by Mehlo, Noel
The sub pen was 1090 feet long by 630 feet wide. The roof was twenty feet thick and able to withstand even the English “Tallboy” bomb. This U-boat submarine bunker was the largest German facility of this type constructed during the war. Between 1943 on, the Allies launched over 80 bombing missions against the facility at a loss of some 50 aircraft. The English RAF launched “Tallboy” bunker-busting bomb strikes against the pens on August 5, 12 and 13, 1944. Even these strikes only modestly caused damage, with only five bombs penetrating the roof resulting in very minor damage. The Germans knew the end to Brest was coming, and the last U-boat, U-256 left the facility on September 4. In a testimony to the German engineering, the French Navy uses the sub pens to this day.2, 3
Figure 300: German Submarine Bunker at Brest, France. Note Fort du Protzic, captured by the 5th Rangers on September 18 to top and left of sub base. (NARA) The Germans defending Brest included between 40,000 – 50,000 soldieries, sailors and marines. General Hermann-Bernhard Ramcke commanded these men with fervency to the Führer. The 2nd Fallschirmjäger (Parachute) Division was among these forces. They were well battle hardened after fighting on several fronts of the war. Other units in the region included the 343rd and 266th Infantry Divisions, and units consisting of Ostbattalions or captured Russian and other Eastern European soldiers. The 343rd was in charge of the defense of the forts under Generalleutnant Erwin Rauch. Ramcke had been given the assignment by Hitler on August 5 with orders for the “unconditional holding to the last of even the smallest fortifications.”
Ramcke divided the defense of Brest into eastern and western sectors. The Penfield River was the boundary between sectors. This river runs through Brest, emptying into the harbor. His experiened and well-trained 2nd Fallschirmjäger (Parachute) Division was spread around the perimeter to bolster the effectiveness of infantry forces at any single point. The main line of German resistance was fronted by small outposts that were frequently patrolled by German units. Of the 40,000-50,000 German defenders, 3,500 were naval antiaircraft and artillery personnel and 9,000 were naval personnel and marines. There were also a number of Organization Todt personnel available.
The Germans had quite some time to prepare the final defenses of Brest while the Americans fought their way through Normandy. Brest was a fortress. It was protected from attacks from air, sea or land. Included as part of this final bastion were multiple rings of defensive lines that incorporated ancient forts, strongpoints, heavy artillery and coastal batteries and the use of the hedgerows in the area. As the Americans had learned fighting in Normandy, the hedgerows formed the most arduous defensive structures they would face. The French called this “bocage” meaning hedgerow country. General Omar Bradley referred to this area as “the damndest country I’ve ever seen.” The majority of fields in the area were shaped irregularly and averaged in size approximately 200 by 400 yards in size. The hedges were up to fifteen feet in height, and they were flanked by drainage ditches. The attackers were often limited maneuvering through one field at a time due to poor visibility. Taking advantage of the terrain, as they had done throughout this region of France, the defenders used the hedgerows to camouflage and conceal the many small unit positions incorporated into their defense. They dispersed many minefields and many small heavily armed antitank and antipersonnel units to contend with the advancing Americans. This strategy allowed the German small unit forces to often repel American units up to five times their strength in number. The fighting in this environment was up close and personal often at ranges of less than three hundred yards. Much of the training conducted by the Rangers in the summer months was aimed at overcoming this terrain and the German tactics used in it.
By the time St. Lo fell in the summer months, the Germans and Americans had each suffered some 100,000 casualties. The Americans were overconfident as they approached the Battle for Brest in thinking they could quickly cause the Germans to surrender.4 The Germans were ready for them and would make them pay for every inch of ground. Surrender was not in their plan. American Lieutenant William Arendt wrote a book that included a vivid account of hedgerow fighting that included a fair assessment of the task at hand in a book Midnight of the Soul.
