by Mehlo, Noel
The Munros Mountains, often referred to as the “hills of Scotland” by the Rangers proved to be an interesting challenge by the men, as they had yet to train on this type of terrain. It is often said by the Rangers that “Rangers were made or lost” in Scotland. They conducted tactical field marches in these mountains going up and down the steep slopes. Victor Miller described hiking “up and across the many hills with their marshy pits we might sink into and go for about five miles” only to attack something when reaching the objective. These are techniques still used by Rangers today. Ranger Copeland stated “The Scotland hills made or broke any tentativeness held by soldiers wearing the Ranger emblem—some soldiers ‘washed-out’ even at this late stage of elite U.S. Ranger training.”
General Raaen gave me the following account: “There were two types of training I remember. The first was assault training with live fire. We had many casualties and injuries during this training. In fact, we had a surgical team attached to us to have on the spot care for those wounded. I remember one incident. A Ranger company was in the attack. It used it's 40's against the entrenched enemy. The 40-mm mortar fire lifted and the company attacked. Meanwhile a thousand (?) meters away, an 81-mm mortar team was observing and saw the forties striking. Aha! Target of opportunity! The 81's opened up on the same target. The 81-mm mortar rounds reached their target at the same time as the Ranger Company. Eight casualties. I forget how many dead. The surgical team was needed.
The other type of training that I remember was amphibious training. Here we used the same LSIs and LCAs that we were to have in the invasion. I don't mean the same exact individuals, but the same ships and landing craft. One thing I'll never forget. The troops coming back from landings and assault of the mountains behind the beach, claimed even though the slope was something like forty degrees, there was standing water six to eight inches deep. Tufts of grass held little pools of water to keep it from running down hill.”
Figure 149: Ranger log training in Scotland from movie film. Note movement of logs. (NARA) Skill sets previously learned and mastered were not left behind in Scotland, they were honed (figure 149). The men practiced and practiced amphibious landings using the new methods learned by their British Commando instructors. These operations were practiced almost daily, with the Scottish coastline playing the lead adversary. The men would assault beaches strewn with obstacles such as barbed wire and any other German emplacement photographed during Allied surveillance flights of the French coastline. The military intelligence planners wasted no opportunity to provide any and all manner of anti-assault beach obstacle to throw at the Rangers and other units being trained here. The Rangers worked through every conceivable simulated battlefield situation and circumstance. The men loaded on their assault boats or craft and sailed some distance away from the embarkation point. The March waters of the Scottish coastline were bitter. The men would jump in and wade ashore through this, learning to overcome the conditions. After completing their infiltration of the shore defenses, the men practiced the art of meeting at a rally point and reassembling to carry on the assault inland to meet the attack on continued objectives. In his biography, JR Copeland noted “They were shooting live ammo at us, some Rangers got killed,” JR’ said about the Commando training. “It was tough, damn tough . . . as tough as I ever had.” Victor Miller expressed some funny stories in his biography of the Rangers scaring some of the locals while on training exercises, or just horsing around, by the use of live fire. He also indicated that the Rangers fired and fired their weapons as part of their training while in Scotland.
Figure 150: S/Sgt Hull and Corporal Herman Stuyvesant in Scotland SSG Herbert Hull & Cpl Herman Stuyvesant 5th Ranger Infantry Battalion, B Company had their photo taken at Rothesay, Scotland (Figure 150). The photograph was taken by the notable Victorian photography company J. Adamsom & Son, Rothesay. The studio was located on the Isle of Bude near where the Rangers trained in Tighnabruaich, Scotland. This photo was taken between March 1 and March 27, 1944.
