These parachute insertions were accomplished utilizing old T-7 type parachutes, which offered limited maneuverability. The team’s bulky and heavy radio equipment, which included a generator, was bundled and dropped in a separate parachute. It became immediately obvious that the team and its equipment were at the mercy of the wind and assembly on the ground became a significant challenge.5,6 The aerial photography of drop zones was also subject to misinterpretation, as well. What appeared to be triple canopy jungle might well be knee high scrub, and vice versa. Several injuries and at least one death occurred as a result of these mis-reads. Captain Richardson sent SFC Gerald DeLong to Saigon to work with the Research and Development group to develop a solution. With the aid of a group of Filipino technicians, a system was devised whereby a length of copper wire with a radio frequency transponder was rigged to the equipment parachute so that it would stretch the length of the risers when the chute deployed. Several inexpensive transistor radios were tuned to the transponder frequency and given to the team members. Once on the ground, they could use the radios as directional signal trackers and move to the equipment bundle to assemble for the mission. The transistor radios doubled as receivers for coded messages composed at headquarters in Saigon and transmitted from the local radio station in Saigon.6 During this brief period of preparation, the priority that was assigned to the mission was exemplified by the speed with which requests for assistance and equipment were answered. On one occasion, a request for karabiners was sent to Saigon and within a few days a C130 arrived in Nha Trang from Japan carrying nothing except two boxes of the snap links.5 The team members were also provided a money belt with a number of gold coins should they encounter a situation where they might have to barter their way out. Throughout the first few months of its existence, reports on Project Delta’s progress went directly to the White House every 24 hours.5,6
Captain Richardson argued with Headquarters long and hard that helicopter insertion was more controllable and safer. His arguments drew the ire of those who considered the parachute infiltration as their own brain child and he was told to relent or be replaced. Having seen the Project this far, Captain Richardson relented and chose to see his investment through to the end. Having exhausted the allotted time for preparation, Captain Richardson declared the teams ready for the operation, now code named Leaping Lena. There was one more blow to be dealt before the operation commenced. Because the U.S. advisors had been training with the teams and had accompanied them on the various training missions, they assumed that they would be accompanying them on the cross border missions. Headquarters ordered that no Americans were to cross the border under any circumstances. The LLDB were understandably demoralized by this change of plans. They viewed the American presence on the ground as reassurance that the power to command air assets and fire support would be at their disposal. They felt they were being committed with no power. To their credit, all 40 volunteers stayed with the plan.5,6
On the night of June 24, 1964, Teams 1 and 2 boarded C-47’s and prepared for their night insertions along Route 9 near Tchepone, Laos. Team 1 departed the aircraft at an altitude of approximately 400 feet and, clad in bulky smokejumper suits, descended into the trees. The team leader, SGT He, landed in a tree and lowered himself to the ground only to find that his second in command was missing and the remainder of the team was scattered across the jungle.4 After assembling his team, SGT He attempted to make radio contact with Captain Richardson’s command group, which had set up in Khe Sanh. Communications were unsuccessful. Team 2 aborted due to poor navigation. The next night Teams 2, 3, and 4 boarded the C-47’s and were inserted south of Route 9. Again, radio communication was attempted. The only communication received was a single transmission from Team 2. Two nights later Team 5 was inserted just north of Moung Nong and immediately made contact with enemy forces. The team leader was killed at once and the rest of the team scattered and ran for the border. On that same day, Team 1 made contact with the enemy and also evaded toward the border.4,5,6
