Several months before the war ended Major Arthur Goodfriend, editor in chief of Stars and Stripes, the Army newspaper, was assigned by higher headquarters to find out what the GIs thought about the Germans. He surveyed a large number of troops and found their opinion highly favorable. One AMG officer interviewed estimated thirty days as the interval from the day the war ended before the onset of complete fraternization. He was not far wrong. In spite of repeated demands from the highest quarters that the policy be enforced, the soldiers evaded the rules and the lower commands found enforcement impossible, partly because those responsible for the enforcement were themselves breaking the rules. Finally, on July 14, two months after the war's end, General Eisenhower announced in a face-saving statement that "in view of the rapid progress which has been made in carrying out Allied de-Nazification policies ... it is believed desirable and timely to permit personnel of my command to engage in conversation with adult Germans on the streets and in public places." Ike had surrendered. The troops joyfully dubbed this "the fraternization order." Now they could openly parade their frauleins.
July 11: To Stuttgart to see the Swedish consul on business. Talked with him and his wife for about two hours. Both deplored the behavior of the French troops while they were occupying Stuttgart. Much pillaging and raping. Both swore that most Germans had little idea of what went on in the concentration camps during the Nazi regime.
Just how much did the Germans know about the concentration camps? Many resorted to the defense of der kleiner Mann (the little man) and to belogen and betrogen (lied to and deceived). In other words, they knew and they didn't know. The media was not free and did not publicize the camps' existence, but complete ignorance of their existence was also not possible. Perhaps the most insightful description of the actual situation was "they knew enough to know that they didn't want to know more than they knew." Those who would have liked to have done something about it were powerless in the face of the venal government with its iron-handed grip on the citizenry. And those several thousand Germans who did challenge the regime soon themselves became inmates.
In mid-August we were awash with news. First, we heard over the radio that Japan had surrendered. Second, my right-hand man, Lieutenant Phillip Rothman, received orders to report to Biarritz University. Rothman was a scholar and humanist and detested the work in which we were involved. "There, but for the grace of God, go I," he would often remind me. I had arranged the transfer at his request, yet I hated to lose him. But we had become good friends and I joined in his joy.
Third, hardly had I bid Phillip good-bye when, without any previous warning, I received the news that I was to report to Military Intelligence Service Headquarters preparatory to repatriation.
The Army had devised an equitable scoring system to return troops back to the States for discharge. Scores were determined by awarding one point for every month of overseas service and five points for every battle star. A battle star was earned for each campaign in which a serviceman had fought. Since I had been in five or six campaigns, and had also been awarded the Bronze Star, which added more points, I came up for fairly early discharge.
After reporting to MIS Headquarters, I went to Army Headquarters, where I was told to start winding up my affairs and to be prepared to leave on short notice.
Since "short notice" could mean anything, "hurry up and wait" being one of the Army's Ten Commandments, I continued inspecting and supervising matters at the camp.
August 21: My temporary replacement arrived today. He is a Dutch Jew named Hecht [a first lieutenant/. In discussing internment camps, he said, "Let one of our guard outfits guard the prisoners the way they would like, and we'd have concentration camps as bad as the German ones. "
I rather agree after my own experiences with the guarding units.
September 12: To Military Intelligence Service Headquarters.
While being handed my orders to return to the States, I was simultaneously implored to volunteer for another six or eight months' service, since there was an appalling lack of experienced German-speaking intelligence officers for the work still to be done.
I went to lunch and weighed the pros and cons of returning to the States versus staying in Germany for another few months. The appeal to my patriotism, to help out the Army during its shortage of German-speaking officers, was one of the factors in my decision. The decisive one, though, was my desire to research the Field Marshal Rommel story, a story I sensed as a great tragi-drama. After the revelation four months earlier that Rommel had been murdered, I found myself in a constant ruminative preoccupation with the man, the event, and the reasons for it. My desire to get to the bottom of the story had never abated. But at war's end I was far from Herrlingen, and the pressure of my duties left little time for searching out the sources that could supply the information. The surrendered German Army had to be disbanded. In the process the arrestables had to be sifted out and interned. The same was true in the civilian and political spheres while anew government was being installed. War criminals, known and suspected, had to be rounded up to await trial. There were, for an intelligence officer, just too many things cooking. Rommel had to be placed on the back burner.