In March 1944, 5th Ranger Infantry Battalion Commander, Lt. Colonel Owen E. Carter had lost the confidence of at least a portion of his officers. Company Commanders, Captains John T. Eichnor, George P. Whittington, Jr., and Hugo W. Hefflefinger all went outside of the chain of command to Colonel Rudder to persuade him that their commanding officer was not of Ranger caliber. These officers possibly made several trips to visit the Colonel to complain about their view of the incompetence of Lt. Colonel Carter. From their perspective, these officers took a great professional risk in their actions as they believed that they were saving lives in doing so. It is a serious breach of military protocol to do what they did in the manner they did it. General Raaen told me that somehow Major Sullivan or Captain Butler learned of the communications with Colonel Rudder by the three officers either through one of their friends in the unit, such as E Company Commander 1st Lieutenant Edward Luther or possibly through reporting through the non-commissioned officer chain of command. Sullivan, Butler and Luther had all graduated from the Massachusetts Military Academy. It is possible that if the three "mutinous" men had approached the Corps Command, that someone there may have tipped off Sullivan and Butler. Then 1st Lieutenant Raaen was awaken after midnight on March 4 and asked to report to Battalion Headquarters. When he arrived, he was asked by Major Sullivan and Captain Butler if he was one of the officers in on the activities of the others. One of the officers asked him, “Are you one of them?” Lieutenant Raaen replied, “One of whom? What are you talking about?” Lieutenant Raaen had heard that the three had “sneaked” down to Corps and report that Lieutenant Colonel Carter was incompetent and should be relieved. Lieutenant Raaen was asked what his opinion of the matter of the “mutineers” was from a military protocol standpoint as Raaen was Regular Army (RA), meaning that he held a full commission in the RA with a future career in the service with West Point under his belt, and all the formal training as an officer that entailed. Lieutenant Raaen “told them if they wanted to relieve the three, do it instantly, have them gone by reveille”. The Corps was called and the three officers were all summarily relieved of their respective company commands, and they were all removed from the battalion that very day on March 4, 1944. The Company Morning Report for the day shows Captain Whittington, from duty to Duty Station (DS) 2nd Ranger Infantry Battalion, APO#270, relieved from command. The next line shows 1st Lieutenant Bernard M Pepper, Assumes company command.
The Corps Command along with Colonel Rudder took a hard look at the accusations of incompetence brought against Carter. Colonel Rudder was not the deciding official, but the Corps command respected him and valued his opinion. As a result of that or other reasons, Lt. Colonel Owen was relieved of command of the 5th Ranger Infantry Battalion, by the VIII Corps on March 4, 1944. He was temporarily replaced by Major Sullivan on the same date. The seasoned Major Max Schneider later took command on March 24, 1944. Around the year 2000, General Raaen learned of the fact that the three captains had made several secretive trips to complain to Colonel Rudder about their Commanding Officer. He indicated to me that Colonel Rudder must have been concerned with the command situation in the 5th Ranger Infantry Battalion. General Raaen opined that Colonel Rudder must have been involved in getting the wheels turning on Lieutenant Colonel Carter’s removal. Even through the Provisional Ranger Group that formed later as a command structure to coordinate the actions of both Battalions on D-Day did not exist, Colonel Rudder was well respected in the command circles of EUTOSA. High opinions of Colonel Rudder and were held by General Eisenhower then on down the line. General Raaen to this day still does not know how Sullivan and Butler found out about what the three “mutineers” had been doing. General Raaen recalled liking Colonel Carter personally, but felt that his departure from the unit was not a bad thing. General Raaen did not believe that the strong willed personalities of Rangers were the kind of soldiers that he was best suited to command.
The United States Army 50th General Hospital advanced party arrived in Glasgo
w, Scotland on January 18, 1944. The advance party went to Cowglen Hospital at Boydstone, located in the then outskirts of Glasgow. They toured the 2nd Evacuation Hospital and acquainted themselves with the functions of the Hospital. They signed for the equipment and facility and began the work of setting up shop. The main element of the unit arrived on February 17. The former Cowglen Hospital was adjacent to two golf courses, and had ready access to rail facilities. The hospital was connected with the Glasgow water and sewer system as it had been in operation as a hospital before being requisitioned as a military hospital. The British government took to building many other facilities and Nissen hut buildings in order to accommodate the personnel assigned and patients who would travel through the hospital on their path to healing. The unit was subject to regular inspections from Brigadier Stevenson, Medical Consultant for the Scottish Command, Officers of the 26th District, Western Base Section, and by representatives of the Chief Surgeon's Office. They also had special inspections by General Lee, General Patton, General Kirk, General Grant, General Manifold, Surgeon of the Scottish Command, Brigadier Sheppard and others.