"In my opinion, hedgerow fighting is the toughest in the world, with the possible exception of closecontact, jungle warfare. Traditionally, the attacker needs a 3 to 1 advantage; the Germans showed they could defend successfully in the Normandy bocage country against a 5 to 1 ratio, and the reasons are simple. Each hedgerow is easily defended; hedgerows running at right angles to line of attack offer good retreating shelter to where another defense line can be set up, sometimes even at the next hedgerow; heavy equipment, such as tanks, are virtually useless and artillery is handicapped because of the closeness of the fighting troops. We were fighting for 100 yards at a time."5
The city of Brest was surrounded by a medieval wall 35 feet tall and 60 feet wide in some places. The wall was impervious to artillery fire, and the Germans had cleared everything within 300 yards to its front facing the attackers. This resulted in outstanding fields of fire on any assault force. The wall had thoroughly frustrated the attack of the 2nd Infantry Division “Indianhead Division” until patrols eventually discovered a neglected portion of wall they could successfully exploit.6
The German defenses of Brest were covered in the War Department book, United States Army in World War II, European Theater of Operations, Breakout and Pursuit. The book described the defensive works protecting Brest. These included ancient fortifications, bolstered by gun emplacements, casemates, concrete pillboxes and simple trenches. The Germans enhanced these further by adding barbed wire obstacles, mine fields and antitank ditches. A lynch-pin of the German defenses was the line of old French forts dating from the time of Louis XIV (1774-1793). The ancient fortifications had been constructed prior to the Franco-Prussian War, and were located primarily to the west and northwest of the city of Brest. These forts were continually upgraded over time and had casemates and heavy guns. There were additional forts located throughout the region. The old forts were constructed with a defensive strength of assault from the sea in mind. To that end, they were still formidable positions during World War II. The Germans incorporated ramparts, thick walls and alcoves for the shelter of gun emplacements that gave advantage over an attacker. The Germans positioned either their own or captured French coastal, field artillery and naval battery emplacements. They added defenses consisting of field artillery of varying sizes and dual-purpose antiaircraft guns and naval guns stripped from ships sunk in the harbor by Allied planes. The Germans, masters at the concept of fields of fire, relied on their batteries of coastal and field artillery on the Daoulas promontory and the Quelern peninsula for additional fire support. The German heavy guns near Le Conquet, could fire seaward or landward. The Germans employed twelve batteries of Army field artillery and eighteen batteries of Navy Flak to defend Brest. Some of the heavy German coastal and artillery batteries could be turned landward to fire.7
There were additional scattered forts further west on the coast, such as the Graf Spee Battery near the village of Lochrist with its four 280mm naval guns, three of which that could fire landward Figure 301. The 2nd Rangers would take on the mission of silencing this location. The Rangers fought hard in the western most tip of the Le Conquet peninsula. Then, in what is one of the most brazen acts of heroism that I have learned of, four Rangers from the 2nd Ranger Infantry Battalion simply walked up to the fort, requested audience with the commander and requested the Germans to surrender, which they did. The Rangers had a reputation as fighters among the Germans, one that was well earned by the five battalions through the war. That reputation enabled that to happen.8, 4 Two good books that cover this event are The Battalion by Robert Black and From Beachhead to Brittany, the 29th Infantry Division at Brest, August-September 1944, by Joseph Balkoski.
Figure 301: 280 mm guns of the Graf Spee Battery defeated by the 2nd Ranger Infantry Battalion (NARA photos) Each of the five coastal forts was s
eparated by intervals of about one mile. From west to east, the forts were Fort de Toulbroc’h, Fort de Pointe du Petit Minou, Fort de Mengant, Fort de Dellac and Fort de Portzic. They were in a section of rugged coast with deep coastal ravines separating the prominences where the forts were located high on cliffs. This was considered the toughest terrain in this portion of Brittany. Of five coastal forts integral to the defensive lines of Brest, the westernmost and largest of these forts was Fort de Toulbroc’h. It was over a mile long and a quarter mile deep. It bristled with weaponry.
