Sunni insurgent leaders who were nationalists or Baathists realised that they had too many enemies. Not only was al-Qa'ida trying to take over from traditional tribal leaders, it was also killing Sunni who took minor jobs with the government.
The Awakening, or al-Sahwa, movement of Sunni fighters was first formed in Anbar province at the end of 2006, but it was allied to the US, not the Iraqi government.
This is why, despite pressure from General Petraeus, the government is so determined not to give the 99,000 al-Sahwa members significant jobs in the security forces when it takes control of - and supposedly begins to pay - these Sunni militiamen from 1 October. The Shia government may be prepared to accommodate the Sunni, but not at the cost of diluting Shia dominance.
If McCain wins the presidential election in November, his lack of understanding of what is happening in Iraq could ignite a fresh conflict.
In so far as the surge has achieved military success, it is because it implicitly recognises America's political defeat in Iraq. Whatever the reason for President George Bush's decision to invade Iraq and overthrow Saddam Hussein in 2003, it was not to place the Shia Islamic parties in power and increase the influence of Iran in the country; yet that is exactly what has happened.
The surge only achieved the degree of success it did because Iran, which played a central role in getting Nouri al-Maliki appointed Prime Minister in 2006, decided to back his government fully. It negotiated a ceasefire between the Iraqi government and the powerful movement of Muqtada al-Sadr in Basra, persuading the cleric to call his militiamen off the streets there, in March and again two months later in the Sadrist stronghold of Sadr City. It is very noticeable that in recent weeks the US has largely ceased its criticism of Iran. This is partly because of American preoccupation with Russia since the fighting began in Georgia in August, but it is also an implicit recognition that US security in Iraq is highly dependent on Iranian actions.
General Petraeus has had a measure of success in Iraq less because of his military skills than because he was one of the few American leaders to have some understanding of Iraqi politics. In January 2004, when he was commander of the 101st Airborne Division in Mosul, I asked him what was the most important piece of advice he could give to his successor.
He said it was "not to align too closely with one ethnic group, political party, tribe, religious group or social element". But today the US has no alternative but to support Mr Maliki and his Shia government, and to wink at the role of Iran in Iraq. If McCain supposes the US has won a military victory, and as president acts as if this were true, then he is laying the groundwork for a new war.
Friday, 10 October 2008
CORRUPTION BLAMED AS CHOLERA RIPS THROUGH IRAQ
A deadly outbreak of cholera in Iraq is being blamed on a scandal involving corrupt officials who failed to sterilise the local drinking water because they were bribed to buy chlorine from Iran that was long past its expiration date.
The centre of the epidemic is in Babil province, south of Baghdad, in the marshy lands east of the Euphrates river, not far from the ruins of ancient Babylon. In Baghdad, where half the six million population has no access to clean drinking water, people are now drinking only bottled or boiled water.
The Iraqi Prime Minister, Nouri al- Maliki, has appointed a commission of inquiry to find out why ineffective chlorine was being used. He is also refusing to release three officials under arrest despite demands from the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) to which they are linked. In the town of al-Madhatiya, in southern Babil, a councillor involved in buying the chlorine was reportedly released after militiamen connected to ISCI intimidated police into freeing him.
The scandal over the contract is becoming a test case of the Maliki government's willingness to tackle the pervasive corruption in Iraq where officials see their jobs primarily as a way of enriching themselves through bribes.
It is also a test of his ability to exercise central control over ISCI and parties which have been hitherto dominant outside Baghdad.
Cholera is endemic in Iraq but last year there was an epidemic in northern Iraq which was far more serious than anything seen for years. Some 4,700 people, mostly in Sulaimaniyah province, were struck.
This year, the government hoped to stop another outbreak of the disease by repairing shattered water and sanitation stations and putting chlorine in the water supply. An Iraqi government official, who did not want his name published, said the Health Ministry bought $11m (£6.4m) worth of chlorine from Iran for use in the provinces of Babil, Diwaniyah and Kerbala, all on the Euphrates river south of Baghdad.
