4th Ranger Company was inserted on August 9th after a weather delay of 24 hours. On August 11th the Company fired upon six VC in a firefight that lasted about ten minutes. One Ranger was killed in the exchange. The Company took up defensive positions on a hillside with a large bomb crater that served as an LZ as well as a command post near its crest. Herb Siugzda manned the radio inside the bomb crater and called for air support. Fifteen minutes later the 4th Company was attacked from two directions by an estimated reinforced company and another platoon of NVA. Shortly thereafter air support arrived and suppressed enemy fire for a few minutes. During the lull after the air attacks the Rangers counted three more of their own killed and nine wounded.
Fred Walz was with the Rangers in a position down the hill from the bomb crater and went to the aid of a Ranger wounded in the face. After dressing the wound, Walz lifted the soldier and began carrying him up the hill to the crater, leaving his medical kit behind in the process. He met Ed Coffey who was on his way to assist with the wounded and advise Walz that the medevac was on the way in. After this brief exchange Coffey started down the hill and was hit in the face and chest by enemy fire. Walz ran to Coffey and began to carry him up the hill. Struggling under the weight of the injured man he was forced to pause on the steep slope. Siugzda saw the two Americans and thought that Walz was wounded and Coffey was attempting to rescue him. Siugzda ran from the bunker and immediately recognized the situation and began to assist Walz with carrying Coffey to the bunker. Coffey managed a deep gasping breath and quickly wrote a note that said simply, “I cannot breath.” Because the medical kit was some distance away, Siugzda attempted to create an airway for Coffey by performing a tracheotomy with his Kabar knife.
At that point a Marine CH-46 arrived to medevac the wounded. The Rangers quickly loaded nine wounded soldiers and the rear gate of the helicopter closed just as Siugzda and Walz arrived with Coffey. Siugzda quickly ran to the front of the helicopter and requested, in the strongest of terms, that the gate be opened. The helicopter pilot initially declined and said they were drawing too much fire. Siugzda said, “What the fuck do you think we’ve been doing all day?” The pilot relented and lowered the gate. Walz quickly loaded Coffey and was told by the crew that he could not accompany the wounded. After further discussion Walz prevailed and attempted to keep Coffey’s airway open and treat the bullet wounds to his chest. At Phu Bai the doctors at the field hospital declared Master Sergeant Ed Coffey dead.
Meanwhile, Herb Siugzda found himself alone with ten Rangers and no interpreter. He was able to contact Major “Bruiser” Allen in the C&C ship and was told that no air assets were available to assist him. He and his small band continued to pour fire at the enemy and Bruiser came back on line to tell him that he had found an Air Force jet with two 500 pound bombs on board. Herb requested that the first be delivered 50 meters from his position. The pilot refused, saying that 50 meters was much too close. He dropped it 300 meters down the hill from the bomb crater with no resulting lull in the enemy fire. Running low on ammunition and badly outnumbered, Siugzda demanded the second bomb be placed 50 meters from the bunker. The pilot agreed and with hand gestures accompanied by heavily Lithuanian accented pigeon English Siugzda informed his Rangers that the bomb was coming and would be very close. They all hunkered down in the bunker for the blast. As Herb tells it today, “Trust me. I don’t know what is a 500 pound bomb …” Herb recalls that after the blast the area was encompassed in total silence. After hours of constant small arms and machine gun fire there was not even a bird chirping. Bruiser called from the C&C ship and directed Siugzda to assess the battlefield for enemy casualties. Siugzda responded with, “If you want a body count come down here and get it yourself.” Five UH1Ds and two CH-46 helicopters evacuated the rest of 4th Company.51,95,96
Edward Coffey’s name is inscribed on Panel 24E, Line 99 of the Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial.
