After thus alienating the Eastern troops, Pope made matters worse by issuing a series of orders (written by Stanton) dictating that civilians should be treated harshly: property would be seized, disloyal residents deported south, violators of loyalty oaths executed, and guerrilla attacks punished by reprisals. The hard hand of war, he intimated, would now fall on noncombatants. (This policy sharply clashed with that adopted by McClellan, who responded coldly to Pope’s friendly overtures. For good reason, Pope feared that Little Mac would not readily cooperate with him.) An angry General Lee deemed Pope a “miscreant” to be “suppressed.”66
As the Army of Northern Virginia closed in on Pope, he retreated from the Rapidan to the north bank of the Rappahannock, where for several days he parried the Confederates’ attempts to cross. On August 9, at Cedar Mountain, Stonewall Jackson whipped a much smaller force under Nathaniel P. Banks, who managed to inflict severe casualties before withdrawing. Lincoln praised the Massachusetts politician-general: “I regard Gen. Banks as one of the best men in the army. He makes me no trouble; but, with a large force or a small force, he always knows his duty, and does it.”67 To Judge Hugh Lennox Bond of Maryland, Lincoln described Banks as “his ablest man.”68 Pope and Banks bought enough time for McClellan’s forces to join them, but Little Mac as usual moved at a glacial pace. (A young woman observing a photograph of the general said “any artist could get a good one of him because he was always setting still.”)69 Lee boldly divided his 54,000-man force, sending half of it under Jackson on a wide flanking movement around the Union right. This dangerous maneuver indicated how little respect Lee had for McClellan. On August 27, Jackson’s men astounded Pope by getting into his rear, sacking his supply depot at Manassas Junction, and severing his communications. When news of that calamity reached the capital, Lincoln felt mortified, depressed, angry, and alarmed. His reaction was understandable, for Jackson now stood between him and Pope.
Realizing that Lee had divided his forces, Pope sought to defeat Jackson before the rest of the Army of Northern Virginia could join him. But his failure to block Thoroughfare Gap in the Bull Run Mountains allowed James Longstreet’s corps to stream to Jackson’s rescue. On August 29 and 30, while the Second Battle of Bull Run raged, Lincoln anxiously followed events as described by telegrams from Herman Haupt, chief of the army’s railroad construction and transportation. The president greatly admired Haupt, who he said “had enough brains for a corps commander, if he could be spared from his railroad work.”70 Lincoln was especially impressed by the colonel’s succinct, informative dispatches, so different from the imprecise, fretful, and misleading ones sent by McClellan.
The president worried most about McClellan, who had established headquarters in Alexandria and was supposedly hastening to Pope’s assistance. Of the Army of the Potomac’s 90,000 men, amazingly only 20,000 managed to connect with the Army of Virginia. The 25,000 soldiers in the corps of Franklin and Sumner could easily have reached the battlefield in time to help Pope if McClellan had not delayed their advance. An officer complained that Little Mac was “too dull to ever accomplish anything in War when decisions & speed are the essentials.”71 When Halleck chided him, McClellan sniffed that the general-in-chief “is not a refined person at all.” In fairness, it should be noted that Halleck’s infrequent orders were vague.72
On August 29, Little Mac shocked the president with an extraordinary telegram. “I am clear that one of two courses should be adopted,” the general counseled; “1st To concentrate all our available forces to open communication with Pope—2nd To leave Pope to get out of his scrape & at once use all our means to make the Capital perfectly safe.”73 McClellan wrote his wife that “I have a terrible task on my hands now—perfect imbecility to correct. No means to act with, no authority—yet determined if possible to save the country & the Capital. … I have just telegraphed very plainly to the Presdt & Halleck what I think ought to be done—I expect merely a contemptuous silence.”74 Contrary to McClellan’s expectations, Lincoln did reply. Suppressing his anger at the transparent suggestion that Pope be abandoned to his fate without the hearty cooperation of the Army of the Potomac, the president told the general: “I think your first alternative … is the right one. But I wish not to control. That I now leave to Gen. Halleck, aided by your counsels.”75 When Lincoln showed Old Brains the telegram from McClellan, the general-in-chief maintained that the Young Napoleon had been repeatedly ordered to hurry Franklin’s corps to Pope.
