by Mehlo, Noel
Figure 231: General Eisenhower message given to Allied Forces before D-Day (USACMH) To truly understand what really happens in a battle, it is important not just to study it from one point of view. The German defenders who opposed the Rangers, 29th Infantry Division and 1st Infantry Division are every bit as important to place on the battlefield to understand what happened that day. The initial ferocity of fighting that they brought to bear along Omaha Beach bears testament to this. The Germans had readied themselves for nearly five years for the inevitable attack they knew would come from the British and Americans. It is my strong opinion that Hitler essentially lost the war when he attacked the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941 when he launched Operation Barbarossa. There was no numerical way he could defeat the Russians with conventional means. To fight the Soviets, British and later the Americans was not realistic. Hitler and his Nazis were big believing in theatricality and false hopes. As the war progressed they were equally big on overestimating their own abilities. The Atlantikwall, although a great concept for defense, was never constructed to the measure of strength Hitler had ascribed to it. Had he not attacked the Soviets, perhaps he could have applied the proper manpower and resources to set sufficient defenses with which to defend the coast. The loss of German air supremacy during the early years of the war was a major strategic and tactical blunder that later cost the Germans the control of France. The war of intelligence and deception was won by the Allies well before the invasion. A prime example of this was that the Pas de Calais was never the real target of the Allies, and yet the Allied of leading the Germans to that conclusion as a deception worked brilliantly. Another example of the intelligence win for the Allies was the Ranger assault on Point du Hoc. Albert Speer, Reich Minister for armaments and munitions wrote a very telling truth often overlooked both then and now. It was captured by Joseph Balkoski in his great work Omaha Beach, D-Day, June 6, 1944. Speer wrote:
Given the great length of the French, Belgian, and Dutch coasts, a complete line of pillboxes spaced close enough to offer mutual protection would have far exceeded the capacity of the German construction industry. Moreover, there were not enough soldiers available to man such a large number of pillboxes… For (The Atlantik Wall) we consumed, in nearly two years of intensive building, 17,300,000 cubic yards of concrete worth 3.7 billion DM (Deutsch marks). In addition the armaments factories were deprived of 1.2 million metric tons of iron. All this expenditure and effort was sheer waste.6
The German chain of command in Normandy fell under the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, Adolf Hitler. Reporting to him was the Oberkommando de Wehrmacht (OKW) or Armed Forces High Command, under Generalfeldmarscall Wilhelm Keitel. The Oberbefehlshaber West (OB) or Commander-in-Chief West was Generalfeldmarscall Karl Rudolf Gerd von Rundstedt with the mission to “prevent any hostile landing in its area. The MLR (Main Line of Resistance) is the high tide line in the coast. Should the enemy land at any place, they are to be immediately thrown back into the sea”. Rundstedt oversaw Army Group G and Army Group B. Army Group B was under the command of Generalfeldmarscall Erwin Johannes Eugen Rommel, who due to his popularity with Hitler, maintained personal access to the Fürher. Rommel in turn oversaw the LXXXVIII Corps, Fifteenth Army, Seventh Army and had conditional tactical control over the II Parachute Corps. The Seventh Army was in command of the units on western Omaha Beach including the 716th Static Infantry Division, and the 352nd Infantry Division (Wehrmact). The 716th Infantry Division was under the command of Generalleutnant Wilhelm Richter. The 726th Infantry Regiment with their command post at Gruchy Castle just west of Vierville was part of the 716th. The 352nd Infantry Division was commanded by Generalleutnant Dietrich Kraiss. The Allied Intelligence efforts failed to firmly place the more experienced 352nd Infantry Division in the vicinity of the Omaha Beach landing area in time to affect D-Day planning. They had become aware of its presence in May, but did not change plans in response to the realization of their placement. This division was near full strength and was well equipped. They had nearly completed their training by D-Day. Although many of the soldiers in the Division were conscripts, many of their officers had experience on the Russian front. There are two really good books for understanding the German point of view is The German Army at D-Day by David C. Isby,7 and NORMANDIEFRONT: D-Day to Saint-Lo Though German Eyes by Vince Milano and Bruce Conner.8 They draw from German source material and set the table from the German Army leaders and soldiers who were there. Everything that happened to the Rangers at Pointe du Hoc, Pointe et Raz de la Percée, Exit D-1 at Vierville on Omaha Beach and the Omaha Dog White/Dog Red landing locations was as a direct result of the defenses put in place by the defenders and their means and mode of counterattack throughout the battle.
