by Mehlo, Noel
It was now full daylight as the Rangers worked their way through from beach obstacle to obstacle and into the breakwaters, the shingle, seawall and coastal road above it. The Rangers view of the defenders was reminiscent of the carnival game “Whack-a-Mole” where a German would be seen popping up, fire a weapon and drop back down again, only to have the same soldier or another man pop up somewhere else. The smoke began to become intermittent now and again, and the wind made some direction changes during this time. The hand of God also played a hand in protecting the Rangers as they came ashore. This was amidst horrendous carnage both to the left and to the right of the battalion. A Landing Craft Tank (LCT) was struck by artillery to the right front of the Rangers as they landed a little down the beach which began to draw German attention. This was LCT No. 29 commanded by Lt. (jg) Wright, transporting 743rd Tank Battalion, HQ Section. This vessel dropped its ramp at 0745 approximately 200 yards from shore. During this, the cables operating the ramp snapped and the ramp door folded underneath the craft, thereby not allowing debarkation. The Germans then began shelling the LCT. The craft withdrew from the beach at 0800 and took position 1000 yards from shore.
Between the first and second wave of Rangers to land, The United States Coast Guard (USCG) Landing Craft Infantry Large 91 (LCI(L)-91 or LCI 91) made their second attempt at landing at 0750 hours to the right of the Rangers just moments before LCA 1377 carrying Captain Raaen touched down on the right flank of the Rangers. LCI 91 was carrying Headquarters 116th Infantry, 147th Engineers Battalion, 121st Engineers Battalion, and 7th Beach Battalion. On their first grounding, the skipper, LTJG Arend Vyn, Jr., USCGR, reported striking a mine in the port bow. The LCI had first landed further out from the seawall about 0730 and started to disembark troops, but had to move closer to shore to account for the incoming tide after about 140 troops had disembarked. LCI 91 and her sister ships were formidable landing craft, presenting targets that the Germans had to deal with. Each 158 foot vessel was capable of landing some 201 troops and was armed with at least four 20mm Oerlikon cannons and two .50 heavy machine guns. LCI 91 was reportedly initially struck in the starboard side by an 88 mm round from WN 72. The vessel was then also rocked by additional 88 mm and other artillery shell blasts machine gun fire and by teller mines attached to adjacent beach obstacles. The 88 mm shell struck amidships and caused a flamethrower soldier to erupt into a conflagration of flame engulfing everything around him. General Raaen would later write that LCI 91 had touched down some 50 to 100 yards to the right of his location, placing him just on the other side of the blast pictured below. Consequently, B Company, 2nd Platoon would have been another 50 yards or so further to the east from Raaen’s position. The arrival of LCI 91 became a German focus for fire as it came ashore. The official history by the War Department reported of the destruction to LCI 91: “Clothes burning, men jumped or fell off into the sea and tried to swim in under continued artillery fire. It is estimated that no personnel escaped from No. 1 compartment of the craft out of the 25 carried there”.32, 39, 40 Figure 254 shows LCIs 91 and 92 as they travelled across the Channel to Normandy.
