When he spoke of these incidents to his wife and son, Rommel commented, "Sometimes you feel the man is no longer normal. Eighty million Germans should not have to die for this man's demoniacal hate."
Rommel was a meticulous preserver of his records. After the First World War when writing his book, Infanterie Greift An, he had been handicapped by the absence of essential documents. Planning to write a book about his experiences in the Second World War, he was determined that this would not happen again. One could therefore hope to find in the marshal's many records an exposition of his metamorphosis from a worshipper of the Fuhrer to an implacable foe. Such a document would be a testament to his transformation and degree of putsch participation. Unfortunately, no such document has turned up. An examination of all his surviving papers by the eminent British military historian and analyst B. H. Liddell Hart revealed nothing about his connection with the July 20 affair "principally," said Hart, "because he destroyed everything that might have been incriminating for himself or other people."
This cleansing of his records, we can safely assume, occurred during his recuperation when reports began to arrive of the fates befalling those judged by the Court of Honor to have been involved in the affair. It is probably not an unwarranted assumption to say that a letter to his wife on July 24 from the hospital after his wounding was intended as a shield in the event he became a Gestapo target. In it he wrote, "The attempt on the Fuhrer's life, coming on top of my accident, has left me very badly shattered. We must thank God that the Fiihrer got off so lightly."
It is difficult to say just when Hitler lost Rommel's allegiance. Mrs. Rommel told me that her husband's confidence in Hitler began to fade with the many unkept promises he made to the marshal during the African campaign and was further eroded after the crumbling of the African front, at a time when Rommel was posted to Hitler's headquarters as an adviser. With Italy collapsing, Rommel thought it an opportune time to talk with Hitler about the overall war situation. On average, U-boats were being lost at the ghastly rate of one a day. How could Germany match the rapidly growing strength of the British and Americans, which was supplemented by that of their many allies, while German production centers were constantly being hit with 2,000 and 3,000 bomber raids?
Hitler admitted to Rommel the war was lost and said he had never wanted war with the West but it was not possible to make peace with those in power.
While mass killings were never mentioned at Hitler's headquarters, Rommel heard that Himmler's SS troops and Gestapo forces were engaged in executions in the East. He did not at first believe that Hitler was aware of the practice, but when in the early months of 1944 he received information that confirmed the criminal practice and its extent, his disillusionment with the Fuhrer deepened. Honorable men fought by a code; they did not execute British commandos or Russian commissar or tolerate mass murders of civilians.
In 1925 Himmler took control of the SA, the organization that provided bodyguards for Hitler and strong-arm men to control hecklers at Nazi Party meetings. He eliminated the SA and replaced it with the SS, which was built into a powerful force, its military arm numbering half a million men. It was responsible for the extermination policies in eastern Europe and the Russian front, and it directed the concentration camps. In my interrogating experiences one of the most common types of pictures found on PWs who had served a stretch on the Russian front were photos of hangings.
The murders directed by Himmler tormented Rommel. In December of 1943, son Manfred was due shortly to be called to service. There was a great deal of propaganda directed at German youth at this time to persuade them to choose the Waffen SS, which was in competition with the Wehrmacht for voluntary enlistments. The SS was known to be better equipped than regular Army units, and they wore snappier uniforms. The young Manfred was influenced by this, and when he told his father he had chosen to join the SS, the marshal had a strong reaction. "That's out of the question," he snapped. "You'll join the same force that I've served in for over thirty years."
When Manfred began to argue, said his mother to me, Rommel cut him short with a final remark that he did not want the youngster to be under the command of a man who, according to his information, was carrying out mass killings.
"Do you mean Himmler?" asked Manfred.
"Yes," answered Rommel.
Like all in the German services, Rommel had taken the sacred military oath of loyalty to Hitler: "I swear by God this sacred oath: that I will render unconditional obedience to the leader of the German Reich and people, Adolf Hitler, commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and that I will as a valiant soldier be ready at all times to stake my life for this oath."
