Very shortly thereafter the sound of heavy trucks coming from the west was heard. The ambush was to be initiated by firing a Light Anti-tank Weapon (LAW) at the lead vehicle once the convoy was in the kill zone. The Ranger in 1st Company aimed the missile at the lead truck and it misfired. Seizing the initiative, another Ranger Private jumped up and fired his M-79 grenade launcher into the truck’s windshield, effectively stopping it and initiating the ambush. The FAC had been on standby with air assets and directed an air strike against the stalled convoy resulting the destruction of five trucks destroyed, four trucks damaged and a number of enemy killed.69,62
The name of Little J. Jackson is inscribed on Panel 43E, Line 45 of the Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial.
On March 6th Recon Team 1 was inserted south of Highway 547 and east of the site of the Ranger actions. Like Team 2, Team 1 was ordered to find a hiding place until the Ranger action was concluded. As the team resumed movement toward the highway they encountered a lone NVA soldier who fled after being fired upon. The team continued their mission and discovered 14 fresh graves very close to the road. The decision was made to insert the Nung BDA Platoon (SSG Mike Stanfield, SSG Jay Graves, SGT Roland Meder) to exploit any targets around the grave sites. The Nungs were inserted on March 10th and began to search the area. They soon discovered a bamboo structure with a sleeping platform and cooking utensils. The area had been used within the last 24 hours. On the 11th the Nungs found an aid station with many bloody bandages, empty boxes of morphine syrettes, expended medicine containers, human hair and forceps. They encountered three NVA soldiers who fled to the rear when fired upon. The Nung BDA Platoon spent two nights without movement due to heavy rainfall. On the 13th they linked with Recon Team 1 and went to the site of the freshly dug graves. They traveled along Highway 547 and placed demolition charges on the road to create a crater 5-7 meters deep. At the grave site the Nungs dug up 14 graves. Each grave had a head marker identifying the interred soldier as a corporal killed on March 5th. Each body was wrapped in a plastic sheet. Documents found on the bodies indicated that the NVA had recently made the journey from North Vietnam through Laos and into South Vietnam, some within the previous week. Their unit designations did not appear on any known order of battle listing and it was assumed that these were replacement troops. The sophistication of the medical equipment found at the aid station was such that it appeared to be a large medical facility usually located in what the enemy would consider a secure area.69
Recon Team 7 (SSG Sam Zumbrun, SFC Bill Bruno, SFC Rick Conaway) was inserted into their AO on March 13th. During insertion the helicopters received intense heavy machine gun fire. The aircraft laid down a smoke screen to shield the insertion but Team 7 came under fire in the LZ resulting in slight wounds to Zumbrun and Bruno. The team evaded the enemy and continued their mission. Late in the day, Team 7 watched a platoon of fifty NVA advance toward them on line. Thinking that they were well hidden, Team 7 remained in the brush until the enemy opened fire on them. They returned fire in an intense fire fight that lasted three minutes.
Zumbrun and Conaway were both wounded, Zumbrun for the second time that day. As the team executed their immediate action and evaded the enemy Zumbrun noticed that one LLDB was missing. The team was forced to leave much of its gear behind as it fled under continuous enemy fire. They successfully evaded the enemy and found a suitable LZ. The first recovery ship dropped ladders and Bruno and two LLDB quickly climbed as the ship drew heavy fire and departed the LZ. One LLDB was shot as he entered the helicopter; the other was shot off the ladder some 50 meters from the LZ. The second ship came in and was forced from the LZ by heavy enemy fire. The third helicopter arrived at the LZ and dropped McGuire rigs only to take several automatic weapon hits and be forced to land a short distance away.