Now, however, I was no longer working in camps in Austria. I was in the province of Wuerttemberg, Rommel's home grounds, and within a reasonable driving distance of his home. Only weeks earlier I had been recommended for the job of commanding officer of a seven-officer, twentyman intelligence detachment at Army Headquarters and had declined it because I felt it would pin me down too much and hinder my search for the Rommel sources once I began the hunt.
Returning to MIS Headquarters after lunch, I agreed to stay provided I was reassigned to the work I had been doing and to the camp at Neustadt, near Ludwigshafen, where I had been slated to go next. There, in my little fiefdom, I would have the liberty to go off in search of sources when my work permitted.
Two views of Internment Camp 97 in Neustadt near Marburg. The quality of housing for the internees varied greatly. Some facilities were well constructed, especially those that had once housed German military units. Others were jerry-built barracks hastily thrown together in muddy fields. Common to all were guard towers at each corner of the camp. Photos by author.
September 15: To Army Headquarters, where I arrived just in time to keep them from sending an officer up to replace me. Thee were glad to see me back and gave me my team and camp back again.
The next day I formally took over Internment Camp 97 at Neustadt and set about getting the interrogation offices ready for business.
The camp housed 2,200 internees, among them 218 generals, of whom were 23 Hungarians, 6 Austrians, and I Slav.
September 27: One prisoner shot in the leg while trying to escape.
Told a sergeant to get me a BMW mechanic specialist for my car and damned if one of the generals didn't volunteer for the job. Probably the first time in history that a captain had a general as his mechanic.
Complimenting the ordnance general on how well he was keeping my car tuned led to a discussion of vehicle maintenance in both our armies. He remarked that he had always envied his American counterpart because so many American vehicles were mass produced by General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler that it was easy to keep replacement parts in inventory. The Germans, in contrast, had a big problem with replacement parts because the bulk of their vehicles were manufactured by numerous small companies and maintaining inventory was "horrendous." As I had learned from his letters, Rommel had also been impressed by American standardization.
September 28: Another prisoner was shot today. He was gathering herbs for soup and had reached over the warning wire. The shot killed him instantly. Since the killing took place in broad daylight, 10:30 A.M., it was absolutely unnecessary.
Things like that, wanton killing, shock me and bother me for days.
Although this kind of thing is outside my jurisdiction, in the absence of the camp commander I ordered the warning wire moved back three more yards and a war
ning sign posted even' five yards. When 1 next saw him I requested that he instruct the guards to fire a warning shot first.
This killing was indicative of the action Lieutenant Hecht had referred to some weeks earlier when he said, "Let our guard units guard the prisoners the way they would like, and we'd have concentration camps as bad as the German ones." It also reinforced my own earlier observations about the needless brutality of some troops.
The signing of an armistice does not cause an automatic eruption of love and respect between the two sides. It does not, on the other hand, justify the victor inflicting brutality and starvation upon the loser. The prisoner food ration was only 1,500 calories, barely enough to sustain life. Most men were hungry and some were trying to bolster their rations with soup.
Unfortunately, there were some GIs who simply had to "get" their Nazi. Hecht and I agreed that in the tradition of Ulysses S. Grant it would be better that there be magnanimity and the swords be converted to plowshares.