Taylor’s notes discuss the miraculous landing of the 5th Rangers intact. He noted the LCIs were drawing the artillery fire. He discussed the grass fires and the movements of other units in the sector. “Possible factors may be, that C Company, 116th Infantry had gone up the bluff just to the right front, as the Rangers were coming in, and this would have disorganized the nearest enemy positions; that A and B Companies of the 2nd Rangers were drawing heavy fire of all types 300 yards to the right; that smoke from grass fires on the bluff, to the right, may have obscured some part of this beach. At any rate, the 5th Rangers came in at a “blind spot” (or a “blind moment”) in the enemy fire defenses and their luck was almost unique in these first hours on Omaha Beach. It was wholly a question of absence of fire…”24
Figure 254: LCI 91 and LCI 92 en route to Normandy for D-Day invasion. (NARA) Victor Miller, 5th Ranger Infantry Battalion, F Company wrote: “When we got closer we could see tracers coming down the beach which wasn't a very promising sight. We saw obstacles sticking up, which were triangular pieces of steel with mines dangling from them”.41
Figure 255: LCI 91 explosion at 0750 hours on D-Day. Omaha Beach, Dog White Sector (NARA) The second wave of Rangers came in behind but centered slightly to the right of the first wave covering a two hundred yard front. Their craft landing at this time included from right to left: LCI 91 (116th Infantry Regiment) located 50 to 100 yards from the Rangers, LCA 1377 to the extreme right of the Ranger position with the other half of HQ Company, C Company’s two LCAs, D Company’s twp craft landing on top of Scnheider’s position, and the F Company, 2nd Platoon landing on top of B Company.38
LCI(L) 92 landed to the left of the Ranger formation in the minutes after the second wave of Rangers reached the seawall. LCI(L) 92 was commanded by LT Robert M. Salmon, USCGR, and was part of Task Force 124. She was struck on the port side by an 88 mm shell, presumably fired from WN 73. This vessel was struck by multiple 88 mm shells and teller mines. The Germans then focused their efforts on destroying the vessels and men from both LCIs. The after action report states that the two LCIs would burn for most of the day. It was also reported that much artillery fire was brought to bear upon the beach west of Exit D-3 from enemy artillery positions at Pointe de la Percée. The German defenders would fire a shot, then make any needed adjustments to their firing azimuths, then fire three or so shells of artillery upon their prey.40
Figure 256: This view from within the H677 casemate at Wn 72 shows to advantage how the 88m Pak 43 installed within dominated the beach to the east. The wrecked LCI 91 is visible on beach in center of photo. US Army Signal Corps Photo, NARA “The approach to the beach was heavily obstructed. The LCI(L)-91, which had beached half an hour earlier, was in flames, and it was decided to beach to the left of the 91 and in lee of her smoke, which could be used as a screen. At 0810 she passed through the first row of obstacles and cleared the outer three rows successfully. When apparently clear, however, a terrific explosion on the port (left) side rocked the ship, setting the No. 1 troop compartment in flames and spraying the entire forward deck with burning fuel. At about the same time a shell exploded close aboard to starboard. The engines were ordered ahead but she was unable to move over the runnel”.40 Figure 255 illustrates the explosion that destroyed LCI(L)-91 as the Rangers were some 50 yards to her left side. The view from WN72 is in Figure 256. The wreck of LCI(L)-91 can be seen down the beach in the center of the photo.
The loss of life was catastrophic on these vessels, but their destruction allowed the Rangers a chance to survive. The noise remained deafening and bullets could be heard screaming by as the men prepared to make their next moves. The air remained filled with smoke from the grass fire, and now the thicker black smoke of the burning vehicles on the beach surrounding the Rangers. The artillery shells added additional big black puffs of smoke and all of the weapons fire caused debris, shrapnel and dust to fly everywhere.42 The 88 mm artillery fire included direct fire from WNs 61 and 72 flanking both ends of Omaha Beach. Some of the fire to hit the LCIs is known to have originated from these positions.
As part of our journey to discover the truth about S/Sgt Hull my immediate family visited the U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. While there, we discovered the following restored German 88 mm artillery piece along the Heritage Trail. The sheer size of the weapon is testament to the devastation it caused, and for that reason I have added this side note to help the reader appreciate its significance. Many GIs lost their lives to this weapon platform on D-Day. Figure 257 illustrates the size of the German 88.
