Roger Bourderon writes that with “the final burying of the truce, the 22 August saw the lifting of heavy uncertainties”. Writing of this day, Colonel Villate, one of Rol-Tanguy’s deputies, emphasises Rol-Tanguy’s professionalism. “The CP functioned normally, like a real organ of command. Several times during the day, the Colonel [Rol-Tanguy] and his adjutants went out, accomplishing the various tasks of liaison in the different quartiers of Paris, the Préfecture, Rue Guénégaud—the CP of the FFI of the Seine—to the organs of the Resistance around the arrondissments and quartiers of Paris. Often there were only two officers left at the main CP beneath the Barrière d’Enfer. A direct telephone line from the Préfecture permitted the receiving of numerous messages through which it was possible to pass on information to district police stations from where other sources of information reverted to the Préfecture, thereby making it the symbol of the Resistance. This information, often exaggerated, was analysed at the Barrière d’Enfer, checked by workers from either the water department or the Metro, who were easily contacted from the CP at Denfert-Rochereau and usually au courant with the real battle situation, and able to take a well-advised view of what should be done. It should be remembered that while the CP was at Denfert-Rochereau there were 285 calls from the Préfecture, which represents fifty per day.”90
Interviewed by Francis Crémieux during the 1960s, Alexandre Parodi said that while he understood the reasons for ending the truce, it bought Paris two precious days during which most Parisians recognised what was happening under their noses. “When on Tuesday 22 August we resumed combat, I think I can honestly say that, on that day, there was a total difference in the situation because the Resistance now had behind them, not only episodiques movements partial to uprisings, like those I have alluded to, but truly all the people of Paris.”91
Though Parodi’s last clause needs qualifying, a real spirit of fraternité reigned behind the barricades from the FFI and their supporters down to the most retiring badauds. Most FFI simply wanted to kill a Boche and cared little for the distinct groupings within the Resistance. In the 17th Arrondissement, a youth approaching an FTP CP seeking food was told “There’s nothing for you here” by a FTP veteran. But the commander interjected, “Here there are only Frenchmen.”92
THAT NOT ALL PARISIANS WERE INVOLVED is proved by maps which demonstrate that barricades, while plentiful in some areas, were virtually non-existent in others. Generally speaking there were noticeable differences between smart areas, les quartiers aisés, and those working-class areas usually reckoned traditonellement révolutionaires. Where the proletarian and the aristocrat worked together on local barricades, these would usually be in older quartiers like the Latin Quarter where aristocratic homes exist behind high walls alongside buildings comprising modest apartments, the Rue Séguier being a good example. Barricades occurred where there was something to barricade against, such as a German-occupied barracks or an established strongpoint.93 As Pierre Bourget said, “Let us not forget the presence, throughout the combats, of fishermen beside the Seine, and bathers taking the sun on the beach created after the Exposition International of 1937 near the debouche of the Pont d’Iena on the rive droite, without forgetting also those who chose the Square du Vert-Galant (patch of garden on the west end of the Ile de la Cité behind the Statue of Henri of Navarre) to bask in the Sun before plunging their heads in the river.”94
Among the Haussman-style quartiers of western Paris, the haute bourgeoisie observed the résistants’ arrival at ungarrisoned mairies with measured concern. Most wealthy Parisians never suffered the vindictiveness inflicted on collabo suspects like Pierre Taittinger. Usually they were relieved to witness the Insurrection’s nationalist character, finding themselves smiling at résistants’ apparent contempt for military tradition. “This is not serious,” remarked a retired officer on seeing a young FFI standing in an open car; an excellent target for German snipers. For such veterans, being serious meant joining either de Lattre’s First Army or Leclerc’s 2e DB.95
BEFORE SENDING REPITON-PRÉNEUF TO V CORPS, General Leclerc emphasised that Gribius was unaware of Guillebon’s detachment, and that fact must be clarified to Gerow’s staff, hoping the Americans would understand. French thinking—sending Guillebon’s Patrouille—spoke for itself. “But,” wrote Girard, “difficulties were inevitable.” And when Weil piped up that Bradley intended to envelop Paris from north and south, where forces were already taking position, Leclerc was furious.
