“When they returned, the weather had cleared enough for them to locate our panel. They then directed us to an LZ about 400 meters away to the South. We moved to that location and found it to be too steep for an LZ plus having Elephant grass about eight feet high. There was a ridge about 300 meters from us and I told the Aircraft that we would move to the ridge as it was pretty flat, however, it had high grass also, so I requested a rope ladder. Four of the men were exfiltrated in this manner at 1610 hours at coordinates BS728204, I was exfiltrated in the same manner at 1620 hours from same location.”25
Team 2, code named Capitol, was led by SFC Frank Webber. The following is the unedited statement of SSG Charles Hiner. He and SFC Webber were the only survivors of this mission:25 “Team Capitol was infiltrated into the operational area at last light 271853 hours at coordinates BS766198. From the infiltration site, the team moved approximately four hundred meters to the west-northwest and spent the night.
“The team was ready to move at first light on the morning of 28 January. We made radio contact on schedule at 280730 hours and reported negative traffic. Above our location, approximately 75 meters, ran a trail running from southwest to northeast. Our plan was to observe this trail, which we did after making radio contact. We found the trail to be larger than we expected, as we had discussed this trail during the briefing prior to infiltration. We found the trail to be about one meter wide and well used. The trail had been used during the night of 27 January while we were in the area. A light rain had fallen during the night and the tracks were real fresh. The team moved across the trail moving in a southeastern direction for approximately 600 meters when we came upon an area that was crisscrossed with trails and appeared to have been well used within the last 24 hours. In this area, the jungle canopy was approximately 150 feet high, but under the canopy, it was fairly clean and clear with very little undergrowth. From this location, we decided to move to the southwest into thicker jungle.
“After we started moving again, we still encountered numerous trails leading to high ground. The trails all seemed to lead from the valley floor. All the trails we crossed or observed had been used within the last 24 hours. At 281130 hours, the team came upon an old hut that was partially torn down, with a trail running by it. The hut appeared not to have been used recently. We continued on down, moving parallel to this trail, until we came to a position overlooking a stream at coordinates BS763187. At this location, we decided to stop for our noon meal and make radio contact. After eating, we made contact and sent message number one.
“We continued on down still moving parallel to the trail and after about 20 minutes, the jungle started clearing up. I, being the point man, saw four woodcutters working. They were wearing black shorts and shirts and had a cart with two water buffalo. About the same time I saw them, they seemed to pause for a second with their work and then started back to work. I gave the signal for the rest of the team to fade back into the jungle. Immediately the woodcutters seemed to start working towards the top of the hill until they were out of sight. It seemed that the closer they got to the top of the hill, the faster they were going. The team discussed the possibility of being seen by the woodcutters and felt that we had been compromised. We decided to head for high ground as fast as we could. We moved out hitting real heavy undergrowth and at times, we were crawling through undergrowth on our hands and knees. Suddenly we broke through the undergrowth and came to what seemed to be a “buffalo wallow”.
“The area was well worn with trails running in all directions with buffalo tracks and fresh buffalo droppings. There was no jungle canopy here, only scrub trees about 10 feet high, this was at coordinates BS178184. The team moved right through the middle of this area as fast as possible in order to clear it and get back into thicker jungle. Almost as soon as we got through this area, we hit some banana trees and heard a dog barking and figured that we were close to a village. We then decided to move north away from where the dog was barking. Also, as soon as the dog started barking, we heard someone start banging on what sounded like a tin wash basin about 200 meters away. We don’t know if this was some sort of signal or not, but it had a pattern to it. He would bang for a minute or so then wait for a few seconds and then start again. This was continued until we were out of hearing. This was at coordinates BS755185.