In the latter two provinces, officials noticed that the chlorine was old and the time during which it could be employed effectively had expired, and refused to use it. But in Babil the chlorine was put in the fresh water supply stations at al-Madhatiyah, al- Hashimiyah and al-Qasim, south-east of the provincial capital, al-Hillah. Soon 222 people were confirmed as having cholera in Babil, in a total of 420 cases of whom seven have died.
The scandal is a reflection of the way Iraqi politics works. The ruling parties monopolise jobs and contracts.
It is impossible to find work at any level in most ministries without a letter of commendation from one of the parties in the government. The enormous Iraqi government apparatus, employing some two million people, is a patronage machine. There are now more state officials than under Saddam, but it is unable to supply electricity, food rations and clean water, despite Iraq's $80 billion in accumulated oil revenues.
The power base of ISCI, the most powerful Shia religious party, is the Shia provinces of southern Iraq between Baghdad and Basra. Political parties are expected to protect their members from arrest. This explains what happened next. The officials arrested in Babil belonged to the Badr Organisation, the militia wing of ISCI.
Leaders of the party demanded their release but Mr Maliki refused. Badr militants then turned up at a police station in al-Madhatiya and forced the police to release a councillor apparently involved in purchasing the chlorine.
But the grand Shia coalition which won more than half the seats in the Iraqi parliament in the last election in December 2005 has broken up. Mr Maliki is trying to build up his own Dawa party, using the resources of the state.
He has deepening differences with ISCI which won most of the southern Iraqi provinces. They accuse him of trying to create a power base in what was previously their territory by paying the tribes who belong to government-sponsored "support councils" in southern Iraq. His aim is to get his own candidates elected in the provincial and parliamentary elections next year.
"These will be crucial in deciding who will hold power in Iraq in future," said one senior Iraqi official.
Control of oil revenues gives Mr Maliki a crucial card. Iraq has 50 to 60 per cent unemployment and most jobs are with the state. Salaries of state employees have risen sharply. But the government remains largely dysfunctional aside from its growing military strength. Iraqi journalists are encouraged and paid to write "good news" stories. In Baghdad, people notice there is little mention of the cholera in the media. This provokes fear that the epidemic may be worse than the government admits.
Friday, 28 November 2008
THE DAY THE LAST US SOLDIER LEAVES IRAQ
The Iraqi parliament voted by an overwhelming show of hands yesterday to end US military control of their country - a crucial turning point in the Iraq conflict. The security agreement, the outcome of lengthy and rancorous negotiations, requires US forces to leave Iraqi cities, towns and villages by 30 June next year. American troops must withdraw from all Iraqi territory by 31 December 2011.
Until then, US forces will come under Iraqi supervision for the first time. Currently the US military can do what they like. In future, they will have to consult Iraqi officers before every operation and obtain Iraqi arrest warrants.
After difficult negotiations, the coalition government persuaded leaders of the Sunni Arabs, a fift
h of all Iraqis, that they will not be at the mercy of the majority Shia community after the US forces have gone. The agreement was supported, after a brief debate, by the coalition's Shia and Kurdish supporters as well as the largest Sunni bloc.
The only opponents were 30 followers of the anti-American Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, who shouted protests and waved banners saying: "No, no to the agreement." The international focus on the US presidential election and on the world financial crisis has drawn attention away from radical concessions made to the Iraqi government by President Bush in the past few months. Senator John McCain was still claiming victory in Iraq as American political influence in the country diminished by the day. As Mr McCain denounced Barack Obama's plan to withdraw combat troops over 16 months, Mr Bush was agreeing to a pact which was not radically different.
To win over Sunni doubters, the Iraqi government has agreed to hold a referendum on the pact next year after it is implemented. The Sunni leaders are also seeking guarantees for the safety of 17,000 Iraqis, three quarters of them Sunni, detained by the US military, who will be handed over to Iraqi authorities.