By 1944, the Germans had had a taste for the style of battle the Americans combined with the British could and would bring as a result of the action in the Mediterranean. They knew of the supremacy of the skies and sea that the Americans created through their technological development and industrial machine. Field Marshall Erwin Rommel had evaluated the Normandy defenses in January, 1944 and reported his findings directly to Hitler. His report indicated that the defenses of area along the Normandy coastline were inadequate. There was also disagreement between Rommel and von Rundstedt regarding the placement and use of reserve forces including armor. As a result of this report, the Germans began to fortify the Omaha Beach landing area in earnest. The improvements to the beach would prove devastating to the men initially landing on June 6; however, the poor decisions regarding the latter would result in allowing the Allies to gain a foothold as there was not sufficient defense on depth behind the beach. The Germans hence set about improving the defenses installing Belgian Gates, Czech Hedgehogs and obstruction beams (Figures 232-233).
Figure 232: German beach defenses at Omaha Beach, Belgian Gate (left) and Czech Hedgehog (right). (German Federal Archives)
Figure 233: Field Marhall Erwin Rommel inspects Omaha Beach defenses (Hemmbalken, or "obstruction beams") in spring of 1944. (German Federal Archives) One weakness along the Calvados coast was that between what the Allies referred to as Draws, where the cliffs and bluffs overlooked the beach, the German 716th Infantry Division physically did very little to defend the crest. They put in place minefields, open trenches and other light defensive positions, but not the heavy defensive infrastructure that was abundant at the WNs (Widerstandsnest). The Germans underestimated the Allied ability to infiltrate large numbers of infantry forces up the bluffs. They assumed that the interlocking fire on the beach would inhibit any ability to make it up the bluffs, or the cliffs of Point du Hoc, for that matter (Figure 234). This was found to be nowhere more critical to the assault on Omaha Beach than at Dog Red/Dog White.6
Figure 234: German 80 mm mortar (left) and MG-42 machine gun crew in Normandy (German Federal Archives) Major General Deitrich Kraiss, Commander of the 352nd Infantry Division charged with the defense of the section of Normandy Coast that included both Omaha and part of Gold Beach. He had led a German Division in fighting the Russians in 1941. The 352nd formed on the Eastern Front. This Division did contain a cadre of a core group of men who had fought on the Russian front. The rest of the men in the unit were either young or inexperienced conscripts. They trained the best that they could, considering the shortages of fuel and other supplies that hindered their training mission in the months leading to D-Day. The Division was well equipped and was nearly at full strength of some 12,000 men by D-Day. It had new German 105 mm and 150 mm guns (Figure 235). They were assigned antitank units equipped with armored vehicles. General Kraiss’s headquarters was at Molay-Littrey. This placed his command post some nine miles west of Bayeux and thirteen miles south of Omaha Beach.
Figure 235: German 105 mm gun, pictured in Russia, 1942 (German Federal Archives) The 352nd Grenadier-Division included soldiers from three different combat experiences units that had become combat ineffective. These were the Grenadier-Division 546, decimated at Stalingrad, and the 268th and 321
st Infantry Divisions, decimated in the Kursk Offensive of 1943. Other men who had recovered from wounds received in Africa and Italy also joined the cadre of the unit. Ten percent of the overall soldiers in the division were combat veterans. In total, approximately 75 percent of all non-commissioned officers and officers were battle tested veterans. All the line officers had frontline experience. To this seasoned group were added several thousand German conscripts from the training camp at Schlann, Germany. The new division was to be fully activated by January 1944, and would train in order to fight on the Eastern Front. There were several battalions of eastern Europeans conscripted “volunteered” for service in the German Army. These men were commanded by Germans and constituted a small fraction of the Division strength at thirty percent of the total strength. The German Army was better integrated than the U.S. Army with all of its endemic bigotry. By March 1944, the division was declared at the disposal of OKW and ready for deployment. The men of B Company would later take some of these volunteers as prisoners, and would not be impressed with them as soldiers.