Fort de Toulbroc'h, otherwise known as Batterie Toulbroc’h, formed part of the coastal defenses guarding the approaches to Brest Harbor along the goulet de Brest in the commune of Locmaria-Plouzané. The fort is located at latitude: 48.3406076, longitude: -4.6289067. As previously stated, the fort dates to the late 1700s. The oldest of the existing buildings onsite date back to 1884. By World War II the fort had four 240mm French guns from 1903 in open and unshielded concrete firing positions (Figure 302). There is a report that the Germans replaced the 240mm guns with 75mm guns, but photographic evidence suggests the presence of the larger pieces before the assault (Figure 303). There were three main batteries and one under construction, but operable by September 2. At either end of the various batteries the Germans had observation posts. They had ample ammunition storage in protected bunkers and multiple observation posts for a whole field of view of the region. The other batteries consisted primarily of 75mm artillery pieces. The fort also had ample 20mm Flak V pieces (Figure 304), heavy Mortar positions, and the entire perimeter was surrounded by light Mortar and machine gun positions (Figure 305) with interlocking fire. There were also reported to have been several 30 cm mortars, model 1883 T-93 situated at Toulbroc’h. These had a range of 8000 meters, could fire 1 round every four minutes and could rotate up to 360 degrees to fire.9, 10, 11
Figure 302: One of the 240 mm guns at Fort de Toulbroc’h, later reportedly replaced by the Germans with 105 mm guns (patrimoine.region-bretagne.fr)
Figure 303: German 75 mm gun in Casemate at Fort de Toulbroc’h (patrimoine.region-bretagne.fr) Figure 304: German 20mm Flak V, antiaircraft weapon (German Federal Archives)
Figure 305: German MG-42 machine gun (NARA) The Projecteurs of Fort de Toulbroc’h were high powered spotlights that were installed at the turn of the century. They were massive searchlights that were capable of blinding anyone gazing their direction. They could flood the entrance to the Brest harbor with light and send rays of light into all the crevices of the harbor in effort to seek out any enemy warship seeking to silently enter the port.11 The German Naval Artillery existed to defend sensitive coastal sectors and port facilities. The units comprising the Marineartillerie formed multiple batteries along the Atlantik Wall and used a combination of German equipment and captured equipment from occupied nations. The batteries used railway guns, encuvements, pillboxes and concrete or armored turrets. Along the coast, units were part of the Kriegsmarine. A subgroup of the Marineartillerie was the Coastal Artillery Group (Marine Artillerie Abteilung MAA) whose purpose was to detect and engage enemy fleet action and to defend large ports and sensitive defensive sectors. Some of the MAA units were formed as Regiments or Brigades in the defenses around Brest.12 Specifically defending Fort de Toulbroc’h were the German Naval Ordnance Department 262 units 3./MAA 262 and 7./MAA 262. These units were also referred to as the third and seventh batteries. They had formed in Brest in 1940 with five companies. They were subordinate to Marine Artillery Regiment 26.13 The soldiers, marines and sailors at the fort included Italians and Germans and were under the command of an Italian Ensign 1st Class Sovelli, who served the German Navy. The mission of the fort and her batteries was to protect the entrance of the Goulet (estuary) de Brest and the surrounding beaches.9 Figure 306 illustrates the construction of casemates and more importantly the cliff edges used to approach the fort by the Rangers.
The following maps taken from US War Department publications reveal the movements of the U.S. Army shortly after the Breakout of Normandy and the movements into Brittany and ultimately Brest. The movements of the Rangers discussed in the previous chapter can be compared against these larger movements through Brittany and into position at the western tip of the peninsula.
Figure 306: Casemate construction at Fort de Toulbroc’h (patrimoine.region-bretagne.fr) Figure 307: The Breakout of Allied forces from Normandy (USACMH)
Figure 308: The breakout of U.S. forces into Brittany (USACMH) General Eisenhower had placed the capture of Brest on his timetable for August 1, 1944. The summer fighting had slowed the Allied advance down such that this did not occur. The collapse of certain of German forces in France and the ensuing Allied Breakout as it is called resulted in rapid advances to the east by the end of August. The port of Brest was a daunting challenge that the Allied forces could not ignore. The U-boat threat from there needed to be neutralized. The usefulness of the port to move logistics was not lost on the high command, and the matter of the large number of Germans known to exist in the peninsula was of concern to a rapidly moving Allied force as it moved east to liberated France. The Allies could not risk leaving a force of crack troops in their rear areas unopposed that could otherwise cause havoc on these rear areas.