BMH Cowglen Hospital was located at Cowglen Road, Glasgow G53 6XJ. After World War Two British Military Hospital Cowglen became the Glasgow and Western Regional Hospital Board Hospital. The facility was demolished in 2000. In present day terms, from where the UK M8 crosses the river in downtown, one would head south a couple of miles to the interchange of M8 and M77. Take the M77 south to Barrhead Road (B762) and head west to a five point intersection called Peat Road. Head South on Peat Road to Cowglen Road which should be the first left turn. The hospital was located somewhere in this area.10
Dr. Robert W. Florence served with the 50th General Hospital during the war. He wrote some wartime memoirs in the American Acadamy of Orthopaedic Surgeons publication, Legacy of Heroes, 2002. In it he tells how the Cowglen, Scotland hospital had been a former tuberculosis hospital. He wrote about the use of the Nissen huts for surgical operating rooms and wards. He specifically wrote: “The 50th General Hospital became the station hospital for the American troops stationed in the area, and were soon busy. With the 5th Ranger Battalion doing their training in the rugged country to the north of us, the orthopedic service was soon busy treating all types of fractures. Our orders were to treat lower extremity fractures with traction, so it is my recollection that we had one Nissen hut filled, or nearly so, with beds equipped with Balkan frames and patients in traction.”11, 12
As if there was not enough change in leadership occurring in Scotland, on March 23, 1st Lieutenant Matthew Gregory was brought into B Company as the 2nd Platoon leader. He would land with the men on D-Day.
Figure 151: World War II Nissen Huts in use as part of a Station Hospital (NARA) On March 26, 1944, while on a training involving steep terrain, S/Sgt Hull lost his footing and broke his right ankle. He was training on terrain similar to that shown in Figure 152. He is noted in the March 27 B Company Morning Report as transferred to the 50th General Hospital, APO 506, US Army. His medical records provided through the Department of Veterans Affairs verified this event. James Robert Copeland told me during one of our calls that he remembered he (S/Sgt Hull) had fallen and gotten injured. He could not provide additional details. Thus began the vacation of S/Sgt Hull from the 5th Ranger Infantry Battalion. His path intersected with that of the 50th General Hospital. On March 30, he was transferred in grade with eight other injured enlisted men to the Detachment of Patients, 50th General Hospital for additional treatment. After being treated, he was then be assigned to Headquarters, 10th Replacement Depot, APO 874, until he was transferred back to the battalion on April 17, 1944 in Braunton Camp, England. His prowess as a Ranger likely led to his return to the unit, whereas many other men fell from the roles of the unit in Scotland, never to return.
The 10th U.S. Army Replacement Depot, known as a “repple depple” by troops was a temporary station for troops who were destined to be replacement soldiers for front line units. Wounded soldiers who had been released from medical care would be sent to the replacement depots to await return to active service. The last function of the replacement depot was that of a military prison for soldiers who were convicted of having gone AWOL (Absent Without Leave) if from a unit headed to front-line service. In August 1942, the 10th Replacement Depot moved to Whittington Barracks, a British Army base in Whittington, Staffordshire, near Lichfield, England. The address was at 10th US Army Replacement Depot, APO 7245, NY, NY, at Litchfield, England.
The British Army, British North Staffordshire Regiment turned the facility over to the U.S. Army in World War II for the replacement depot. The British had constructed part of the facility in 1877, and it was constituted of red brick buildings. The remainder of the area had been part of a housing development started in 1937 known as the Pheasey Farm development. By the outbreak of World War II, 2000 homes had been completed. The location of it was at the corner of Collingwood Drive and Beacon Road on the site of the old Roxburgh Grove.
Figure 152: 5th Ranger Infantry Battalion conducting cliff climbing training in Scotland (NARA) The 10th U.S. Army Replacement Depot had its own dubious reputation earned during the World War II. After the war in 1946, several of the command officers and guards associated with the prison attached to the Replacement Depot were tried for allegations of war crimes involving cruelty against prisoners. These crimes included beating prisoners, making them do seven hours of vigorous physical training a day and only allowing five minutes to eat. The 10th U.S. Army Replacement Depot was under the command of Lieutenant Colonel James A Killian. He would later stand accused in the aforementioned court martial. Several accounts of soldiers passing through the unit while waiting assignment to their future line units were likewise subjected to treatment not exactly fitting that of trained soldiers. One account indicated that a particular soldier, who having been assigned to the 10th U.S. Army Replacement Battalion, 438th Battalion, Company C, was subjected to unusual treatment, not even as a prisoner. He indicated that the men were subjected to routine gas mask drills, close order drill and formal retreat ceremonies on a nightly basis. The soldier said these were performed for the personal pleasure of the Post Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Killian. I can only imagine how any Rangers would have taken to a “leader” of this caliber while “stuck” there. I am sure that the shenanigans at the Replacement Depot did not impress any of the Rangers to pass through the gates.