“What!” he exclaimed. “There’s going to be a battle north of Paris and we aren’t going to be there?”
When Repiton-Préneuf returned it was found that General Gerow’s response was predictable: the 2e DB was under his corps’ command and was not allowed to go anywhere without his orders. Regarding Guillebon’s Patrouille, Gerow was emphatic: “If your general has sent this detachment then he had better recall them.” Leclerc decided immediately that his only option was to board a Piper Cub and fly to Bradley’s 12th Army Group HQ at Laval.96
Roger Gallois reached Bradley’s HQ at 9am. Set in verdant woodland, the HQ was the Château du Bois Gamats, built in a mix of styles whose overall impact was nineteenth-century Gothic. A village of olive-green tents guarded by armoured vehicles covered its lawns. Gallois waited around thirty minutes until Bradley’s French liaison officer, Colonel Lebel, appeared. “Venez,” said Lebel. First stop was the mess for breakfast, during which Lebel took details from Gallois. Then Lebel spoke to Bradley’s chief of staff, General Edwin Sibert, who gathered around forty staff officers in a large salon to hear Gallois’ resumé. Entering the room, tired, scruffy and unshaven, Gallois noticed that Lebel looked almost as nervous as he was.
“We are listening, Monsieur,” said Sibert.
For half an hour Sibert questioned Gallois. Gallois repeated what he had told General Patton, that while the Resistance was under-equipped, the Germans were sufficiently weak to countenance compromise as evidenced by Nordling’s truce, and that Paris was there for the taking. “The people of Paris wanted to liberate their capital themselves and present it to the Allies,” he said emotionally. “But they cannot finish what they have started. You must come to our help or there is going to be a terrible slaughter. Hundreds of thousands of Frenchmen are going to be killed.”97
Afterwards Lebel informed Gallois that General Bradley would shortly attend an important conference at Eisenhower’s HQ where Paris would be discussed. Gallois also learnt that General Leclerc was arriving soon. Recognising that they would be pitching for a major change in Allied plans following Gallois’ plea, Sibert took him aside before departing for Shellburst.
“I want your word as an officer that everything you have told me is true,” said Sibert.
“I give you my word,” replied Gallois.
For good measure Lebel inserted his own personal note with Sibert’s papers: “If the American Army, seeing Paris in a state of insurrection, does not come to its aid, it will be an omission the people of France will be unable to forget.”
As Sibert left he tugged Lebel’s arm. “Your impatient lion Leclerc is coming today. Take care of him. We may have news for him tonight.”98
Several Eagletac officers shook Gallois’ hand. Then Lebel approached him. “My dear friend, you cannot imagine how you have arrived just at the right time. For two days,” said Lebel, “everyone has been coming here asking whether we’re going to take Paris. When Leclerc arrives, we’ll go and find him.”99
As soon as Leclerc’s Piper Cub landed on Eagletac’s airstrip Lebel introduced Gallois.
“Come at once, mon garçon,” called Leclerc. “We need to talk.”
Seeing Leclerc’s divisionnaire stars, carrying his ubiquitous cane, representing France in the massive Allied machine, Gallois was in tears.
“Mon garçon,” said Leclerc. “No emotion, no emotion. We have serious work to do.”
Between Lebel, Gallois, Leclerc and Repiton-Préneuf, the conversation flowed easily. After Gallois had described c
onditions in Paris, Leclerc explained the difficulties he had dealing with the American High Command. “I would very much like to march on Paris but I am being prevented and I haven’t the supplies.”
“But Mon Général,” said Gallois. “Can’t your division reach Paris in forty-eight hours?”
“You’re really somewhat naïve to be an officer,” scoffed Leclerc. “Do you really think that a whole armoured division can move around like a company of infantry? I depend on the Americans for my supplies and I can’t do it just like that.”