On the other hand, the static 716th Infantry Division was ill trained, equipped and prepared in the estimation of Rommel to cover such a vast defensive sector of the Normandy Coast. As a result, he assigned the 352nd the task of defending the area known to the Allies as Omaha Beach. Rommel allowed the deployment of the 352nd Artillery behind the beaches to bolster the defense of the coastal zones. Additionally, the I and III Battalions of the GrenadierRegiment 726th were transferred to the 352nd.
Rommel issued three orders to the 352nd Grenadier-Division: Improve the beach defenses along their part of the coast
Be responsible for building and maintain defensive positions from the coast all the way to St. Lô, and provide security in this area
Maintain the current Divisional training schedule
Kraiss established two main battle lines. The first was the beach defenses along the coast. The second was a line established some 10 to 15 km south of the coast. This turned out to be a mistake due to Allied air power and poor north south routes to move forces. It lengthened German supply lines such that they could not resupply ammunition. The 352nd was also on standing alert for movement within Europe and as such, they faced supply challenges from higher echelons. By June, the beach defenses were evaluated and a report provided to Kraiss. The report stated that only 45 percent of the bunkers were built to sustain artillery fire. Only fifteen percent of these numbers of fortifications were constructed to withstand aerial bombardment. The remaining fortifications were deemed unfit to either. Kraiss determined that he would have to rely on the readiness and quality of his troops for the invasion. Throughout the spring, he trained his men using two overall themes. His experience had shown the importance of individual training of the soldier. He knew that small groups of well trained soldiers could inflict damage upon and hold up larger and more powerful enemy units. Secondly, he knew the value of training for the counterattack. Again, his combat experience had shown him the importance of the counterattack to retake ground or to plug gaps in battle lines. In final preparations, a failure was made by the Germans in that they did not provide enough ammunition to their coastal defenses. Many of the units simply fired their weapons until they ran out of ammo. Some German positions fired as many as 10,000 rounds on Omaha Beach on D-Day.
According to study of the German forces, the conventional thinking that the 352nd was just training in the Omaha Beach sector should be called into question. Also, while not a crack SS type unit, these men were a properly trained, equipped and an experienced unit. The division had been on station for all of 1944. They had trained well, even incorporating it into mundane activities such as securing supplies to construct the coastal barriers on the beaches. A testimony to this is the lack of Maquis action against the 352nd in Normandy. German Obergefreiter Josef Brass wrote about it. “Our units were never attacked by the Maquis because we were a combat unit with machine guns and support weapons. These men may have hated us but not enough to ensure death by attacking a well armed and trained unit.”
Another impressive aspect of the 352nd was their intelligence gathering ability, and the abilities of their commander to properly weigh the intelligence data. Kraiss believed the Normandy coastline would be a major invasion objective. He trained his men for it. On June 1st, the 352nd had received reports of low flying recon aircraft. Kraiss also had reports of an increase in carrier pigeon traffic from the Normandy coast. In response, he put a bounty on pigeons. The captured messages evaluated as a result of this action revealed the Maquis had made detailed reports to the Allies as to German positions and troop strengths. The capture of a Maquis in Brittany resulted in a wealth of intelligence from the interrogation. The Allies were reported to commence the invasion in the first week of June in Normandy. Kraiss reported this up to Berlin, requesting an alert be issued. He was denied this request as being alarmist. This is from a U.S. Army Intelligence Document MS-B 432, 352nd Infantry Division, dated 1947. The German high command of the 7th Army was scheduled to have war games for the entire first week of June, as is reported in books like The Longest Day. Kraiss acted skillfully on his intelligence gathering and remained at his post, using the war games as an excuse to put his men on alert on June 4. He told his subordinates of the impending invasion, and that for them, the alert was real.8
Oberstleutnant Fritz Ziegelmann, Assistant Chief of Staff, 352nd Infantry Division later wrote that he had asked about the strength of reserves in May and was rebuffed. “My query, that the width of the division sector (53 kilometers) and the weaknesses of our rearward defenses made possible an infiltration through the less heavily occupied sections, and that to counter this, assault reserves were necessary behind the lines, remained unanswered…”8 This weakness would be exploited by the 116th RCT and the 5th Ranger Infantry Battalion as they assaulted the bluffs.
