the Executive, or die.”71
On April 16, Lincoln signed the legislation and explained his concerns to the lawmakers: “I have never doubted the constitutional authority of congress to abolish slavery in this District; and I have ever desired to see the national capital freed from the institution in some satisfactory way. Hence there has never been, in my mind, any question upon the subject, except the one of expediency, arising in view of all the circumstances. If there be matters within and about this act, which might have taken a course or shape, more satisfactory to my jud[g]ment, I do not attempt to specify them. I am gratified that the two principles of compensation, and colonization, are both recognized, and practically applied in the act.”72 Unlike the bill he had framed in 1849 abolishing slavery in the District, this statute did not allow the District’s voters to express their views, nor did it make emancipation gradual. Referring to his earlier measure, he told a friend: “Little did I dream in 1849, when I proposed to abolish slavery at this capital, and could scarcely get a hearing for the proposition, that it would be so soon accomplished.”73 In his 1858 debates with Stephen A. Douglas, Lincoln had declared that he “would be exceedingly glad to see Congress abolish slavery in the District of Columbia, and, in the language of Henry Clay, ‘sweep from our Capital that foul blot upon our nation.’ ”74
Washington blacks were jubilant, especially those who had been hiding out for days, fearing that their owners might remove them from the District in anticipation of Lincoln’s action. At Cooper Union, the preacher-colonizationist Henry Highland Garnet proposed to a group of fellow blacks who were celebrating the statute that they give “three cheers for the Union, the President, and old John Brown.”75 Alluding to Proverbs 14:34, Frederick Douglass hailed the new law as “that first great step towards that righteousness which exalts a nation.” The New York Anglo-African said: “Americans abroad can now hold up their heads when interrogated as to what the Federal Government is fighting for, and answer, ‘There, look at our capital and see what we have fought for.’ ” The president’s action “marks the grandest revolution of the ages, a revolution from barbarism to civilization” and among blacks won for him a “confidence and admiration … such as no man has enjoyed in the present era”76
White abolitionists loudly sang the law’s praises. Henry Ward Beecher declared that it “is worth living for a lifetime to see the capital of our government redeemed from the stigma and shame of being a slave mart. … we have found by experience that though Abraham Lincoln is sure, he is slow; and that though he is slow, he is sure!”77 Lydia Maria Child thought “it is some thing to get slavery abolished in ten miles square, after thirty years of arguing, remonstrating, and petitioning,” although the amount of territory liberated was “not much.” She predicted that the “effect it will produce is of more importance than the act itself.” As for the president, she was “inclined to think that ‘old Abe’ means about right, only he has a hide-bound soul.”78 Even the National Anti-Slavery Standard, which freely admitted that it had “not been overswift” to “acknowledge the sagacity of the President,” now said he “has shown himself a resolute and a wise man” with his “face set Zionward and a disposition to press forward in that direction.”79
Most Radicals thought that Lincoln’s approval of the bill represented “the turning-point in the policy of the Administration upon the slavery question.”80 Indiana Congressman George W. Julian rejoiced that the “current is setting in the right direction.”81 Passage of the bill, said Charles Eliot Norton, “has a significance far deeper than is contained in the mere fact of freeing a few thousand negroes. The first step toward general freedom has been taken, and certainly in this case it is le premier pas qui coute.”82
Some Radicals were less enthusiastic, believing that “the butter is spread on rather thin.”83 The eccentric Parker Pillsbury, whose “fretful, narrow spirit” disturbed fellow abolitionists, “said he dreaded to give way to any rejoicing, for he had noticed that any good thing in the Government was quite sure to be followed by some extraordinary baseness!”84 Illinois Congressman Owen Lovejoy, a self-described “old and ultra abolitionist,” demurred. With an apt image, he defended Lincoln as an “Executive rail-splitter” who “understands his business.” The president knew full well “that the thin end of the wedge must first enter the wood.” By signing the emancipation bill, he had “taken the Abolition wedge, and struck it into the log of Slavery and now the heavy m
all of Abolition must let the blows fall till it is driven to the head, and the log riven in twain.” But, Lovejoy cautioned, “in very ugly and cross-grained, or frozen wood, the blows have to be a little easy at first, or the wedge flies out.” Echoing Lincoln’s belief, the congressman added that it was “not worthwhile to strike so hard as to have a rebound, for that would retard the work in the long run.”85