The Status of Forces Agreement, as it is officially known, marks a significant milestone in the Iraq conflict. When the US started negotiating the accord, which replaces the UN mandate for the occupation that runs out at the end of the year, Washington wanted to make the US military presence open ended. But the Iraqi government, taking an increasingly nationalistic attitude, demanded and obtained an unconditional timetable for the withdrawal of US forces.
The hand of the ruling Shia-Kurdish coalition, led by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, has been strengthened by the fact that the Sunni uprising against the US occupation has largely ended. Mr Maliki was able to face down the Shia militia of Muqtada al-Sadr earlier this year through Iranian support. In control of increasingly powerful Iraqi security forces, the Shia leaders no longer believe they need US backing to survive.
To avoid claims that he is a US puppet, the Prime Minister is stressing the agreement is a plan for American withdrawal.
Its title in Arabic is: "Agreement between the United States and the Republic of Iraq on the withdrawal of United States forces from Iraq".
The pro-Muqtada al-Sadr bloc in parliament wanted US forces to go immediately.
They claim the agreement is a subtle way to prolong the occupation.
The governing Shia parties toughened their line against the US because they were worried the Sadrist anti-occupation rhetoric would win votes in January's provincial elections.
Some senior American officials are reportedly dismayed at the extent of the concession made by President Bush.
The agreement alters the balance of power between the US forces and the Iraqi government. Apart from the requirement to consult with Iraqi officers, the US will be forbidden to use Iraq as a base for attacks on other countries. This would rule out attacks like the recent helicopter commando raid into Syria.
A sticking point was the Iraqi demand for the right to prosecute US soldiers accused of crimes. The US gave ground on this, though it is unlikely they will be prosecuted since this can only happen if they are off duty and away from their bases. The Iraqis can prosecute US contractors, notably the private security companies detested by Iraqis. Iraq takes over responsibility for the Green Zone, the seat of power, from 1 January 2009.
Mr Maliki rejected early versions of the agreement for fear he would be called unpatriotic, and because he needed to satisfy the Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the powerful Shia religious leader, that the deal was acceptable. He also required the support of the largest Shia party, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, and for Iran to ease its hostility to the agreement. A legacy of the British occupation is that Iraqis are deeply wary of agreements with an occupying power.
ENDLESS INSURGENCY (2009)
Under attack by militants
Saturday, 31 January 2009
ELECTION THAT WILL SHAPE IRAQ’S FUTURE
Campaign posters are pasted over the concrete blast walls across Iraq as parties urge followers to vote in today's provincial elections. They will determine the political landscape of Iraq as American troops withdraw.
The last provincial polls four years ago helped ignite the civil war between Sunni and Shia, because the once-dominant Sunni community felt marginalised.
Today's ballot, followed by a parliamentary election later this year, will determine which parties will hold power in the Sunni and Shia communities.
Unlike the 2005 election, when many Iraqis argued that real power stayed in the hands of the Americans, the vote on 31 January will take place as the 142,000 US troops in Iraq begin to depart. In keeping with the federal constitution, the new councils will exercise greatly enhanced powers such as the right to appoint and dismiss governors as well as preparing their own budget.
The election will be a crucial test for the Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who has had a spectacularly successful year during which he faced down, at different times, the US, the Kurds and his Shia rivals. He has been strengthening his own small Dawa party by using state funds and patronage to buy the support of tribal leaders.
The political elite in Iraq has an unsavoury reputation among voters as a kleptocracy interested only in plundering oil wealth and incapable of providing electricity, water supply and sewage disposal. The election will take place against a background of improved security but also disillusionment with post-Saddam leaders. "If things do not improve I fear there will be a neo-Baathist takeover in a few years," said one former government minister.
The election of 2005 led to more violence because Sunni Arabs and many of the Shia poor did not accept them as valid and did not vote. This time round all parties accept the rules of the game.