On August 30, in conversation with John Hay, Lincoln “was very outspoken in regard to McClellan’s present conduct. He said it really seemed to him that McC wanted Pope defeated.” As evidence supporting that conclusion, the president cited Little Mac’s message about leaving Pope “to get out of his own scrape.” He also deplored McClellan’s “dreadful cowardice” in recommending that Chain Bridge be blown up. (An order to that effect was countermanded.) Lincoln was furious at the general’s “incomprehensible interference with Franklin’s corps which he recalled once, and then when they had been sent ahead by Halleck’s order, begged permission to recall them again & only desisted after Halleck[’]s sharp injunction to push them ahead till they whipped something or got whipped themselves. The President seemed to think him a little crazy.” (Indeed, McClellan displayed unmistakable signs of deep-seated paranoia.) When Hay asked if the general-in-chief had “any prejudices,” Lincoln exclaimed: “No! Halleck is wholly for the service. He does not care who succeeds or who fails so [long as] the service is benefited.”76 In fact, Halleck had misinformed Lincoln about the orders to McClellan. Contrary to what he told the president, Halleck was in fact too timid to confront McClellan. In the midst of the battle, Halleck reportedly “lost the serene, cheerful cordial manner which was his a week ago. He is very short even with men who bring letters from Lincoln.”77 On August 31, the general-in-chief, fatigued by the heavy responsibility resting on his shoulders, appealed pathetically to McClellan: “I beg of you to assist me in this crisis with your ability and experience. I am utterly tired out.”78 With uncharacteristic promptitude, Little Mac responded, criticizing Pope harshly: “to speak frankly,—& the occasion requires it, there appears to be a total absence of brains & I fear the total destruction of the Army.”79 He recommended that Pope immediately fall back to Washington, which was, he thought, in such grave danger that he told his wife he would try to slip into the city and rescue her silver.
On August 30, Hay and the president met with Stanton, who severely criticized McClellan. The war secretary “said that nothing but foul play could lose us the battle & that it rested with McC. and his friends,” who deserved to be court-martialed. Stanton, wrote John Hay, “seemed to believe very strongly in Pope. So did the President.” That night, according to Hay, “[e]very thing seemed to be going well … & we went to bed expecting glad tidings at sunrise.” But the next morning, Lincoln told his young secretary: “Well John we are whipped again, I am afraid. The enemy reinforced on Pope and drove back his left wing and he has retired to Centerville where he says he will be able to hold his men. I don[’]t like that expression, I don[’]t like to hear him admit that his men need holding.” Lincoln did not despair, however. Hay noted that he “was in a singularly defiant tone of mind. He often repeated, ‘We must hurt this enemy before it gets away.’ ” The following day, when his assistant personal secretary remarked that things looked bad, Lincoln demurred: “No, Mr Hay, we must whip these people now. Pope must fight them, if they are too strong for him he can gradually retire to these fortifications.” Hay thought that it was due largely to Lincoln’s “indomitable will, that army movements have been characterized by such energy and celerity for the last few days.”80
The president emphatically declared to Gideon Welles that “there has been a design, a purpose in breaking down Pope, without regard of consequences to the country. It is shocking to see and know this.” On August 30, “[w]e had the enemy in the hollow of our hands” and would have destroyed him “if our generals, who are vexed wi
th Pope, had done their duty; all of our present difficulties and reverses have been brought upon us by these quarrels of the generals.”81 Radical Republicans in Congress shared his view.