But Gallois soon realised that liberating Paris was the 2e DB’s raison d’être. After lunch an American officer told them, “General Bradley is in conference with General Eisenhower. He will return at 1600 hours and then examine modifications to the plans.”100
Eisenhower had considered the question of entering Paris the previous evening and wrote to General Bedell-Smith.101 Now, on 22 August, the choice was clear. Either the Allies could stick with their original plan or else, recognising the thin German defences and the compounding humanitarian situation inside the city, go in. “It is important to note,” Gallois later wrote, “that before my arrival the Allied High Command had no idea of the importance, nor the scale of the achievement by the Resistance, of the Seine.”102
“NOBODY CAN UNDERSTAND THE PRESENT ALLIED STRATEGY,” wrote David Bruce. “General Patton’s Third American Army has been in a position for several days to take Paris. Two of his divisions are across the Seine and have moved north. There are no German forces of consequence between us and the capital. Rumours have been prevalent for some days here that the failure to allow Third Army to press forward and fully realise its capabilities is due to high politics. Some even say the delay is to permit President Roosevelt to arrive and enter the city himself. Most, however, claim that the Americans are being forced to await the entry of General Montgomery and the British, who, unable to clear a way through the territory assigned to them, are now to swing through the American Sector and thus get ahead. Whatever the reason may be, it does not seem to make much sense to sit around here as if there was serious opposition in front of us, thus allowing the Germans to lay mines, disengage troops, and withdraw supplies that otherwise we could mop up with ease.”103
Several of Bruce’s speculations fell wide. Roosevelt had little interest in France beyond ensuring that the French contributed to their own liberation, thereby saving American lives. And although he had welcomed Leclerc to Tripoli in January 1943 and praised Force L’s conduct in Tunisia, Montgomery was no Francophile, as his treatrment of de Gaulle over Bayeux demonstrated. Unaware that Leclerc was still awaiting his marching orders, Bruce wrote of the 2e DB, “Like the Scarlet Pimpernel, it is said to be here, there and everywhere.”
“This morning, a Frenchman wearing the red képi and the American uniform characteristic of a portion of that division appeared outside our hotel,” wrote Bruce, describing a Spahi officer. “He was promptly pounced upon and induced to lead Gravey, Mouthard and myself to an advance element of Leclerc’s.” This was Guillebon’s CP pitched in a wheatfield at Nogent le Roy. “We gave the colonel [Guillebon] a fill on the situation to the North, East and West of Rambouillet, and, while we were having lunch, his tanks and retainers lurched off, with the intention of going as far as Sceaux.”104
Several correspondents also arrived, asking the 2e DB’s plans for Paris, but the taciturn Guillebon could not answer.105 Even with tanks fighting just up the road, the cream of the American press corps—including William Randolph Hearst, Jr.—descended on Rambouillet that afternoon. But when a dejected German soldier was brought to the Grand Veneur in triumph, Hemingway invited John Mowinckel, freshly returned from Le Mans, to join in the interrogation over a few beers.
“I’ll make him talk,” said Hemingway, signalling Mowinckel to dump the petrified youth on the bed, saying, “Take his boots off. We’ll grill his toes with a candle.”
“Go to hell,” said Mowinckel.
The young German, who clearly knew very little, was released.106
Another arrival at Rambouillet was Major Airey Neave. Captured in 1940, Neave was the first man to escape from Colditz Castle, and subsequently joined MI9, organising escape lines. Neave was pursuing British traitor Harry Cole who wreaked havoc with his venal betrayals, thereby helping the Gestapo arrest hundreds of evading servicemen along with the résistants who hid them. A third were executed, making MI9 keen for Cole to face British justice.107
EVEN WITH THE TRUCE OVER, General von Choltitz’s restraint was self-evident. Far from being blown apart in a storm of fire and blood like Warsaw, no Stukas screamed down on Resistance strongpoints; nor did 88mm guns blast barricades apart with a single high-explosive shell, which is all it would have taken. Von Choltitz played patball. His garrison dominated central Paris and much of the west, principally around the Étoile and the area north of the Tuileries-Louvre network of streets, especially the west end of the Rue de Rivoli, including the Hôtel Meurice, stretching along to the classical columned buildings of the Hôtel Crillon and the Naval Ministry on the north side of the Place de la Concorde. South of the river the Palais Bourbon, Quai d’Orsay buildings and the École Militaire were held with considerable garrisons. Von Choltitz kept his tanks at junctions like the Place Saint-Augustin, the Villiers crossroads and the Place Malesherbes, from where they could fire along several avenues as envisaged when nineteenth-century Paris was laid out. The Germans had abandoned several of the hotels requisitioned in 1940, along with garages and depots involved in Wehrmacht logistics. Outside central areas a few redoubts remained, principally the Luxembourg Palace and the Jardin de Luxembourg, and the oft renamed barracks on the Place de la République from which they patrolled unbarricaded thoroughfares.