Captain Richardson continued efforts to establish communications with the teams with little success. One team did make contact through Saigon and requested a resupply to include several bottles of wine. Saigon immediately contacted Captain Richardson and questioned him about the wine. Captain Richardson set a standard for future Command and Control policy when he told Saigon that it didn’t matter what the people on the ground asked for, or what they wanted it for-the important thing was to get it to them.5 Richardson returned to Nha Trang to accompany the resupply mission. An Air Force LT Colonel asked to accompany him on the mission and Richardson welcomed him aboard. The C-47 made several passes amidst a violent series of thunderstorms at low altitude in an attempt to find the team. The aircraft was thrown violently in the turbulence and was in real danger of breaking apart. The team was located and the drop was accomplished. Back in Nha Trang the Air Force officer informed Captain Richardson that they were all crazy and he certainly didn’t want any more air time with this group. Shortly thereafter communications with all of the teams failed and Captain Richardson launched an intense search effort along the border. He organized an effort to patrol the border with his staff by air and with the aid of local villagers to try and locate any survivors who might successfully escape to the border.5,6
Several days later Captain Richardson recovered four members of Team 1, including SGT He. A couple of days after that, two members of Team 5 made it to the border. History remains unclear as to the number of men who made it out of Laos. Of forty infiltrators, between five and nine returned.4,5,6 One member, the Team Leader of Team 5, was confirmed dead and the remaining thirty were presumed captured or missing. Much later Captain Richardson was able to piece together several scenarios from CIA and other intelligence reports. At least one team member crashed through the roof of a house on landing; another landed in dense scrub and was killed on impact. Several members attempted to buy their way to freedom with their gold coins and were promptly turned over to the enemy after paying the local villagers. One team decided to take offensive action and ambushed a convoy of seven vehicles. After successfully destroying the convoy, the team was pursued relentlessly and eventually captured. Each team’s mission was to collect information on enemy activity, to include movement of trucks, artillery, and heavy equipment. They were to look for any signs of troop movements of intact units such as companies or battalions.5
Although Leaping Lena was classified a failure, the intelligence developed or generated from the team members who returned was much more than MACV had prior to that time. It was determined the area was alive with enemy ground forces, and many were equipped with NVA uniforms. Every culvert on every road, and every bridge had a minimum of two enemy personnel guarding it. Additional roads, not detectable by air, were discovered and the movement of convoys noted.4,5,6 The teams found these through visual observation on the ground. Units as large as battalion-size were observed, including one that was in the act of crossing into Vietnam west of Khe Sanh. This sighting was confirmed by a helicopter crew sent out to search for the teams. Team members also reported approximately 30 sampans being used simultaneously to cross company size units. This same information was repeated by several members of different teams. There was high density enemy activity throughout the area astride Highway 9 and west of the international boundary. One of the hard learned lessons of Leaping Lena was that it was unrealistic to expect any team to survive for a long period of time while engaged in these activities. The original mission was conceptualized at thirty days.5,6 Within nine days all the teams had been compromised, captured or killed. From that point forward, the planned duration of these missions was seven days, or less, with the optimum number being in the three to five day range.
When Captain Richardson returned to Nha Trang he found that SF Detachments B1/110, which had arrived from Okinawa on June 12th, 1964, was assigned to take over Project Delta. He relinquished command and returned to his regular assignment. During his tenure with Project Delta
, Captain Richardson had established a firm foundation from which a functional clandestine force could be built. In his after action report, he recommended strongly that Delta would be better utilized if the teams were accompanied by American advisors, were inserted by helicopter, had better communications capabilities, and operations were conducted inside Vietnam away from interference from political influence and with availability of direct mission support.
The new team of advisors at Delta continued with training, but not without significant difficulty. The horrendous losses suffered during Leaping Lena, coupled with a lack of trust and familiarity with the new advisors was a cause for dissent and dissatisfaction among the LLDB. At one point in late July, the LLDB refused to participate in any more training and forced an armed standoff with U.S. SF personnel. The Project was stalled in its tracks.