3rd Ranger Company was inserted on August 12th. On August 13th they reported sighting ten enemy soldiers dressed in gray uniforms and called an air strike on their location. On August 15th 3rd Company was ambushed by an unknown sized enemy force. The Company seized the initiative and captured a hill top and was engaged in a sustained contact for several hours. They successfully repelled three enemy attacks and counted twenty NVA killed and captured thirteen. The 2nd and 4th Ranger Companies were inserted as an immediate reaction force. They were accompanied by Major Allen and his counterpart. One Marine CH-46 suffered damage to its rotors and was forced to land on the insertion LZ. The 4th Ranger Company secured the LZ and helicopter while a Marine maintenance crew flew in and repaired the damaged rotor. The repaired Ch-46 evacuated the five wounded Rangers. Major Allen and his counterpart took the thirteen prisoners out by 281st UH1D helicopters. The remainder of the Ranger Battalion was extracted on the 16th.51
Operation Samurai was stood down on August 16th, 1967 and Project Delta returned to Nha Trang a day later. Over the next month the Marines exploited target areas identified by Delta during Operation Samurai. Their success led Lieutenant General Cushman, Commander of the III MAF, to request that Project Delta again be assigned to identify other targets of opportunity for them in I Corps, their area of responsibility.
Project Delta mobilized to An Hoa and reestablished their FOB on September 15th, 1967 to execute Operation Samurai II. Old intelligence reports had long indicated the location of major NVA base camps in Laos. In Operation Samurai Project Delta had investigated a specific area for way stations and travel routes as well as enemy units and their locations. In Samurai I Project Delta was tasked with exploring another suspected maze of intersecting travel routes through an area that had received little U.S. attention to date. The routes were suspected to utilize networks of small stream and river beds that were numerous in the area that borders I and II Corps. The existence of several north-south drainages intersected by many smaller east-west drainages offered numerous potential routes for infiltration of men and equipment toward the coastal areas, toward the northern cities, or toward northern II Corps.55
Once again the weather would have an effect on operations. Attempts to begin reconnaissance in the western sections of the AO were aborted due to the heavy rains and lingering cloud cover. Major Allen and his staff identified several known and potential areas of enemy concentrations and got approval for B-52 strikes to be available on a standby basis. Delta would conduct twelve Recon missions, ten Roadrunner missions, eight Ranger operations and one Nung platoon operation during Samurai II. Roadrunner Team 102 was inserted on September 20th. They found several huts that showed signs of recent occupation that contained personal effects and cached food. In one group of huts they found 100 hogs running loose. Shortly thereafter they encountered seven VC and opened fire on them, killing one. The dead VC was armed with a Chicom model 53 carbine and had eleven rounds of ammunition. On September 22nd, Roadrunner Team 102 was extracted under enemy fire that resulted in 281st AHC pilot WO Boisseau being wounded in the leg. At the same time, 1st Company, 91st Airborne Ranger Battalion came into contact with enemy troops and Recon Team 9 reported being pursued by an estimated 15-25 enemy troops. The Rangers suffered one killed and one wounded. Recon Team 9 called for an immediate air strike and the FAC had support on station in a matter of minutes. In what was to become a Delta mantra, Major Allen instructed the team to “Break contact and continue mission.”55 The Ranger casualties were extracted on the 23rdand the Ranger Company asked to continue the mission for another day. Recon Team 9 continued their mission into the afternoon of the 23rd and made successive contacts with small groups of enemy who were apparently trying to surround them. After killing several of the enemy soldiers the team found itself confronted by 10-20 enemy at a distance of 50 meters and they requested extraction. They were extracted under heavy small arms fire that was quickly suppressed by the 281st AHC gunships. On September 24th Roadrunner Team 103 reported making contact with an enemy company. In the ensuing firefight twelve enemy were killed and one member of th
e Roadrunner team became separated from the others. The rescue helicopters immediately scrambled for departure from the FOB and began a search of the area. The separated team member was found and rescued. Shortly thereafter the remainder of the team was picked up. The helicopters took small arms fire from virtually all directions during the extraction effort. The Delta FAC placed air strikes in the area. Roadrunner Team 101 heard voices from three directions almost immediately upon insertion. They evaded their pursuers and over the course of the next few days they found several huts and villages. They situated themselves to observe activities and found themselves listening to nightly gatherings of villagers singing patriotic songs the central theme of which was to protest the “American Imperialist.”55
On September 29th Major Allen put into play an operation of his own design. He named it Condor I. Because of the early indications that the AO was saturated with small groups of inhabitants, many of whom were women and children, Major Allen decided to conduct a surprise mission in an area of known habitation and seize all people and equipment and exploit their intelligence value. The attack would consist of two or three platoon sized elements inserted in different locations with missions of seizing the village and blocking escape routes. The 1st Company, 91st Airborne Ranger Battalion, led by Major Allen, acted as the main assault force. 2nd Company inserted 1500 meters from 1st Company and acted as a blocking force as they moved to link up with 1st Company. Within twenty minutes of landing, 1st Company came under small arms fire near the LZ. They directed suppressing fire from the 281st gunships and proceeded to their target. They immediately captured seven prisoners and initial interrogation yielded information on the location of several platoon sized enemy positions nearby. Major Allen called air strikes in on those locations and the FAC reported them completely destroyed. They began searching the village and discovered more people hiding in bunkers that were located under each house. 2nd Company completed its sweep into the village and began posting security around the village and assisted 1st Company in the search. 2nd Company had intercepted nine people and detained them. A total of 29 detainees and 11 VC suspects were captured and transported to III MAF Interrogation Center for processing.55