Not until the Fi hrer's victory-or-death order at El Alamein did he question his own blind obedience. He had carried out the order in great disgust, knowing it would needlessly cost him the loss of much of his infantry. As the campaign wore on, he was forcefully impressed by the Allies' overpowering materiel superiority and aware that it would only increase with time. The forces arrayed against Germany had gained the offensive and the best the Fatherland could hope for was to continue the battle in a defensive stance, making its fighting so costly for the Allies that they would agree to a reasonable armistice.
By the winterof 1943-44 Rommel was in contact with resistance elements, specifically former Minister of Foreign Affairs Neurath and Mayor Stroelin of Stuttgart, and they exchanged ideas on the necessity for an immediate end to the war. Rommel's deep social conscience could find no rationale for the continuing imposition on his beloved Fatherland of the inevitable concomitants of war: the killing and maiming of its youth; the leveling of its beautiful cities, towns, and villages; and the ruin of their economies. He had similar conversations with General Stuelpnagel, the Military Governor of France and former fellow teacher at the Dresden military academy.
Rommel's plan, Speidel told me on the trip to see Famy, was to seize Hitler and all Party, Gestapo, and SS leaders. Hitler was to be placed before a German court and charged with his crimes. Rommel felt that if the Germans cleaned their own house, it would show the world that the German people realized the immorality of their government and were not dependent on the enemy for its cleansing. It would also give the Allies a genuine German government to deal with at the conclusion of hostilities. He was convinced that the Allies could never make peace with Hitler and that Hitler would never give up the struggle.
Rommel hoped to end the war in the West by an armistice, continued Speidel, and he was fully prepared to withdraw all German forces behind the West Wall and even to accept an Anglo-American occupation, if Roosevelt and Churchill insisted on it. Germany was then to limit its wareffort to holding the front in the East. Under these conditions, he thought, the English-speaking allies would agree to a cessation of hostilities. They would be spared the costly invasion and, of vital interest to them, Germany would arrest the spread of Communism into western Europe.
On Rommel's behalf Speidel met with Neurath and Stroelin at Speidel's home in Freudenstadt on May 27, 1944, a few days before the Normandy invasion. Neurath and Stroelin were representing the political group of the putsch plotters and had come to find out what preparations the marshal had made for ending the war independently in the West. Neurath asked that Rommel take over the army, should the plot succeed.
At about the same time Rommel, aware that the invasion was imminent and might take place before Hitler could be unseated, came to a clear understanding with Rundstedt: As soon as it was evident that the invasion could not be beaten off, they would confront the Fiihrer with a fait accompli, an independent armistice with the American and English commanders in chief.
Rommel's political opinion on the eve of the invasion can be best described as follows: Disillusioned and grieved, he had to admit that the ideals and ideology to which millions of Germans had subscribed, among them the mass of the youth and he himself twelve years before, were not only forgotten by many, but had also been misdirected and prostituted. The sacrifices that National
Socialism had demanded, and with which he had once been in the fullest accord, had been dissipated. Hitler had discarded all ethical standards of ruling. No longer was there any semblance of an autocratic leadership with a unanimity of will, thought, and action. Instead, there were many who in their power felt themselves little Hitters and practiced theircaprice undeterred by law or decency.
The soldier Rommel, who in the beginning thought his fate in such good hands, saw his world of ideas not only in ruins but cruelly ridiculed. Similarly, it seemed to him, National Socialism had forsaken the old army's standards of soldiery, and this to the detriment of the people and the Fatherland, which had so trustingly sent millions of its sons into the ranks. Hounded by his conviction that it had ceased to operate for the benefit of Germany but instead had become a garrote around its neck, he was determined to end its existence.