Midwestern Republicans hailed the new law joyfully. “ ‘The world does move!’ ” exclaimed a happy Ohioan. “Congress has begun in the right place.”86 People in western Illinois felt “like shouting glory” to celebrate the news “that we have at last got a clean nest for the American Eagle.” One Sucker praised Lincoln for having “the discretion of Washington & the firmness of Andrew Jackson.” Initially, “we thought the pro Slavery influence about him would kill him—now we perceive his wisdom in making haste slowly.”87
Even the London Times, which generally took a dim view of the Lincoln administration, praised the law extravagantly. The “Thunderer” predicted that April 16, 1862, would “stand in American history as the greatest day since that of signing the Declaration of Independence—the day of this century which will be honored through all time.”88 With similar hyperbole, Wall Street lawyer George Templeton Strong asked rhetorically, “Has any President, since this country came into being, done so weighty an act?” Strong rejoiced that the “federal government is now clear of all connection with slaveholding.”89
Conservatives in Congress, however, were gravely disappointed. Democrats sneered that the “inevitable consequence must be a very great influx of fugitive negroes, and drain on the pockets of the philanthropic, besides calling for government assistance.”90 The Chicago Times predicted that the bill, along with Lincoln’s compensated emancipation scheme, “will prolong the rebellion” and “make eventual adjustment a thousand times more difficult.”91 That paper’s Washington correspondent remarked: “Negrophobia has seized the entire party of the Administration; they have nigger on the brain, nigger in the bowels, nigger in the eyes, nigger, nigger, everywhere.”92
When told that the Maryland congressional delegation would protest that their constituents’ slaves might escape to Washington, Lincoln remarked: “Well, I shall say to them, ‘I am engaged in putting down a great rebellion, in which I can only succeed by the help of the North, which will not tolerate my returning your slaves, and I cannot try experiments. You cannot have them.’ ”93 In fact, slave masters did complain to Maryland Governor Augustus W. Bradford about bondsmen fleeing to the capital. In May, the governor called on Lincoln, who was busy, but from Congressman Crisfield he learned that Marshal Lamon was helping to return fugitives to their owners.
Lincoln appointed Daniel R. Goodloe, Horatio King, and Samuel F. Vinton as commissioners to appraise the monetary value of each slave in the District. He explained to them “that he had chosen Mr Goodloe as representing the ‘black Republican’ party, Mr Vinton, his old Whig party, and Mr King the democratic party.”94 When some Republican senators objected to King, who had served in Buchanan’s cabinet, the president met with them at the Capitol on April 26. King and the others were soon confirmed, and over the next few months authorized compensation for 2,989 slaves.
One Step Backward: Revoking Hunter’s Abolition Decree
While Lincoln was willing to sign what he regarded as an imperfect emancipation measure for the District, he would not condone formal emancipation by military commanders in the field. Just as he had overruled Frémont’s proclamation in September 1861, so, too, he struck down General David Hunter’s similar decree in the spring of 1862. On May 9, Hunter, in charge of the Department of the South (consisting primarily of the Sea Islands off the coast of Georgia, Florida, and South Carolina), cited military necessity as a justification for liberating slaves there. Two days later, he pressed hundreds of them into military service and gave them weapons, prompting Border State delegations to demand that Lincoln repudiate Hunter’s action. From the North, Lincoln received heated protests, including one from a New Yorker who warned that if “General Hunter’s proclamation declairing the slaves of his department forever free, is not disowned by the administration and himself disgraced, I will place my whole property to the value of three millions, in the hands of the rebels for the use of the traitor Jeff Davis and his base ends[.] This act has done us more harm than a loss of two battles and has made Kentucky & Maryland almost against us, if not wholly.”95 Reverdy Johnson of Maryland pleaded with Lincoln to overrule Hunter and recall the general: “Unless promptly corrected, it will serve the rebels, more than a dozen victories.” Though he insisted that he was devoted to the Union cause, Johnson said he regarded “the policy thus inaugurated, if to be followed, as fatal to all our hopes.”96 Another Marylander, the former congressman and future Radical bête noire of the Lincoln administration, Henry Winter Davis, called Hunter’s proclamation “an outrage,” “unmilitary, unrepublican & insubordinate & wholly incapable of giving liberty in fact to a single slave who could not himself take it. A proclamation of emancipation over three States by a commander who hangs on by his fingernails to the coast under cover of … gun boats is a little ludicrous!!”97 A Philadelphian recommended that Lincoln should turn the tables on proclamation-prone generals by forbidding the issuance of any such documents contradicting administration policy. The president may well have been tempted to do so, for he exclaimed in frustration: “No matter what I do—I am troubled every day with the rash and unexpected acts of my officers!”98