A poll reflecting the real allegiances of voters will determine who holds power in important parts of Iraq. Nineveh, the capital of which is Mosul, has a Sunni Arab majority but has largely been ruled by Kurds in alliance with the US since a 2004 Sunni uprising. The Kurds have 31 out of 41 seats in the local council because the Sunni mostly did not vote in the last election. Anbar, the giant province where almost all are Sunni
Arabs, and once the heart of the rebellion against the US occupation, is seeing a battle for the allegiance of the Sunni community. This is between the Iraqi Islamic Party, which won by default last time round, and the Awakening Councils, tribally-based anti-al-Qa'ida militias backed by the US military which have strong popular support.
The Shia parties are also split. Four years ago they joined the all-powerful United Iraqi Alliance backed by the immensely influential Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. This coalition's aim was to enable the Shia, 60 per cent of Iraqis, to win elections and take over as Iraq's dominant community. They largely succeeded, but the coalition is no more.
The Grand Ayatollah is staying neutral this time around. The most powerful party, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), is at odds with Mr Maliki's state-backed Dawa party. Followers of Muqtada al-Sadr, whose Mehdi Army militia once controlled much of Shia Iraq, still have support among the poor and will back independent candidates.
The venom with which party rivalry is conducted is because state patronage is the main source of jobs in Iraq where half of the population is unemployed. Everybody, from a policeman to a teacher, needs a letter from a political party to get a job. ISCI, which currently controls Baghdad council and most of the Shia provinces, has a powerful political machine but is widely unpopular because of its corruption.
Mr Maliki's Dawa party currently only rules one province, Kerbala, but is organising tribal councils with government funds. The Prime Minister burnished his nationalist and non-sectarian credentials last year by attacking the Sadrists in Basra, Amara and Sadr City.
The ability of Iraq to recover from 30 years of disaster all depends on how much money it has to spend. The re-stabilisation of the country over the last two years is partly the result of being able to pay for 600,000 men in the security
forces and create hundreds of thousands of well paid-jobs in government. In terms of security provided, it makes a great difference that an Iraqi private soldier is paid about $600-700 a month and his Afghan equivalent only $120 for doing the same job. Everybody in Iraq wants a comfy and unsackable position in the government and not in the languishing and insecure private sector. The hatred and fear which divides Iraqis is the understandable reaction to decades of slaughter and is too intense and recent to be overcome in less than a generation. The exploitation and use of Iraq's vast oil wealth is not only the best, but is perhaps the only chance, of recreating a country in which people will want to live.
Saturday, 25 April 2009
HOW WELL WAS THE IRAQ WAR REPORTED?
Journalists are departing from Iraq. In Baghdad US newspapers and television are slimming down or closing their bureaux. The British media always had a slighter presence but there is less and less coverage of the war. This might be justified by saying there is no war to cover, but Iraq is still the scene of a horrendous amount of violence with suicide bombers killing at least 144 civilians in the past two days.
The main reason for reduced foreign interest in Iraq is that the US is pulling out by the end of 2011 and its forces will have left the centre of Iraqi cities by the end of this June. US military casualties are a fraction of what they once were. British troops will soon finally depart from Basra.
Iraq is still one of the most dangerous places in the world but security is vastly improved compared with 2006, when at the height of the Shia-Sunni civil war some 3,000 people were being killed every month.
As the war de-escalates it is worth asking how the foreign media performed during a conflict which has now gone on longer than the First or Second World Wars. Could somebody outside Iraq reading the newspapers, watching television or listening to the radio have got a real understanding of what was happening in the country? Was the news reporting better than it had been in Vietnam to which it is often compared? There should be a number of health warnings here about war reporting in general. In one sense it is easy because war provides instant melodrama which people want to see or read about. Demand for news is generally greater than supply. But the melodrama is often misleading as to what is generally happening. This is particularly true of television because on modern battlefields there is usually very little to see. This has been since the end of the 19th century when armies began being armed with rifles using smokeless powder firing long distance. Everybody with any sense kept their head down.
Iraq- The West Shakes Up The Middle East Page 13