One may wonder why, since while in Africa he had already found Hitler a false prophet, Rommel permitted a year to elapse before starting to plan participation in a coup. The reason was the same one that kept so many thousands of Germans fighting long after they had begun to doubt the righteousness of their cause and the likelihood of victory. It was, as I and every Allied interrogator heard over and over again, the soldier's oath of loyalty to Adolf Hitler. Rommel considered the oath he had taken before God an unseverable one. The decision finally to break it was, in view of his personal integrity and the Fiihrer's past favor, the weightiest decision of his life and one he made with the greatest reluctance. But by the winter of 1943-44 he was determined to remove by force Hitler and the Party, who he considered had sold out National Socialism. He was ready, if called on, to head a military dictatorship devoid of the Party apparatus and founded on what he viewed as the good in the original National Socialist program.
Before Rommel's plans were complete, the Allies invaded Normandy. So bloody was the fighting in the latter part of June 1944 that there was a brief local truce west of Caen to permit the burial of the dead and the return of the German nurses who had been cut off when Cherbourg fell. "An incidental result of this truce," Speidel told me, "was that during its arrangement the radio channels to Eisenhower and Montgomery, and in general the method of contact, became known to us." With that knowledge Rommel now began to lay detailed plans with confidants to contact the Allied commanders and, simultaneously, the British ambassador in Madrid, Sir Samuel Hoare.
On July 9 General Stuelpnagel dispatched Lieutenant Colonel Hofacker, his liaison officer to the Goerdeler group, to meet with Rommel. Hofacker's mission was twofold: One, he was to get Rommel's evaluation of the situation on the Normandy front for the purpose of passing it on to the Berlin conspirators; and two, he was to appeal to the marshal to start negotiations independently. Rommel's participation, the plotters believed, was essential. His stature in the eyes of the German Army, the German populace, and the Western Powers was colossal. His character was unassailable.
"Rommel explained the situation to Hofacker substantially in the form of the ultimatum he was later to radio to Hitler," said Speidel, "and asked him to bring back the intentions of the Berlin group, so that all measures could be coordinated. He specifically wanted to know what preparations had been made for taking over the government and how much the conspirators on the Russian front had been told of the plan. He also wanted to know for when the putsch was scheduled.
"In addition," Speidel continued, "many points still needed ironing out, among them what to do with Hitler. The political group wanted him taken alive and held for future trial, a view with which Rommel sided, whereas the military group held this to be impractical and favored assassination.
"Three days later, on July 12 while Hofacker was in Berlin, Rommel confided his views and preparations to Kluge, who had replaced Rundstedt. Although upon first meeting the two marshals had got off to a stormy start, they had soon composed their differences. Kluge now professed a similar outlook to Rommel's and agreed to take part in the putsch."
On July 15 Rommel sent his ultimatum, endorsed by Kluge, to the Fuhrer.
On the evening of July 17 Hofacker returned from Berlin to Rommel's headquarters, only to find that a few hours earlier Rommel had been wounded in the strafing of his car and now lay unconscious in a hospital hovering between life and death. Faced with this unforeseen contingency, Hofacker rushed back to Berlin for instructions.
When three days later Colonel Stauffenberg placed the plotters' bomb, hidden in a briefcase, under the table where Hitler usually stood in the map room, Kluge was away at the front. Unaware of the first telephoned report from Berlin, that Hitler was dead, he did not immediately take control of the plastic situation. By the time he returned to his headquarters the public radio was reporting the attempt and its failure. The Fiihrer's reasons for demanding Rommel's life, said Generals Burgdorf and Maisel to the marshal before making him take his own life, was that he had been implicated in the putsch by General Stuelpnagel, and by Speidel and Hofacker, and that his name headed Goerdeler's list as potential Reich president.
This explanation by Hitler's emissaries warrants close examination. First, did Stuelpnagel implicate Rommel'? This is unlikely, since he did not implicate Speidel, and he and Rommel had been friends for many years, had taught at the same military academy, and were on good terms.