Lincoln was also angry at General Fitz John Porter, who was court-martialed and cashiered for failing to support Pope on August 29. Robert Todd Lincoln recalled seeing his father deeply distressed upon learning of Porter’s behavior. To a friend the president remarked that “he knew no reason to suspect any one [involved in the Second Bull Run campaign] of bad faith except Fitz John Porter,” and that “he believed his disobedience of orders, and his failure to go to Pope[’]s aid in the battle … had occasioned our defeat, and deprived us of a victory which would have terminated the war.”82 After signing an order dismissing that general from the service, Lincoln remarked that in “any other country but this, the man would have been shot.”83 With unwonted severity, he asserted that Porter should have been shot. (In early August, Porter had called Pope “a fool” who “deserves defeat” and accurately predicted that he “will be whipped.”84 McClellan had made a similar prediction: “Pope will be thrashed during the coming week—& very badly, whipped he will be & ought to be.”)85 Republicans applauded Lincoln’s decision, which they regarded as a sign that he would crack down on other disloyal army officers and civilian bureaucrats. “It was a bold act, and he deserves credit for it,” commented a Radical journalist.86 Democrats had anticipated that they could convince him to go easy on Porter, but as D. W. Bartlett noted, when the president “is thoroughly convinced” he “is obstinately courageous. When he is not convinced he is sometimes vacillating.”87
A sense of déjà vu came over Lincoln as he contemplated the military situation. Things looked as bleak after the second battle of Bull Run as they had after the first. “I have heard of people being knocked into the middle of next week, but this is the first time I ever knew of their being knocked into the middle of last year,” he remarked on September 4.88 Four days later, General James Wadsworth reported that the president was “very downcast” and “has given way to apprehension remarkably.”89
McClellan’s actions infuriated not only Lincoln and Stanton but other members of the cabinet as well. Seward expressed amazement “that any jealousy could prevent these generals from acting for their common fame and the welfare of the country.”90 Bates complained of “a criminal tardiness, a fatuous apathy, a captious, bickering rivalry, among our commanders who seem so taken up with their quick made dignity, that they overlook the lives of their people & the necessities of their country.”91
On August 30, Stanton and Chase drew up a remonstrance calling for McClellan’s dismissal. Bates suggested that they tone down this “round-robin,” which was done. Smith, Stanton, Bates, and Chase signed the amended version, which declared that it was their “deliberate opinion that, at this time, it is not safe to entrust to Major General McClellan the command of any of the armies of the United States.”92 Welles was sympathetic but thought the document insufficiently courteous and respectful, while Blair refused to sign, though he agreed that McClellan was too untrustworthy for command. Seward was out of town, perhaps to avoid any confrontation over Little Mac.
On September 1, the angry McClellan had a frank talk with Halleck and Lincoln. The president and general-in-chief explained that they were alarmed by Pope’s dispatch complaining of the “unsoldierly and dangerous conduct of many brigade and some division commanders of the forces sent here from the Peninsula.” The demoralization of the army seemed “calculated to break down the spirits of the men and produce disaster.” Little Mac reluctantly agreed to accept command of the defenses of Washington and to urge officers in the Army of the Potomac to cooperate with Pope.93 Halleck, unable or unwilling to lead, had failed in his assignment to produce victory. McClellan had outmaneuvered him as sure-footedly as he had outmaneuvered Scott.
Bitter Pill: Restoring McClellan to Command
Lincoln was understandably perplexed. His Illinois friend Mark Skinner reported that the president “wanders about wringing his hands and wondering whom he can trust and what he’d better do.”94 On September 2, at a heated cabinet meeting, he appeared to be in deep distress and suffering bitter anguish, saying “he felt almost ready to hang himself.”95 He astounded the department secretaries by announcing that he had put McClellan in charge of Washington’s defenses. Chase vigorously protested “that giving the command to him was equivalent to giving Washington to the rebels” and predicted that “it would prove a national calamity.”96 When Stanton endorsed those views, Lincoln said that “it distressed him exceedingly to find himself differing on such a point from the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Treasury; that he would gladly resign his place; but he could not see who could do the work wanted as well as McClellan.” Halleck had proven incapable of command. The president would not budge, for he insisted that McClellan “knows this whole ground—his specialty is to defend—he is a good engineer, all admit—there is no better organizer—he can be trusted to act on the defensive, but having the ‘slows’ he is good for nothing for an onward movement.” Halleck shared his view, Lincoln added. Blair agreed that McClellan “had beyond any officer the confidence of the army.”97
The president said that he understood why the cabinet opposed McClellan and, according to Bates, that he “was far from doubting our sincerity, but that he was so distressed, precisely because he knew we were earnestly sincere. He was manifestly alarmed for the safety of the City. He had been talking with Gen Halleck … & had gotten the idea that Pope’s army was utterly demoralized—saying that ‘if Pope’s army came within the lines (of the forts) as a mob, the City w[oul]d be overrun by the enemy in 48 hours!!’ ” Bates argued that “if Halleck doubted his ability to defend the City, he ought to be instantly broke. 50,000 men were enough to defend it against all the power of the enemy. If the City fell, it would be by treachery in our leaders, & not by lack of power to defend.”98 The meeting adjourned without a discussion of the anti-McClellan round-robin, which Lincoln never saw.