The remaining team members, Zumbrun and Conaway, both wounded, attempted to find the LLDB team member who had fallen from the ladder. They were pursued immediately by well disciplined NVA who moved rapidly through the undergrowth without speaking or shooting to give away their positions. The team moved in ever expanding figure eights all night and finally broke contact in the early morning hours of March 14th. Amazingly, these two men, both wounded, continued to gather intelligence until midday when a recovery ship dropped a hoist to extract them. When the hoist was 30 feet above the ground the helicopter took heavy ground fire causing Zumbrun to fall to the ground and injure his back. To their credit, the 281st rescue ship stayed over Zumbrun until they could lower the hoist and lift him to safety.69
The small stream named Khe A To flows west down a steep valley and then crosses an open plain before approaching Highway 547 and turning abruptly north. Recon Team 10 was assigned the area near the point where the stream emerges from the steep valley and enters the flatland. Team 10 was inserted at last light on March 17th and hastened to their RON position. They heard movement on two sides of them intermittently all night long. During the hours of darkness they also heard the sounds of heavy trucks or bulldozers from the general area of Highway 547 to their west. On the 19th the team made contact with two NVA with unknown results. They continued the mission and found a well used trail that followed a ravine north of the Khe A To. They heard sounds of several people and some small arms fire and decided to attempt a prisoner snatch.
As they began to set up, three NVA approached on the trail and the team was forced to open fire and move away from the area. They evaded up the ridge to the northeast and set up observation on an intersecting trail near the top of the ridge. They soon observed many groups of three to fifteen men carrying 5 inch diameter tubes slung across their shoulders. The men would reappear from the opposite direction without the tubes. They would then reappear with more canisters and the sequence was repeated several times over the course of the hour that the team watched them. Team 10 made its way slowly around the area and heard the sounds of many men coughing and talking along a stream bed near the trail they had been watching. On March 21st the team moved quietly toward an extraction LZ and engaged three enemy in a firefight before being extracted.69
On March 29th a combined force consisting of the 91st Airborne Ranger Battalion, Nung BDA Platoon and Recon Team 3 prepared for insertion near the site of the Ranger ambush on Highway 547 in which several trucks were destroyed and SGT Little Jackson was killed. It seemed that more information about the vehicles was desired and could be obtained from the vehicle identification plates attached to each chassis. Team 3 was to accompany the larger force and choose a time and place to slip unnoticed into the hills for a stay behind recon mission. Three school qualified demolitions men, Jay Graves, Gary Stedman and John Link accompanied the combined force prepared to set explosive charges and render the trucks totally unsalvageable. The size of the force required the use of both the 281st AHC helicopters and CH-46 Helicopters from the Marines. As the force began infiltration mid-morning on the 29th the first lift came under intense automatic weapons fire but managed to unload the lead elements. The second lift also came under fire and one UH-1H and one CH-46 were forced down on the LZ. The downed helicopters and the Delta forces on the ground began receiving small arms and rocket fire on the LZ. 281st gunships suppressed enemy fire long enough for the third lift to approach. A Marine CH-46 attempted to land and received heavy machine gun fire during which SSG Phil Salzwedel was wounded in the elbow, MSG Jim Kreilick had his fingers shot off and three LLDB Rangers were wounded. The helicopter aborted the insertion and departed the area with the senior advisor to 5th Company, LT Tom Humphus, still on board.
While the third lift was regrouping at Hue/Phu Bai the Rangers on the LZ continued to receive rocket fire and continued to call air strikes against the enemy positions. SGT Jim Holland, a Recon NCO, had accompanied the Rangers on this mission and found himself as the senior advisor to 5th Company after Salzwedel was wounded and Humphus had not been able to exit the aircraft. He immediately positioned the Company and directed fire while also directing the helicopters into the LZ. The third insertion li
ft returned and received the wounded as the last elements of the 91st departed. During the third lift two UH-1H and One CH-46 were shot down. A second CH-46 went down some distance from the LZ. One pilot was killed and two wounded; the crews were pinned down under heavy enemy grazing fire on the LZ. Dangerously low on ammunition, the force called for immediate resupply from the FOB. SP4 Russ Cooper, an S-4 clerk, immediately took charge and loaded 281st slicks with cases of ammunition and grenades. The 281st slicks began arriving at the LZ with crates of ammunition stacked in the door for resupplying the ground force. Gunships lay down suppressing fire as the pilots flew in, Russ Cooper kicked out the ammo, and the dead and wounded were loaded.
SFC George Ku ran for cover and was blasted off his feet by a mortar round landing to his rear. One of the American advisors rushed to his aid and began carrying him to a resupply helicopter. He was wounded just as he placed Ku on the bird and was pushed into the helicopter by Humphus, who had dragged his wounded interpreter to the helicopter. Humphus returned to his bomb crater and began to look for 5th Company when he was struck in the chest by a single small arms round. The bullet entered his left chest and followed the pectoral muscle before exiting under his arm.