CHAPTER IV: REVITALIZATION; CONTINUE MISSION
Within a month, Captain Richardson was called in for a meeting with Col. John Spears, the new Commanding Officer of the 5th Special Forces Group. Col. Spears briefed Richardson on the new urgency assigned to intelligence gathering, ostensibly because of the events in the Gulf of Tonkin in early August 1964. He called upon Richardson to re-invigorate Project Delta. He attempted to entice him to return by conceptualizing different missions. One such mission would be to stage a raid on the oil field in the Gulf of Tonkin and destroy it. No such mission ever came about, but it serves to demonstrate the level of competence that was expected of a revitalized Project Delta.5 Negotiating from a position of advantage, Captain Richardson was not shy about setting conditions for his reassignment as the Commanding Officer of Project Delta. A directive from General Westmoreland was issued that focused Delta’s mission on in-country operations, just as Richardson had recommended, and authorized U.S. advisory personnel to accompany these missions. Captain Richardson would establish the methods for infiltration, meaning that the Project would abandon the foolish practice of night jumps into enemy controlled territory. Operations would focus on surveillance and interdiction on the Vietnamese side of the border, catching the enemy as he entered or returned from Laos. Research and development assets would be made available to assist advisors in improving equipment and techniques. Richardson would report directly to Saigon and would have access to the personnel of his choosing to staff the Project. U.S. personnel would accompany the teams on the ground. In short, the Project would receive all the attention and priority that this new urgency demanded. In mid-August, Richardson resumed command of Project Delta. He then called on his right hand man, Paul Payne, who was the first Sergeant Major of Project Delta, and selected his team. The high priority assigned to the Project enabled them to choose from personnel currently assigned to the Project, already in country, in the U.S. and in Okinawa. These handpicked volunteers were assembled in a matter of days. He got every single man he requested. He sat his new staff down and gave them a pointed ‘this is the way it is’ speech and offered the option of leaving to any man who didn’t want to operate in accordance with his plan. No one left. One of his first acts was to establish a mess hall and staff it with the widows and families of the men lost on Leaping Lena. They received a fair wage from the now seemingly unlimited funds available to Captain Richardson.5,6
In the ensuing weeks, training resumed and lessons learned from the first training exercises and the disastrous first missions were addressed. Morale among the LLDB improved dramatically. Helicopter insertion techniques were developed in concert with the Vietnamese pilots. The insertion helicopter flew in a straight line formation with four other ships that were used as decoys and to mask the sound of the actual insertion. Variations on this theme became standard operating procedure in Delta and other units throughout the course of the conflict.6 The 11th Airborne Ranger Battalion stationed at Dong Ba Thin as a regional reaction force was permanently assigned to Project Delta. Training continued in preparation for its initial missions as an immediate reaction force under the tutelage of an A Team headed by LT Dick Kamerling and Warrant Officer (WO) Jim Garvey. The ranger companies were organized along ethnic lines, one each being of Thai, Nung and Vietnamese heritage.5 Half the Nung Ranger Company pulled security around the Project Delta camp at Dong Ba Thin. The other half moved to Nha Trang and assumed the security responsibility there. The rangers were designated the 91st Airborne Ranger Battalion in November, 1964. The U.S. staffing level rose from about twelve to approximately thirty two. The type of autonomy that Captain Richardson enjoyed during this time was unheard of, especially for a man of his rank.6 At a time when a command the size of Project Delta would ordinarily be staffed by a Major or Lieutenant Colonel reporting directly to 5th Group, Captain Richardson retained only one other officer, LT Paul O’Neal, on his staff and routinely met with General Officers and senior embassy personnel. He also had his own paymaster who would go to Headquarters in Saigon, fill his satchel with money and deliver it to whomever Captain Richardson designated.5 Part of this money was in the form of payoffs involved in setting up an intelligence network. Captain Richardson was instrumental in setting up an intel net right out of the Special Forces Handbook. His only contact, by design, was an ARVN Major whose initial information checked out well. When he passed on an enemy plan for attacking Ton San Nhut air base, Richardson immediately went to Saigon and relayed it to a Brigadier General who shall remain unnamed. The General asked Richardson what or who the source was for this information, and, in accordance with accepted intelligence protocol, Captain Richardson refused to compromise his contact. He was chastised and chased from the office with various insults and threats leveled at his back. Sure enough, Ton San Nhut was attacked in precisely the manner and with the number of troops that had been divulged. Disappointed that his information had been waylaid, Richardson was compelled to contact the intelligence community and report it. He was instructed to go to a restaurant in Saigon and take a seat. He did and was joined by two operatives in civilian dress and from that point forward, he reported his intel net findings directly to them. 5