One of the conspirators was General Boineburg, Commandant of Paris, a subordinate of Stuelpnagel. The letter he wrote me while a PW in one of my camps ended with, "I owe my life to von Stuelpnagel's silence."
"1 knew Stuelpnagel well," Speidel told me. "I was his chief of staff in France until the end of 1941. He was a brave man and an honorable one, not one to take others down with him."
Since by his silence Stuelpnagel had shielded Boineburg and Speidel, it is most likely that he had also shielded Rommel. The next assertion, that Speidel and Hofacker had betrayed Rommel, is equally unlikely. The two men were several times made to face each other and then grilled at length by interrogators. "Hofacker," said Speidel, "had been caught red-handed. He knew he was doomed to death, but he was not the kind of man to drag others to their doom. When we were brought face to face, Hofacker was directed by the Gestapo men to look at me closely. He did, and said, `I do not know this man. I have never seen him before.' He saved my life.
"Hitler's charge that I incriminated Rommel is fantastic!" said Speidel. "In fact, had I made any incriminating statements, they would automatically have made me an accessory, and I would not be alive today."
Another noteworthy point is that the Gestapo made no attempt to interrogate Speidel in detail on Rommel's involvement until after the marshal had already been murdered. Typical of the autosuggestive mind, Hitler had set out with a conclusion that Rommel was involved in the plot and manufactured the evidence to prove it. In this case his conclusion happened to be correct.
Hitler's assertion that Rommel's name headed Goerdeler's list as proposed Reich president was probably true, for it is known that the Gestapo found Goerdeler's lists. Tremendously popular at home and highly respected in enemy military circles as a brilliant and chivalrous opponent who fought by the rules, the Desert Fox commanded the loyalty of the mass of the German Army and the public more than any other man. As Reich president his position would have been similar to that of the popular World War I war hero, Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg, who in 1925 was elected president of the German Republic. In view of the German penchant for strong leaders, the choice of Rommel by Goerdeler and his circle was a natural one.
Rommel's name on Goerdeler's list was probably the biggest factor in Hitler's decision to kill him. The theocracy built around Hitler had no room for other gods. The Fuhrer knew that as long as the Swabian lived, Germany had a popular potential successor and his internal enemies a constant inspiration for a second dethronement effort. By nature distrustful and intent on guarding his position to the utmost, he had long recognized with anxiety the soldier's growing popularity.
In May 1946, in one of my last visits to Speidel's home, we discussed the
autocrat's dilemma. The general poured us each another glass of wine, went to his desk and returned with a manuscript. "Four hundred years ago," he said, "Machiavelli put it succinctly." He pointed to a quotation:
The general whose skill has brought victory and success to the Prince must stand in such high esteem with the soldiers, the people, and the enemy, that the Prince must not merely be grateful for victories. The Prince must secure himself against his general, do away with him, or strip him of his renown.
According to Kurt Hesse, the historian who had contacts in the highest military circles, the Fuhrer thought he would bounce back from his defeats. "He had a Frederick the Great complex," said Hesse. "He had early studied the personality of the Prussian king, as can be seen from his book Mein Kampf. He had a great admiration for Frederick and inwardly ever increasingly identified himself as a twentieth-century Frederick.
"The evidence of this complex is plentiful. It can be seen in his speech to the German people on September 1, 1939, upon the outbreak of the war. It is practically a copy of the so-called Leuthen speech, the speech that Frederick delivered to his generals two days prior to the Battle of Leuthen. It can be summarized in two sentences: `Either we win or we die. We either annihilate the enemy or we fall before his batteries."'
"Would Hitler himself have been so ready to die if he were in the foot soldier's shoes?" I asked Hesse.
"I think so," he replied without hesitation. "To give the devil his due, he was a brave soldier in the First World War and was awarded the Iron Cross First Class, which, as you know, is a high military honor."
Discovering the Rommel Murder Page 28