“After we started moving again, we started hitting freshly cut trails. These trails were so fresh that the leaves on the brush were still green and not wilted. The only tracks on these trails were those of the people who had been working on them. These trails averaged in width from about two to three meters wide in some places and were coming up from the valley floor. All these trails were generally north to south. We hit this area about 1600 hours on 28 January. We discussed our situation and decided to start hunting for a good area to spend the night since we were in an area with so many trails and also since we felt we had been seen by the woodcutters. We had to have a site with plenty of cover and concealment. After selecting our camp site, we again discussed our situation and decided that since we had really seen nothing but numerous trails in the area, that the next morning we would move across the main trail that runs from north to south and turn south until we reached a point above a village located at coordinates BS756178. At this point, our intention was to split the team. One half was to stay in that location and observe the village and the other half was to move further south to coordinates BS751172 and observe the general area. We also figured that since we were so close to the valley floor that if we got into trouble, we could use one of the rice paddies for an exfiltration point.
“The team was ready to move out at first light on 29 January. The weather was very bad with heavy rains and fog lying right on the ground. At 0730 hours, we made radio contact with base and reported negative traffic. After leaving this location, we encountered very difficult terrain, heavy undergrowth and rocks. At approximately 1000 hours, we stopped and took a chow break as we had had no breakfast. After we finished eating, we moved for no more than 30 feet until we came to the main trail running north and south. (The undergrowth was so thick in this area that we couldn’t see the main trail, although we were only 30 feet from it when we stopped to eat.) This trail averaged in width from about two to four feet in some places and had been used within the last 24 hours by a lot of people. We crossed the trail and turned south until we hit a real bad area with a rock cliff. When we hit this, we turned west again in order to avoid this.
“The going was through real heavy undergrowth again and we were on our hands and knees breaking a trail to get through. All of a sudden, we broke out of this undergrowth into a clearing at coordinates BS75183. This area was approximately 20 meters long and 10 meters wide with fairly clean undergrowth and rocks that averaged in size from about three to four feet long and about the same in height. During the movement into this area, due to bad weather, our hearing had been very bad so we decided to stop, take a five minute break and see if we could hear anything.
“Our order of march throughout the entire patrol was as follows: SSG Hiner on point, SFC Hancock, SFC Webber, SFC Cook, SSG Dotson, and SSG Hoagland. We entered the clearing in this order. This was at approximately 291040 hours. As soon as we entered the area and we took up positions. The team had no more than sat down after taking up defensive positions when an unknown force opened fire from the Southeast. The undergrowth was so thick all around this clearing we could see nothing.
“I estimate that the force was of about platoon strength and all weapons appeared to be either SMG’s or M 1 Carbines, US make. In the initial burst of fire, SGT’s Hoagland, Hancock, Cook, and Webber were hit. SGT Hoagland was hit so bad that he never moved. He fell on his back, but I don’t think he died right away. Hancock, I think, was killed in the initial burst of fire. SGT Cook was hit in the back and fell on his stomach, he called and said that he couldn’t move from the waist down. SGT Cook started returning fire from where he lay although he was badly wounded and couldn’t move. SGT Webber’s left arm was s
hattered from the elbow down. The only two not hit in the initial burst of fire were SGT Dotson and myself. I moved as fast up the hill as I could, (this was to the north) to cover from this direction.
When I reached the top, SGT Cook called to me and said to come back and get the radio out of his pack. I then called to SGT Webber to cover me as I came back down the hill to where Cook lay. When I started down the hill, SGT Webber put out a heavy volume of fire in the direction of the heaviest fire. When I reached Cook who was still on his stomach and still firing, I took the radio out of his pack and moved back over to SGT Webber’s position behind the rock. (I did not try to move Cook at this time because he was lying beside a tree.) I set up the radio and started calling anyone who would answer me.
