He remembers the then head of Saudi General Intelligence "literally shouting at me across his office: '9/11 is a mere pinprick on the West. In the medium term, it is nothing more than a series of personal tragedies. What these terrorists want is to destroy the House of Saud and remake the Middle East.'" In the event, Saudi Arabia adopted both policies, encouraging the jihadis as a useful tool of Saudi anti-Shia influence abroad but suppressing them at home as a threat to the status quo. It is this dual policy that has fallen apart over the last year.
Saudi sympathy for anti-Shia "militancy" is identified in leaked US official documents. The then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton wrote in December 2009 in a cable released by Wikileaks that "Saudi Arabia remains a critical financial support base for al-Qa'ida, the Taliban, LeT [Lashkar-e-Taiba in Pakistan] and other terrorist groups." She said that, in so far as Saudi Arabia did act against al-Qa'ida, it was as a domestic threat and not because of its activities abroad. This policy may now be changing with the dismissal of Prince Bandar as head of intelligence this year. But the change is very recent, still ambivalent and may be too late: it was only last week that a Saudi prince said he would no longer fund a satellite television station notorious for its anti-Shia bias based in Egypt.
The problem for the Saudis is that their attempts since Bandar lost his job to create an anti-Maliki and anti-Assad Sunni constituency which is simultaneously against al-Qa'ida and its clones have failed.
By seeking to weaken Maliki and Assad in the interest of a more moderate Sunni faction, Saudi Arabia and its allies are in practice playing into the hands of Isis which is swiftly gaining full control of the Sunni opposition in Syria and Iraq. In Mosul, as happened previously in its Syrian capital Raqqa, potential critics and opponents are disarmed, forced to swear allegiance to the new caliphate and killed if they resist.
The West may have to pay a price for its alliance with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf monarchies, which have always found Sunni jihadism more attractive than democracy. A striking example of double standards by the western powers was the Saudi-backed suppression of peaceful democratic protests by the Shia majority in Bahrain in March 2011. Some 1,500 Saudi troops were sent across the causeway to the island kingdom as the demonstrations were ended with great brutality and Shia mosques and shrines were destroyed.
An alibi used by the US and Britain is that the Sunni al-Khalifa royal family in Bahrain is pursuing dialogue and reform. But this excuse looked thin last week as Bahrain expelled a top US diplomat, the assistant secretary of state for human rights Tom Malinowksi, for meeting leaders of the main Shia opposition party al-Wifaq. Mr Malinowski tweeted that the Bahrain government's action was "not about me but about undermining dialogue".
Western powers and their regional allies have largely escaped criticism for their role in reigniting the war in Iraq. Publicly and privately, they have blamed the Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki for persecuting and marginalising the Sunni minority, so provoking them into supporting the Isis-led revolt. There is much truth in this, but it is by no means the whole story. Maliki did enough to enrage the Sunni, partly because he wanted to frighten Shia voters into supporting him in the 30 April election by claiming to be the Shia community's protector against Sunni counter-revolution.
But for all his gargantuan mistakes, Maliki's failings are not the reason why the Iraqi state is disintegrating. What destabilised Iraq from 2011 on was the revolt of the Sunni in Syria and the takeover of that revolt by jihadis, who were often sponsored by donors in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait and United Arab Emirates. Again and again Iraqi politicians warned that by not seeking to close down the civil war in Syria, Western leaders were making it inevitable that the conflict in Iraq would restart. "I guess they just didn't believe us and were fixated on getting rid of [President Bashar al-] Assad," said an Iraqi leader in Baghdad last week.
Of course, US and British politicians and diplomats would argue that they were in no position to bring an end to the Syrian conflict. But this is misleading. By insisting that peace negotiations must be about the departure of Assad from power, something that was never going to happen since Assad held most of the cities in the country and his troops were advancing, the US and Britain made sure the war would continue.