The Nung platoon provided cover for SSG Jay Graves, SFC Robert Thompson and SGT Roland Meder as they attempted to retrieve the dead and wounded air crews from the downed helicopters. Graves recovered the body of a dead Marine door gunner and grabbed an ammo can to help with the shortage situation. When he had reached cover he opened the can only to find an assortment of screw drivers and pliers. Thompson, an S-2 clerk along to take photographs of the trucks, was shot twice in the chest and moved to a crater to wait for medical attention. A few minutes later SP5 Albert Merriman and SP4 John Link rushed the LZ to rescue a wounded Marine crewman. Merriman was wounded in the legs but Link managed to assist the Marine to safety. He then returned to assist Merriman and managed to remove him to safety but was wounded in the process. Meder and Gary Stedman rushed to Link’s aid and moved him to a covered position. Captain Jim Morris, a Special Forces Public Information Officer along for the ride, was wounded in the arm while providing cover fire as Link was recovered. John Link died from his wounds.
Major Ken Naumann, the Ranger Battalion Senior Advisor, continued to call in air strikes around the LZ against positions that continued to fire rockets and mortars into the perimeter. Early in the morning of the 30th enemy squads probed the perimeter with machine guns, mortars and rockets. The Rangers returned fire and the enemy broke contact. The Rangers captured one enemy soldier and killed several others. During the course of the battle, thirteen helicopters were shot down and several crewmen and pilots were rescued by the Rangers. An extraction LZ was selected several hundred meters from the insertion LZ-turned- battlefield.
The Rangers utilized tactical air strikes to cover their withdrawal to the LZ and to clear the LZ for extraction. The force carried their dead and wounded with them. Two Marine pilots, both officers, were directed to carry the body of their dead door gunner. When they got within a hundred meters of the LZ they saw the rescue helicopters approaching and dropped the body of the gunner and ran for the LZ. The Delta advisors were shocked that any U.S. military man would behave in such a cowardly fashion and after gently carrying the dead gunner to the aircraft they chastised the officers in no uncertain terms.62,69,70,97
The name of John Link is inscribed on Panel 47E, Line 13 of the Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial.
During Operation Samurai IV, over thirty contacts were made with the enemy. Two U.S. Special Forces advisors were killed and thirteen wounded. The 91st Ranger Battalion lost eleven killed and 59 wounded. The operation ultimately showed that VC military and political organizations had been all but eliminated in the tactical area of operations by the Tet counter offensive. They had been supplanted by NVA regular troops who had established a regimental base in the Highway 547/547A area. Weapons and ammunition captured indicated that heavy caliber weapons were being emplaced and used against aircraft. Large amounts of 23 mm ammunition indicated that the NVA planned to use even heavier weapons than the heavy machine guns used against aircraft during Samurai IV. The patterns of truck operations also indicated that a base area probably existed close to the junction of the Rao Nhi and Rao Nho river junctions. This was further supported by the number of secondary explosions occurring during air strikes on the area.69
“Counteroffensive, Phase IV”, 2 Apri1 1968-30 June 1968. During this period friendly forces conducted a number of battalion-size attritional operations against the enemy.
Operation PEGASUS-Lam Son 207 relieved the Khe Sanh Combat Base on 5 April and thereby opened Route 9 for the first time since August 1967. This operation not only severely restricted the North Vietnamese Army’s use of western Quang Tri Province but also inflicted casualties on the remnants of two North Vietnamese divisions withdrawing from the area. This success was followed by a singular allied spoiling operation in the A Shau Valley, Operation DELAWARE-Lam Son. These two operations prevented the enemy from further attacking I Corps Tactical Zone population centers and forced him to shift his pressure to the III Corps Tactical Zone.
During the period 5-12 May 1968 the Viet Cong launched an offensive with Saigon as the primary objective. Friendly forces defended the city with great determination. Consequently Saigon was never in danger of being overrun. Small Viet Cong units that did manage to get into the outskirts were fragmented and driven out with great loss of enemy life. By the end of June 1968 friendly forces had decisively blunted the enemy’s attacks, inflicted very heavy casualties, and hindered his ability to attack urban areas throughout the Republic of Vietnam. The enemy was forced to withdraw to his sanctuaries.