“While I was on the radio, SGT Webber moved over to the edge of the clearing to where he could put out a better volume of fire, he moved in front of where SGT Cook lay. The first call I put out was answered by a C-47. After SGT Webber took up his new position, I called to SGT Dotson to move up to where I had been previously and cover from that direction. He started to move and got about ten feet and was hit in the chest and fell back. I think he was killed instantly. He got off one round while falling. After I made contact with the C-47, the C-47 made contact with the FAC (Robin one) who then made contact with me and requested my location. I gave him my coordinates and reported the situation as best I could under the circumstances. The FAC stated that he had two gunships on the way to our location. I threw red smoke to mark our position. After the FAC found my position; he said that he would have to leave to lead the gunships back to my position due to bad weather. When the gunships arrived, they wanted me to mark our area. I threw another smoke (yellow) and they couldn’t see it so I threw another red, they marked and wanted to know where I wanted the ordnance. I told them 50 meters all around the position.
“All during this, the VC fire was sporadic. After the gunships made the first pass, the fire from the VC quit for about two or three minutes, then broke out again, very heavy, from the South, West, and East. At this time, I called the FAC and told him to tell the gunships to make a run right over the top of us. At this time, the gunships came in and expended their ordnance right through the middle of our position. After this pass, the FAC informed me that the gunships were out of ordnance and that other gunships were on the way. (I was wounded in the head on this pass.)
“The FAC asked me if we could move to an LZ. I told him negative, because we were all either dead or wounded and unable to move. I then requested an air strike using napalm to try and burn an LZ next to our position. At this time the FAC said something about B-57’s in the pass or something I don’t remember exactly what. When I made this request, the FAC stated that the ceiling was too low for Air Force aircraft and that he was afraid of collisions over the area. I then requested a reaction force of any kind to try to get to us because we were unable to move.
At this time, small arms fire broke out again from the southeast corner of the perimeter. I informed the FAC, and he told me that no gunships were available at the moment but he would buzz the area. He continued this until the gunships were in the valley, then left to lead them to our location. At this time, SGT Webber started firing and called grenade and pointed in the direction the grenade came from. I took up the fire and tried to lay down a cross fire. SGT Webber saw one man throw a grenade; this man was wearing a khaki baseball type hat with a red star in the center. (This was the only man seen during the entire action.) We received a total of three hand grenades during the entire action and all three went off. They were of the “potato masher type”. After this fire, SGT Webber moved back from the edge of the clearing and as he came by Cook, he picked him up and dragged him back over by the rock where I was. Cook was still alive at this time but unable to talk. After he lay Cook down, SGT Webber moved back around the rock to where I was with the radio and gave Cook a shot of morphine and took one himself.
“SGT Webber was getting pretty weak from the loss of blood, and I put a dressing on his arm. By this time, the FAC was back over the area with the gunships and I requested another run around the position. The gunships wanted me to mark for them and I informed them to wait for a minute or so that I was out of grenades and would check one of the bodies for a grenade. (A total of four gunships arrived this time.) I ran over to SGT Hancock’s body and got a grenade from his pack as he was lying on his stomach and was easy to get to from my position. After I threw the grenade, I told the gunships to hit fifty meters from the center of my position in a 360 degree circle. The gunships came in this order: one from the North, another from the West and one from the South. The ship that came from the East must have misjudged, because he came right down through the middle of our position. We figured this was when SGT Cook died. SGT Webber and I were down behind a big rock and we think this is what saved our lives.
“From this point on I thought we were finished, I estimate the time to have been around 1230 hours. I again asked for help. The FAC (Robin One) was requesting help, telling someone we were hurt bad and needed help. I don’t remember who he was calling. We were told by him that a reaction force was on the way before this, but by this time, we had just about given up hope. By this time, all firing had stopped. SGT Webber was very weak from the loss of blood and I was losing blood from the wound in my head and starting to have faint spells. I then got up and moved among the bodies and checked them. I also collected ammunition off the bodies and brought this back to where SGT Webber and I were behind the rock because we were expecting more fire and figured we had had it as far as getting out. When I got back to the rock, I got back on the radio and gave the FAC a complete report on the situation. He in turn started calling for a reaction force. From here on for a few minutes things were blank because I had a faint dizzy spell.