The chief beneficiary is Isis which over the last two weeks has been mopping up the last opposition to its rule in eastern Syria. The Kurds in the north and the official al-Qa'ida representative, Jabhat al-Nusra, are faltering under the impact of Isis forces high in morale and using tanks and artillery captured from the Iraqi army. It is also, without the rest of the world taking notice, taking over many of the Syrian oil wells that it did not already control.
Saudi Arabia has created a Frankenstein's monster over which it is rapidly losing control. The same is true of its allies such as Turkey which has been a vital back-base for Isis and Jabhat al-Nusra by keeping the 510-mile-long Turkish-Syrian border open. As Kurdish-held border crossings fall to Isis, Turkey will find it has a new neighbour of extraordinary violence, and one deeply ungrateful for past favours from the Turkish intelligence service.
As for Saudi Arabia, it may come to regret its support for the Sunni revolts in Syria and Iraq as jihadi social media begins to speak of the House of Saud as its next target. It is the unnamed head of Saudi General Intelligence quoted by Dearlove after 9/11 who is turning out to have analysed the potential threat to Saudi Arabia correctly and not Prince Bandar, which may explain why the latter was sacked earlier this year.
Nor is this the only point on which Prince Bandar was dangerously mistaken. The rise of Isis is bad news for the Shia of Iraq but it is worse news for the Sunni whose leadership has been ceded to a pathologically bloodthirsty and intolerant movement, a sort of Islamic Khmer Rouge, which has no aim but war without end.
The Sunni caliphate rules a large, impoverished and isolated area from which people are fleeing. Several million Sunni in and around Baghdad are vulnerable to attack and 255 Sunni prisoners have already been massacred. In the long term, Isis cannot win, but its mix of fanaticism and good organisation makes it difficult to dislodge.
"God help the Shia," said Prince Bandar, but, partly thanks to him, the shattered Sunni communities of Iraq and Syria may need divine help even more than the Shia.
Saturday, 9 August 2014
OBAMA SENDS BOMBERS INTO IRAQ
The US sent aircraft yesterday to bomb fighters of Isis in a desperate attempt to stop their advance on the Kurdish capital, Erbil. The US intervention comes after the surprise defeat of Kurdish Peshmerga forces by Isis, which has captured a quarter of Iraq and a third of Syria in the past two months.
Britain said it would provide technical assistance to the US, but last night refused to rule out joining air strikes in future if the bloodshed worsened.
The US air strikes, the first at 1.45 pm local time, were authorised by President Barack Obama to protect Christians and to avert "a potential act of genocide" against tens of thousands of Yazidis, an ancient sect denounced by Isis as "polytheists". Many Yazidis have taken refuge on a mountain in Sinjar to escape massacre and are receiving relief supplies dropped by US aircraft.
The air strikes came as the Iraqi government said hundreds of Yazidi women had been taken captive by the Islamic militants.
Kamil Amin, spokesman for the Human Rights Ministry, said: "We think the terrorists by now consider them slaves and they have vicious plans for them. We think these women are going to be used in demeaning ways by those terrorists to satisfy their animalistic urges in a way that contradicts all the human and Islamic values."
The Isis offensive has shown the Peshmerga, the fighting forces of the KRG, to be weaker than expected. They offered little effective resistance in Sinjar and failed to protect Christian towns in Nineveh province, of which Mosul is the capital. In a humiliating series of reverses, they retreated back to Kalak, a town on the Greater Zaab river which is the last defensible position on the road to Erbil.
In
the first US attacks last night, F-18 jets dropped 500lb laser-guided bombs on mobile artillery firing in support of advancing Isis forces that were half an hour's drive from the city. Shortly afterwards, four jets attacked a convoy and mortar position and a drone aircraft also fired at a mortar emplacement, the Pentagon said.
The US will, however, have to do more than launch limited air strikes if Isis is to be stopped. Since the self-styled "Islamic State" captured Mosul on 10 June, it has taken most of northern and western Iraq and last month scored a series of victories in eastern Syria against the Syrian army and Syrian rebel groups.