One morning I found on my desk a letter from one of my 218 generals, Hans von Boineburg, who was the Commandant of Paris on July 20, 1944, when the putsch attempt failed. Most of the generals in the plot were brought before the Fuhrer's Court of Honor and hanged. Boineburg was one of the few participants who survived. His letter depicts his role in the aborted effort. It shows the difficulty of orchestrating the many elements necessary for a successful coup d'etat in a police state and the confusion that ensued when it became known that the bomb went off, but that the result was uncertain. The letter explains why Boineburg survived, and was to shed some light on one aspect of the Rommel story. It follows:
Neustadt, 9/29/45
Subject: Participation of German personnel in the July 20, 1944, attempt on Hitler's life.
To: The staff of Internment Camp 97
... I am fifty-six Years old, married to a Finnish woman from Christinenstad in Finland; I was neithera member of the Nazi Party nor of the General Staff. I am the administrator of a family endowment and proprietor of forest lands.
I was in sharpest disagreement with National Socialism since the Jewish pogrom of 11/8/38. The further unfolding of events in Germany, aside from the condition o f my health, caused me to retire from active service. I was last the commander of the 23rd Panzer Division. Against my wishes, I was appointed Commandant of Paris. Here in July 1943 at the behest of'General Stuelpnagel, who was the commanding officer in France, I joined the Witzleben- Olhrecht group, which was involved in the attempt to remove Hitler.
Relations with the SS and the Paris SD /Security Service
From the very beginning I was sharply opposed to the SS and the Paris SD. Their infamous activities precluded any decent basis for relations with the populace.
In the course of the preparations and planning for the implementation of a change of administration, General Stuelpnagel demanded that my staff be appropriately reorganized. To carry out the plan it was necessary that I get rid of several questionable people, which resulted in a severe clash with the Army Personnel Office.
On July 14, 1944, General Stuelpnagel informed me, together with my chief of staff, Colonel Unger of the General Staff, in the presence of Colonel Linstow, that the attempted murder of Hitler had been planned for today, but had to be postponed. I was in the meantime to ascertain the locations of the quarters and service posts of all member of the SS and the SD and their commanders. In addition to that the military commander asked me if 1 had firm control of the troops, to which 1 affirmed that I had. My chief of staff and I carried out the orders. The knowledge of the plan was limited to us.
On July 20 Colonel Unger and 1 were at the office of the head of the Military Government, Minister Dr. Eckelmann, for a conference concerning the provisioning of Paris. At 1800 hours there was a call from the military commander's office. Colonel Unger and I were to report immediately to General Stuelpnagel. At 1815 we arrived at his command post.
General Stuelpnagel in the presence of his chief of staff enjoined us to give the following picture of the situation to the troops: "The SS and the SD have removed Adolf Hitler by an armed uprising. You are to immediately take captive all leaders of the SS and SD and all members of both organizations. In the event of opposition, weapons are to be used ruthlessly. All documents and records are to be secured. Arrest the district leaders, the NSDAP, Hubei, as well as the leaders of the Rosenberg von Behr staff Report to me here at the Hotel Majestic on the progress of the execution of these orders. I am going to Field Marshal Kluge to inform him of the cause. "
During the return to the Hotel Meurice I decided, to avoid the bad impression the proceedings would create on the French, to postpone the action until dawn. From my command post I alerted Guard Regiment 1, which was to execute the arrests; I alerted the operations officer, Major Pietschet, who was my standing deputy; also Brigadier General Brehmer and his operations officer Major Wulf, as well as Major Schreib, who was the commander of the field police, which were to be employed as shock troops.
Schreib was the most knowledgeable about the locations of the quarters and service posts of the SS and so on. Because the commander ofGuardRegiment 1, Lieutenant Colonel Kraevel, was not immediately found, the issuance of the written order was delayed. During this time the radio made a short announcement of the attempted murder of Hitler without naming those responsible and without giving any further details.
I ordered Brigadier General Brehmer to personally arrest Major General Oberg, commander of the entire SS and other units in France; Lieutenant Colonel Kraevel, who had in the meantime been found; and Colonel Knochen, the commander of the SS in Paris. The leaders were to be held at the Hotel Continental and the enlisted men in the Fresnes Prison.