Captain Richardson made the trip to Saigon once a month and gave his reports directly to headquarters. At the same time, MACV would give him six or seven areas they wanted intelligence gathered from and let him pick and choose his next area of operation. Captain Richardson would evaluate the requests and negotiate his conditions for committing his troops. At this point in the evolution of the Project, Forward Operating Bases were not set up. The operations usually required only a handful of teams and they were reliant on the host units for logistical support. The one exception was that Captain Richardson demanded that Project Delta’s own 91st Airborne Ranger Battalion would be the immediate reaction force should a team request one. He did not want to leave the fate of a small group of fighters in someone else’s hands. This early in the escalation of the war, air assets were at a premium. Captain Richardson went back channel and made arrangements with several aircraft unit commanders for priority air support, not only for transportation of the unit, but also for tactical air support. The primary source of air support was through the LLDB utilizing the assigned H 34’s and C 47’s. The second source was from the 5th Special Forces Group’s attached and assigned air commands.5,6
In September of 1964, the Montagnards from the CIDG force at the Buon Sa Par Special Forces Camp revolted against the Vietnamese LLDB and took several hostage. Brigadier General William DePuy, MACV J-3, called on Project Delta to provide a show of force in resolving the situation. Code named Operation Snatch, volunteers from the Project landed 500 meters outside the camp while negotiators, led by DePuy, arranged for release of the hostages. After the successful conclusion of the situation, the task force returned to Nha Trang. The 91st Ranger Battalion at Dong Ba Thin remained on alert throughout the negotiations, but was not deployed. 6
Toward the end of 1964, the training missions and lessons learned from early excursions resulted in a Project Delta that was prepared to conduct reconnaissance missions with small teams consisting of two U.S. advisors and eit
her four or six LLDB, depending on the nature of the mission. Infiltration techniques had been developed with the assigned air assets and the 91st Airborne Ranger Battalion was trained and ready to respond to any contingencies.
Over a period of a few days commencing December 9, 1964, an Area of Operations (AO), on the peninsula running east and south from the village of Ninh Hoa was infiltrated by three Project Delta recon teams. The area lies just north of Project Delta’s home base in Nha Trang. Operation 12-64 commenced with insertion of the three teams at first light. Two of the teams made contact with superior forces and began evasive action. The third team made contact, captured a prisoner, and was successfully exfiltrated.9
After making initial contact with an estimated enemy company at 1600 hours on the 9th, Team 1 called for an immediate extraction, but the rescue ship was driven off by heavy fire. Two men became separated from the team, but the split team managed to outmaneuver the enemy and reunite on an alternate Landing Zone (LZ) for extraction. The LZ was situated on a steep hillside and the Vietnamese pilot had to rest one of the H 34’s wheels on the hillside and avoid smashing the rotors into the mountain as the crew simultaneously engaged heavy sniper fire and pulled the team aboard. Despite being shot out of their AO, the team returned with valuable information that helped to identify the enemy unit and its strength. 9
On December 11th, Team # 2, meanwhile, had broken contact and descended to the valley floor to an exfiltration point. As the helicopter prepared to land it was driven off by pursuing forces. The team took cover behind a dike in a rice paddy where three of its members, two U.S. advisors and one wounded LLDB, were pinned under a withering enemy fire. The other three team members witnessed the barrage and, assuming that the three in the paddy had been killed, fled from the area. While darkness and torrential rain on the 11th covered all noise of movement the three separated team members crawled from the rice paddy. They crept until almost daylight, when they found that they had penetrated the outer perimeter of the enemy base camp. Throughout the day the three hid in thick cover. At one point, a VC search party stopped for a break for nearly 30 minutes within arm’s reach of the three. That night the three crawled back out of the enemy camp and made radio contact. They were directed to the only available LZ located 50 meters on the opposite side of a village held by two reinforced VC platoons. At 0500 hours on December 14th, the three stood. Supporting the wounded LLDB between them, the two U.S. advisors strode through the half light toward the village. They waved casually at a VC guard smoking a cigarette. The guard returned the wave and the three exited the far side of the village undetected. They hid in the undergrowth until the weather lifted enough for a helicopter to effect an extraction. The rescue ship drew fire, but the extraction was successful. The teams called in airstrikes on the identified enemy locations resulting in 16 VC killed, 17 wounded and 4 captured. A company of Rangers was committed and the total enemy casualties rose by another 39 killed, 2 squads captured and 22 tons of rice captured. The operation was an outstanding success. The Americans and Vietnamese coordinated beautifully. Project Delta penetrated right into enemy camps under the VC’s noses and then wreaked havoc, using the VC’s own tactics.
Boots on the Ground: The history of Project Delta Page 4