Lincoln told Hay that McClellan, for all his faults, was at that moment indispensable because of his popularity within the army. “Unquestionably he has acted badly toward Pope,” the president acknowledged. “He wanted him to fail. That is unpardonable. But he is too useful just now to sacrifice.” In the present emergency, “we must use what tools we have.”99
Lincoln justifiably feared that the military might revolt if McClellan were not restored to command. On August 31, General Carl Schurz chatted with some brigadiers in the Army of the Potomac, who spoke contemptuously of the administration. McClellan boasted “that people had assured him that the army was so devoted to him that they would as one man enforce any decision he should make as to any part of the war policy.”100 A reporter who was initially indignant at the reappointment of McClellan changed his mind when he learned that “ninety thousand of our best troops were almost in a mutinous condition … because Gen. McClellan was not their commander.” This journalist, who strongly opposed slavery, concluded that “Lincoln did the very best thing he could do. Admit that the necessity was a melancholy one, nevertheless it was a most imperative necessity.”101 Whitelaw Reid heard a prominent public man remark: “I have been spending the afternoon talking with one of our leading Generals on this very subject of a possible coup d’etat. He has given me an inside view of military machinations, and I tell you, we have more than one General who has been trying to shape events so as to make himself dictator.” Reid found it significant “that the idea begins to be tolerated as a possibility” beyond the circle of proslavery officers.102 A high-ranking general in the Army of the Potomac warned that if someone other than McClellan were put in charge, it would be hard to tell whether the Confederate army or the Union army would reach Washington first. Michigan Senator Zachariah Chandler speculated that “traitor Generals” would soon remove Lincoln and establish a military dictatorship.103
To help squelch mutinous stirrings, Lincoln sacked Major John J.
Key, who had asserted that the Army of the Potomac had no intention of defeating Lee. When asked by a fellow officer why the army had not pursued the Confederates after Antietam, Key allegedly replied: “The object is that neither army shall get much advantage of the other; that both shall be kept in the field till they are exhausted, when we will make a compromise and save slavery.”104 When Chase heard about this conversation, he promptly informed the president, who “said he should have the matter examined and if any such language has been used, his [Key’s] head should go off.”105 After Chase’s informant met with Lincoln and repeated the story, Key was summoned to the White House and in response to questions “said he thought that slavery was a divine institution, and any issue in this conflict that did not save it would be disastrous.” Lincoln interrupted: “You may think about that as you please, but no man shall bear a commission of mine, who is not in favor of gaining victories over the rebels, at any and all times.” To show that he was serious, the president immediately cashiered Key “for his silly treasonable talk” and because he feared “it was staff talk” and he “wanted an example.”106 Lincoln felt humiliated by the necessity to restore the army to McClellan, but he insisted that considerations merely personal to himself “must be sacrificed for the public good.”107 He told Congressman William D. Kelley that “though he acted as Commander-in-Chief, he found himself in that season of insubordination, panic, and general demoralization consciously under military duress,” for McClellan “had contrived to keep the troops with him, and by charging each new failure to some alleged dereliction of the Secretary of War and President, had created an impression among them that the administration was hostile to him.” Reappointing Little Mac, the president added, “was a good deal like ‘curing the bite with the hair of the dog’ ” and called the decision to do so “the greatest trial and most painful duty of his official life. Yet, situated as he was, it seemed to be his duty.”108 Lincoln did not worry that McClellan himself would mutiny. When John Hay suggested that Little Mac might harbor seditious thoughts, the president replied: “McC[lellan] was doing nothing to make himself either respected or feared.”109
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