Some Republicans maintained that Hunter had acted within the scope of his authority as a department commander; that the slaves freed by his order could not in good conscience be re-enslaved; and that the order would eliminate all possibility of European powers’ intervention on behalf of the Confederacy. Chase urged Lincoln to support Hunter, alleging that it was “of the highest importance, whether our relations at home or abroad be considered, that this order be not revoked. … It will be cordially approved, I assume, by more than nine tenths of the people on whom you must rely for support of your Administration.”99 The president, who “expressed great indignation” at Hunter’s action, curtly replied: “No commanding general shall do such a thing, upon my responsibility, without consulting me.”100 He explained that Hunter “was specially enjoined not to meddle with matters political” and had been forbidden to issue proclamations.101 Though Stanton approved of Hunter’s act, he deplored his lack of discretion: “Damn him, why didn’t he do it and say nothing about it.”102 Similarly, Lincoln remarked that he wished the general “to do it, not say it.”103
At first, Lincoln hesitated to overrule Hunter, lest European powers conclude that the North was simply waging a war of conquest which civilized nations might feel compelled to halt. But on May 19, he formally revoked Hunter’s order, surprising many Republican allies. The president averred that “the government of the United States, had no knowledge, information, or belief, of an intention on the part of General Hunter to issue such a proclamation,” adding that “neither General Hunter, nor any other commander, or person, has been authorized by the Government of the United States, to make proclamations declaring the slaves of any State free; and that the supposed proclamation, now in question, whether genuine or false, is altogether void, so far as respects such declaration.”
Having taken away with one hand, Lincoln then gave with the other. Portentously, he hinted that soon he might issue a proclamation like Hunter’s: “I further make known that whether it be competent for me, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, to declare the Slaves of any state or states, free, and whether at any time, in any case, it shall have become a necessity indispensable to the maintainance of the government, to exercise such supposed power, are questions which, under my responsibility, I reserve to myself, and which I can not feel justified in leaving to the decision of commanders in the field. These are totally different questions from those of police regulations in armies and camps.”
When a friend reminded the
president that he had allowed Halleck’s notorious order of the previous November forbidding slaves to enter Union lines to stand, Lincoln replied: “D—n General order No 3.”104
Lincoln used the occasion to warn Border State senators and congressmen that they should approve his compensated emancipation plan. In his proclamation revoking Hunter’s order, he issued an earnest appeal: “I do not argue. I beseech you to make the arguments for yourselves. You can not if you would, be blind to the signs of the times. I beg of you a calm and enlarged consideration of them, ranging, if it may be, far above personal and partizan politics. This proposal makes common cause for a common object, casting no reproaches upon any. It acts not the pharisee. The change it contemplates would come gently as the dews of heaven, not rending or wrecking anything. Will you not embrace it? So much good has not been done, by one effort, in all past time, as, in the providence of God, it is now your high previlege to do. May the vast future not have to lament that you have neglected it.”105 The appeal fell on deaf ears.
Lincoln’s revocation of Hunter’s proclamation pleased Moderates like Governor Israel Washburn of Maine, who maintained that the general’s “act was in fact unauthorized” and therefore “the President could say no less.” Washburn believed that “it is wise that the power should be exercised by him [Lincoln] alone.”106 To a general who congratulated him on his decision, the president remarked: “I am trying to do my duty, but no one can imagine what influences are brought to bear on me.”107
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