What the Omaha Beach sector lacked in depth to their defenses, they made up for during the initial hours of the assault with artillery fire and the defenses of the WN stongpoints. A good detailed description of these WN positions is found in a book called Omaha Beach by Georges Bernage. A captured German map shows that the Germans had zeroed in the beach for artillery strikes (Figure 233). The important fact is that the Germans were as ready as they could be, and they were waiting for the Allies, particularly at Omaha Beach due to the command decisions of General Kraiss. For that reason, the Allies would have to pay by the inch in blood for their assault here.
On D-Day, the Germans had fortified the seven km stretch of Omaha Beach from Sainte-Honorine-des-Pertes to Pointe et Raz de la Percee with 14 WN positions numbered 60 through 73. Only WNs 63, 67 and 69 were not able to provide direct fire upon the beaches. The WNs had a massive amount of available firepower. This included:
Two 88 mm Pak
One 76.2 mm FK
Six 75 mm FK(f)
Two 75 mm turreted guns Ten 105 mm Pak
One 47 mm Pak
At least 85 machine guns 15 mortars of various sizes
Two 80 mm mortars
Six 37 mm guns
Four artillery batteries consisting of: Twelve 105 mm leFH
Four 150 mm sFH
Figure 236: German Marder III Tank Destroyer
(German Federal Archives) The slit trenches, bunkers, pillboxes, mortar pits and Nebelwerfer (rocket launchers) and machine gun nests were manned by men from the 916th and 726th regiments. The GR 726 occupied the majority of the WNs. 10/GR 726 occupied WN 64, 65, 66 and 68. The 11/GR 726 based at Vierville occupied WN 70, 71, 72 and 73. Stab II/GR 916 was at Formigny. The 9/GR 726 was at Gruchy near Englesqueville, 6/GR 916 was located at Formigny, and 7/GR 916 was at Surrain. The third battalion of the 726th Infantry Regiment, including the above units was attached to the 352nd Infantry Division. The total units along the beach included five infantry companies, with five additional infantry companies and four artillery batteries in support, not including the guns of Pointe du Hoc. The 352nd Infantry Division also had reserve
units consisting of II/IR 915 and 2/Panzerjaeger Abtl 352 (Marders) available to reinforce IR 916 at Omaha Beach (Figure 236). Other defensive weapons are shown in Figure 237.
Figure 237: German PAK 38 gun (left, German Federal Archives) and Nebelwerfer (right, NARA)
Figure 238: Portion of captured German Map showing artillery firing solutions onto Omaha Beach between Vierville Sur Mer and St Laurent (NARA) The Germans developed methods to sight in every portion of the beach with direct and indirect fire for all locations. There is photographic evidence of firing solutions painted on walls inside the WN positions and mortar pits. The map in Figure 238, captured by the Allies demonstrates the German artillery planning. The Germans used interlocking tunnels and other means of communications to direct the attack. Unfortunately for them, their wirebased systems became easy prey for the French Resistance and Allied forces as the battle developed.
Gruchy is one kilometer to the west of Vierville. It sits at a small crossroads along the coastal highway on the way to Pointe du Hoc and is named for a manor house that sits to the south of the road (Figure 239). The Castle Gruchy, as it is known is unseen from the roadway as it is surrounded by forests and hedgerows. In 1944, this manor was owned by a family by the name of Loÿs, overseen by Madame de Loÿs and her 16 year old son Guy Loÿs. She played host to one hundred soldiers quartered at the manor. She was said to have been polite and accommodating, yet not allowing for familiarity with the men. She took in some neighbors as a result of the pre-invasion bombing from as far west as Pointe du Hoc. The Castle became a hive of activity beginning at around 4 and 5 o’clock in the morning of June 6 as reports began to come in of the Allied activities in the region. The Madame and her son went out on the terrace where they were joined by the German Company Commander.