The Kurds have lost the Mosul dam on the Tigris river, enabling Isis to control the flow of water and electricity from a hydroelectric power station. Isis could blow the dam, sending a 65ft-high wall of water down the Tigris Valley, but is unlikely to do so because territory it already holds would be worst affected.
The Kurds did not expect to be targeted by Isis at this time, believing that it was fully engaged in Syria and further south against the Iraqi army.
The Peshmerga were overextended after the KRG had expanded its territory by 40 per cent via an opportunistic land-grab following the fall of Mosul, when it took districts long disputed with the Arabs. This left the KRG with a 600-mile-long frontier to defend against Isis, with the Peshmerga, whose high military reputation is based on battles against Saddam Hussein a quarter of a century ago.
"The Peshmerga didn't have the military equipment to face Isis," says Professor Gareth Stansfield, an expert on Kurdish and Iraqi affairs at the Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies at Exeter University.
"They basically use Kalashnikovs and rocket-propelled grenade launchers." Over the past two months Isis has captured weapons including tanks, artillery, heavy machine guns and hundreds of US Humvees. Professor Stansfield says the Arab population of the disputed territories has become more anti-Kurdish since the KRG took over. Powerful Sunni tribes sympathise with Isis in a bid to drive the Kurds out, even putting the oil city of Kirkuk at risk. The professor emphasises that if Kalak falls there will be little between Isis and Erbil airport.
The long Kurdish front line is too thinly held to repel attacks. Likewise, the Iraqi army further south has failed to rally since its rout in Mosul and Tikrit two months ago. Its one counter-attack to try to retake Tikrit on 15 July was ambushed and beaten back with heavy losses.
Shia militia rushed to the front line when Isis first reached Baghdad, summoned by Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the most influential Shia cleric. But many have since returned home, disillusioned by the government's failure to provide them with training, weapons and food.
Isis may not directly assault Baghdad, but it has been increasing its hold on Sunni villages and towns to the south of the capital, an area known during the American occupation as "the Triangle of Death".
This would enable Isis to cut roads between the capital and the Shia provinces of the south. It could probably take over Sunni enclaves such as Abu Ghraib, Amariya, Khadra and Dora in the west.
The military crisis is matched by a political crisis in Baghdad. Despite military defeat and a well-established reputation for incompetence and corruption, Nouri al-Maliki is still clinging on as Iraq's Prime Minister.
Grand Ayatollah Sistani yesterday made his clearest call yet for Mr Maliki to go, his weekly sermon, read out by an aide, saying that politicians who cling to power "are making a grave mistake".
Mr Maliki has been laying down conditions for his departure, such as: no prosecutions for corruption, officials he has appointed to stay in office, and personal protection. A former minister commented that it is "surreal" how Iraqi politicians have debated the future leadership of Iraq while half the country has been conquered by Isis.
Saturday, 16 August 2014
SUNNIS AND KURDS REJOICE AS HATED AL-MALAKI RESIGNS
After eight years as the Prime Minister of Iraq, Nouri al-Maliki, deserted by his allies, has finally stood down and will be replaced by Haider al-Abadi, who was not always a front-runner to succeed him.
Applause for the new Iraqi leader has come from individuals, parties and countries which normally detest each other, such as Iran, the US, the Kurds, Sunni politicians and Shia militia leaders. A commentator on Iraq caustically remarked: "Somebody is going to be disappointed."
Mr Maliki's stubbornness in clinging to power was finally overcome when Iran decided that there must be a new leader in Baghdad who was not detested by the Sunnis and the Kurds. Mr Maliki's Dawa party put forward Mr Abadi as a candidate who fitted this description and this was accepted by Tehran.
The ex-Prime Minister's speech ceding power late on Thursday may have been motivated by fear that, if he did not withdraw, he would be denounced at Friday prayers by Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the vastly influential Shia clerical leader. The chorus of cheers inside and outside Iraq that has greeted Mr Maliki's departure is not unanimous.
The most significant of those who say the change will make no difference is Isis and Sunni armed groups who actually control the Sunni provinces and whose fighters have recently been knocking on the gates of Baghdad and Irbil. They see Mr Abadi, a member of Mr Maliki's Dawa party, as one more representative of a Shia religious party who will seek to maintain Shia dominance over Iraq.