“When I came around, I heard the FAC say over the radio that the reaction force was on the way. I informed him that if they would use rope ladders that they could let down right in our position. The FAC informed me that Lieutenant Holland was on the ground and working toward my position. The reaction force got within 300 meters of our position and wanted us to throw smoke and fire three rounds in the air. I threw the smoke and SGT Webber fired the shots. I also tried to make radio contact with the reaction force but with negative results.
“At this time, the FAC had a chopper from the 1st Cavalry come in and hover over our position for about five minutes. SGT Webber told me to move out into the clearing and wave to the gunners to let them know we were still there. I did this and the gunners pointed towards the reaction force. About ten minutes later, the reaction force broke through the clearing.”25
Captain Ken Kerr was the Forward Air Controller (FAC) who acted as the radio relay, directed air support and guided the recovery effort. He recalled the mission as follows:25 “At approximately 291040 hours, I Kenneth L. Kerr Capt USAF was scrambled to work as a FAC in support of a Project Delta Team, which had been hit by a VC Force. At the time the only contact with the Team was by FM radio, which SSG Hiner was the operator. SSG Hiner upon my arrival informed me that the VC were on all four sides of his position. He also informed me that he had two KIA and two WIA. He also estimated the VC strength at about platoon size. I then informed SSG Hiner that I could not call in any Air Force Aircraft due to bad weather. (The ceiling averaged from three to five hundred feet.) I then told him that two rocket Helicopters were on the way to his position, he then requested they make runs to the South and East of his position.
“At this time, he marked his position with yellow smoke, after the rocket ships made the first run, he requested that they be brought in closer to his position. The ships made the second run and he reported they were on target, by this time the ships were out of ordnance and had to leave, also two more ships were on station in the valley and on the way to the target. Upon arrival, the two second ships made two runs each over the target. “These ships made runs over the same area as the first two ships. At this time, SSG Hiner informed me that t
he VC had ceased fire. I then held the third two ships that were on station in the valley for approximately 15 minutes, then Hiner called me and said that he was again receiving fire from the East. (I could hear the fire over the radio.) He asked me at this time if I could direct the Rockets in a little closer to his position because he felt that the VC were preparing to overrun his position. I told him yes, but I also reminded him of the danger in bringing them in any closer. He then told me that he wanted them in closer. I then told the rockets where he wanted the fire, and the ships made a run right over the top of his position, then made the second pass over the same position as the first.
“At this time Hiner called and told me to pull the ships out a little as the rockets were hitting right on top of them. He also said he thought the VC were pulling back. (He didn’t explain why he thought this.) At this time, I get a call from Delta’s FOB asking if the Team could move to an LZ, I then ask Hiner if this was possible. He replied no and informed me that he had four KIA and two WIA, at this time his voice seem to fade or get weaker over the radio. He also stated that a reaction force would have to come in to relieve them. I then asked SSG Hiner what he estimated the VC strength to be. He estimated their strength at Platoon size. I then informed Delta’s FOB that a reaction force of about 10 to 15 men could relieve these people. The FOB then informed me that they had 15 men standing by and ready to go. I then informed SGT Hiner that the reaction force was on the way to his location. SGT Hiner informed me that the VC had started to fire again. I then asked for more smoke to mark with, he then threw a red smoke. As soon as I saw the smoke, I called the rocket ships who were standing by to come on in.
“At this time, I made tree top level passes over his position to ensure I had his exact location and try to scare the VC away from his position. I continued to buzz his position for approximately five minutes until the rocket ships got into position to fire. I then fired two smoke rockets into the VC position as directed by SGT Hiner. After I marked, the rocket ships made two runs each, approximately 20 to 30 meters out from SGT Hiner position. After these two runs, SGT Hiner informed me that the fire from the VC had ceased. (About 25 minutes had passed since I had informed SGT Hiner that a reaction force was on the way.) He also asked me where the reaction force was. I then called back to Delta’s FOB and asked where the reaction force was, and they informed me that a reaction force was on the way to the helicopters and would be at my location in approximately 30 minutes.
Boots on the Ground: The history of Project Delta Page 9