The 5th Ranger Infantry Battalion completed their training in Scotland and on April 2, 1944, departed for their next duty station at Braunton Camp, England, APO 230. The unit left Tighnuabruaich, Scotland at 1600 hours by motor boat and arrived at Rothasay, Scotland fourteen miles at way at 1745 hours. They then embarked aboard the TSS Sussex and arrived at Wemyss, Hemys Bay, Scotland at 1925 hours having travelled 25 miles. Next they travelled 100 miles by rail, arriving at Preston, England at 2359 hours. On April 3, they travelled 400 miles by rail to the US Assault Training Center at Braunton Camp, England. They were aboard their train from 0001 hours until 1530 hours.
12 U.S. ASSAULT TRAINING CENTRE, BRAUNTON, ENGLAND
Major Max F. Schneider was the 2nd Ranger Infantry Battalion Executive Officer. He had transferred to the unit on November 11, 1943 while the rest of the 2nd Ranger Infantry Battalion was transiting the Atlantic. He joined the unit on December 1, 1943 near Glasgow, Scotland when the Queen Elizabeth docked with the battalion aboard. While a member of the 2nd Rangers, he had participated along with British Commandos on nighttime reconnaissance landings of the entire Normandy coastal area later attacked on D-Day. He had previously served as a Company Commander in the 1st Ranger Infantry Battalion in Africa. He then served as the Battalion Executive Officer of the 4th Ranger Infantry Battalion in the Mediterranean, where his leadership and experiences landing in Sicily and Italy would prove a decisive factor on D-Day.
The commander of the 2nd Rangers was briefed on the landings on January 4, 1944. This D-Day mission briefing is of critical importance to the story of D-D
ay later on. Colonel Rudder and Major Schneider reported to General Omar Bradley’s headquarters in London where the briefing took place. General Bradley’s operations officer, Colonel Truman Thorson, provided the briefing to the men. The office had detailed maps of the invasion area including unit locations and objectives as part of the invasion. The Rangers were briefed on Pointe du Hoc and the importance of knocking it out. They were briefed on the six 155-mm Grande Puissance Filloux (GPF) cannons at Pointe du Hoc that had a range of 17,400 yards, with a modernized weapon using modernized ammunition having a range of 25,000 yards.1
They were also provided two other objectives including taking control of the coastal road running parallel to the cliffs and taking control of Pointe de la Percee which was a strongpoint on the western bluffs of Omaha Beach. Seventy percent casualties were expected of the Rangers they were told. When presented with the plan, it is said that Major Schneider took it in and whistled through his teeth. I picture a single note emanating from him when reading that. A book about him by his son, James F. Schneider tells how this briefing had profoundly affected his father for a time, likely as a result of post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).2 I am deeply moved by the biography of Max F Schneider, and recommend it as reading to anyone interested in military leadership during World War II. PTSD was a condition that during World War II had yet to be identified. It was reported by his son that Schneider knew the job that had to be done, and prepared himself to do it.
As a result of the change of command on March 24, 1944 with Major Max Schneider assuming command of the 5th Ranger Infantry Battalion, both Captains George P. Whittington, Jr. and Hugo W. Hefflefinger were reinstated in the battalion by Major Schneider on April 3, 1944. Whittington resumed command of B Company, and Hefflefinger became the Battalion S-3 Officer. Captain John T. Eichnor declined Major Schneider’s invitation to rejoin the Battalion and moved on to the 125th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, Mechanized. He would return home at the conclusion of the war a hero after having survived being a German POW, and the sinking of a vessel he was travelling on in the Atlantic. General Raaen would again meet the officer during the Vietnam War. First Lieutenant Charles H. “Ace” Parker assumed command of A Company and 1st Lieutenant George Miller assumed command of D Company. 2