But cynicism can go too far and the departure of Mr Maliki removes a man who had become a hate figure for six million Sunni Muslims.
Thursday, 25 September 2014
AIR POWER IS NOT ENOUGH TO WIN THIS WAR
The US plan to weaken and ultimately destroy Isis has several political and military weaknesses undermining its long-term success. Air campaigns not supported by ground forces can damage the other side but they do not win wars on their own. Isis has already faced bombardment by US planes in Iraq since 8 August, but it is still fighting the Iraqi army around Baghdad.
Some of the weaknesses of the air war are already apparent, since Isis had evacuated its leaders, fighters and heavy equipment from buildings that were targeted. Its fighters avoid large gatherings and mix with the civilian population. The shock effect of being bombed will be the less because the Syrian air force has long been bombing rebel-held cities and towns.
Isis's expertise is in guerrilla warfare and it is only recently that it has used columns of vehicles packed with gunmen and heavy weaponry. Air superiority over the fruit groves of Diyala province is difficult to use effectively.
Of course, in Syria and Iraq there are ground troops capable of taking advantage of the strikes, but they mostly belong to armies and militias with whom the US is not meant to be cooperating.
Air power can be made more effective at a tactical level by having forward air observers on the ground calling in air strikes. This worked in Afghanistan in 2001 and in northern Iraq in 2003.
But use of these today means the US getting further involved in somebody else's civil war.
There are other complications. Turkey now says that it is joining the anti-Isis coalition, but it does not want to strengthen the Kurds or Assad. What would be interesting here would be to know what the US has said to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan about their future plans for Syria.
Isis is strong because of its military expertise and religious fanaticism but there are more general reasons why it will be difficult to defeat. Many Sunni in the areas controlled by Isis do not like it, but they are terrified of the return of the Syrian or Iraqi armies.
Isis has been more successful than it ought to have been because of two vacuums which it has been able to fill. One is the vacuum left by the dysfunctional Iraqi state. The other is the political vacuum created by the absence of Sunni leadership in Iraq and Syria capable of offering an alternative.
Sunday, 23 November 2014
THE LAST CHRISTIANS IN IRAQ
Two years ago Jalal Yako, a Syriac Catholic priest, returned to his home town of Qaraqosh to persuade members of his community to stay in Iraq and not to emigrate because of the violence direc
ted against them.
"I was in Italy for 18 years, and when I came back here my mission was to get Christians to stay here," he says. "The Pope in Lebanon two years ago had established a mission to get Christians in the East to stay here."
Father Yako laboured among the Syriac Catholics, one of the oldest Christian communities in the world, who had seen the number of Christians in Iraq decline from over one million at the time of the American invasion in 2003 to about 250,000 today. He sought to convince people in Qaraqosh, an overwhelmingly Syriac Catholic town, that they had a future in Iraq and should not emigrate to the US, Australia or anywhere else that would accept them. His task was not easy, because Iraqi Christians have been frequent victims of murder, kidnapping and robbery.
But in the past six months Father Yako has changed his mind, and he now believes that, after 2,000 years of history, Christians must leave Iraq. Speaking at the entrance of a half built mall in the Kurdish capital Irbil where 1,650 people from Qaraqosh have taken refuge, he said that "everything has changed since the coming of Daesh. We should flee. There is nothing for us here." When IS fighters captured Qaraqosh on 7 August, all the town's 50,000 or so Syriac Catholics had to run for their lives and lost all their possessions.
Many now huddle in dark little prefabricated rooms provided by the UN High Commission for Refugees amid the raw concrete of the mall, crammed together without heat or electricity. They sound as if what happened to them is a nightmare from which they might awaken at any moment and speak about how, only three-and-a-half months ago, they owned houses, farms and shops, had well-paying jobs, and drove their own cars and tractors. They hope against hope to go back, but they have heard reports that everything in Qaraqosh has been destroyed or stolen by IS.
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