Bernard Gordon Lennox watched aghast as both German and British soldiers fell, ‘it was here most of the casualties occurred. The men learnt a lesson and there will not be much more notice taken of the white flag’. Jeffreys was sure there was never any premeditated treachery intended by the Germans, the leading line, he felt, had had enough and was very low in ammunition; the support line behind them, however, had no intention of surrendering and opened fire when the British troops ran forward.
The confusion which followed was the prelude to another attack, this time from the direction of Ostel. It was met with the customary Guards resolve in the form of the 3/Coldstream machine-gun section and the Grenadiers who lined the road north of the farm. The enemy attack soon withered away but any thoughts of a further advance that afternoon seemed to be out of the question. The muddle which surrounded the fighting on the 4 Brigade front was exacerbated by the news that the 3rd Division was in trouble at Vailly. Initial reports reaching I Corps HQ at noon of a general retirement of 3rd Division units was fortunately corrected and by 2.00pm a more realistic appraisal of the situation was in front of Sir Douglas Haig. Realizing his left flank was under threat if the 3rd Division was pushed back to the river, he took steps to fill the gap between Chavonne and Vailly with 1 and 2 Cavalry Brigades which were ordered to Soupir. Haig’s own assessment of the situation is contained in the I Corps war diary:
‘A little later, an officer of the 15th Hussars rode in and reported that he had seen signs of our 3rd Division having been beaten back. The situation was critical. An advance by the enemy through Chavonne on Soupir would have cut the communications of the Corps; the last battalion of my reserve brigade had been drawn into the fight near Chivy, and I had no infantry that I could detach. The only men immediately at hand were a troop of the 15 Hussars and a squadron of the South Irish Horse. These I despatched at once to the threatened flank, and I also called upon the 2nd Cavalry Brigade to move to Soupir.’150
Captain Arthur Osburn was in reserve with 4/Dragoon Guards and remembered thinking that had the Germans counter attacked that afternoon things would have become very nasty. At about 4.00pm the brigade was halted in the woods to the northwest of Soupir:
‘Our General and some of his staff suddenly appeared. He evidently thought the situation, especially the position of the infantry who had crossed over behind us, precarious. He made us a speech … “You must stay here at all costs! Everything may depend on you! Don’t give an inch of ground. You may have to sustain seventy or eighty per cent casualties! Remain and die like gentlemen!” We looked at each other. Like Gentlemen – how else do people usually die?’151
Brigadier General de Lisle’s speech certainly put, ‘the wind up’ Osburn who then, ‘made quite elaborate and feverish’ medical arrangements for what he expected to be an, ‘enormous battle’. The men of 1 Cavalry Brigade had evidently received a similar pep talk from Brigadier General Charles Briggs as the 11/Hussars war diary betrays the urgency with which the regiment was ordered to Soupir:
‘We received an order to go to the left of the 1st Army [I Corps], Sir Douglas Haig is anxious about his left. The 2nd Army [II Corps] are not joined up with the first, and their right is being driven back over the river. We arrive at Soupir and take up a dismounted position on the left of our infantry [2/Ox and Bucks], also succeed in getting in touch with the right of the 2nd Army. The gap is a biggish one and a nasty bit of country. As we arrive, we see streams of wounded being brought down the track, the Guards have been having a bad time of it.’152
The remainder of 1 Cavalry Brigade was deployed in a second line at Chavonne which enabled 11/Hussars to be withdrawn. Shortly afterwards 2/Ox and Bucks were moved to Soupir at which point Arthur Osburn felt it was almost an anticlimax that no German counter attack actually took place and the Dragoon Guards retired to Soupir Château with the Hussars.
Back at Cour de Soupir the day was drawing in but the German batteries continued to shell the British positions as they had for most of the day. Two companies of 2/Coldstream were sent down to Chavonne where they spent a wet night with the cavalry and a further two were pushed across to the right to where the Irish Guards were digging in. Artillery support we now know was practically non-existent-apart from the 71/Battery appearance at Cour de Soupir – XLI Brigade crossed at Bourg and then retired to Veil-Arcy firing only twelve rounds all day – although Sergeant Reeve with 16/Battery was adamant that the battery, ‘stayed in action all day and night’, but conceding that they only, ‘blazed off a bit’. At least 35/Heavy Battery managed to fire thirty-four rounds which was more than 44/ (Howitzer) Battery managed at Verneuil.