Condor I was so successful that Major Allen decided to attempt Condor II in and around the abandoned Special Forces camp at A Ro. No signs of recent occupation were found. In mid-October the Nung Platoon conducted a reconnaissance in force mission and encountered an estimated enemy platoon at very close quarters. Unable to move, the Nung’s U.S. advisor called in helicopter gunships for close support and drove off the enemy, leaving one Nung wounded.55
As it turned out, the information gained from the many detainees served to augment and verify the information gathered by Project Delta’s ground elements. Throughout the entire AO there was evidence of an organized VC infrastructure. There was little doubt that the VC had complete control of the area and its inhabitants. There was no evidence that the VC had resorted to terrorist tactics to gain the support of the people but information from the detainees indicated that the VC were lenient on the local populace in times of poor crops and reduced taxes from each village. All of the detainees were women and children or men over age thirty five. They readily admitted that most young men had joined the VC and that platoon sized units existed back in the hills. Soon after Project Delta began operations and directed air attacks on river and trail traffic, the local populace and VC resorted to night time operations. Small groups would venture into villages after dark for food and to visit families. Platoon sized groups would make their way to villages and conduct meetings that often included songs and instructions to villagers. The villagers were instructed to shoot at any aircraft they saw and build bomb shelters under their houses. This accounted for the persistant single shot small arms fire encountered throughout Samurai II. A total of eight contacts with squad or smaller sized enemy units occurred during the operation. Most likely these small groups were employed as trail watchers or to transport supplies. Only four contacts with platoon or company sized units occurred; three by Roadrunner teams and one by the Rangers. As suspected, there was a major infiltration route system that crossed this AO. Some trail areas were observed to have been cut two meters wide and up to four meters high through the jungle. No signs of vehicular traffic were seen. All indications were that this trail system was not a primary system but one that could be easily utilized to centralize the enemy assets scattered through the AO and mobilize them into either I Corps or II Corps.55
During the Samurai Operations Project Delta established a Civilian Action (CA) program and charged Captain Biff Hadden with implementing it. During the operations from late 1967 into 1968, Captain Hadden visited several hamlets and villages located near the FOB and AO. Accompanied by Project Delta medics, LLDB counter parts and MACV representatives, the CA team distributed medical and hygiene supplies, treated injured and sick villagers, taught classes on basic health and hygiene, and held special events for the area children. The program was well received and well attended.55
Project Delta remained in An Hoa for the period October 18th through October 31st, 1967, to conduct Operation Samurai III, an extension of Samurai II. Earlier intelligence gained during Operation Samurai in August indicated the presence of the NVA 368B Rocket Regiment, responsible for several attacks on the city of Da Nang. A prisoner taken during the initial operation admitted to being a part of the forward unit for the 368B responsible for staging firing positions and selecting targets. He reported that there was a base area located in the Happy Valley that the 368B operated from. Project Delta’s mission was to locate the base area and any other smaller support units in Happy Valley and destroy them with ground assaults or air strikes. To assist in the offensive, the 6th Company of the Mobile Guerrilla Force, A-503 (Mike Force) was attached to Delta. The Mike Force consisted of six U.S. advisors and a company of CIDG Montagnard troops. In the previous several operations the Areas of Operation assigned to Project Delta had encompassed an average of 1500 square kilometers. Samurai III’s AO was a mere 550 square kilometers, allowing much more intensely saturated mission coverage. It allowed for faster response times for teams in trouble and for near continuous radio relay coverage. During Operation Samurai III nine Recon missions, seven Roadrunner missions, four Ranger operations, one Nung operation, and one operation utilizing the Mike Force Company were conducted. These twenty three operations were conducted in a short two week span. Numerous contacts were made with small enemy units of one to ten individuals. These small units were characteristic of the small units encountered during Samurai and Samurai II and probably were deployed as trail watchers, rear security for larger forces, and as local guerrillas awaiting orders to consolidate and mobilize.56
Recon Team 12 was inserted on October 19th and began hearing sounds of human activity almost immediately. They heard people filling water containers from a stream near their overnight location and heard hammering noises the next morning. Later on the 20th the team heard voices coming from the same area that they had heard the hammering noises. Team 12 called for gunship support from the 281st AHC and directed fire on the area. The gunships reported good coverage on target and the team was reinforced with a Ranger Platoon reaction force to perform a damage assessment. The reinforced team continued to patrol and contacted two more small groups of enemy and engaged them in a firefight.