My greatest concern was how to maintain secrecy until the hour of execution. The telephone to the service posts and quarters of the SS and SD had been cut off since 1800 hours.
At 22001 went to the Avenue de Foch, where the main building of the SS was located. Directly next to it, on the Boulevard Suchet, was the residence and service post of Major General Oberg. At 2230 hours General Brehmer notified me of the seizure of Oberg, which occurred without incident. At the same time Regiment I arrived. The entire SSand SD of Paris were captured and imprisoned without incident. I proceeded to the Hotel Majestic to announce the successful conclusion of the undertaking.
General Stuelpnagel had not yet returned from his trip to see Field Marshal Kluge. In the meantime Colonel Linstow showed me several telegrams from Berlin, signed by Fromm, and saying that the situation was unclear. [Colonel General Fritz Fromm was commander in chief of the replacement army and a central figure in Berlin.]
Toward 2330 hours General Stuelpnagel returned and said to me: "Field Marshal Kluge has not yet made up his mind. " In between Colonel Unger phoned me and notified me that Admiral [Theodor] Kranke demanded the immediate release of the arrested, or else he would free them with his marine soldiers. In the meantime further news from Berlin showed that our situation had worsened and was completely unfathomable.
Around midnight we learned through speeches by Goering, Doenitz, and Hitler that the assassination attempt had failed. Thereupon l pleaded with General Stuelpnagel to either carryforth the process from France, which was still possible in my opinion, or to cut the action short. General Stuelpnagel postponed making a decision, but upon my further pressure, at about 0030 hours, he ordered the release of the captured. I gave the order to Brigadier General Brehmer and Colonel Unger, who had both appeared at the Hotel Raphael, and personal/'v drove to the Hotel Continental, where I freed Major General Oberg and Colonel Knochen. I took them to the Hotel Raphael. Here a dramatic scene ensued between Stuelpnagel and Oberg in the course of which the just-arrived chief of staff of Field Marshal Kluge, General of Infantry Blumentritt, in the name of the field marshal, relieved Stuelpnagel of his offices and provisionally took over the office of Military Commander of France himself. This scene was witnessed by Ambassador [Otto] Abetz and Ambassadorial Counselor Hoffmann. Blumentritt
ordered me to give an explanation to the troops who took part in the action, explaining it was only a military exercise.
For the fact that 1 am still alive, I thank the silence of General Stuelpnagel and Colonel Linstow. Both were executed. I was relieved of my position of Commandant of Paris.
[signed] Baron von Boineburg, Hans, Major General PoW #22498
Particularly important for the reader to note, for what is to follow, is General Stuelpnagel's silence.
Calling Boineburg to my office, I found the aristocrat a pleasant man and easy to talk to. We went through the contents of his letter and then continued with a more general discussion of the failed coup d'etat.
"I was not privy to what went on in the highest levels of the conspiracy," he said, "but surely you can appreciate the difficulty of organizing such an effort. You must realize that this had to be undertaken without attracting the attention of the Gestapo and the SS, who were a law unto themselves. They could arrest you and execute you without trial. They permeated all our institutions, these thugs, these swine!"
I offered the general a cigarette. After a deep puff, he watched the smoke from the burning tip. "You Americans," he finally said, "cannot understand what it is like to live in a society where you must be careful to whom you can honestly speak your thoughts."
"I think I understand," I assured him.
"Consider, Captain, if you will," he went on, "how complex an operation it is to simultaneously seize all reins of power. You must have a shadow government in place, and yet only two or three people, a handful at most, can know all the names of those who compose it lest one of these be caught by the Schweinhunde [scoundrels] and forced through torture to reveal all in the plot. Add to that, to prevent internecine fighting should the plan succeed, there must be reasonable harmony among the plotters as to who the new leaders will be and the course of action they will take."
Discovering the Rommel Murder Page 21