The Connaught Rangers were ordered back to Soupir as soon as it was dark. As a battalion they were clearly viewed with some disdain by the Guards. Major Jeffreys remarked in his diary that they had been, ‘notorious for straggling in the retreat’ whilst Bernard Gordon Lennox dismissed them as the rabble which, ‘occupied’, rather than, ‘held’ Cour de Soupir Farm and writes in his diary that they, ‘did not remain long before making a “strategic movement to the rear’”. Not only is this allegation plainly false but even more slighting is the lack of acknowledgement by the Grenadiers themselves as to the part played by the Connaughts in the fight for Cour de Soupir Farm. Though to be fair, according to Sergeant John McIlwain, a Connaught reservist serving in D Company, Colonel Fielding, in his temporary role in commanding 4 Brigade, did send a, ‘message of congratulation … for the manner in which we had held the position after the severe counter attack by the Germans’. The final accolade as to the fighting ability of the Connaughts came from Major Henry Dillon, a company commander with the Ox and Bucks Light Infantry. Writing in a letter home on 23 September, he mentions the fight for La Cour de Soupir Farm: ‘An Irish regiment were the first to get to the top and they fought like nothing on earth’.
It has to be said that Major Sarsfield’s early occupation of the farm on 14 September was carried out with the same spirit of initiative which drove Hunter-Weston’s advance with 11 Brigade at Vénizel. Sadly it had the same outcome. What is difficult to understand is that at 5.30am the Connaughts were already halfway to the brigade objective, yet the first of the Guards battalions did not cross the river until 8.30am, despite the evidence from the Connaughts’ war diary – and that of 5 Brigade – both of which confirm that brigade headquarters were aware of the Connaughts’ position at Cour de Soupir Farm.
John McIlwain’s diary – although inaccurate in places and often quite damning of some of his officers – places him on the right flank at Cour de Soupir and describes the death of his platoon officer, 21-year-old Second Lieutenant Victor Lentaigne:153
He was the younger son of Sir John Lentaigne, the well known surgeon of Merrion Square, Dublin. He was a modest, quiet lad who could have been severe with me many times …He was over eager to get into action. His orders yesterday were to hold his platoon in reserve till called upon …He fixed his sword in the ground to mark the point of advance, went forward alone and was not seen again.’154
Victor Lentaigne was one of three Connaught officers killed with a further five wounded. In the ranks 18 men were killed, 102 wounded and 97 declared missing. The Grenadiers’ losses were comparable: two officers – John Cuncliffe and Frederick des Voeux – killed and six others wounded in addition to seventeen other ranks killed, sixty-seven wounded and seventy-seven missing.155 The Coldstream casualties amounted to two killed – including Second Lieutenant Richard Lockwood – and sixty-three wounded in the 2nd Battalion and twenty-five killed and 153 wounded in the 3rd Battalion.156 The dead included the 26-year-old Lieutenant Percy ‘Perf’ Lyulph Wyndham who had inherited the magnificent Clouds estate at East Knoyle two years previously on the death of his father, the Rt Hon George Wyndham MP.157 ‘Perf’ had been married for less than two years to the Hon Diana Lister and was a cousin of the 17-year-old Edward ‘Bim’ Tennant who himself would be killed serving with the Grenadier Guards in 1916.158 Tom Bridges – a family friend –
was at Soupir Château with 4/Dragoon Guards when he heard of Wyndham’s death: ‘the evening was marred by the death of a friend, Percy Wyndham, close by, and the opening of a heavy battery on our billet later in the night’.