Figure 257: German PAK 43/41 Antitank Gun. According to the USHEC, this is one of five known remaining examples of this variant which is on display at USHEC, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Pictured is my wife holding my youngest daughter, with my middle daughter is in the background. (author’s collection) Raaen reported th
at to avoid the heavy MG-42 fire on the beach you had to run following the splashes of the
Raaen reported that to avoid the heavy MG-42 fire on the beach you had to run following the splashes of the 5 round bursts of their weapons to keep the barrels cool and to keep a handle on the weapon for accuracy. As the Rangers funneled into the series of fifteen fifty-five foot long breakwaters spaced every 55 feet, they found themselves stacked two to three men deep in behind the shingle and wooden seawall above. These breakwaters were constructed of huge boulders and wooden posts and rails. The breakwaters offered bays where the men were able to huddle in numbers of approximately 80 men per bay. The Rangers were on top of various men from the 116th RCT. The breakwaters offered protection from the flanking machine gun fire. It hindered communications as men had to go around or over the breakwaters to communicate with the men in the next bay. According to Raaen, B Company huddled in two bays, with one platoon in each bay. This caused Captain Whittington to have to convey orders between both bays as they planned for what came next. General Raaen was in 4th or 5th bay formed by the breakwaters from their western extent. The Ranger front was about 200 yards wide.
Onaha Beach, Dog White during and shortly after the landings can be seen in Figures 258 and 259. Figure 258 reveals the burning wreckage of LCIs 91 and 92, as well as the aforementioned LCT. The breakwaters used by the Rangers to take cover with the 116th RCT after landing and the scorching caused by the grass fire on the bluffs is clearly visible in Figure 259.
LCI 92
LCI 91
LCT
Figure 258: View that 5th Ranger Battalion had of beach at Dog White upon approach of the shore showing fires. (NARA)
Figure 259: Aerial View of Dog White/Dog Red sector that 5th Ranger Battalion landed at taken at 1230 hours showing breakwalls and blackened areas as a result of fires on the bluffs. The crest of the bluff is noted by the farm fields to the top of the photo. Also note the hedgerow on the top right of the photo. This was used by the Rangers to mask their movements. (NARA)
The devastation of the LCIs was etched into many of the men who were there to witness the event. “I hit the dirt (sand) halfway across the beach to catch my breath and duck a burst of MG fire. Behind my shelter (a steel tetrahedron obstacle) was a GI, I first thought dead. He pushed a scared face next to mine and blurted “I’m supposed to be blowin’ these obstacles, but those sons-a-bitches won’t let me” Another burst of fire and I jumped up and headed inland for the comparative safety of the sea wall… An LCI with a flame-thrower man was hit by artillery. Much fire and smoke. I saw a man being half carried across the beach. I thought he had on long white evening gloves, nearly removed and hanging inside out. It was his skin shedding off from the burns.”19
5F, T/5 Dan D. Schopp (half of F on Dog White) At 0750, C Company, 116th RCT blew gaps in the barbed wire (Figure 260) at the behest of their leadership and began to assault the bluffs to the right of the 5th Rangers. Members of the 2nd Rangers landed in that section of beach merged into the 116th for ascending the bluffs. This was west toward WN 70. General Cota was in the midst of this action spurring the soldiers to action. Fran Coughlin, one of the 5th Rangers from HQ Company felt the road on top of the seawall and realized it was blacktop. The barbed wire was on the far side of the road about 25 yards distant. This would require anyone trying to blow gaps in the wire to expose themselves to German fire. Raaen recorded the barbed wire across the road.
Figure 260: German Coastal Defenses, War Department, Special Series Number 15, Page 23 Between 0750 and 0810, the Ranger officers converged on the position of Lt. Colonel Schneider to report their status to him and to receive orders. The officers assessed their situation and determined the best way forward was to follow a predetermined plan to advance inland by method of platoon infiltration practiced by the men since Camp Forrest. The codeword for these orders was “Tallyho”. The movement off of the beach required certain preparatory measures by the companies and platoons to allow them to breach the wire and assault the bluffs. The men had to prepare their Bangalore torpedoes. The mortar teams had to set up behind the seawall to provide supporting fire to the men headed up the bluffs. The Company Commanders had to issue orders to their platoons and assault sections to provide the men proper instruction as to what came next. This is not to say the men were unaware as to their missions. They had practiced this until they could do it in their sleep. Copeland recalled that “every Ranger knew what we had to do—they were to reach the beach and advance inland, up the hill, meet at the top and kill as many Germans as possible along the way.”30 The officers returned to their companies and then prepared and began to blow the wire. The battalion would blow four holes in the wire to advance through for the assault.