During this same time Roadrunner Teams 106 and 107 were inserted together and stayed together for a short time before splitting up on their separate missions. Both teams encountered small groups of enemy soldiers and were tracked by platoon sized forces using flashlights at night. The teams called in air strikes and continued their missions until the 22nd, when both teams were extracted under heavy small arms fire.56
The mission assigned to Recon Team 2 was typical of the missions run during Samurai III. Team 2 was inserted on October 20th and began to see signs of enemy presence almost immediately. They found a series of foxholes along a well used trail and discovered bamboo
slat fencing running parallel to the trail. The next day the team found another fence that surrounded an area with fire rings and signs of recent occupation. Soon after they watched as ten VC followed them. They attempted to ambush their pursuers but lost them instead. After spending the night listening for their pursuers the team made contact with six VC on the 22nd, killing one and wounding four. In the now familiar direction from the C&C chopper, they were instructed to “Break contact and continue mission.” Ten minutes later the team made contact with more VC. The enemy broke contact and fled into the jungle. Later on the afternoon of the 22nd, the team heard troop movement very close to their position and called in an air strike. During a lull in the air attack the team heard the sound of a whistling object that landed 30 meters from their position. Two minutes later they heard an explosion and surmised that an enemy mortar round had been launched at them and was a dud with a delayed explosion. The enemy fled the area during the air strike. On October 23rd Team 2 made contact with another small group of three VC and fired on them. They called for an extraction and placed fire from the 281st AHC gunships on the enemy. As they approached the extraction helicopter a lone VC dressed in a khaki shirt and loincloth attempted to fire upon them on the LZ. The team fired on him, killing him.56
The payoff mission for Samurai III began with the routine insertion of Team 7 (SFC Edgar Morales, SFC Cahall, SGT Jim Holland) at last light on October 20th, 1967. On the 21st the team began searching the area and came across a well used trail. Team 7 decided to observe the trail for activity. While watching the trail they heard chopping noises from an area about 300 meters in the direction the trail followed. They decided to get to higher ground and observe the area from which the noise emanated. They discovered a second trail leading to the same general area as the first trail and came upon a log fence that extended as far as they could see into the jungle. Deciding that there might be a significant installation within the fence, the team established surveillance. In a very short time they observed three small groups of soldiers dressed in khakis and carrying semi-automatic weapons leave the fenced area. They called for air strikes which were delivered two hours later. Soon after the air strikes the team heard signal shots fired some distance away. The team continued their reconnaissance and found the junction of two more well-used trails. They set up observation of the trails and saw 15 NVA carrying bags of supplies and wearing khakis and black pajamas. Late in the day the team decided to set up for a prisoner snatch on the trail but saw no more activity. They moved away from the trail and set up their night position. They observed enemy soldiers searching for them with flashlights in three directions from their position and heard others moving under cover of darkness within ten meters of their position all through the night. Early on the morning of the 22nd the team made immediate contact with one enemy soldier and began to evade toward an extraction LZ. Team 7 called for gunship support to be placed on their overnight position and in areas where they had heard enemy activity through the night. They were extracted under heavy fire at 0915 on the 22nd.56,57
Boots on the Ground: The history of Project Delta Page 16