After dark Matheson and Jeffreys reorganized their respective battalions from the ‘proper mix-up’ which the day’s fighting had produced. It was agreed between the two battalion commanders that the Grenadiers would hold a line from the wood east of the farm as far as the Chavonne road, the 3/Coldstream along the Chavonne road to link up with the 2/Coldstream at Chavonne. On the right of the Grenadiers the Irish Guards were in contact with the KRRC of 6 Brigade. Thus the 2nd Division found itself digging in from the southern edge of the Beaulne spur, across the Braye valley north of La Metz Farm to Cour de Soupir Farm and down to Chavonne.
Darkness was also the opportunity for recovering the wounded, some of whom had been lying out in front of the lines since the engagement began. Jeffreys had seen a, ‘considerable number’, of both British and German wounded as well as, ‘a very large number of dead Germans’. There were also those who had been lying doggo and had been waiting for darkness to give themselves up. The sheer numbers of wounded men threatened to overwhelm the battalion medical teams which had been working feverishly for most of the day. The farmhouse was already full and the wounded now overflowed into the farm enclosure buildings, yet even though as many wounded men as possible were taken away that night by the few horse drawn ambulance wagons that could be spared, many were not taken down to Soupir until 16 September. Inevitably there were many wounded men in the woods on the right flank who were not found and died as a result.
The medical facilities for the 2nd Division were initially overwhelmed with the sheer numbers of wounded. Two advanced dressing stations were established at Moussy and in some caves near Chivy with the main dressing stations at the château at Verneuil and the rather ostentatious château at Soupir. At Verneuil conditions were made more difficult by the nearby artillery batteries which ensured the building was frequently shelled as German batteries searched for the British guns. 5/Field Ambulance took over the château at Verneuil around lunch time on 14 September and by the end of the day the building itself and the surrounding stables and outbuildings were filled with wounded. Major Frederick Brereton estimates some 9 officers, 166 other ranks and 54 Germans were admitted during the day, a number which included 48-year-old Lieutenant Colonel Charles Dalton159, the 2nd Division ADMS.160 Dalton was severely wounded by a shell splinter as he was assisting with the carrying of casualties into the château. 6/Field Ambulance arrived on the night of 14 September to assist in bringing in the wounded and over the course of the next twenty-four hours another seven officers and eighty-five other ranks were admitted.
But Verneuil had become too much of a shell trap to continue in its role as a divisional collecting station, it was becoming very exposed and three days later it received a direct hit which prompted the move to Viel-Arcy on the 20th. Brereton, in his account of the RAMC on the Aisne, writes of the moment when the direct hit on the château took place:
‘It smashed through the château, shrieked across the operation room, and plunged through the mirror hanging over the salon fireplace. Orderlies still hovered around. Instruments were lifted carefully from the sterilizer. The anaesthetist looked round at the mirror and dripped chloroform. He lifted up the eyelid of the unconscious patient, grunted his satisfaction and again bent to listen to his breathing. The operating surgeon had not even raised his head. His busy fingers played about the wound, one hand grasped the scalpel … finally as the patient was lifted from the table he turned and examined the mirror. “Broken it eh?” he observed; “that’s bad luck for the Germans!”.’161
The château at Soupir did not take on the role of a main dressing station until 17 September when 4/Field Ambulance moved into the building. Prior to that, No. 3/Cavalry Field Ambulance had occupied the building along with 1 and 2 Cavalry Brigades which, readers will recall, had been sent to reinforce the left flank after the 3rd Division had got into difficulties. 3/Cavalry Field Ambulance had already been severely mauled by shell fire on the night of 15 September when a large shell fell amongst a group of horses and men at the château. Five men were killed, and a further eight were wounded. The bombardment continued, forcing the ambulance to move south of the river but even as they crossed the river they attracted further salvos which followed them across the flat, open ground all the way to Viel-Arcy.