After conferring orders, Captain Whittington, Lt. Pepper and a small handful of B Company enlisted men climbed atop the seawall and crossed the road to the Barbed wire. Men from three other companies also did this. They then laid down ten yards in front of the obstacle to evaluate it. Copeland said of Whittington “He was a ‘crusty son-of-agun’ as JR’ says and ‘tough as nails and twice as ornery.”30 Whittington could be heard ordering a Bangalore torpedo to make the breach. “Copeland, get that f$*@#%! Banger up here now!”30 Copeland had been shot twice, but he reacted and grabbed the weapon from the bazooka man. He then tried to run and make his way to the wire. His wounds began to get the better of him as his legs first burned and then went numb causing Copeland to fall, unable to run. Another Ranger yelled back to the Captain that Copeland’s legs were shot. Cpl Gale Beccue then moved forward and prepared to detonate the torpedo and then blew one of the four openings in the barbed wire on top of the seawall made by the battalion. The double apron barbed wire is located on the inland side of the paved road for the length of the beach from the Rangers perspective. According to General Raaen, B Company blew its hole some 50 yards to the east of the hole made by D Company that he went through with Headquarters Company. A German soldier was firing an MG-42 from the right in their direction along the coastal road. Weast recalled later that a Ranger named Bucky Rogers blew a hole in the wire. For B Company, he stated that 1st Platoon led the charge, followed by 2nd Platoon through the gap.23 It is possible that Rogers took over when Copeland was shot.
Almost simultaneously with these events, General Cota had made his way back east to the 5th Ranger landing area. He found Captain Raaen, and asked him who they were and where their commander was. After hearing these were the 5th Rangers, General Cota was said to have been relieved but exhorted them to get moving off the beach much as he had been doing with all units on the beach since he landed at 0730. Many of the Rangers witnessed Cota’s fearlessness while prowling along the beach waving his pistol and issuing orders. Some of the men thought he was crazy. All of the men were inspired by his courage. Both Ching and Copeland were within earshot of the moment that established the Ranger Motto for all time. Copeland reported what he heard Cota say as “G#%-d@^#*? then, Rangers lead the way.”30 In reading various reports and accounts of these moments, Cota may have said this or a variant of this amongst the Rangers a few different times. This would account for the ability of all the men to have universally heard some variant of it, and for the distance spanned by the men separated by the breakwaters and noise levels on the beach. The important thing at this point is that B Company, 2nd Platoon heard it, loud and clear. Copeland and Ching remember it to this day. General Cota’s leadership was absolutely vital for the success of the assault. Cota would write later that he knew it was only a matter of time before the Germans would realize the magnitude of the target presented of these intact infantry forces massed among the breakwaters. He realized the danger posed by directed heavy artillery fire in the sector. He reasoned that all of the men had to get off the beach as quickly as possible. The only reason he was not awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor for his heroic actions well beyond the call of duty appears to be that he was a General. PFC Ching recalled “And we got ordered to clear out the beach, or exp
and the beachhead, and kill any German you find. So that’s what we did.” In B Company, 1st Platoon was first over the seawall, followed by 2nd Platoon. A few members from the 116th joined in the advance. The beach flat was a 200 yard wide obstacle to traverse at double time to the safety of the foot of the bluffs.
The 2nd Rangers on Omaha were in need of relief. Lt. Robert Edlin recorded his thoughts. “Now, I thought, where are the 5th Rangers? I turned and I couldn't walk or even hobble anymore. I crawled back to the beach. I saw 5th Rangers coming through the smoke of a burning LST that had been hit by artillery fire. Co!. Schneider had seen the slaughter on the beaches and used his experience with the Rangers in Africa, Sicily, and Anzio. He used the smoke as a screen and moved in behind it, saving the 5th Ranger Battalion many casualties.”35