The strength of the U.S. Army in Vietnam reached a peak of nearly 360,000 men during this period.65
Operation Samurai V was an extension of Samurai IV. The AO was expanded to include what came to be known as The Yellow Brick Road, a newly constructed and well maintained infiltration route from Laos that intersected another well documented part of the Ho Chi Minh Trail known as Wire Road Alpha. During Samurai V eighteen Recon missions, fourteen Roadrunner missions, two Ranger operations, two Nung BDA missions, and one Mike Force operation were launched. Five rescue missions were also run to find missing members of a gunship crew and a Roadrunner team. During the stand down period between Samurai IV and V the 91st Airborne Ranger Battalion was designated the 81st Airborne Ranger Battalion and its authorized strength was increased to six Companies.
Operation Samurai V was run from April 19th through May 20th, 1968. During this time Project Delta was able to establish that it was unlikely that any significant enemy base was yet established in the area. NVA/VC were widely spread throughout the area and had freedom of movement. Most were engaged in establishing food sources and constructing and maintaining antiaircraft positions, bunkers and travel routes. Many of the teams encountered small groups of NVA and engaged in firefights.
The most significant intelligence items were garnered from prisoners taken by Team 4 and Team 10. Another prisoner was captured by Team 5 but died on the way to the LZ. The prisoners were recent arrivals from North Vietnam and were attached to support and transportation units. The operation was plagued by continuous rain and poor weather, resulting in many delays and postponements. A force of an estimated 30 NVA pursued Team 1 for two days before the 81st Rangers were inserted as a reaction force and engaged them. The enemy broke contact amid air strikes and a counter attack by the Rangers.71
Project Delta returned to Nha Trang to regroup and recover from the effects of two long and arduous operations in I Corps. The Project was immediately tasked with performing reconnaissance in the areas to the west of Nha Trang as part of the post Tet security plan. Four teams were inserted for a very short two day period and succeeded only in being fired upon by friendly troops in an adjoining area. The operation, called Shakedown IV, was quickly recognized as an effort in futility and lack of coordination and shut down. In June the ne
wly designated 81st Airborne Ranger Battalion prepared for urban operations in Saigon after a second surge of Communist attacks pushed government forces out of the capital’s northern suburbs.
The Airborne Rangers were shuttled into Saigon and began advancing toward VC held sectors around the Duc Tin Military School. Without the Rangers as an immediate reaction force the Recon section was out of business. Several Recon men joined the Rangers in Saigon, among them SFC Paul “Mickey” Spillane. MSG Virgil Murphy, SFC Moe Elmore, SFC Billy Bean, SSG Dave Ryder, SGT John Burdish, SGT Erickson, and several others were already there. SSG Dennis McVey joined the Rangers for his first operation with Project Delta as a medic. McVey recalls, “While in the Saigon area the rangers and DELTA advisors patrolled what was known as the “rocket belt”, that area outside of the city and the airport where 122 mm rockets were or had been firing from. We would be deployed out to an area and patrol looking for bunkers, trenches, caches, or enemy contact. After an area was swept we would go back to a base area in the city, refit, and then deploy to another area. We also did one riverine operation with the US Navy brown water swift boats. We would also use loaches (LOH Light Observation Helicopters) to draw fire and then the cobras would pounce and the rangers would follow up with a sweep of the area.”66
SFC Tom Schultz recalls that the Rangers suffered casualties, but this under strength and combat weary Battalion of Airborne Rangers routed a VC Regiment and literally wiped them off the enemy’s Order of Battle.63 So feared was the reputation of these Rangers that hundreds of enemy sought out any other allied unit in order to surrender by the hundreds.66,63
The pace of the operation was furious. As soon as one sweep was completed, another would begin. Nights were spent either on night patrol or in positions close enough to the rocket belt where enemy rockets were launched so that an immediate reaction could be mounted. On July 26, 1968, The Rangers were settling in for a watchful night when a single small arms shot rang out. SFC Paul D. “ Mickey” Spillane lay dead with a single gunshot wound to the head.61,62,63,64,66
Boots on the Ground: The history of Project Delta Page 19