U.S. Forces first arrived in the vicinity of Brest on August 6, where elements of the 6th Armored Division met German forces east and north of the city. The Americans drove the Germans back to the outskirts of the city through Calvary and armored action. The Americans promptly demanded the Germans to surrender, to which the Germans refused on August 8. With the arrival of the 2nd Fallshirminger Division, Ramcke took command of German forces on August 11. He consolidated his defenses and deemed the area “Festung Brest”, meaning fortress Brest. He became aware that the Germans faced three U.S. Armored Divisions, and a strong French underground (FFI) contingent in the area. To his credit, Ramcke evacuated some 40,000 civilians from the City of Brest and surrounding areas prior to the American assaults on August 20.
Further west of Brest, patrols pushed scattered enemy forces back to Le Conquet, and St. Renan. To the southeast, Allied forces pushed the Germans back to the Daoulas and Crozon Peninsulas. The Americans then employed armored and Calvary forces with infantry support of the FFI. This was the case in early August until the employed armored and Calvary forces with infantry support of the FFI. This was the case in early August until the 18. The VIII Corps, under the command of General Troy Middleton, and consisting of the 2nd, 8th and 29th Infantry Divisions were given the task of capturing Brest. So it was that the Fortress of Brest stood as a formidable challenge to capture, intact if possible. This mission fell to three infantry Divisions, the 2nd, 8th and the 29th. Their unit patches are below in the aforementioned order. The overall assault on Brest began on August 20.4
The 8th Infantry Division began to establish a plan by sending out patrols to identify the German defensive lines. The 2nd Infantry Division moved to their left flank on August 20. The 29th Infantry Division moved into position on the right flank of the 8th Infantry Division.14 The patches of these units are in Figure 309.
Figure 309: Patches of the 2nd Infantry Division (left), 8th Infantry Division (middle) and 29th Infantry Division (right) (public domain) August 22 was a warm and sunny day. The 29th Infantry Division moved west into Brittany from Normandy on a seemingly never-ending convoy of Deuce-and-a-Half trucks. This move took until the 23rd. The 5th Ranger Infantry Battalion was already on the western portion of the peninsula, and on this day, Captain Whittington had killed the French operative. The vast convoy was preceded by a Calvary Reconnaissance Troop and it was monitored from the air by Piper Cup observation planes. The trucks travelled on the peninsular highway, well away from the coastal areas to avoid direct observation by the enemy. The division convoy took hours to pass any given point due to its length.15
The Battle for Brest is displayed in Figure 310. The major U.S. Army assets are noted on the map by their respective unit patches.
Fi
gure 310: Map showing Battle for Brest (USACMH)16 On August 24, the British battleship HMS Warspite was called upon to silence the German coastal batteries on the peninsula. At the time, the majority of available Allied warships were in the Mediterranean supporting the Allied amphibious landings on the South of France. The Warspite had 15” guns (Figure 310). She closed to between 29,000 and 32,000 yards of her targets. The targets were the Graf Spee battery with her 11” guns, the Les Rospects 6” gun battery, Fort de Toulbroc’h with her two batteries, Fort Minou, and Fort Monthbarey. Warspite fired salvos for two and a half hours at these targets expending over 213 high explosive and amour-piercing rounds with her main batteries. This was done to support the assault of the attacking American Infantry just prior to commencing the ground attack. Fort de Toulbroc’h was zeroed in on after two salvos. The warship fired eleven salvos consisting of 32 rounds at the fort’s batteries at a range of 32,000 yards. The Allies ascertained that day that infantry assaults of these forts would result in heavy casualties, so the Warspite was called in to silence the guns. After Warspite received word to cease firing at 1745 hours, she began to take 11” fire from the Graf Spee Battery. The German shells fell close enough to the warhorse to shower the ship with shell fragments, but none scored direct hits. The result of the British bombardment was disappointing, as only one of the German positions was knocked out of action.4,17