German forces retreating through Paris could still use outer boulevards and roads along the Seine’s north bank, such as the Avenue de la Grande Armée which leads up to the Étoile from the west, from which they could then turn northeast along the Avenue de Friedland, then Boulevard Haussmann, branching northeast along the Rue La Fayette, under the grey, functional looking railway bridge at the Rond-Point de la Villette—now the Place de la Bataille de Stalingrad—and veer northeast again along the Avenue Jean Jaurés. From there outwards retreating Germans were safe from being shot at by résistants.108
Despite the Insurrection’s second wind, western quartiers like Auteuil saw no fighting at all; shops remained open, the leisured classes sat outside at cafés. In central Paris streets were largely empty. The Champs Élysées stood in sun-drenched, apprehensive silence broken periodically by a German tank or armoured car, or the panicked running of an office worker or woman pushing a perambulator. Offices, including government premises, mostly remained open. For the non-partisan silent majority the insurrection experience was simply something to get through. “Can one pass here?” Parisians asked both résistants and German soldiers. “Yes, but watch out over there,” might come the reply. In more embattled quartiers a résistant might announce himself by calling out “FFI!” whereas an infirmière (nurse) escorted by a brancardier (stretcher bearer) both draped in white, would announce themselves at the top of their voices as “Croix Rouges”.109
While Gallois confered with Leclerc, Rol-Tanguy remained optimistic while nevertheless recognising the FFIs’ precarious position. “We had to achieve the paralysis of the enemy, to prevent him from using thoroughfares, to stop him from employing his tanks. We knew they [the Germans] were not particularly numerous, but we also knew that he could call in some very persuasive assets if he could move them from one end of the city to the other. This remained a great danger, even if the enemy had been pushed onto the defensive since the early days of the Insurrection. The barricades were intended to reduce this danger,” he told Bourderon. Then, possibly exaggerating, Rol-Tanguy said, “They [the barricades] were effectively real tank traps, possibly more effective against enemy vehicles in general … They produced negligible military gains but had disastrous psychological ef
fects on vehicle crews whose morale was already low, who found themselves confronted by barricades, gunmen and petrol bombs.”110
Rol-Tanguy continued: “[Our] anti-tank capabilities were not limited to petrol bombs. Before the Insurrection, the staff gave essential descriptions of German tanks, explaining how best to attack them with specially grouped grenades and explosive packages, in a manner similar to dynamiteros during the Spanish Civil War. We also demonstrated that it was possible to obstruct tanks with chains placed across their path which would entangle their tracks, otherwise to puncture with bullets the tyres of armoured cars and place in front of barricades deposits charged with explosives serving as anti-tank mines.”111
Even if FFIs fought tanks less frequently than their Warsaw counterparts, the fighting could be merciless. German outposts, pinpointed during the truce, became targets for the FFI. Easily taken, their occupants were either killed or taken prisoner, the second outcome often involving degradation, and the “blue fear” of being murdered. Yet, to qualify this, while some Parisians vented their resentments by injuring or killing prisoners, Raymond Dronne insists such incidents were rare. “Nearly all wounded Germans were gathered up by Red Cross teams, correctly treated and well cared for,” he wrote. “One of these, taken to a hospital where there was lots of coming and going and noise, expected to be shot in the head and closed his eyes. When he opened them again he found a Frenchman leaning over him, offering a cigarette and saying, ‘For you, Fridolin, the war is over.’”112
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