The château building and its grounds were situated close to the church at Soupir. A construction of pretentious proportions, its grand architectural design even encompassed the stable block, a magnificent building some two storeys high and so ornate it was sometimes mistaken for the main building. Surrounded by elaborately designed gardens and boasting a large lake to the southwest, the château was the home of Maria Boursin, the alleged mistress of Gaston Calmette the editor of the Paris newspaper Le Figaro.162 A diary account of an 11/Hussars officer speaks of the ‘great scramble’ in the château kitchen when the regiment arrived on 14 September:
‘We make soup and heat up bully beef. No bread, biscuits soaked in soup. The house servants produce wine from the cellars, real good claret, they gave it to us wholesale. About 11.00pm having given orders and made all the arrangements for an early start get Purser to pull off my boots and prepare to bed down in one of the bedrooms.’163
Sergeant John McIlwain had cause to visit the château with several of his platoon of Connaught Rangers and one gets the distinct impression they were on the look-out for ‘souvenirs’:
‘This château was a magnificent building inside. When I, with two or three more, entered to find the big kitchen occupied by a party of the 15th Hussars who declared they were in possession by order of their CO. Ladies boudoirs and the bedrooms were littered with empty jewel and plate cases, their contents removed probably by the owners. In chests of drawers were dainty but stoutly woven linen handkerchiefs, which was all there was worth our attention, apart from a barrel of good quality bitter wine on tap by the back door. Very welcome after a march on a hot day.’164
All this was to change on 17 September, within days the three story building was catering for the seemingly continual stream of wounded who were being brought in from the surrounding area. Under the command of Major Percy Falkner the château was taking in an average of fifty casualties per day on top of the German casualties being treated in the nearby church. Soupir Château remained in the hands of 4/Field Ambulance until it finally left on 12 October, by which time the building had suffered severely from German artillery and the ravages of war. Maria Boursin also owned property in Paris to which she hastily retired when war reached the Aisne. By November 1918 – after the war had run its course and three battles had been fought on the Aisne – the building lay in ruins and Maria Boursin never returned to Soupir to rebuild her home.
The aqueduct over the Aisne at Bourg. It was the towpath on the right which was used by units of the 1st Division to cross the river on 13 September 1914. Once across the Aisne the modern day D925 was accessed via a corduroy road built by the sappers of 23/Field Company.
A British 18-pounder field gun in action. In 1914 British troops had not been issued with steel helmets.
The modern day road bridge at Vénizel. The photograph was taken from the site of the original bridge crossed by 11 Brigade on the night of 12 September.
Bucy-le-Long and the high ground above which was occupied by 11 Brigade. La Montagne Farm is beyond the tree line to the left of the private house.
Second Lieutenant Jock Marden 9/Lancers. ‘Gave the ferry boy a Franc for courage.’
Corporal John Lucy, 2/Royal Irish Rifles, taken after he was commissioned. ‘The line staggered under the ferocious smash of machine gun fire.’
Lieutenant William Read, 3 Squadron RFC. ‘The air all round us was thick with shell bursts.’
Lieutenant Kenlis Perceval Atkinson, 4 Squadron RFC. ‘Funny noise those shells make when they
burst, not a loud bang, sort of a ‘plop’.’
Lieutenant Baron ‘Bron’ Trevenen James, 4 Squadron RFC. Described by John Mowbray as ‘an exceptional man’.
Lieutenant Donald Swain Lewis of 4 Squadron, who with Baron James, pioneered air-to-ground radio communication which was first used over the Aisne Valley in 1914.
The Royal Aircraft Factory BE2a. ‘When one considers that this revolution in artillery observation had taken place with just two BE2a aircraft from the Wireless Flight, the magnitude of the achievement can be appreciated.’
General Hans von Zwehl. Despite his age he was still a formidable commander, ably demonstrated in his defence of the Chemin des Dames.
General Alexander von Kluck. His maverick style of command was in direct contrast to that of General Klaus von Bülow.
Sir Douglas Haig, commanding I Corps on the Aisne.
Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, who stood his ground at Le Cateau and commanded II Corps on the Aisne.
Lieutenant Colonel John Longley who was in command of 1/East Surrey Regiment. He was soon promoted and eventually commanded the 10th Division.
Lieutenant Colonel Ernest Montresor was killed in action on 14 September whilst in command of 2/Royal Sussex Regiment.
BEF Campaign on the Aisne 1914 Page 15
